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N ARRA TIVE STRATEGIES IN THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES 
The working premise of this thesis is that the book of Ecclesiastes can be studied 
with confidence as a narrative text for the purpose of analysis. The first part, 
then, seeks to flesh out those qualities of the text that are narrative qualities: the 
presence of events, first-person narration (autobiography in particular), plot and 
motif. 
The second part explores the strategy of the frame narrator, who provides 
a structure that both limits and opens up possibilities for readers. That narrator is 
in a position of tension in that on the one hand he validates Qoheleth's radicalism 
by appearing to find his words worth relating. Even words of praise are offered. 
On the other hand, from the summary of the epilogue, I argue at length, it is 
clear that the frame narrator did not agree with Qoheleth's approach to wisdom, 
God and tradition, bound as they were to his wholly different epistemology. 
Further, the strategy of framing occurs on many levels, and one of its 
consequences is the bringing into question of the reader's relation to the framed 
material, as well as the relation of the framer to the one framed. The interpretive 
possibilities arising from the tension in these narratorial relationships are explored 
in detail. 
The third part explores the strategies of Qoheleth, the disillusioned 
rationalist and story-teller. Here is addressed the fact that in reading Ecclesiastes 
an interaction seemingly takes place, one in which the reader feels the concern of 
identity and of the formation of Qoheleth's character. In the guise of Solomon 
that concern is ironic (almost satirical) and somewhat playful. In the 
establishment of his self as the central concern of his narrative, Qoheleth shows 
that although he passionately observes the world's transience and absurdity he 
desires (again with irony) that his image would be fixed and remembered. After 
exploring such elements of self-expression, the linguistic characteristics and 
ideological categories of Qoheleth's quest are surveyed. Included in this 
investigation are the element of physicality in Qoheleth's language and the 
identification of the actors in the quest; the Subject, Object and Power (or 
Sender) in particular. 
Although I do not categorically argue that Ecclesiastes can only be 
understood as narrative, the point of the whole is to experiment with what 
happens when a text is investigated with confidence in its narrative quality. This 
redresses an interpretive imbalance in Qoheleth-studies in that while there are 
some scholars who refer vaguely to Ecclesiastes as a story (although usually by 
implication), and others who make real assumptions about Ecclesiastes' narrative 
quality, virtually none attempt to critically examine that quality or to demonstrate 
it with any degree of conclusiveness with the aid of narrative criticism. 
In loving memory of my mother, Penny 
(1943-1990) 
Sweet is the light, 
and it is good for the eyes to see the sun ... 
Remove vexation from your heart, 
and take away pain from your body, 
for youth and the prime of life are fleeting. 
-Ecclesiastes 11.7, 10 
Acknowledgments 
Abbreviations 
INTRODUCTION 
CONTENTS 
THE NARRATIVE QUALITY 
Chapter 1 
ECCLESIASTES AS NARRATIVE 
1. The Narrative Assumption 
2. Events and a Proleptic Plot Afoot 
3. Qoheleth's Autobiographical Adhesion 
4. Motif 
5. The Structure of Narrative Discourse 
THE FRAME NARRATOR'S STRATEGY 
Chapter 2 
PUTTING THE FRAME IN PLACE 
1. The Frame "Proper" 
2. Frame Narratives 
3. The Production of Narrative Levels 
4. Narrative Level as a Cause of Amnesia 
Chapter 3 
THE OUTER BORDERS: I 
1. The Superscription (1.1) 
2. Plot and Desire at 1.1-2 
Excursus 1 
QOHELETH AND THE MEANING OF "~n 
1. "~n outside Ecclesiastes 
2. "~n in Ecclesiastes 
3. "~n and "~n 
Chapter 4 
THE INNER BORDERS 
1. CI""~n "~n in the Frame (1.2; 12.8) 
2. A Momentary Intrusion (7.27) 
Chapter 5 
THE OUTER BORDERS: II 
1. The Inclusio (12.8) 
2. The Final Portrait (12.9-10) 
6 
8 
10 
14 
14 
18 
28 
37 
41 
46 
46 
49 
62 
63 
66 
66 
70 
73 
73 
75 
82 
86 
86 
88 
91 
93 
94 
Contents 5 
3. Warnings and Admonitions to a Preferred Epistemology (12.11-12) 102 
4. The Final Word (12.13-14) 111 
Chapter 6 
FRAMING THE FRAMER: FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THIS FRAME 116 
THE NARRATIVE STRATEGY OF QoHELETH 
Chapter 7 
THE SOLOMONIC GUISE 123 
1. The Scope and Strategy of the Solomonic 123 
2. The Solomonic, the Canon and the Rabbis 144 
3. The Solomonic and the Pseudonymic 149 
4. The Implied Author and/as Qoheleth/Solomon 155 
5. Solomonic Readings and Readers 158 
Chapter 8 
QoHELETH AND THE BIBLICAL SELF AMONG THE DECONSTRUCTED 168 
1. Self-Presence? 169 
2. The Deconstructed Subject 173 
3. The Biblical Self 177 
4. Qoheleth on the Self and his Self 188 
5. Accounting for the Self 208 
Excursus 2 
QoHELETH AND THE EXISTENTIAL LEGACY OF THE HOLOCAUST 213 
1. Existentialist Themes: Material for a Response 215 
2. The Existential Drama Made Real 218 
3. The Disillusioned Rationalist and the Holocaust 223 
4. Survival and Memory 231 
5. Conclusion 234 
Chapter 9 
QoHELETH'S QUEST 236 
1. Success, Failure and Many Questions 238 
2. "And Move with the Moving Ships": Qoheleth's Physical Language 242 
3. The Quest and its Actors: Qoheleth's Search and the Actantial Model 250 
4. Gustave Flaubert's Bouvard et Pecuchet: A Comparison 259 
5. Redemption and Remembrance 267 
CONCLUSION 282 
Bibliography 286 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Authors who always refer to their works as "my book, my commentary, 
my history", sound like solid citizens with their own property who are 
always talking about "my house". They would be better to say: "our 
book, our commentary, our history", seeing that there is usually more of 
other people's property in it than their own. 
-Blaise Pascal (Sayings, 1) 
Pascal's truism extends to the sometimes less obvious influence of friends and 
mentors through the years. It is therefore with appropriate gratitude that I begin 
by thanking Professor Sean McEvenue, a valued friend whose encouragement to 
me as an undergraduate to read the Bible critically and yet with jouissance and 
even love has had a lasting impression on me. I am also grateful to my Ph.D. 
supervisor, Philip Davies, who, throughout the duration of my study, has not 
only been generous in his time and comments but has helped me constantly to see 
the forest for the trees of my work. And thanks must go to my friend and 
colleague John Jarick, with whom I have enjoyed many a mini Qoheleth-seminar, 
and whose comments from a reading of the final draft have proven invaluable. 
If it is possible to thank a group of people significantly then I must make 
the attempt. Thank you to my friends at the Sheffield University Department of 
Biblical Studies, many of whom have made the trials of studentship far more 
enjoyable than they would have otherwise been (Ruth Anne, Mark, Becca, 
Richard-the class of 91-95). Also, thank you to the staff, in particular to Alison 
Bygrave and Gill Fogg who endured many a forgotten form that I should have 
filled out a week ago. 
Thank you to my parents, Dennis and Rose Christianson, who year after 
year have sent their encouragement and support over the miles. Finally, more 
thanks than I can express are due to my wife, Sonya Christianson, who has 
carefully read the majority of this thesis and offered her insightful comments (and 
rightly insisted on the deletion of not a few commas). Even more impressively, 
Acknowledgments 7 
she has had no choice but to live with the Preacher at every waking moment and 
yet she has listened patiently to my incessant monologues and has still not had me 
committed to a Home for Beleaguered Qoheleth-Readers. Sonya, by gracing me 
with your friendship, laughter and love you have imparted joy to my few days 
under the sun. 
AbrN 
AEL 
ANE 
ANET 
ASTI 
AUSS 
AUUSSU 
BDB 
BHS 
BLS 
BRev 
BT 
BTB 
BTF 
Bto 
BZAW 
CBQ 
CL 
CR:BS 
CritInq 
CTR 
DCH 
Enc 
EvQ 
Exp 
ExpTim 
GR 
HAR 
HS 
HTR 
HUCA 
HudR 
ICC 
ISBL 
ITC 
Int 
JAAR 
JAC 
JBL 
JBR 
Jpst 
JQR 
JR 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Abr-Nahrain 
Lichtheim (ed.), Ancient Egyptian Literature 
Ancient Near Eastern 
Pritchard (ed.), Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old 
Testament 
Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute in Jerusalem 
Andrews University Seminary Studies 
Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Semitica Upsaliensia 
Brown, Driver and Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old 
Testament 
Biblia hebraica stuttgartensia 
Bible and Literature Series 
Bible Review 
The Bible Translator 
Biblical Theology Bulletin 
Bangalore Theological Forum 
The Bible Today 
Beihefte rur ZA W 
Catholic Biblical Quarterly 
College Literature 
Currents in Research: Biblical Studies 
Critical Inquiry 
Criswell Theological Review 
Clines (ed.), The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, I 
Encounter (Indianapolis) 
Evangelical Quarterly 
Expositor (London) 
Expository Times 
The Gennanic Review 
Hebrew Annual Review 
Hebrew Studies 
Harvard Theological Review 
Hebrew Union College Annual 
Hudson Review 
International Critical Commentary 
Indiana Studies in Biblical Literature 
International Theological Commentary 
Interpretation 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
Journal of Advanced Composition 
Journal of Biblical Literature 
Journal of Bible and Religion 
Journal of Psychology and Theology 
Jewish Quarterly Review 
Journal of Religion 
JSOT 
JSOTSup 
JTS 
KN 
LAE 
LXX 
MLN 
MT 
NCB 
NEB 
NIV 
OLA 
OTWSA 
PRS 
PrtRev 
PTMS 
RL 
RSV 
RTF 
SBL 
SBTh 
SCT 
SIAN 
SJT 
TBS 
TDOT 
TLB 
TOTC 
TrinJ 
12 
IT 
VTSup 
WBC 
WUNT 
Z4W 
ZDMG 
Abbreviations 
Journal jor the Study oj the Old Testament 
Journal jor the Study oj the Old Testament, Supplement Series 
Journal oj Theological Studies 
King James Version 
Simpson (ed.), The Literature oj Ancient Egypt 
Septuagint 
Modem Language Notes 
Masoretic Text 
New Century Bible 
New English Bible 
New International Version 
Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta (Uppsala) 
Ou Testmentiese Werkgemeenskap in Siud Afrika 
Perspectives in Religious Studies 
Partisan Review 
Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series 
Religion in Life 
Revised Standard Version 
Bauer et al. (eds.), Remembering jor the Future 
Society of Biblical Literature 
Studia Biblica et Theologica 
Studies in Continental Thought 
Gammie (ed.), The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East 
Scottish Journal oj Theology 
The Biblical Seminar (Sheffield Academic Press) 
9 
Botterweck and Ringgren (eds.), Theological Dictionary oj the Old 
Testament 
The Living Bible 
Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries 
Trinity Journal 
Theologische Zeitschrift 
Vetus Testamentum 
Vetus Testamentum, Supplements 
Word Biblical Commentary 
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 
Zeitschrijt jUr die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 
Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenliindischen Gesellschaft 
INTRODUCTION 
A Chopin prelude always is saddening, and Milton's "L' Allegro" never 
fails to liven up a leaden day. Koheleth, however, merely brings defeat 
and gladness into sharper outline in their relationship to each other, and 
does not deny or praise one or the other. 
-Elizabeth Stone l 
In the history of biblical scholarship Qoheleth' s inconsistencies and strange 
sayings have long been hung on the lines of academic and popular works of all 
sorts for the world to see. Indeed, it is a rare thing to read an introduction to a 
work on Ecclesiastes that does not begin with airing them out again, and to state 
that the book is "perplexing", "enigmatic" and so forth is bordering on an insult 
to the reader's general knowledge. This work, however, does not rest on the fact 
that Ecclesiastes presents problems to readers. Rather, it is simply an experiment 
in what happens when a text is investigated with confidence in its narrative 
quality. Such an approach need not be contrived. 
Many would admit (as we shall see in Chapter 1) that Ecclesiastes has 
"narrative elements", "narrativity", "narrative threads" and so on. However, few 
if any regard such elements to be suggestive of the book's overall quality. While 
the various wisdom themes and narrative elements vie for the reader's 
commitment, the latter are rarely allowed predominance. If Ecclesiastes is such a 
double-sided mirror, what determines the form of the reflection? The decision lies 
ultimately with the "viewer". What, then, happens when narrative elements are 
viewed as constitutive of the whole, as opposed to, say, the structure of wisdom 
sayings or the relationship between themes of wisdom/folly and birth/death, or 
indeed to any elements commonly found in a collection of wise sayings? 
By enlisting the help of narrative criticism I will examine seriously that 
1 "Old Man Koheleth", JBR 10 (1942), pp. 98-102 (99). 
Introduction 
reflection of story which has previously only been glanced at. Central to my 
approach is the concept of "strategy", one I consider more useful than the more 
common approach of structure. (Many have attempted to delineate the book's 
structure in order to discipline or rationalize its overt contradictions. i By 
11 
strategy I mean simply a scheme for achieving some purpose, an artful means to 
some end. Narrative strategy is the function a narrator intends to fulfil by the use 
of a narrative device, technique or overall design. More specifically, states 
Wolfgang Iser, it is the "panoply of narrative techniques available" to the author, 
the ultimate function of which is "to defamiliarize the reader" with topics and 
language that are old while familiarizing the reader with what is new and 
particular to this story. 3 I include under the rubric "narrative strategy" elements 
such as first-person narration, framing and characterization. Sometimes my 
investigation is particularly structural, sometimes not. For example, while it is 
clear that the frame narrative suggests a structural strategy, the same cannot 
necessarily be said of first-person narration (or more precisely, the construct of 
self with which Qoheleth narrates). The concept of strategy therefore has the 
advantage of including structural considerations as well as those that are not 
2 One of the most influential structural studies is A.G. Wright's "The Riddle of the 
Sphinx: The Structure of the Book of Qoheleth", CBQ 30 (1968), pp. 313-34 
(supplemented by two later articles: "The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited: Numerical 
Patterns in the Book of Qoheleth", CBQ 42 [1980), pp. 38-51; "Additional Numerical 
Patterns in Qohelet", CBQ 45 [1983), pp. 32-43). His conclusions have been widely 
accepted and the work seen as a truly structuralist approach to Ecclesiastes, as evidenced 
by its presence in bibliographies representative of structuralist approaches to the Bible; 
for example, Robert Polzin, Biblical Structuralism (philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977); 
R. Barthes et al., Structural Analysis and Biblical Exegesis (PTMS, 3; trans. A.M. 
Johnson, Jr; Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1974). For summaries of attempts to discern a 
structure in Ecclesiastes, see Wright, 1968, pp. 314-20; M. Fox, Qohelet and his 
Contradictions (JSOTSup, 71; Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989), pp. 19-28; J. Crenshaw, 
"Qoheleth in Current Research", BAR 7 (1983), esp. pp. 48-56; S. Breton, "Qoheleth 
Studies", BIB 3 (1973), pp. 38-40. 
3 W. Iser, "Narrative Strategies as a Means of Communication", in M.1. Vald~ and 
0.1. Miller (eds.), Interpretation of Narrative (foronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1978), pp. 101-102. 
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evidently so. 
The question remains as to how I can justify a general narrative-critical 
approach to a text that is not commonly regarded as a narrative. Hence the 
purpose of the first section ("The Narrative Quality", Chapter 1) is to establish 
the veracity of the statement, "Ecclesiastes can be studied with confidence as a 
narrative text for the purpose of analysis." That statement has arisen from a 
reading conjecture: that Ecclesiastes relates the story of Qoheleth (an assumption 
I have found present in many readings of Ecclesiastes). To flesh out that 
conjecture I will review four features of Ecclesiastes. Two are common to all 
narrative textHhe presence both of events and of plot-and two serve as 
indicators of a narrative quality but are not limited to narrative texts-first-person 
narration and motif. 
The second section ("The Frame Narrator's Strategy", Chapters 2-6) 
isolates the frame narrator (in 1.1-2; 7.27; 12.8-14) as a character in his own 
right. More specifically this section explores his strategy, which is partly to 
provide a structure that both limits and opens up possibilities for readers. That 
narrator is in a position of tension in that on the one hand he validates Qoheleth's 
radicalism by appearing to find his words worth relating. Even words of praise 
are offered. But from the summary of the epilogue, I argue at length, it is clear 
that the frame narrator did not agree with Qoheleth's approach to wisdom, God 
and tradition, bound as they were to his wholly different epistemology. The 
strategy of framing occurs on many levels, and one of its consequences is the 
bringing into question of the reader's relation to the framed material, as well as 
the relation of the framer to the one framed. The interpretive possibilities arising 
from the tension in these narratorial relationships are explored in detail. 
The third section ("The Narrative Strategy of Qoheleth", Chapters 7-9) 
explores the strategies of Qoheleth, the disillusioned rationalist and story-teller. 
Here is addressed the fact that in reading Ecclesiastes an interaction seemingly 
Introduction 13 
takes place, one in which the reader feels the concern of identity and the 
formation of Qoheleth's character. In the guise of Solomon that concern is ironic 
(almost satirical) and somewhat playful. In the establishment of his self as 
perhaps the central concern of his narrative, Qoheleth shows that although he4 
passionately observes the world's transience and absurdity he desires (again with 
irony) that his image would be fixed and remembered. After exploring such 
elements of self-expression, the linguistic characteristics and ideological 
categories of Qoheleth's quest are surveyed. Included in this investigation are the 
element of physicality in Qoheleth's language as well as the identification of the 
actors in the quest, the Subject, Object and Sender (or Power) in particular. The 
final outcome of the quest is a redemption of Qoheleth's youth and folly in which 
Qoheleth implicitly invites readers to take part. 
4 I use "he" since all verbal forms relating to Qoheleth are masculine (with the 
majority of commentators I take MT'S feminine form of nc,"p "'OM at 7.27 to be a 
misconstrual of the masculine form of nc,"pl"1 'OM) , and the narrator of 2.8b; 7.26-
29--and other passages-likely has a male orientation. As a character, Qoheleth (as well 
as the frame narrator; cf. 12.12) is a "he". Narrators, however, are not always 
characters. 
Chapter 1 
ECCLESIASTES AS NARRATIVE 
One might argue, as Mieke Bal, that no narrative theory is capable of describing 
"all the aspects of a narrative text" ,5 and that it is therefore justifiable to 
approach any text that has narrative aspects (or "narrativity") with the tools that 
narrative criticism offers. While not disputing this, my purpose here is to go 
further than such an approach allows. Rather, I will investigate the possibility 
that Ecclesiastes meets certain narratological criteria that would commend it as a 
narrative text for the purpose of analysis, and not merely as a text with elements 
of narrativity. 6 
1. The Na"ative Assumption 
[Qoheleth] is "disillusioned" only in the sense that he has realized that an 
illusion is a self-constructed prison. He is not a weary pessimist tired of 
life: he is a vigorous realist determined to smash his way through every 
locked door of repression in his mind. 
-Northrop Frye7 
[Qoheleth's] own personal experiences seem to supply the key to his 
outlook ... He is a free-lance humanist ... There may have been many a 
melancholy streak in his nature that disposed him to look at the shadier 
sides of life. He is the original "gloomy dean". He had hung his harp on 
the weeping willows and it moaned in the breeze. 
-John Paterson8 
S Narratology: Introduction to the Theory 0/ Narrative (trans. C. von Boheemen; 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 9. 
6 This will be pursued in the same spirit in which Bal herself goes on to delimit her 
definition of what constitutes a narrative (or what she would call a/abula), presumably 
so that she is able to make similarly decisive judgments about texts (Narratology, pp. 11-
47). 
7 The Great Code: The Bible and literature (Toronto: Academic Press Canada, 
1982), p. 123. 
8 "The Intimate Journal of an Old-Time Humanist", RL 19/2 (1950), pp. 245,250-
51. 
1. Ecclesiastes as Narrative 
Qohelet constantly interposes his consciousness between the reality 
observed and the reader. It seems important to him that the reader not 
only know what the truth is, but also be aware that he, Qohelet, saw this, 
felt this, realized this. He is reflexively observing the psychological 
process of discovery as well as reporting the discoveries themselves. 
-Michael Fox9 
Qoheleth is an "intellectual" in a sense otherwise unknown to the Old 
Testament. In his remorseless determination to probe the nature of things 
he belongs to a new world of thought, though ... his sense of God's 
transcendence ("God is in heaven, and you upon the earth", 5:2) is a 
Jewish inheritance which distinguishes him quite radically from the secular 
philosopher. 
-R. N. WhybraylO 
I wish ... that I could have spoken with Qohelet face to face, seen his 
emotion as he told his story, noted the tone of his voice, where he smiled 
or was tearful, whether he was hesitating or agitated, silent or effusive, 
have him repeat his tale, and note the variations, what he added and what 
he suppressed, what were his conflicts and his dreams especially ... 
-Frank Zimmermannll 
15 
Each of the above statements presents a unique characterization of Qoheleth. To 
Frye he is a realist embarked on a critique of the way of wisdom. To Paterson he 
is a journal-keeping humanist. To Fox he is a seeker of truth eager to 
communicate his experiences. To Whybray he is a distinctly Jewish philosopher. 
To Zimmermann he is a melancholy story-teller. To each of them Qoheleth is a 
character who (according to Ecclesiastes) interacted with the world and left it 
with his consequent thoughts and judgments about it. In each instance the 
tendency is to assume the presence of a cohesive narrative character at the heart 
of Ecclesiastes. 
So why is Qoheleth, to many readers, seen clearly as a character who 
interacted with the world? Is it because Ecclesiastes is a narrative?; that is, 
because it is "the representation of real or fictive events or situations in a time 
9 Qohelet, p. 93. 
10 Ecclesiastes (NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), p. 7. 
II The Inner World of Qohelet (New York: Ktav, 1973), p. ix. 
1. Ecclesiastes as Na"ative 
sequence,,12 that tells the story of Qoheleth? Of course, quotations about 
Qoheleth as a character are not in themselves evidence that Ecclesiastes is a 
narrative. For perhaps Ecclesiastes is only a group of CI'''rDO collected and 
placed in a relatively random order by a redactor(s), all loosely structured by a 
frame narrator/epilogist/editor. 13 But if the above quotations show anything it is 
the justification of the question, Why has Ecclesiastes been understood to be 
otherwise?14 While the narrative assumption is often made, relatively little effort 
has been given to legitimate it. A brief survey will help to show what I mean. 
Leland Ryken affirms that Ecclesiastes reads "much like a story", citing 
some of Qoheleth's narrative style as evidence. 1s Less committedly, J.G. 
16 
Williams admits that there is in Ecclesiastes the use of a kind of narrativity which 
is merely common (and necessary) to the poetics of all wisdom literature. 16 
Also, there has been some significant study of the Ich-Erzahlung of Qoheleth 
12 G. Prince, Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative (Berlin: Mouton, 
1982), p. 1. This definition is distinct from two other uses of the word: (1) The subject 
of the narrative discourse; Le., the actual events themselves (akin to what I call "story" 
below), (2) The event of narrating itself (see also G. Genette, Narrative Discourse [trans. 
J. Lewin; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980 (1972)], pp. 25-27). After a great deal of 
reading I settled on Prince's definition as representative of definitions of narrative; that 
is, most definitions suggest that events in the relation of time are fundamental to a 
narrative. What qualifies such an entity (Le. narration, plot etc.) will be further explored 
below. 
13 Take, for example, John Barton's statement: "[Ecclesiastes is sapiential wisdom 
with a frame narrative], not a narrative overweighted with sapiential advice" (Reading 
the Old Testament [London: SCM, 1984], p. 132). For a convenient summary of 
redactional hypotheses which imply a similar sentiment, see Crenshaw, "Qoheleth in 
Current Research", pp. 45-46. 
14 My introductory quotes have been profusive to make a point. The point is that 
such writing about Qoheleth is common. Similar statements about the narrative quality of 
Ecclesiastes can be found in many academic works, and one may take those I have here 
supplied to be representative. 
IS "Ecclesiastes", in idem, Words of Delight: A Literary Introduction to the Bible 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987), p. 321. 
16 "Proverbs and Ecclesiastes", in R. Alter and F. Kermode (eds.), The Literary 
Guide to the Bible (London: Collins, 1987), pp. 273-75, 277. 
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which assume a cohesive narrative element at work. 17 While not specifically 
narrative in approach, many studies have reviewed literary aspects of Qoheleth. 
For example, Edwin Good's "The Unfilled Sea: Style and Meaning in 
Ecclesiastes 1: 2-11 ", sets much emphasis on Qoheleth' s sophisticated uses of 
common narrative devices. IS Also, there is Frank Zimmennann's widely, in my 
opinion, neglected psychoanalytic study. In order to carry out his study he must 
(and does) presume that the whole book is autobiographical, "a complete 
representation of Qohelet himself" .19 Harold Fisch has offered a stimulating 
review suggesting sophistication in Qoheleth' s use of irony. In doing so he relies 
heavily on the notion of an autobiographical coherence in Qoheleth's narrative?O 
Finally, Michael Fox's article, "Frame-narrative and Composition in the Book of 
Qohelet" ,21 is the only study I know of which explores "the literary 
characteristics of Qohelet as narrative" . 22 
Such a brief survey shows that there are some, such as Ryken, who refer 
vaguely to Ecclesiastes as a story (although usually by implication), and some, 
such as Zimmennann, who make real assumptions about Ecclesiastes' narrative 
quality. It is a narrative assumption that has not been thought possible in work on 
Proverbs and yet has had not a few advocates in work oil Job. However, no one 
17 E.g., O. Loretz, "Zur Darbietungsform der 'Ich-Erzahlung' im Buche Qohelet", 
CBQ 25 (1963), pp. 46-59; P. Hoffken, "Das EGO des Weisen", 1Z 41 (1985), pp. 121-
34. Also, cf. Bo Isaksson, Studies in The Language of Qoheleth (AUUSSU, 10; Uppsala: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1987), chapter 2. 
18 In J. Gammie et al. (eds.), Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in 
Honor of Samuel Terrien (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978), pp. 59-73. See also, P. 
Viviano, "The Book of Ecclesiastes: A Literary Approach", Bto 22 (1984), pp. 79-84; 
and M. Payne, "The Voices of Ecclesiastes", CL 15 (1988), pp. 262-68. 
19 Inner World, p. xiii; also, cf. pp. ix-xiv. 
20 Fisch, H., "Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist", in idem, Poetry with a Purpose: Biblical 
Poetics and Interpretation (ISBL; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 
pp. 158-78, esp. pp. 158-59. 
21 HUCA 48 (1977), pp. 83-106. The article is reprinted in a shortened form with no 
modification as regards the narrative approach in Qohelet, pp. 311-21. His work has 
been helpful in laying some foundation for my own and I shall draw upon it accordingly. 
22 "Frame-narrative", p. 83. 
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(with the possible exception of Fox) has examined that narrative quality critically 
in Ecclesiastes, or attempted to demonstrate it with any degree of conclusiveness 
with the aid of narrative criticism. 
2. Events and a Proleptic Plot Afoot 
The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there. 
-L. P. Hartley23 
The story of any narrative can be "transformed" into any medium: comic book, 
pantomime, film and so forth. For example, the story of Jesus (consisting of 
selected events, settings etc. from the Gospels) has been transformed into several 
types (stained glass, film, theatre etc.) of narrative discourse, each showing that 
story can be transferred from discourse to discourse. Similarly, the text of 
Ecclesiastes (its narrative discourse) is the tangible expression of its story. 24 
That Ecclesiastes has been rendered as music,25 poem,26 slide show, 27 series 
23 The Go-Between (Penguin: Middlesex, 1958), p. 7. 
24 Narratives are structures (discourses) "independent of any medium", having 
"wholeness, transformation, and self-regulation" (S. Chatman, Story and Discourse: 
Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film [London: Cornell University Press, 1978], pp. 
20-21). This implicitly strict division between content and form has been criticized. For 
example, Wayne Booth argues that it is not legitimate to see events as simply "clothed" 
in the form of narrative discourses. For this does not give justice to the real author who 
is far more complex in using his or her privilege to "telescope" certain events while 
"expanding" others, and is hence more in control of the shape of events as manifested in 
their narrative discourse (1983 Afterword to The Rhetoric of Fiction [Middlesex: 
Penguin, 2nd edn, 1983], pp. 437-38). In other words, there is no such thing as "pure" 
transformation of content to form. Obviously, this is not the place to enter such a basic 
and hence large debate. Suffice to say that while I agree with Booth that there is no such 
thing as "pure" transformation, the operative distinction (as long as we are aware of its 
limits) in Chatman (and others) is useful. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (Narrative Fiction: 
Contemporary Poetics [London: Methuen, 1983], pp. 6-8) concludes similarly. 
25 For example, the classic 1960s rock song, Tum, Tum, Tum! (music written and 
words adapted by Pete Seeger; performed by The Byrds). Although I recall reading about 
a classical music suite based on Ecclesiastes, unfortunately I have been unable to locate 
the reference. 
26 For example, Ecclesiastes: Rendered into English Verse by F. Crawford Burkitt 
(London: Macmillan, 1936). The first "verse" reads, "Bubble of bubbles! All things are 
a Bubble! What is the use of all Man's toil and trouble?" (p. 9). 
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of woodcuts28 and sketches29 points at least to its transferability. Although not 
all fonns demonstrate a narrative quality, the central events of the text to which I 
will be making reference are often evident. 
Events, in any given text, are the most important distinctive quality that 
earns the title "narrative", for events are the fabric of which stories are made. An 
"event" is most simply described as "something that happens". Also, events entail 
a change from one state of affairs to another. This takes place in most verbal 
statements. Borrowing Seymour Chatman's tenn, such verbal phrases are 
"process statements" .30 While a process statement is an event, by itself it is not 
necessarily a narrative event. If verbal action were the only criterion the 
definition would be far too loose to be of value. 
Events (actions) are only meaningful in relation to at least one other event 
in the relation of time. Narrative events are thus "made" before the reader. This 
shows that the event in question has functionality. My own use of the word takes 
on board two of Mieke Bal's criteria for narrative events: change and choice.3! 
Z7 For example, R. Short's photo-essay of Ecclesiastes, A Time to Be Bom-A Time 
to Die (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). 
28 For example, Stefan Martin's series of wood engravings, in J. Blumenthal 
(designer), Ecclesiastes, or The Preacher (New York: Spiral Press, 1965). There is an 
example on p. 69, below. 
29 As can be seen from any number of attempts to augment Ecclesiastes with 
sketches demonstrating its narrativity. For example, see the illustrations of Emlen Etting, 
in Koheleth: The Book of Ecclesiastes (New York: New Directions, 1940). 
30 So Chatman, Story and Discourse, pp. 32-33. Rimmon-Kenan challenges 
Chatman's distinction, wanting to include "stasis" statements (statements that only 
describe the state of things and are therefore not events; e.g. "Bob is hungry") in the 
definition of an event. She argues that "an account of an event may be broken down into 
an infinite number of intermediary states ... [for example,] 'He was rich, then he was 
poor''', and that this implies a process of change, meeting Chatman's criterion (Narrative 
Fiction, p. 15). There are certain stasis statements (as her example) which imply change 
and can therefore be considered process statements. 
3! So Bal, Narratology, pp. 13-16. I have chosen not to use BaI's criterion of 
confrontation (pp. 16-18). This criterion demands that every event have a subject, 
predication and (direct) object. The subject and (direct) object must be "confronted by 
each other" (p. 16). Furthermore, both the subject and (direct) object must be agents of 
action. This means that BaI can say that "Liz writes a letter" meets such a criterion (p. 
17). For it can be implied that a letter represents a person and that therefore two agents 
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The two concepts are closely related. An event must be functional in (produce 
change in or have an effect upon) the larger sequence of events that I have called 
a narrative. This can only be accomplished through the choice(s) made by 
characters in the narrative. Narrative events can have different types of 
functionality according to their context. Again, to borrow from Chatman, there 
are two types of such functional events: kernels and satellites. A kernel is an 
event that initializes narrative motion.32 Kernels create the possibility for a 
change of story-line. That they do assumes their functionality to other events. If 
kernels are not in relation to another event in time, by which they can raise a 
question or further the plot, they are logically expendable. If they are logically 
expendable they have only an "immediate functionality". Such events are 
satellites; that is, one or more events that are directly related to the kernel but do 
not themselves further the story-line. The satellite is "always logically 
expendable" . 33 
Does Ecclesiastes have functional narrative events? First, it must be 
established that the text in question narrates an event; that is, that it meets the 
basic criterion of verbal action, change. Every time Qoheleth makes his opinion 
known, or relates what he has done in order to come to a certain conclusion, 
there is a process of change at hand. The first explicit appearance of this is in 
1.12-13a:34 "I am Qoheleth. 3s I was king over Israel in Jerusalem. I set my 
of action confront each other in the narrative. But in my view this is included in the 
criterion of functionality. The letter can only be significant if the agent it represents is of 
any consequence in the larger structure of events. At any rate, functionality can only 
occur if at least two agents of action (not necessarily human) are involved. 
32 Story and Discourse, pp. 53-56. Kernels "[advance] the plot by raising and 
satisfying questions ... [and are] nodes or hinges in the structure, branching points which 
force a movement into one of two (or more) possible paths" (p. 53). 
33 Story and Discourse, p. 54. 
34 While I consider 1.1-2 to be an implicit event (see Chapter 3.2) I have chosen to 
discuss 1. 12-13a for the sake of clarity, as it is the first explicit narrative event. 
3S "I am Qoheleth" (as opposed to the usual, "I, Qoheleth ... ") seems the best 
translation of n"np '~M. This is the first self-introduction of the book and would hence 
deserve the slight pause this translation offers (so also, Fox-for the same reason, but 
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heart to investigate and to search out by wisdom all that is done under the 
heavens." The subject, Qoheleth, describes himself in a stasis statement: "I was 
king". During the time of his reign that the statement refers to, Qoheleth gave his 
heart (~") to investigate and to seek out ("n, "spying out" or "evaluating"; see 
Num. 13.32; 14.34 [of land]) an object; namely, "all that is done under the 
heavens". I will not investigate here the real Object of Qoheleth's quest (for this, 
see Chapter 9.3, below). What matters for now is the criterion of change. 
Qoheleth's state of knowledge at this narrative level is given a quality of self-
determination, of the inevitability of change. 
Second, functionality must be established in order to show how this event 
is meaningful in the larger structure of events. This event finds an immediate 
functional counterpart at 1.14: "I observed all the deeds that have been done 
under the sun, and behold, everything is absurd36 and a pursuit of wind." The 
narrator, Qoheleth (unchanged from 1.3), has temporally linked two narrative 
events. Ecclesiastes 1. 12-13a and the event of 1.14 are separate, and yet the 
former begs the conclusion: the event of fmding what is searched for.37 A story-
line, however small, has been created and the criterion of functionality met. But 
does Qoheleth's seeking at 1. 12-13a function as a kernel event? Qoheleth 
announces his intention to inform himself about what we must assume he did not 
know. His quest was "successful" (he observed successfully all that is done under 
the sun) and his fmdings could have been expressed in a variety of ways: as 
moral treatise, as "the bare facts", even as "evil" report. At Num. 13.32 we are 
also on the grounds that it resembles "the opening of various royal inscriptions", 
Qoheiet, p. 174). Cf. Joseph's dramatic self-introduction, '10" 'lM (Gen. 45.3; cf. 
also, 2 Sam. 19.23-0f a king). 
36 On translating "~M as "absurd", see Excursus 1. 
37 To understand this as conclusive, rDr31M nnn 'WJ)lrD C'WJ)Oi'T""=> at 1.14a is 
taken to be equivocal to C'OrDM nMn MWJ)l 'rDar"=> at 1.13ba. "Under the heavens" 
and "under the sun" are interchangeable throughout Ecclesiastes (see 2.3, 11; 3.1; cf. 
5.2 [see n. 43, below]). Hence, the conclusion (roM",.) of the investigation is that the 
object of 1.14aa is absurd and a pursuit of wind. 
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told that the report of the spies was evil (or "cunning", l"1:l,), which implies that 
a good report was possible. Qoheleth's seeking, like the spies' report, forces the 
logic of the story (eventually) to take a particular direction. His seeking creates 
numerous possibilities in the direction of the sequence of events and is hence a 
kernel event. By claiming that he set his heart to discover things by wisdom, 
Qoheleth limited the scope of his quest while at the same time opened wide the 
possibilities for story-direction and for the imagination of the sequential reader 
(Le., the reader who reads this text for the first time, attentively, from beginning 
to end). 
Obviously, events can have more than one functional counterpart. There 
are several in 1. 12-13a that the sequential reader discovers as the narrative line 
unfolds. Indeed, every subsequent observation is "covered" by the event of 
investigating "all that is done under the heavens". 38 While it could be argued 
that such a functional poetic is necessary to the opening verses of any book of 
wisdom literature, this would depend on the strategy at hand. The prologue to 
Proverbs (1.1-3 in particular), for example, states the purpose of the entire 
"book": 
The proverbs of Solomon, son of David, king of Israel. 
To know wisdom and instruction, 
and to understand the sayings of insight. 
To acquire instruction in wise dealing, 
righteousness, justice, and integrity. 
By this the reader realizes that the purpose is primarily a didactic one.39 Content 
38 For example, after the highly observational ch. 2, cf. 3.10, 16ff.; 4.1, 4, 7; 
passim. 
39 That the infinitive constructs here may be taken to be purpose clauses (e.g. nlJ'r, 
= "in order to learn", so the sense of RSV and other translations) is evidenced by the fact 
that there is no other referent for the infinitives except the opening phrase, "The 
proverbs of Solomon", without which the infinitives "to know" etc. would stand rather 
meaninglessly on their own. Thus each of these verbs and their nouns should be seen as 
qualifying the purpose of the C,r,rDO. The infinitives which qualify the meaning of Eccl. 
1.13, however, have an altogether different function. 
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is given precedence over story, and the functional poetic of events is neither 
present nor necessary here.40 
Other functional events in Ecclesiastes may here be indexed. Both the 
location of the event and the location of one event to which it is functional are 
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shown. The selection of one event from each chapter shows that functional events 
are ajeature of the book as a whole. 
Place 
1.2 
2.1 
3.16 
4.1-2 
5.1 
6.3-6 
Na"ative Events in Ecclesiastet1 
Description 
Speech-act of Qoheleth (Fe = 1.12; cf. 1.16; passim) 
Test of Mnew (Fe = 2.2-10; cf. 3.22; 5.1842) 
Observation of to!)rDe (Fe = 1.13; 3.17; cf. 5.8) 
Observation of ?rDl' (Fe = 1.13; 4.3-4; cf. 5.8; 8.9) 
Shift to present;43 admonition (Fe = 12.9; cf. 8.2-4) 
Didactic pericOpe44 (Fe = 6.1; cf. 4.13-16) 
E I 
X 
x 
x 
x 
x 
40 This is not to say that there are not events in the book of Proverbs. Events are 
present as early as 1.7, 8 and following, but these are not functional to the whole. 
x 
41 E = explicit; I = implicit. Here is a plain example which demonstrates the 
distinction: E = "Someone reported Qoheleth's words." I = "The words of Qoheleth." 
The latter is an implicit form of the former explicit event. This can also be thought of in 
terms of the classic distinction between telling (E) and showing (I). Wayne Booth argues 
persuasively that showing is, in fact, a form of telling (Rhetoric of Fiction, chapter 1, 
esp. pp. 18-20, 25-27). FC = functional counterpart. It is worth noting here that there is 
some non-narrative material in Ecclesiastes, particularly the two blocks of wisdom 
sayings in 7.1-14, 19-22 and 10.1-4, 8-20. Even these passages, however, are set firmly 
in a narrative context (see below, Chapter 1.5). 
42 In referring to ch. 5 I use the English versification which is one verse ahead of 
the MT. 
43 The shift in narration at 5.1 (and the examples of 7.13-14; 11.9) constitutes a 
narrative event in that the shift occurs not only in the external structural level (of 
discourse) but in the narrative diegetic level (of story) as well. That is, that Qoheleth 
speaks suddenly to a character in the text not mentioned before (i.e. an implied reader) 
can be seen as an event of narration. It is because the reader can, in a sense, visualize 
Qoheleth changing his narrative stance that this meets the change criterion. The 
functionality criterion is met in comparing 5.1 to 12.9b: "He [Qoheleth] continually 
taught the people knowledge ... " From this statement the didactic quality of this and other 
addressee passages can be made sense of in a narrative context-that is, in the context of 
what Qoheleth did: his story. 
44 A didactic pericope such as this (and the examples of 4.13-16; 9.13-15) is a 
virtual mini-story within itself (pericope). This particular pericope has its own characters 
(the man of 6.3a-b, 4, and the stillborn ['!)~M; cf. Job 3.16] of 6.3c, 5) and events 
functional to one another (the living [6.3a], dying [6.3b] and consequential experience 
[6.4] of the man and the "experience" [6.3c, 5] of the stillborn). 
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Place 
7.13-14 
8.16 
9.13-15 
10.5-7 
11.9 
12.8 
Description E I 
Shift to present; admonition (FC = 12.9; cf. 7.10)X 
Test of "~!)n (FC = 1.13 [reiteration]; 8.17; cf. 7.23) 
Didactic pericope (FC = 9.16; cf. 4.13-16) 
Observation of "n, (FC = 1.13; cf. 5.13; 6.1; passim) 
Salient shift to present (FC = 12.9; cf. 9.7-10) 
Conclusion/summary (FC = 1.3, 13; passim; cf. 1.2) 
figure 1. 
x 
X 
X 
X 
Undoubtedly functional events are the most important feature of 
narratives. These separate the classified ads from the roman, the academic essay 
from the quest epic and the collection of sayings from the autobiography. When 
functionality is present in a text, the whole work necessarily exudes another 
feature: plot. The element of plot (which is not possible without functional 
events) is essential to any narrative. As Chatman puts it, "A narrative without a 
plot is a logical impossibility ... [The issue is not so much that a given work has] 
no plot, but rather that the plot is not an intricate puzzle, that its events are 'of 
no great importance' ... ,,45 What, then, is the "great importance" of events in 
X 
Ecclesiastes? Is there something, for example, that instigates a readerly desire for 
resolution, or expansion of some generating thrust or idea? 
Events constitute plot when they are arranged in an ordered time sequence 
of some kind (in fact, any functionality constitutes a type of plot in that all 
functional events happen within a time sequence). The arrangement of events is 
what gives a plot its particular type of suspense or narrative desire-a shape. 
If plot may be said to be the product of tension between events (partly the 
result of the quality of their respective time relationships), in Ecclesiastes it is the 
time element that creates that web of tension. This is anachrony; in particular, 
prolepsis. Gerard Genette says of prolepses that "Repeating prolepses ... scarcely 
appear except as brief allusions: they refer in advance to an event that will be 
4S Story and Discourse, pp. 47-48. 
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told in full in its place. ,,46 Take, for example, the reflections of Scout, the 
primary narrator in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird: 
When he was nearly thirteen, my brother Jem got his arm badly broken at 
the elbow. When it healed, and Jem's fears of never being able to play 
football were assuaged, he was seldom self-conscious about his injury ... 
When enough years had gone by to enable us to look back on them, we 
sometimes discussed the events leading to his accident. 47 
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Here the reader is clued into future events not yet narrated but that have already 
had their effect on the narrator. Such a prolepsis creates an initial tension in the 
plot.48 Likewise, it is the implication of Qoheleth's age at the moment of his 
narration that forms the proleptic element in Ecclesiastes. That is, by stating his 
observations at the outset in a past aspect, the reader is aware that it is "old man 
Qoheleth" who is reflecting on his youth, the younger persona of the 
experiencing Qoheleth.49 By placing his statements in the preterite Qoheleth 
places himself in a future stance, and places the reader both in the narrative 
telling now and in the time of his narrated world. Whenever the preterite is used 
the reader could easily preflx the sentence with, "When I was younger ... " The 
46 Narrative Discourse, p. 73. 
47 To Kill a Mockingbird (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1964 [1960]), p. 9 (italics 
mine). 
48 Compare the prologue of Ben Sira: " ... my grandfather Jeshua, after devoting 
himself for a long time to the reading of the Law ... was led to write on his own account 
something in the line of instruction and wisdom ... You are therefore invited to read it 
through ... " (The Apocrypha [trans. E. Goodspeed; Chicago: University of Chicago press, 
1938], p. 223). Although the Translator (the narrator here) does not allude to a particular 
event. he does suggest a causality in its production which, he implies, increases the 
instructional value of the book. This initiates a readedy desire. 
49 The aspect of old age is discerned in 1.1-2 and 1.12 ("I was king"; the description 
of Qoheleth as Solomon [see Chapter 7] may imply the perspective of old age; cf. 1 Kgs 
3.14; 11.4). Also, the test of toil in ch. 2 implies a great amount of time to have elapsed 
in order for Qoheleth to have become great and surpass all who came before him (2.9; 
cf. 1.16). Passages such as 7.15; 8.16 and 9.1-3 also assume a wealth of experience at 
Qoheleth's disposal. This perspective is, of course, enforced by the extensive use of the 
preterite which always keeps Qoheleth's narrative stance in a reflective mode (see 
Chapter 8.4). Finally, Qoheleth's injunction to remember one's creator in the days of 
youth "before the years draw nigh when you will say, 'I have no delight in them'" (12.1; 
cf. 9.7-10; 11.9-10), assumes (or even requires) from its narrator a life of deeply felt 
experience. 
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narrative stance, then, is one which generates a readerly desire to "fill-in". In 
other words, such kernel events anticipate a story to be unfolded~ character has 
begun to act, to take shape in the reader's mind, and its actions demand 
consequences and resolution. (That Qoheleth does in fact relate a narrative 
resolution [see Chapter 9.5] brings this story-element into sharp relief.) 
In figure 1 I suggested that 1.13 was the functional counterpart of each of 
the listed observational events (3.16; 4.1-2; 10.5-7). Each observation (of which 
there are many) has a necessary referent in 1.13. This connection, of course, 
transpires in reading. It is the interaction (in the mind of the reader) between the 
notion of quest (instigated at 1.13 and augmented by a host of cognate verses) 
and each of the subsequent observations that creates the sense of mystery and 
enquiry to which the quotes at the beginning of the previous section bear witness. 
Indeed, it is unlikely that those quotes could have emerged from anything other 
than the sense of mystery that this character-oriented plot creates. It is in and 
through this connection and interaction that the plot "unfurls before us as a 
precipitation of shape and meaning". so 
There is another type of prolepsis in Ecclesiastes that engenders a 
fictitious effect. Upon reading Qoheleth's opening lamentatio~indeed, 
denouncement-" Every thing is absurd!" (1.2), it is easily surmised that Qoheleth 
himself is "informed". Already, he has lived and he has judged. From this 
juncture one may envisage an aged Qoheleth in hospital pining for youthful days, 
his body ravaged by time. Or would he be held captive in a prison for the 
unorthodox? Or perhaps one "sees" in Qoheleth one of the "Old Boys" in his 
club, smoking a cigar, content that he has been there, done that and has nothing 
left to prove? The reader, envisaging Qoheleth in any such beginning "knows" 
the final setting, and the natural inclination is to fill-in what is not known-what 
so Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 35. 
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Qoheleth does not reveal. The twist comes when the reader later discovers (at 
12.8) that Qoheleth's opening remarks (stated through the mouth of the frame 
narrator before Qoheleth begins to demonstrate them) are his final and ultimate 
conclusions. What the reader learns in the ensuing narrative (as one learns Jem's 
circumstance from Scout's ensuing narrative in To Kill a Mockingbird) is how 
Qoheleth arrived at that state of apparent cynicism. 
Of course, in a first read of the book, this particular prolepsis is not 
realized at 1.2. That is, it does not become a prolepsis until it appears again, with 
great effect, at 12.8, since only then is the reader made aware that Qoheleth's 
initial state is/was, in fact, his final. Ignorance-that of the actual and implied 
readers-is a mover of plot. It, in the larger constructed order of functional 
events, forms the shape of the plot and the tension that the reader feels in the 
unfolding of Qoheleth's narrative. 
All kinds of questions emerge from the nexus of the mystery of Qoheleth. 
Is there any completeness in his character? Are we led to believe (by his ominous 
conclusions) that all that is important has been disclosed? Is there anything left to 
say beyond the decree, "Everything is absurd It? Is the quest of this enigmatic 
character ever over for the reader? Or is the reader left with his or her questions, 
burning with the unflexing observations on life that Qoheleth has related? To 
return to Chatman's criterion, this is the "great importance" of events in 
Ecclesiastes. It is what Peter Brooks describes as "the principle of 
interconnectedness and intention which we cannot do without in moving through 
the discreet elements-incidents, episodes, actions-of a narrative" .Sl So it is that 
the proleptic aspect propels the story ahead to a known, tragic conclusion. It will 
be seen as this study continues that the concern of plot permeates most of the 
narrative questions under discussion. 
Sl Reading for the Plot, p. S. 
1. Ecclesiastes as Narrative 28 
3. Qoheleth's Autobiographical Adhesion 
The first personal pronoun I is unduly prominent in this book: [Qoheleth] 
suffers from "I trouble", and this ego seems to have few friends. 
-John PatersonS2 
Qoheleth's narration in Ecclesiastes is fused together by an iterative first-person 
narrator. The presence is so strongly embedded that it led E.H. Plumptre in 1880 
to go as far as to read historical (as opposed to fictional) events into nearly every 
sentential statement of Qoheleth: 
Not without reason did the wiser thinkers of the school of Hillel...in spite 
of seeming contradictions, and Epicurean or heretical tendencies, 
recognize that in this record of the struggle, the fall, the recovery of a 
child of Israel, a child of God, there was the narrative of a Divine 
education told with a genius and power in which they were well content 
... to acknowledge a Divine inspiration. S3 
So Plumptre read into the "I" a historical figure. Whatever historicity the reader 
mayor may not assume, one comes from Qoheleth's narrative with an impression 
(which some have thought overbearing) of individuality. Such is one effect of 
first-person narration. 
It should be clarified that by "frrst person" I am referring to a distinction 
of narrative posture and not of grammar alone. The "I" may be used in 
something other than a first-person narrative. Take Gerard Genette's example: 
"when Virgil writes 'I sing of arms and the man ... ' or [ ... ] when Crusoe writes 
'I was born in the year 1632, in the city of York .. .' The term 'frrst-person 
narrative' refers, quite obviously, only to the second of these situations. ,,54 The 
term also applies to Ecclesiastes. Harold Fisch makes such a case by comparing 
the often more impersonal "I" of the Psalter: "The 'I' is there the function of a 
52 "Intimate Journal", p. 251. 
53 E.H. Plumptre, "The Author of Ecclesiastes", Exp 2 (1880), pp. 429-30. 
54 Narrative Discourse, p. 244; see also, Bal, Narratology, pp. 121-26. Although 
Genette goes on to discard the usage of "first person", I will use it in the traditional 
sense, to distinguish narrative posture and to maintain clarity. 
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relationship in which the reader can share; it is not the sign of an autonomous 
ego. By contrast, Ecclesiastes gives us a radically individualized statement. ,,55 
This is an important distinction which Qoheleth enjoys; his use of the "I" is 
uniquely narrative-bound. 
There is no other book in the Hebrew Bible that has such relentless 
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individualism and it is surely this quality that has inspired such titles of articles 
and books as "Old Man Koheleth" (Stone, 1942), or "The Intimate Journal of an 
Old-Time Humanist" (Paterson, 1950) or The Inner World of Qohelet 
(Zimmermann, 1973). As Martin Hengel comments, 
one can ... speak of a marked 'individuality' of authorship. It is an 
individuality which emerges with him for the first time among the wisdom 
teachers of the Old Testament, and later also appears in a kindred form in 
Jesus Sirach and is typical for the time of Hellenism. 56 
Other wisdom-oriented books of the Hebrew Bible rarely employ this intimate 
narrative device.57 This is not to say that Qoheleth's style is without precedent. 
First-person narratives abound in the ANE literature, as well as some Greek 
philosophical discourses.58 Qoheleth's style on the whole, however, is more 
55 "Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist", p. 158. 
56 Judaism and Hellenism, I (trans. J. Bowden; London: SCM, rev. edn, 1974 
[1973]), pp. 116-17 (italics Hengel's). Hengel argues that the source of Qoheleth's 
individuality can be traced mainly to Hellenistic sources, placing Qoheleth's locale of 
writing firmly in a Hellenistic culture. It is obviously precarious, however, to argue for 
any literary-historical relationship of dependence of one upon another, whether with 
Hellenic, Judaic or ANE texts. 
51 For example, Proverbs seems to strike up this personal narrative posture only 
twice: 7.6-27 where the story of a senseless youth is told and 24.30-34 where the 
narrator offers an aetiology for the saying, "A little sleep, a little slumber ... " But cf. 
also, Provo 4.1-3, the Dame Wisdom speeches (1.22-33; 8.4-36) and the dialogue of "the 
man" (CIe) to Ithiel and Ucal (30.1-9). 
58 This is widely noted. For example, Ryken compares Qoheleth's narration to 
"fictional Akkadian autobiography" (in particular the Cuthaean Legend) which utilizes 
first-person narration ("Ecclesiastes", in L. Ryken and T. Longman III [eds.], A 
Complete Literary Guide to the Bible [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993], pp. 273-74). 
Further, see my discussion of ANE texts at Chapter 2.2. 
1. Ecclesiastes as Narrative 
individualized than that of other ancient first-person narratives. 59 Indeed, the 
relentless individualism of his narrative has prompted such labels as 
"confessions", "memoirs" or "autobiography". Like confessions or memoirs, 
autobiography is concerned with the events of the life of the primary narrator. 
The label "autobiography", then, while seemingly anachronistic, is nonetheless 
appropriate. 
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The autobiographical form lends stable integrity to a narrative, for 
autobiography is concerned with the self of the narrator, and the narrator "I" is 
the great adhesive quality of such a narrative. Such a strategy of discourse (on 
the subject of one's own experience) serves to free the narrator to touch on 
innumerable subjects, all of which are bound by the constant narrative presence 
of the autobiographer. While enabling Qoheleth to speak freely on a host of 
subjects (although even his subject matter is motif-ridden; see below) the integrity 
of his narrative has another, more ironic function: to fix his own image in a 
world which for him is transient, frustratingly repetitive and absurd. For, "[the 
autobiographer] believes it a useful and valuable thing to fix his own image so 
that he can be certain it will not disappear like all things in this world". 60 
S9 For example, in The Instructionfor King Merikare (ANET, pp. 414-18), although 
the second person of address implies first-person narration, the primary narrator, King 
Merikare's father, never manages to merge as a distinct character from this form. The 
closest to this is the rather disconnected proclamation, "But as I live! I am while I am!. .. 
I made the Northland smite them [the bowmen], I captured their inhabitants ... " (lines 94-
95, p. 416); but from this experience no reflection emerges. Herein lies the difference: it 
is his seemingly unique reference to experience which makes Qoheleth's narration unique 
among ANE texts. The base which the autobiographical form creates for Qoheleth is, in 
this respect, fully exploited. Again, while a literary dependence can only be speculated 
among ancient texts, it is instructive to point out that Qoheleth's choice of narration does 
not appear to be random (or without serious import), but rather a choice which, as 
Isaksson remarks, "perfectly fits his pretension to be a king of mighty deeds, great 
wisdom, and profound experiences" (Studies in the Language of Qoheleth, p. 49). Given 
the effects it engenders, through that chosen form Qoheleth's narrated experience is made 
difficult to forget. 
liO G. Gusdorf, "Conditions and Limits of Autobiography", in J. Olney (ed.), 
Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical (princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980), p. 30. W.P. Brown has, separately from myself, formulated part of this 
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Qoheleth reflects and juxtaposes the life he narrates to us against the transience 
and absurdity that he has observed and knows to be real. A generation comes and 
another goes, the earth will remain and Qoheleth has ensured his place under the 
sun. Ironically, he has been remembered and will doubtless continue to be. 
This autobiographical integrity establishes a fixed point of reference for 
the reader; the ground for Qoheleth's consciousness. Without a constant "I", 
Qoheleth's narration would lack the same cohesive power which enables us to 
speak of Qoheleth as a unified, although multifaceted, persona.61 "How 
extraordinary it is", Robert Elliott remarks, "that 'I' somehow encompasses in a 
coherent way the thousand and one selves that constitute a 'Self,' and that the 
person whom one loves and the person one loathes also say 'I'. ,,62 Thanks to the 
"I", Qoheleth's thousand and one selves speak with a wonderfully coherent voice. 
Some important rhetorical effects generated by Qoheleth's first-person 
narration are worth pointing out. For example, imagine a key text (7.29) with the 
more "distant" narrative posture of a covert narrator: 
First person: 
See, this alone I have found: that God made humanity upright, but they 
have sought many devices. 
Covert: 
God made humanity upright, but they have sought many devices. 
conclusion in arguing that Qoheleth immortalizes himself through the autobiographical 
form ("Character Reconstructed: Ecclesiastes", in idem, Character in Crisis [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, forthcoming)). 
61 So Fox as well, who appropriately calls this autobiographical presence Qoheleth's 
"organizing consciousness" (Qohelet, p. 159). He expands further: "The pervasiveness of 
the teacher's consciousness in the book of Qohelet is the main source of its cohesiveness" 
(p. 160). Brown makes the same point, seeing literary cohesion emerging from the 
"confessional or self-referential style" ("Character Reconstructed: Ecclesiastes", 
forthcoming). Compare Crenshaw's comment: "Repeated use of the personal pronoun 
["I"] ... thrusts the ego of the speaker into prominence, leaving no doubt about his 
investment in what is being reported" (Ecclesiastes [London: SCM Press, 1988], p. 28). 
62 The literary Persona (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 30. 
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While the latter has the quality of a "tlio in isolation (at the most being connected 
thematically with other C'''tliO), the former is bound unequivocally to Qoheleth's 
character as a narrator. The "I" here is what marks this passage and makes it 
memorable as Qoheleth's own observation. 
Similarly, many statements as they stand would be virtually impossible 
without the first-person stance. Take, for example, 3.10-11: 
I have observed the business that God has given human beings to be busy 
with. He has made everything beautiful in its time. Furthermore, God has 
put eternity in their hearts so that humanity cannot discover the activity 
that God has done from beginning to end. 
Unless one placed, "Qoheleth observed that ... " at 3.lOa, how would the 
sentiment of verse 10 otherwise be narratedj'Qoheleth'S own distinctive words? "-.5) 
The whole aspect of observation would have to be extracted, leaving the platitude 
of 3.11 to stand on its own. This would, by depersonalizing the narration, leave 
us with a completely different timbre, and undermine the otherwise clearly 
narrative procedure of discovery at hand. We would hear not the disillusioned 
observer speaking in fiery and critically unsure tones, but more likely the 
disembodied and sure voice of the wisdom tradition, shaped inevitably from the 
context of a body of maxims instead of through the "I" of a fascinating thinker. 
The form that first-person narration takes in English translations of 
Ecclesiastes does not reflect very well the more entrenched Hebrew form. The 
subject in English usually stands alone as an "I" ,63 whereas in Hebrew it is 
conveyed in a host of first-person singular verb forms and suffixes as well as the 
independent pronoun. In the case of Ecclesiastes, the "I" of English translation 
usually represents the Hebrew first-person verb form. In Hebrew sometimes the 
verb is accompanied by the pronoun, but the function of the pronoun is often 
ambiguous. It may emphasize the sentence it occurs in or, more strictly, the 
63 Of course, very often the "I" is implied, as in imperative statements. 
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speaking subject. The self-referential function of Qoheleth's language, then, is 
often subtle. I will here briefly review the presence of the Hebrew 
autobiographical form and discuss some of its potential interpretive consequences 
for reading. 
The syntactical placement of the twenty-nine occurrences of '~M can be 
broken down as follows: 
A) immediately after a first-person singular preterite64 (21x)65 
B) immediately before a verbal adjective (2x: 2.18; 4.8) 
C) immediately after a singular participle (2x: 7.26; 8.12) 
D) immediately after an infinitive (1 x: 1.16) 
E) predicating a nomen (Ix: 1.12)66 
F) immediately before a noun construct (1 x: 8.2) 
G) immediately before a first-person singular imperfect (1 x: 2.15) 
Most of these occurrences cannot be properly represented in English and all the 
major translations duly ignore them. Every occurrence in A should be considered 
pleonastic to convey the subject. That is, the presence of the ftrst-person verbs in 
these examples render '~M grammatically unnecessary. Categories D and G seem 
pleonastic as well. 67 Category F is, at the least, uncertain.68 Categories B, C 
and E may be considered to be most like the English "I" in translation: 
B 2.18: c,Ql) 'lMrD ,c,Qsrc,~ (all of my toil at which I toiled ... ) 
4.8: c,Ql) '~M 'Qc" (yet for whom am 1 toiling ... 1) 
C 7.26: n,QQ ,Q 'lM U,Q, (I found more bitter than death ... ) 
64 By preterite I mean both the perfect, imperfect (non-conversive) and vav-
conversive forms which have a past simple sense. The translation of some of these is a 
contentious issue (see Isaksson, Studies in the Language of Qoheleth, pp. 23-38). 
However, it is only the presence of the autobiographical form I am here concerned with 
and not the aspect of its narratorial level. 
6S 1.16; 2.1, 11, 12, 13, 14 [with el), 15 [2x), 18, 20, 24; 3.17, 18; 4.1, 2, 4, 7; 
5.18; 7.25; 8.15; 9.16. 
66 See above, n. 35. 
67 At 1.16 (D) 'lM, althou8.h syntactically different to category A, is rendered 
pleonastic by the proceeding 'n"'lM mM. At 2.15 (0) 'lM emphasizes the reflexive 
nature of the M,?Q which will also befall Qoheleth ('~'?'). This occurrence is, again, 
pleonastic to English translation. 
68 The '3M of ,c,Q 'I) '3M (8.2) seems to have no purpose, and, not being 
represented in any of the ancient translations (although emendation theories abound) is 
likely a scribal error. 
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8.12: 'fl1M '~M V,,'""Ql '!) (yet 1 also know that ... )69 
E 1.12: 'n"M nc'ilp '~M (I am Qoheleth. I was ... ) 
In these categories '~M is wholly necessary to convey the subject. 
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It is not clear in the other categories, although they are pleonastic, where 
the emphasis of '~M lies. Usually in classical Hebrew the personal pronoun is 
placed before the verb for the sake of emphasizing the subject. But such verses as 
1.16, where '~M has two unusual placements, show a use of the pronoun largely 
peculiar to Qoheleth's style. Does '~M in such instances emphasize something 
more than the speaking subject? Does it simply emphasize the presence of the 
speaker? Isaksson's detailed review of all occurrences of '~M in Ecclesiastes 
shows convincingly that although the pronouns may be pleonastic in conveying 
the subject, they are "added in instances of greater importance, where the 
narrative halts for a moment to make a conclusion or to introduce a new 
thought" .70 In support of this, '~M must have had a unique rhetorical effect on 
Hebrew readers when read aloud, stylistically marking instances of importance. 
There is another effect, however, which English translations necessarily fail to 
emulate. 
The culminative effect of the sheer abundance of flrst-person reference, 
especially in chs. 1-2, is visually remarkable. The explicit self-referential quality 
of Qoheleth's language is visually depicted in a series of sufflxed yods which, for 
its density, is unprecedented in the Hebrew Bible. Take, for example, the ratio of 
suffIXed yod words that are self-referential in the following sentences: 
69 Without the pronoun in both of these occurrences little sense can be made of the 
participles in determining the subject. The LXX'S modification in both cases of the 
participle to a first-person form (7.26 [7.27], eUpumo tym; 8.12, 'Ylvoxm.o lym) bears 
witness to the need for clarity here. 
70 Studies in the Language of Qoheleth, p. 171; and cf. pp. 166-71. Schoors appears 
to follow Isaksson on this point (The Preacher Sought to Find Pleasing Words: A Study 
of the Language of Qoheleth [OLA, 41; Leuven: Peeters, 1992], §1.2.1). Isakssonalso 
points out that the syntactically similar placement of ~M in Cant. 5.5, 6 signifies an 
emotional climax (p. 166). 
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A) 1.16: 8 out of 22 words 
B) 2.4: 6 out of 8 words 
D) 2.11a: 5 out of 9 words 
E) 2.9: 5 out of 10 words 
The assonance and determining rhythm of the most impressive of these examples 
(2.4) is not only clear to the ear, but to the eye as well: 
C'C'~ "'rll'tol C'rI:l" 'rI'l:l 'Wl'C 'rI"lM 
This may support Isaksson's thesis on another level. While the visual element 
may not emphasize the speaking subject per se, it does highlight the intensity of 
that subject's experience by drawing attention to the grammar by which it is 
referred to. This partly reflects the duality that Qoheleth creates in the process of 
reflection. In reflection the narrating speaking subject becomes separated from the 
earlier experiencing subject that is being reflected upon. From this disjunction 
arises the significance (the comprehension) of that experience.71 The Hebrew 
first-person form, then, works to intensify the presence and significance of 
Qoheleth's experience in ways that English cannot hope to convey in translation. 
In sum, frrst-person narration in Ecclesiastes is conveyed mostly through 
frrst-person singular verb forms, followed in frequency by 'lM (to the exclusion 
of '~lM), although this is often pleonastic to conveying the speaking subject. 
Together with frrst-person pronominal suffixes these all explicitly convey first-
person narration. To visually demonstrate this remarkable presence of the first 
person, the following graph reflects each of the above forms I have mentioned 
(all frrst-person singular verb forms, pronouns and sufflXes).72 
71 I explore this phenomenon of reflection in detail at Chapter 8.4. 
n In the graph I have only omitted the 'lM of 8.2 (see n. 68, above). I am 
assuming that the verses are of roughly equal length-at least enough so for my purposes 
here. The percentage of occurrences shown on the vertical axis is calculated by dividing 
the number of verses containing first-person narration by the number of verses in that 
chapter. Isaksson offers a similar graph (Studies in the Language of Qoheleth, pp. 43-44) 
but it differs from this one in that only verbal first-person instances are represented and 
not pronouns and suffixes. My thanks to Sonya J. Christianson for helping to produce 
the graph. 
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What is most important about the first-person narrative stance, and what this 
graph helps to demonstrate, is that it remains formally?3 unchanged from 1.12 to 
the frame narrator's appearance at 12.8, and therefore dominates the body of the 
book. That stance, which makes Ecclesiastes so unique, constitutes the 
observational quality of Qoheleth's narration, and is the anchor of all of his 
experience. Consequently, it is likewise the anchor of his proleptic quest and the 
sense of mystery that it helps to create. It is integral, therefore, to the 
73 I say "formally" because there remains to be considered the implied first-person 
stance in the use of the second person of address; notably present in chs. 11-12. In fact, 
given this element, nowhere except in the frame narrator's text is Qoheleth's narrative 
stance broken. For more on this rather separate strategy of second-person narration see 
Chapter 9.5. 
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functionality of events and, as we have seen, to the coherence of the narrative as 
a whole. 
4. Motif 
Motifs have a certain musical distinction. In fact, Leitmotif might be a better 
word. Leitmotif (a term borrowed from music studiesf4 denotes a phrase or 
idea, or (as with music) a figure or refrain that is repeated throughout a single 
work having the effect of pronouncing a theme. This sense informs my own use 
of the word "motif" .75 One effect of the motif is certain: it produces theme. 
Whether the reader is aware of it or not the motif will make its impact. E.M. 
Forster describes the effect of motif in the work of Marcel Proust thus: 
There are times when the little phrase-from its gloomy inception, through 
the sonata, into the sextet-means everything to the reader. There are 
times when it means nothing and is forgotten, and this seems to me to be 
the function of rhythm in fiction; not to be there all the time like a 
pattern, but by its lovely waxing and waning to fill us with surprise and 
freshness and hope. 76 
As Forster suggests, such "rhythm" (although at times forgotten) forms a 
coherent theme or idea that through reading develops into a single fact of its 
own. 
The real difficulty lies in determining just what constitutes a motif. Must a 
74 So Chris Baldick (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms [Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990], p. 121): "[Leitmotif] was first used to describe the 
repeated musical themes or phrases that Wagner linked with particular characters and 
ideas in his operatic works". Even in music studies the narrative notion is discernible. 
75 One thing motif should not be confused with is frequency. Frequency is the 
repetition of events (and only events) at the story level and their relation to the time of 
the discourse or diegesis. This is the difference between story time and real time which is 
discerned in such devices as the telescoping or expansion of events (see Genette, 
Narrative Discourse, chapter 3; Chatman, Story and Discourse, pp. 78-79). Motif, 
however, applies to words or phrases that recall previously mentioned words or phrases 
by lexical or ideological semblance of some kind. Unlike motifs, events can be phrased 
in completely different terms and still constitute frequency. 
76 Aspects of the Novel (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962 [1927]), p. 168. 
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phrase have a certain percentage of lexical semblance to the phrase it is purported 
to resemble in some way? And once the location of the semblances (or 
"repetitions") is decided, how many of them must occur before one can call their 
sum a "motif"? For example, should 3.15a ("What was already is, and what is 
already was") be considered a reiteration of (or part of a motif with) 1.9a ("What 
was is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done")? Can one say 
of 1.9a that the quality of the existence of things is repetitious (or recurring)? I 
think so, particularly since the equivocation of "what was" (l"1'l"1U1) with "what 
will be" (l"1'l"1'rD "'l"1) places the scope of the statement in all existence at all 
times. And can one say of 3.15a that the quality of the existence of things is 
repetitious (or recurring)? Yes, although it is important to note that there is a 
development at hand. It is not only existence but activity at all times that is 
repetitious (or recurring). That recurrence of theme develops into an idea that is 
ascribable to the speaker (or one might prefer to say, "work"): at all times the 
nature of events and happenstance is recurring. There is lexical semblance and 
ideological development (perhaps there is a significance in Qoheleth's expansion 
to the recurrence of activity?), and the subjectivity of the decision to call this a 
motif is clear. It is an ascription of meaning to the speaker. Motifs, unlike, for 
example, the analysis of the presence of the first person, are a purely subjective 
matter. 
Even when we decide to call something a motif, its interpretation is 
problematic. The reader must, it seems, be aware of the haunting possibility that 
its significance runs only surface-deep. A comparison to psychoanalysis may help 
illuminate this problem. The analyst is often faced with the repetition of what 
Donald Spence calls the "recursive operator"; that is, a recurring image or idea 
communicated by the patient which may be polymorphous, the discovery and 
identification of which leads to the eradication of the problem that motivates it 
(e.g., a repeated image of anger towards someone which is motivated by the fear 
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of rejection). The temptation is great, argues Spence, to see in every recurrence 
of a given image or idea the presence of a recursive operator. Because 
psychoanalysis still operates in a largely Freudian context in which all such 
recurring phenomena must have a reasonable explanation, the possibility that 
there is no such explanation is unacceptable: 
[This problem] was never confronted during the Freudian age because of 
the belief that the answer could always be found, buried beneath layers of 
surface distortions ... To begin to admit that ... the surface of the world is 
frequently devoid of meaning is to come face to face with a terrible 
possibility ... and the terror behind this challenge accounts for many of the 
more recent efforts to salvage the [Freudian theory of dreams].77 
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The answer to this problem, for Spence, lies in determining when a recurrence is 
worth pursuing. It is to be more willing to accept the terror of the unknown. The 
same may be said of the interpretation of motifs. The interpretation must be 
grounded in both a careful reading of the whole and a sensitivity to the fact that 
ignorance of the significance of recurrence, and of events in general, is always a 
disturbing possibility, an idea which finds sympathy with Qoheleth's own thought 
(cf. 3.11; 7.14; 8.17). 
With such reflections in mind I will survey the presence of three of the 
more prominent developments that one might call "motifs" in Ecclesiastes based 
solely on their lexical and ideological semblance. I have chosen the simplest 
examples I could fmd: (1) All that is absurd; (2) All that is under the sun; (3) All 
that is a pursuit of wind. Although each motif may be disputed to some extent, 
these lines proffer an overview in a manner which is, again, accurate enough for 
the purpose at hand.78 
77 "Narrative Recursion", in S. Rimmon-Kenan (cd.), Discourse in Psychoanalysis 
and Literature (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 206. 
78 The lines represent the entire text and each vertical mark represents the point in 
the text at which that motif appears. There are 222 verses in Ecclesiastes. The length of 
each line is 111 mm. This makes for a ratio of 1 verse to 0.5 mm; 2 verses to 1 mm. Of 
course, there are other motifs (of observation, toil, profit etc.) and this same method 
might be useful to survey them. 
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Pattern of the Distribution of Motifs 
1. All that is absurd ~::ln):79 
" ,""" 
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2. All that is under the sun (or the heavens):80 
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3. All that is a pursuit of wind:81 
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figure 3. 
The placing of motif partly detennines its interpretive effectiveness. Looking at 
the whole, at times there seems to be a methodological certainty (the flrst 50% of 
lines 1 and 2 respectively). At other times its location seems random (line 3), and 
merely brings again something darkly to the mind that found its inception in a 
forgotten nook, having the effect of mere tedium (if there is such a thing). Or 
perhaps the particular placement of a motif serves to frame, or "heighten" a 
certain passage.82 Whatever effect each motif engenders, and however we are to 
interpret its signiflcance, motifs are, collectively, a stylistic feature of 
Ecclesiastes. 
79 1.2, 14; 2.1, 11, 15, 17, 19,21,23,26; 3.19; 4.4, 7, 8, 16; 5.10; 6:2, 9; 7.6; 
8.10, 14; 9.1; 11.8; 12.8. 
80 1.3,9, 13, 14; 2.3, 11, 17, 18, 19,20,22; 3.1, 16; 4.1,3, 7, 15; 5.13, 18; 6.1, 
12; 8.9, 15, 17; 9.3, 6, 9, 11, 13; 10.5. As I pointed out above (n. 37), there is a 
synonymy between "under the heavens" and "under the sun" which suggests a lexical 
semblance. 
81 1.14, 17; 2.11, 17,26; 4.4, 6, 16; 6.9. 
82 So Wright ("The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited", pp. 43-45), who sees a 
numerical significance and key to structure in the placement of the ,::ll"l judgments (he 
ambiguously uses the term Leitmotiv, p. 41). Note Mary Ann Caws's example taken 
from Virginia Woolf, in Reading Frames in Modern Fiction (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press , 198~ pp. 24-25. 
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5. The Structure of Narrative Discourse 
Since both of the narrators introduced in 1.1-2 go on to recount their own events, 
the consequent story-lines are, in at least one sense, necessarily separate. That is, 
when the frame narrator speaks at 1.1-2, the event of speaking is functional to 
the larger sequence of events; not so much to events in Qoheleth's story, but to 
those in his own: "The words of Qoheleth, the son of David, king in Jerusalem. 
'Absurdity of absurdities', said Qoheleth, 'Absurdity of absurdities; everything is 
absurd.'" There are two implied events present here. The first (1.1) is that of the 
frame narrator presenting the words of Qoheleth. The second (l.2-located in 
Qoheleth's story as well) is the action of Qoheleth speaking. The events of speech 
are functionally related to the frame narrator's epilogue in which the reader 
learns who the addressee is (l2.12a; his son/student) and is informed (albeit 
inaccurately; see Chapters 5.2, 9.3) as to the success of Qoheleth's quest (12.9-
10). Like the functionality operative in Qoheleth's plot announcement, this 
propels the frame narrator's story forward and creates the possibility for change 
and choice, as well as the raising of narrative questions. 
In the narrative set-up of Ecclesiastes, then, who is actually doing the 
talking? There is nothing after 1.2 that instructs the reader to forget that the 
frame narrator is doing so. We are subtly reminded of this structure at 7.27, 
where he gently intrudes: "See, this is what I have found, said Qoheleth,83 
adding one to one to fmd the sum." The reader is here reminded that it is still the 
frame narrator who is telling the story. Even the introductory passage of 1.3-11 
(although its narrative form is, on the surface, impersonal) can only be the words 
83 We should be in no doubt that this is the frame narrator's text. As Fox argues, 
the phrase is not an editorial insertion apart from the frame narrative since the grammar 
is too smoothly constructed for a later insertion to be plausible, nor is it a reference of 
Qoheleth's to himself in the third person: "Even if we allow the third-person in 1:2 as a 
self-introduction [which Fox does not], such a switch of voice would be quite useless at 
7:27 and 12:8" ("Frame-narrative", p. 84; and see pp. 85-87). 
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of Qoheleth which were just introduced. And with the commencement of the 
first-person narrative of Qoheleth at 1.12 (although implicitly begun at 1.3 with a 
rhetorical question), the reader will inevitably forget (with the possible exception 
of 7.27) that these are reported words, and will assume that they are being 
directly narrated by Qoheleth throughout the rest of the book; until, that is, the 
epilogue where the frame narrator appears again (12.8-14).84 
It might be relatively simple to perceive who is speaking, but is there 
logical coherence in the narrative discourse? That is, is there any confliction of 
narrative stance or voice at any point? Also, how and where is the strength of the 
narrative line enforced to highlight the primacy of one speaker over the other, or 
to make the presence of the given narrator felt? The following outline of the 
syntactical forms which indicate person and voice, the flow of narration and the 
stance of the narrators-an overview of what is happening on the level of narrative 
discourse-will help to guide an attempt to answer such questions. It is based on 
the narrative form, not content, of the material; the discourse, not story.85 
84 On this effect of diegetic levels, see Chapter 2.3, 4. 
as The thickness of the lines represents the relative emphasis of the narrative 
flow-tbe medium and thickest widths are unbroken narration. There are other narrative 
asides besides those represented (e.g., the mini-parables in chs. 4 and 9) but the asides 
here are those of specific narrative acts on the level of discourse. 
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What does figure 4 signify about the narrative structure? First, it shows 
that there is a logical confluence of narration. That is, the situation of each 
narrator in its respective setting is not in logical dissension with another narrator 
or narrative situation. When Qoheleth's narration is governing the text it is only 
altered by fluctuations in his own narrative stance. At the level of discourse, the 
two narrators do not compete or interfere with one another. That integrity of 
narration can be seen in Qoheleth's narration on its own as well. Qoheleth may 
seem to contradict himself at the story level, but he clearly does not at the 
discourse level. This means that even non-narrative material, such as the 
collections of proverbs in chs. 7 and 10, is located within the unbroken flow (in 
the medium and thickest lines) of Qoheleth's first-person narrative, and is 
therefore part of his story. Apart from 7.27, the frame narrator lets Qoheleth's 
words be spoken without interruption (although the content of his narrative, as we 
shall see, clashes dramatically). 
Second, the outline displays an attention to narrative technique. The 
narrative asides, for example, are always effective at complementing the strategy 
at hand. At 2.15 Qoheleth internalizes his test of wisdom: "And I said in my 
heart, 'As is the fate of the fool, so it will befall me. Why then have I become 
exceedingly wise?' ,,86 The aside is not necessary to Qoheleth's story. The 
question is whispered to himself and to the reader, and serves to accentuate the 
86 The indirect quotation mark here could also appear after "befall me" earlier. 
Regardless of where Qoheleth's indirect speech ends the aside exists in the question 
being directed towards the reader. 
t For MT'S it", ~l'" "l'l':l itlrD ("with his eyes he sees no sleep") read itlrD it", 'll'" 'l'~ ("with my eyes I see no sleep"). The subject for it", could be 
indefinite (Murphy, Ecclesiastes [WBC, 23a; Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1992], p. 81; 
RSV) or it could refer to the "humanity" of the next verse (R. Gordis, Koheleth-1he Man 
and his World [New York: Bloch Publishing, 1962], p. 288; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, pp. 
138-39; this requires emendation as well). In the MT, it", has no subject (LXX supplies 
QUtou). The emendation to first person makes the thought consistent with Qoheleth's 
other narrative asides in the first person where Qoheleth is racked with the vexation of 
his observations (2.15; 4.8b). Further, see Fox, Qohelet, p. 255. 
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absurdity of his becoming wise while failing truly to understand why (cf. 1.18; 
2.14, 16; 6.8; see Chapter 9.4). 
Third, the outline shows that Qoheleth is active as a narrating character. 
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The frame narrator's narrative apparatus (Le. Qoheleth) is by no means static, 
but a dynamic character who is actively communicating with effective narrative 
strategies. The result of this narrating activity is that Qoheleth is able to emerge 
as a distinct character. The persona of Qoheleth is never lost in the often 
rhetorically powerful material it narrates. 
The question posed at the beginning of this section, "ls Ecclesiastes a narrative 
text?", may now be resumed. Certainly by Prince's definition (lithe representation 
of real or fictive events or situations in a time sequence") the answer is yes. But 
this section has gone beyond this definition by sketching other indicators common 
to narratives. While motif, for example, is perhaps the most dubious of the 
narrative indicators I have suggested, the presence of motifs is something one 
might expect from a form of highly stylized literature. While it does not follow 
that all stylized literature is narrative, narrative literature is, by necessity, highly 
stylized. That is, it makes ample use of the types of narrative elements that I 
have so far reviewed (events, plot etc.). Indeed, it may be that the mere presence 
of a frame narrative in Ecclesiastes is sufficient to qualify it as a narrative text, 
yet there is much more for the reader in store. There are more narrative 
strategies to be explored ahead. The only point I wish to emphasize at this 
juncture, however, is that the aspects of the text that I have chosen to survey so 
far suggest that Ecclesiastes can be viewed with confidence as a narrative text for 
the purpose of analysis. 
Chapter 2 
PUTTING THE FRAME IN PLACE 
Look here, upon this picture, and on this. 
-Shakespeare (Hamlet, act 3 sc. 4, 1.53) 
1. The Frame "Proper" 
"To frame", says Mary Ann Caws, "is to privilege what is contained within the 
borders of the picture. "l It is to provide an interpretive boundary. It is to limit 
the view of the reader or observer in order to demarcate the field of 
interpretation. It does not set limits on interpretation itself, but rather on the 
canon in which the interpreter functions and has his or her frame of reference. In 
fact, the frame can raise new questions by virtue of its relationship to the material 
it frames. 
Of course, we borrow the rhetoric of the "frame" from physical frames 
that surround paintings. The interpretive potential of that physical type of frame 
is itself extensive. It is likely that frames began as a practical necessity to enable 
better handling of paintings. Some even provided lids to protect the picture. 2 
Even early on, however, there was an eye towards the aesthetic. The French 
painter Poussin (1594-1665) made a plea to the owners of his works that they 
might, when they had received their painting, "ornament it with a little section of 
corniche, because it needs that in order for the eye's gaze, passing over all its 
parts, to be held and not dispersed outside".3 The next phase was to take steps, 
1 Reading Frames in Modern Fiction, p. 21. 
2 N. Penny, "Back to the Wall", London Review of Books 17118 (21 September 
1995), p. 12. Penny's article is partly a review of In Perfect Harmony: Picture and 
Frame 1850-1920 (ed. E. Mengden; Reaktion, 1995). 
3 As cited from Louis Marin's Detruire La peinture in Caws, Reading Frames in 
Modern Fiction, p. 13. 
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via the frame, to integrate the picture with its respective setting. By the 
seventeenth century, however, frames became so overpowering that they brought 
into question the integrity of their relationship to the picture. Increasingly, frames 
became an art form in themselves and "it could not be plausibly argued 
that. .. [some] styles of frame evolved in response to the needs of particular styles 
of painting".4 Some modem artists have knowingly used frames as commentaries 
either on the painting itself or on some immediate social context. Pissaro was 
apparently one of the first to complement his painting by using the appropriate 
coloured frame and Picasso enjoyed using old Spanish frames for an ironic 
effect.s 
Some questions of relationships can be raised by considering the pictorial 
frame. Who is usually responsible for framing the painting? Some artists have 
had the lUXUry of choice. Some have even found it a form of rebellion to be 
"against routine exhibition mOUldings, against the opulence of dealers' frames, 
against mass-production, even against gilding" . 6 A choice of frame could be 
tantamount to resisting the pressure of dealers to conform. Indeed, artists unable 
to afford materials for painting, yet alone frames, may have had no choice but to 
accept frames that were not to their liking. One could imagine situations where 
those who provided frames were attempting to give the paintings themselves as 
smooth and orthodox an inception into the gallery/public as possible. There is 
opportunity in this four-way relationship (painting/painter, frame/framer) for 
condescension and manipulation. Frames sometimes have such an overpowering, 
even garish effect (as those of the Dutch masters) that they are awarded the "last 
4 Penny, "Back to the Wall", p. 12. Making analogy to the overpowering frames 
imposed on the Dutch masters, Penny humorously suggests that if "the prim Dutch 
matron entered an opulent Parisian hOtel she was divested of her dark suit and dressed 
for the ball" (p. 11). 
5 Both examples cited in Penny, "Back to the Wall", p. 13. 
6 Penny, "Back to the Wall", p. 12. 
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say" in what impression the observer decides to carry away. 
Film provides another physical example of framing. In the technical 
construction of a film, the syntax of the filming frame (the position of the 
subject[s] in the frame) is of considerable importance. As James Monaco notes, 
"The relationship between the movement within the frame and movement of the 
camera is one of the more sophisticated codes, and specifically cinematic. ,,7 The 
physical act of framing a scene (composing what is in the film frame) merits our 
attention since its rhetorical effect is potentially extensive. Questions arise, such 
as "Does the subject[s] stay in it?" or "Is it 'free' to leave it? Why?" Who is 
responsible for the syntax of the frame? The actors? The ("real") director? 
As with models of interpretation, there are many types of framing that 
occur in the arts. Let me take an example from modem fiction: John Steinbeck's 
Of Mice and Men. In it, George frames his mentally ill companion, Lennie, by 
constantly speaking on his account and instilling a fear that causes Lennie to 
allow him to control his relation to the world (not always fairly, and usually for 
monetary motivation, which directs readerly sympathy to Lennie). 
From the beginning the two characters are cast in opposition: George 
having assuring, "sharp, strong features", Lennie "his opposite ... dragging his feet 
a little, the way a bear drags his paws".8 George is quite obviously set up as 
Lennie's "representative" in every form of social communication. When the 
reader, sympathetically aligned to Lennie's perspective, meets the outside world 
for the first time (in the form of the two men acquiring a job), the framing is 
clear: 
The boss licked his pencil. "What's your name?" 
7 He further states that "The masters of the Hollywood style of the thirties and 
forties tried never to allow the subject to leave the frame (it was considered daring even 
if the subject did not occupy the center of the 1.33 frame)" (How to Read a Film 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981], pp. 151-52; further, see pp. 152-54). 
8 J. Steinbeck, Of Mice and Men (London: Heinemann, 1966 [1937]), p. 3. 
"George Milton." 
"And what's yours?" 
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George said: "His name's Lennie Small." 
The names were entered in the book ... 
The boss pointed a playful finger at Lennie. "He ain't much of a talker, 
is he?" 
"No, he ain't, but he's sure a hell of a good worker. Strong as a bull. ,,9 
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The reader learns that the success of their gaining (and in particular, keeping) the 
job rests on George's skill (and Lennie's relative cooperation) in framing. This 
becomes a source of tension throughout the whole book-the tension between what 
the reader (via the narrator's access to thoughts etc.) knows of Lennie and 
George, and how the "outside world" will perceive George's presentation of that 
shared knowledge. By thus "normalizing" Lennie, his character is "shown" to the 
outside world (outside, that is, of the two companions). This is potentially 
limiting, but the scope of those limitations depends, in this case, on the integrity 
of the one framing: George. It is by this same framing that Lennie's prospective 
relationships are left open, and George's integrity made known. By fashioning 
boundaries, then, this framing creates many possibilities. And this is the 
importance of any type of framing: interpretive possibilities. 
2. Frame Narratives 
The "list" of narrative framing techniques is potentially inexhaustible. 10 A frame 
narrative, however, is simply a more formally apparent type of framing than 
some of the examples I have been describing. It is a text in which an external 
narrator narrates an inner story at its beginning and end, thereby framing 
9 Of Mice and Men, pp. 32-33. 
10 For example, " ... delays and pauses to surround, with temporal and spatial 
borders, the central focused part, architectural surrounds to further mark them, 
repetitions and drastic contrasts to call attention either to the borders or to the dramatic 
quality of the scene pictured in them, an included picture to develop by non-verbal means 
the significance of the moral or psychological issues implied in the motifs thrown in 
relief... [etc. etc.]" (Caws, Reading Frames in Modern Fiction, p. 262). 
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(highlighting, privileging, delimiting etc.) the story that it narrates. 
As with the physical relationship of pictorial frames and paintings, the 
relationship of the outer and inner stories varies immensely and provides 
opportunity for interpretive control in the frame narrative. The outer frame story 
can often dominate the entire text, in which case the less important inner story 
serves as a mere excuse for the outer, providing "the material on which that 
[outer] plot feeds".l1 Or, as with Ecclesiastes, the inner story dominates, 
allowing the outer story to simply highlight (usually to great effect) the inner. 
Shortness of length or a lack of complex events in the outer framing story does 
not necessarily diminish the frame's impact, and "[n]o matter how minimal or 
extensive the frame story may be .. .it forms a narrative in its own right" .12 It is 
for this reason that in Ecclesiastes the frame narrator's brief introduction at 1.1-2 
combines effectively with the epilogue to form, despite its brevity, a frame 
narrative which carries with it all the interpretive possibilities I have so far 
discussed. 
It is widely recognized that granting the inner story a validation it could in 
no other way obtain is the most "common" effect of framing. 13 That is, because 
a character is presented in the "mouth" of another, usually more reliable 
11 L. Dittmar, "Fashioning and Re-fashioning: Framing Narratives in the Novel and 
Film", Mosaic 16/1-2, p. 196. The detective novel is a good example of this type. In it, 
the outer story in which the detective solves a crime frames the events that have led to 
the circumstances concurrent with the present narrating stance. Those events "feed" the 
unfolding situation in which the detective works, thereby having the sole function of 
creating the drama necessary to demonstrate the detective's "brilliance". 
12 Chatman, Story and Discourse, p. 255. 
13 See Caws, Reading Frames in Modem Fiction, pp. 9-26; Fox, "Frame-narrative", 
pp. 94-96, 100-106; Dittmar, "Fashioning and Re-fashioning"; J.F. Summerfield, 
"Framing Narratives", in T. Newkirk (ed.), Only Connect: Uniting Reading and Writing 
(Upper Montclair: Boynton/Cook, 1986), pp. 227-40; B. Romberg, Studies in the 
Narrative Technique of the First-Person Novel (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. 1962), 
esp. pp. 63-81. 
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character (i.e. an editor,t4 fictional author, person of higher social status etc.), 
readers are more likely to suspend their disbelief and accept the "fictional 
quality" of the work's premises. IS Although the central "framed" character may 
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be difficult to accept on its own terms, with the respect tended by the frame 
narrator, the reader may be enabled to hold that character in higher regard via the 
frame. 
Michael Fox has adeptly pointed out this effect in Ecclesiastes. He argues 
that the framing "allows the author to maintain both a certain community of 
thought and feeling with the persona [of Qoheleth] as well as a certain 
distance" . 16 Hence the frame narrator is there as counsel to the reader to take 
Qoheleth seriously. In other words, readers are more willing to believe this kind 
of presentation, as opposed to "These are stories by ... ,,17 The real author 
thereby hands over (via the introduction and epilogue) the actual presentation to 
the frame narrator. The distance created may be compared to hearing Qoheleth's 
tale told around the proverbial campfire, invariably shifting one's frame of 
reference to story-mode, thereby entering the narrative world of the teller. 
Through the frame narrator, then, an even greater illusion of reality (one distinct 
from a historical reality) is created,18 with one foot in the camp of the real 
author and the other in Qoheleth's, each standing between "reality and fiction".19 
14 For example, the occasional appearances of Rousseau as "editor" in his Julie, ou 
La Nouvelle Heloise ... lend a "guarantee of the editor's trust-worthiness and credibility" 
and "an illusion of reality to the material presented by the editor" (Romberg, Studies in 
the Narrative Technique, p. 77). 
IS This is not to claim that fictional works have any less a claim than non-fictional 
works on the "real world". It is not my concern to touch on this matter here. Suffice to 
say that I think the opposite is usually the case. 
16 Fox, "Frame-narrative", p. 95; cf. also pp. 96, 101. In the end he opts more for 
the distancing effect than that of a "community of thought". 
17 Fox, "Frame-narrative", p. 96. 
18 That is, the force of the illusion strengthens the reality of Qoheleth as a character 
to the reader, and not necessarily the reality of a historical Qoheleth who lived. 
19 So Romberg, discussing frame narratives in general (Studies in the Narrative 
Technique, p. 68). A more modem example of a frame narrative (again given by 
Romberg, pp. 69-70, passim, and used by Fox, "Frame-narrative", pp. 100, 104) which 
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In creating an illusion of authenticity the frame set-up also creates a 
narrative setting in which to imagine the transmission of Qoheleth's words. Fox 
describes this setting as follows: 
... the epic situation of the third-person voice in the epilogue and 
elsewhere is that of a man who is looking back and telling his son the 
story of the ancient wise-man Qohelet, passing on to him words he knew 
Qohelet to have said ... 20 
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Here we are prompted to envisage a dialogic interaction of characters on an epic 
level. The transmission of the story (Qoheleth's words) can be diagrammatically 
represented as follows: 21 
Text 
real author~ IA-+FN--(Q)-+narratee-(FN's son?)-+IR-+ -+real reader 
figure 5. 
Although readers will often confuse the frame narrator with the real author and 
even with the character of Qoheleth himself (a problem I will discuss later), the 
basic frame provides a reference that enables one to perceive a sense of narrative 
strengthens the illusion of reality via the use of a fictional editor is that of Gulliver's 
Travels. In it, the editor is a "third man" between the real author and the implied (on the 
implied author see Chapter 7.4; on the implied reader see 9.5). The real author uses the 
editor to distance himself from the work, giving responsibility to him. That responsibility 
is grave, for it concerns the illusion of authenticity that the work either fails or succeeds 
to create. For the editor has only collected the Travels of Gulliver, and while he hopes 
that the reader will enjoy them, the author uses him to critique even the credibility of 
those tales (the credibility of the author himself) and makes it clear that the editor is 
responsible for the final shape of the book. 
20 "Frame-narrative", p. 91. 
21 In this figure, FN = the frame narrator, Q = Qoheleth, IA = the implied author, 
and IR = the implied reader (the basic diagram appears in Chatman, Story and 
Discourse, p. 151). By "real author" I am referring to the producer(s) of the text. As L. 
Eslinger argues, the term "author" for biblical critics, should include redactors, 
compilators, sources etc.; for to the text's final form all of these contribute ("Narratorial 
Situations in the Bible", in V.L. Toilers and J. Maier [eds.], Mappings o/the Biblical 
Terrain: The Bible as Text [London: Bucknell University Press, 1990], p. 89). For Fox, 
this "author" is the frame narrator (or "epilogist") himself. 
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direction, to place the characters in their appropriate narratorial positions relative 
to each other. 
Although the frame allows readers to effectively "enter" the story, there is 
often a more subversive element at play. As Linda Dittmar notes, "frames 
actually subvert the reassuring function of bracketing. They encourage audiences 
to suspend disbelief but also force them to re-align the parts into new wholes. ,,22 
This is dependent, of course, on the subject matter of both the inner and outer 
stories. When there is incongruity (as the epilogue is often incongruous with the 
body of Qoheleth's narration; see Chapter 5.3) the frame narrator does more than 
foster a believable fiction. The framer sets up the suspension of disbelief and 
leaves space for the reader to question the inner story on its own terms. For the 
one framing is free to question that story fundamentally. Not to question whether 
it is a fiction or not, but to scrutinize the views it endorses. So, while readedy 
disbelief is enabled, so too are all the possibilities of a commentary which can do 
anything from ridicule to celebrate the inner story's hero. 
Since each framing instance carries with it "the significations it has 
acquired through usage and context" ,23 it will be worthwhile to survey some 
biblical and ANE frame narratives which bear a formal resemblance to 
Ecclesiastes. 24 This survey is carried out not so much with the intention of in-
22 "Fashioning and Re-fashioning", p. 191. 
23 Dittmar, "Fashioning and Re-fashioning", p. 190. This description of framing is 
in reference to the often metaphorical function of close-ups and montage in film. 
:u Fox has already drawn a comparison between Ecclesiastes and the biblical frames 
of Deuteronomy and Tobit, as well as eight ANE frames; hence I refer the reader to his 
credible observations and will not add much to them ("Frame-narrative", pp. 92-94; 
reprinted in a shorter form although with additions to the number of texts compared in 
Qohelet, pp. 312-15). Irene Nowell has offered an insightful study of the narrative 
situation in Tobit but adds little to the understanding of the frame there ("The Narrator in 
the Book of Tobit", in OJ. Lull [ed.], SBL 1988 Seminar Papers [Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1988], pp. 27-38; esp. p. 29). Finally, Matt Wiebe has made an extensive analysis 
(more in~epth than Fox's, although to its detriment not compared in any way to 
Ecclesiastes) of fifteen ANE (usually wisdom) frame narratives in comparison to the 
book of Proverbs ("The Wisdom in Proverbs: An Integrated Reading of the Book" 
[ph.D. Dissertation; Sheffield: University of Sheffield, 1982], pp. 9-41). In addition to 
2. Putting the Frame in Place 54 
depth comparison (although this occurs incidentally) as with that of encountering 
the variety of questions raised by frames, questions that are probably the most 
familiar in terms of content (and with the biblical frames, in terms of ideology), 
cultural context and (although not so with all) structure. 
a. Biblical Frame Narratives 
The framing of stories is certainly not foreign to the Old Testament. Several 
examples are worth noting. 
1. Deuteronomy. The story of the Israelites' journeys are re-told to them by 
Moses. However, beyond Moses there is another, anonymous, external frame 
narrator. 2S At times this narrator invokes the "additional" authority of Yahweh 
(29.1; 32.48). The introduction (1.1-5) clearly frames what is to happen: "These 
are the words which Moses spoke to all Israel beyond ['~»~] the Jordan ... in the 
land of Moab, Moses undertook to explain [,ac] this law, saying ... " (1.1, 5). 
The frame narrator is here prompting the reader to (continue to?) imagine the 
dramatic scene of all the people gathered to hear Moses speak "beyond the 
Jordan". 
Within the flow of narration the frame narrator intervenes to provide 
pertinent information. Note, for example, 4.41-43 (after Moses has been 
speaking): "Then [tM] Moses set apart on the east side of the Jordan three cities 
to which a homicide could flee, someone who unintentionally kills another 
person ... Bezer in the wilderness ... [etc.]". This allows the frame narrator to 
Wiebe's list, Fox includes the frames of Nefem, Ipuwer and Duachety. My analysis adds 
to both lists the frames of Job and Sirach. 
2!1 Fox notes that "in Deuteronomy ... there is a voice telling about the chief 
character, looking back on him from an indefinite distance, while remaining itself well in 
the background" ("Frame-narrative", p. 93; italics Fox's). 
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direct the attention of the reader periodically to data relevant to Moses' story26 
(if not relevant to today's readers, plausibly relevant to ancient Israelite readers/ 
hearers). 
The frame narrator controls the perspective throughout while lending the 
book its own stamp of authority. Indeed, the final form of this book has an 
epilogue in which Moses' life is appraised ("Never since has there arisen a 
prophet in Israel like Moses", 34.10a). It is the frame narrator who thereby gains 
the final word, and who is depicted as having ultimate control over the canonical 
form. 27 
2. Job. The lengthy introduction (1.1-2.13) gives a narrative context for all the 
speeches that follow. Also, beyond the introduction, the frame narrator frequently 
offers clear markers of speech (e.g. 25.1; 26.1; 27.1; 29.1).28 This frame set-up 
is much more stylized than that of Deuteronomy. All the relevant markings are 
clear, and sometimes highly interpretive in their content. 
There is a great deal of potential interpretive control allotted to frame 
narrators and it is well exploited here. The infamous closing statement, "And the 
Lord restored the fortunes of Job when he had prayed for his friends ... " 
(42. lOa), may shape the theological emphasis of the entire book. Is the reader 
meant to accept that the many speeches that confound the notion of a clear 
relation between deed and consequence are now nullified? Is the world, after all 
the existential struggle of Job, so simple after all? As will be seen below (Chapter 
26 Cf. 27.1,9, 11; 31.22-25; 32.44-45,48; 33.1. 
27 Similarly, B.S. Childs: "The new interpretation [in the form of the unique, edited 
narrative framework] seeks to actualize the traditions of the past for the new generation 
in such a way as to evoke a response of the will in a fresh commitment to the covenant. 
The present form of the book of Deuteronomy reflects a dominant editorial concern to 
reshape the material for its use by future generations of Israel" (Introduction to the Old 
Testament as Literature [philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989], p. 212). 
28 For a precise narrative outline of the whole book, see D. Clines, Job 1-20 
(WBC, 17; Dallas, TX: Word, 1989), pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. 
2. Putting the Frame in Place 
5), the frame narrator in Ecclesiastes likewise exploits such interpretive 
control.29 
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3. Proverbs. Matt Wiebe has pointed out the resemblance of Proverbs to ANE 
frames. Wiebe acknowledges, however, that this is not so much a formal 
semblance as one of content. The presence of the frame is discerned mainly in 
the superscription (1.1), the narrative setting of a father instructing his son, the 
apologetic and instructional nature of the introductory material, and in the fact 
that "the end of the introduction [9.17-18] and the start of the instruction [10.1-2] 
are marked by a change of focus" . 30 In many ANE frames (and in Ecclesiastes 
as well) the narrative situation is the same; that is, a father narrating to his son 
about wisdom or a hero of wisdom. Such a narrative situation is set up at Prov. 
1.1-8a, and is unbroken until 10.1 where another proverb collection begins 
(i10"W ,"wo is repeated). At this point the narratee(s) seems to have been 
extended beyond the "son" ('~~ is not used again until 19.20, 27). The implied 
audience is emphatically resumed from 23.15 to the end of ch. 29 (with the 
second person of address from 22.17). Chs. 30 and 31, while not obviously 
structurally related to what precedes, may function as competing epilogues to the 
entire book. 31 
It is particularly the paternal narrative relationship (father-son) that 
frames the material in a narrative context, highlighting the way in which wisdom 
29 The closing lines of Hosea may also be noted: "Who is wise, let them understand 
these things. And the discerning, let them know." Such a directive to the reader (to 
understand the book in the context of wisdom, as opposed to prophecy?) has great 
potential in terms of the book's "final say" (cf. Childs, Introduction, pp. 382-83). 
30 "The Wisdom in Proverbs", p. 56. Wiebe's comparison of Proverbs rests on the 
widely held view that ANE instructional literature is characterized by a three-fold form: 
(1) introduction, (2) instruction and (3) epilogue. Further, see below. 
31 According to Wiebe, Agur (ch. 30) and Lemuel (ch. 31) represent two possible 
reactions to the presentation of Wisdom as Woman in Proverbs. While Agur chooses to 
outwardly reject it (30.3-4), Lemuel merely ignores it (his mother fears that his rejection 
will have repercussions [31.2ff.]; "The Wisdom in Proverbs", p. 218, passim). 
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is acquired: through paternal transmission. 
4. Tobit. Compare the opening words of Tobit to those of the Septuagint of 
Ecclesiastes: 
Tobit 1.1: 
BtpAOC; ACYYroV TroPt't, 'to'\) TroPtllA, 'to'\) ~AVavtll'A .. ~1C 't11C; ~AllC; 
NecpaaA,l.. 
Ecclesiastes 1.1: 
c. P1lJ.1a'ta ~ru 11Ot<XCJ'tO'\), uiou AautB, BamAeroc; 'Iapall'A £V 
~IepoooaA 11Jl. 
The identification of the book's content, lineage and location of the main 
characters each occurs in these traditional superscriptions from the frame 
narrators. 32 
In terms of framing there are other affinities with Ecclesiastes. For 
example, Tobit's frame narrator presents Tobit (even "accompanies" him on his 
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journey) while remaining at a distance from him. Also, in both Eccl. 1.12 and 
Tob. 1.3-4 the perspective of old age is introduced which grants to the respective 
narrators a future stance for the telling now of their narratives. 33 Fox further 
notes that the sparsity of the frame narration at the introductions of both works 
accentuates their formal semblance. 34 
The epilogue of Tobit (14.11-15) merely provides biographical 
information and not so much an assessment of the main character as witnessed in 
32 The locale of Tobit's story is in and around Ninevah, which is where the tribe of 
Naphtali have been exiled (l.3ff.). 
33 Further, see Fox, "Frame-narrative", pp. 93-94, and Chapter 1.2, above. That 
there is nothing intervening between the introduction by Tobit's frame narrator and Tob. 
1.3-4 may lend support to o. Loretz's theory of a primary Ich-Erzahlung in Ecclesiastes, 
to which has been added 1.2-11 and other passages (see "Ich-Erzahlung", esp. p. 46). 
Without 1.2-11, Ecclesiastes' introduction formally resembles that of Tobit's. However, 
cf. the comparison of Ecclesiastes to Amenemhet below. 
34 "Frame-narrative", p. 94. 
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other frames. 
5. Sirach. The extensive prologue serves as an introduction that grants, as with 
other frames, a narrative setting for all that will follow. The frame narrator 
literally presents the book: "I found a copy and ... thought it absolutely necessary 
that I should devote diligence and labour ... to the task of completing the book and 
publishing it. ,,35 He also recommends that it be read. In so doing he assumes 
responsibility for the success of the book's reception and readership. 
There is, however, no distinct epilogue to speak of. Instead is found the 
interesting form of biographical summary by the primary narrator himself (51.13-
22), followed by an injunction to pursue wisdom in the same fashion as he had: 
"She [wisdom] is to be found close by. See with your own eyes that I have 
worked but little, and yet have found much rest for myself" (51.26b-27; see also 
51.23-30). The narrative shift (he now addresses himself to the "untaught" 
[a1t<XtS£t>'tOl] of 51.23, as opposed to "my child" [t£1CVOV] from 2.1, passim) 
represents a shift of concern for the way in which wisdom is to be attained; a 
concern the narrator has grounded in his own experience (51. 13-22}. 
b. Ancient Near Eastern Frame Narratives 
In terms of their respective structures, many ANE instructional texts invite 
comparison to Ecclesiastes. As noted above, I refer the reader to Fox's study, 
and will here limit my comparison to three ANE works which bear some of the 
most important likenesses to Ecclesiastes. 
1. Hardjedej. The epilogue and most of the instruction no longer exist, but it is 
credible to posit an epilogue due to the structural similarity of what remains to 
3~ Goodspeed's translation, The Apocrypha, pp. 223-24. 
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other ANE frames. The opening lines bear a striking resemblance to those of 
Ecclesiastes: 
The beginning of the instruction which the prince and commander, the 
king's son Hardjedef made for his son whom he raised up, named Auibre. 
[He] says: Reprove yourself.. .36 
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It is clearly stated that the instruction was made by the prince for his son. This 
differs from Ecclesiastes mainly in that no comparable origin is offered. The 
clarity and presence of transference goes beyond that found in Ecclesiastes. That 
is, since the story's source is less displaced (due to a more precise description of 
its origin) it becomes easier to fix reasons for the inner story's telling. The 
consequences of such an interpretive clue could be far-reaching. 
2. Kagemni. Only a little of the instruction and the whole epilogue remain, but, 
as with Hardjedef, it is reasonable to posit the rest of the structure. The epilogue 
runs as follows: 
The vizier had his children summoned, after he had understood the ways 
of men, their character having become clear to him. Then he said to them: 
"All that is written in this book, heed it as I said it. Do not go beyond 
what has been set down." Then they placed themselves on their bellies, 
they recited it as it was written. It seemed good to them beyond anything 
in the whole land. They stood and sat accordingly. 
Then the majesty of King Huni died; the majesty of King Snerfu was 
raised up as a beneficent king in this whole land. Then Kagemni was 
made mayor of the city and vizier. 
Colophon: It is finished. (AEL, I, p. 60) 
As with Ecclesiastes 12.9-10, the frame narrator begins the epilogue with a 
summary of the main character's life's work (he had understood the ways oj men) 
which, in Kagemni's case, authenticates what he relates to his children. The 
epilogue's function goes beyond that of Ecclesiastes, however, in its summary of 
a narrative context; one which may well have been more thoroughly sketched out 
36 LAE, p. 340. This and a few more lines of instruction are all that is extant from 
several ostraca of the Ramesside period (ibid.). 
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at the introduction of the work. Finally, the epilogue of Kagemni, as with 
I 
Ecclesiastes 12.11-12, implicitly emphasizes the importance of transmitted 
knowledge (heed it as I said it), an emphasis that is key to the tension in 
Qoheleth's relationship to the frame narrator (see Chapter 5.3). 
3. Amenemhet. The introductory lines merit comparison to Ecclesiastes: 
The beginning of the instruction which the majesty of the King of Upper 
and Lower Egypt: Sehetep-ib-Re; the Son of Re: Amenemhet, the 
triumphant, made, when he spoke in a message of truth to his son, the 
All-Lord. He said: 
Thou that hast appeared as a god, hearken to what I have to say to thee ... 
(ANET, p. 418) 
As with other ANE frames, the introductory "he said" sets up the narrative 
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situation of the book. Indeed, as Wiebe points out, the introductory poetic stanzas 
which follow (1.2-11) set up a narrative situation in which Amenemhet will 
deliver his fIrst-person narrative (1. 12ff.).37 The poetic introduction of 
Ecclesiastes (1.4-11) might be structurally comparable, with its preparation of the 
subject matter which will occupy Qoheletb's narration (Le. the absurdity of 
everything-not least the cycles of the physical world described in 1.4-11). 
Apart from the observations I have made in the course of the comparisons, the 
following structural features of ANE instructions also invite comparison with 
Ecclesiastes. 
The frame narrator commonly introduces some king, courier or pharaoh in 
the opening sentences. As with biblical frames, the introductory lines usually 
identify the book itself, and the lineage and location of its main characters. All 
instructions have some form of introduction, some of them lengthy, providing a 
scenario in which to narrate the whole story (e.g. Nelerti,38 Amenemope,39 
37 See Wiebe, "The Wisdom in Proverbs", pp. 16, 70. 
38 ANET, pp. 444-46. 
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Ahiqar,40 Satire of the Trades;41 cf. Job). After the introduction occurs the 
main body of instruction. This often consists of persistent first-person narration 
(Ankhsheshonqy,42 Merikare, 43 Amenemhet) which serves to ground the 
observations of the wise man or courier in experience. After the instruction, an 
epilogue usually completes the work. This often furthers the story of the outer 
frame (Kagemni [depending on extant material], Ptahotep, Merikare, ANY,44 
Amenemope, Papyrus Lansing;45 cf. Job). 
61 
At this point it is interesting to note the conclusions of Katharine Gittes' s 
thorough study of the history of frame narratives. She sees in the earliest (Arabic, 
Greek, medieval [The Decameron in particular]) some common organizing 
principles; in particular, the centrality of wisdom: 
Foremost among these organizing devices is the framing story itself 
... [and] various thematic motifs, most notably the wisdom theme, which 
often centers on secular knowledge and the importance of wit and 
intelligence as a means of survival in the world. No matter what topic 
they discuss, most frame narratives [i.e. outer and inner story together] 
give a full, rounded view of that topic.46 
The wisdom motif is obvious in most of the frames that I have discussed above. 
Often, the inner stories that outer frames encompassed were concerned with the 
quest or narrative journey of a particular hero or heroine of wisdom. Frame 
narrators, according to Gittes, came to embody a kind of corporate character in 
themselves. That is, the frame narrator became a stock type of character which 
authors gradually exploited to a full extent. It is difficult to say whether or not 
the real author of Ecclesiastes was aware of the rich framing tradition of which 
39 ANET, pp. 421-27. 
40 ANET, pp. 427-30. 
41 ANET, pp. 432-34. 
42 AEL, III, pp. 159-84. 
43 ANET, pp. 414-18. 
44 ANET, pp. 420-21. 
4S AEL, II, pp. 167-75. 
46 "The Frame Narrative: History and Theory" (Ph.D. Dissertation; San Diego: 
University of California, 1983), p. 188; cf. p. vii. 
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he formed a part. Knowingly or not, however, there is a commonality of theme, 
purpose and rhetorical effect witnessed in even the most dissimilar of ancient 
frames. 
3. The Production oj Narrative Levels 
For the sequential reader of Ecclesiastes the frame narration is primary. That is, 
up until Qoheleth commences his own words, he only exists within the 
parameters which the frame narrator's description allows. But from his 
announcement at l.1-2 emerges a narrative product: a story within a story. A 
person is telling a story in which a person is telling a story. Those stories have 
the same "hero" (Le. a central narrating character): Qoheleth. The frame 
narrator's Qoheleth is reflecting and looking back. His Qoheleth is reflecting on a 
younger Qoheleth; one who is experiencing and learning. Qoheleth is at once two 
characters: one experiencing, one reflecting. 47 
This I now and I then embedded in the narrative level was a strategy 
chosen by Virginia Woolf for her own memoirs. She described the reason for her 
choice as follows: 
I think ... I have discovered a possible form for my [memoirs]. That is, to 
make them include the present-at least enough of the present to serve as 
platform to stand upon. It would be interesting to make the two people I 
now, I then, come out in contrast. And further, this past is much affected 
by the present moment. 48 
In her article on framing narratives, Judith Summerfield, after citing this passage, 
goes on to flesh out the idea by discussing Richard Wright's Black Boy: 
47 Fox discerns two levels of narration: levell, the frame narrator, who tells us 
about level 2a, Qoheleth the reporter; who in tum is the narrating "I" looking back from 
the vantage point of old age upon level 2b, Qoheleth the seeker; who is the experiencing 
"I", the younger Qoheleth "who made the fruitless investigation introduced in 1: 12 f. " 
("Frame-narrative", p. 91). 
48 Summerfield citing Woolfs Moments of Being: Unpublished Writing, 1976 
("Framing Narratives", p. 231; italics Summerfield's). 
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[Wright] constructed a text; he framed an event-from a vantage point 
years later, when he was a spectator of his past life. And the entire 
autobiography moves between the I then and the I now; the "participant" 
in things as they are happening; the spectator-out-Iooking back and 
reflecting upon, evaluating: the in and the out became the frame for the 
entire text. 49 
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This framing by recollection occurs simultaneously in the told text and the teller's 
text. In the same way the contrast is created with/by Qoheleth. That is, the 
duality of his now and then allows him to include his present while being acutely 
aware and critical of his past. It also allows him to "redeem" the folly of his 
youth from a more mature narrative stance (see Chapter 9.5). This effect of 
narrative level is partly due to the structure of the frame narrative. 
These levels may be precisely described in narratological terms. It begins 
with the act of writing; the "literary event" we attribute to the author.so All 
events within the act of writing belong to the first (diegetic) level of narration. 
The first level of narration in Ecclesiastes is the frame narrator's. The frame 
narrator is external to Qoheleth as the author is external to the frame narrator. 
Just as Qoheleth makes no reference to the frame narrator, the frame narrator 
makes no reference to the author; that is, the person or group who is identified as 
writing. The frame narrator's access to information, then, is unquestioned: there 
is no source outside of his own story to be questioned (although we can identify 
parts as borrowed from elsewhere, such as the Solomonic element etc.). The very 
effect of such levels is that readers easily forget their presence. 
4. Narrative Level as a Cause of Amnesia 
Because of his position (in regard to narrative level) Qoheleth is made more 
accessible to the reader than is the frame narrator. That is, "[while the frame 
narrator is] existentially immune to conditions that will govern characters within 
49 "Framing Narratives", p. 232 (italics Summerfield's). 
!!O See Genette, Narrative Discourse, pp. 247-48. 
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the story-world and readers in the real" ,51 Qoheleth is not so immune. He is 
what Lyle Eslinger calls "epistemologically limited". His internal position 
ensures that his story-world is limited to the narration of another character 
(Qoheleth has been framed!). As such, Qoheleth's world is easily entered. Not 
only is the frame narrator inviting the reader there, but he is providing the 
premises of a story-world, with all its epistemological limits. Qoheleth is thereby 
placed firmly in the story-world he narrates-within its "spatial and temporal 
bounds" . 52 Everything said at that level becomes relevant to that narrator's 
"ontological ties to the story world and his motivation to narrate is also 
conditioned by the bond". 53 The relationship is not two-way, and this is why 
frame narrators are in such powerful interpretive positions. The frame narrator is 
essentially immune to the "inhabitants" (actors) or events of Qoheleth's narrative 
level. Whether or not Qoheleth will succeed in his quest can be of no real 
consequence to the frame narrator. 
The frame narrator's act of relating Qoheleth's words is easily forgotten 
as one reads (even the intrusion at 7.27 can pass unnoticed). Therefore, what is 
in reality an inner level of story (what Genette would term an intradiegetic level) 
"becomes" a pseudo-primary level of story (pseudo-diegetic). Qoheleth as 
narrator "takes over" the frame narrator's function as the primary (diegetic) 
narrator. This is one way in which Qoheleth is loosed from the epistemological 
bounds imposed by the frame narrator. 
This effect occurs in the much-quoted example of Arabian Nights. 
Scheherazade is threatened with death by her husband the king and occupies him 
with stories every night to preserve her life. Each of the stories has its own 
narrator/characters which in tum tell stories, until eight narrative levels are 
51 Eslinger, discussing biblical narrative situations in general ("Narratorial Situations 
in the Bible", p. 80). 
52 Eslinger, "Narratorial Situations in the Bible", p. 79. 
53 Eslinger, "Narratorial Situations in the Bible", p. 79. 
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created. That the intradiegetic level causes the king to forget this shift of level is 
crucial to Scheherazade's well-being, and therefore, to the outfolding of her 
diegetic narrative. 54 While the diegetic level of Ecclesiastes is not bound to its 
intradiegetic level to such an extent, the "forgetfulness" of the reader is 
analogous. It is because we are drawn into Qoheleth's narrative that we forget the 
previous level of narration. Note Genette's comments about the pseudo-diegetic 
narrator of Proust's Jeunes Filles en Fleurs: 
... the evocation forgets its memory-elicited pretext and to the last line 
unfolds on its own account as direct narrative, so that many readers do not 
notice the spatio-temporal detour that gave rise to it and think it a simple 
isodiegetic [of the same narrative level] "return backward" without a 
change in narrative level. 5S 
Until Qoheleth's narrative has reached its end, readers may either forget the 
frame narrator altogether or see him and Qoheleth as equally diegetic. In this 
way, Qoheleth, by loosing his epistemological bounds, becomes as "free" (and 
hence enigmatic) a character as the frame narrator. Just as Scheherazade is set 
free by the king's forgetfulness, so Qoheleth is liberated by the reader's. 
54 See Bal, Narratology, pp. 143-44. 
ss Narrative Discourse, p. 240. 
Chapter 3 
THE OUTER BORDERS: I 
1. The Superscription (1.1) 
The words of Qoheleth, son of David, king in Jerusalem. 
This verse is often referred to as the "title" of Ecclesiastes. It conforms to a 
common Old Testament narrative device l which might more properly be called a 
superscription. Superscriptions have a function analogous to that of titles. They 
are often descriptive and/or an abstraction of the content of the text which they 
are heading. Often, a title contains pertinent biographical information, offering 
the reader a context of identity and place. In modem fiction, for example, the 
function of the title is potentially considerable. As Wayne Booth remarks, titles 
"are often the only explicit commentary the reader is given: The Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, The Sun Also Rises" and so on.2 A superscription may 
do this and more. To • superscribe " is to write over or above, and by extension, 
outside of. All of the frame narrator's text is, in this sense, a superscription. A 
title is a name. A superscription is a description which, at least in this case, lends 
a certain authority. While the frame narrator obviously supplies more explicit 
commentary at 12.9-14, he makes it clear here that what you are about to read 
has the ·stamp" of authenticity and of kingship. 
a. Whose Superscription is it Anyway? 
The set of constructs at 1.1 does, of course, belong to a narrative voice. But 
1 Eg. Jer. 1.1; Amos 1.1; Zeph. 1.1. 
2 Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 198 n. 25. 
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"whose"? Qoheleth's? One of many redactors? The frame narrator's? The first 
suggestion (Qoheleth) is ruled out by 1.2. That is, since the reference to Qoheleth 
in the third person at 1.2 is not self-referentiae it is likely that the same holds 
for 1.1. The second suggestion (redactors) is not likely since there is nothing to 
suggest any editing beyond that of the frame narrator's own activity at this 
stage.4 That is, there is no reason to posit another voice. Given the correlation 
of 1.1 to 12.10 (see below), and the lack of any narrative contradiction in voice, 
temporal stance or level between 1.1 and 1. 2, I suggest that 1.1-2 is narrated in 
one voice: the frame narrator's. To be precise, then, the superscription is not 
Qoheleth's text. Qoheleth is, as in the rest of the book, an actor. In all but the 
frame narrator's text he is also a narrator. But here he is only an actor in another 
narrator's text. This makes "his" words here a narrative act. As Mieke Bal puts 
it: "In the narrator's text the words of the actor are not represented as text, but 
as an act."s 
So, what kind of "actor" is Qoheleth? The frame narrator's presentation 
of him in 1.1 is of a ready-made character, with limitations immediately set for 
the reader. Qoheleth is a son of David, a king and is in Jerusalem. 6 As such, all 
3 Clearly, 1.2 is the frame narrator's voice with Qoheleth's only in indirect speech. 
The other grammatical third-person references (7.27; 12.8) favour this. When Qoheleth 
wants to be self-referential he is more evidently so (cf. 1.16; 2.1, 2, 15; 3.17, 18; 6.3; 
7.23; 8.14; 9. 16-half of these "speech" events are intensely personal: e.g. "I said in 
my heart", 2.1, 15; 3.17, 18 [1.16, with my heart]; on such idioms which may denote 
self-reflection, see DCH, p. 324). Also, see Fox, "Frame-narrative", pp. 84-87, and 
Chapter 8 below. 
4 As Fox points out (contra Galling), there is no reason to limit the original 
superscription to "Words of Qoheleth" (which would suggest that the rest of 1.2 was 
added by an editor to better harmonize with what was already present that identifies 
Qoheleth-1.12, 16 etc.). Fox argues that the royal fiction was too rooted in the text for 
this to be likely (Qohelet, pp. 166-67). We should also ask ourselves why we might be 
willing to grant such "cleverness" to a redactor for his ability to harmonize and not to a 
"single hand" (on the question of the composition of the w~ole as regards the frame, see 
Chapter 6). 
S Bal, Narratology, p. 142 (italics Bal's). 
6 This last qualification has been sorely overlooked as a geographical narrative 
backdrop for what follows. It creates a fictional locale in which to understand this 
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his actions and observations are set in a particular context. They mayor may not 
betray the conventional behaviour expected of the son of David, king in 
Jerusalem. Like framing itself, this creates a boundary by which we read. It is an 
interpretive boundary. If what we read violates our boundaries a certain meaning 
is created in that process. Not only does the frame narrator, in a quasi-physical 
sense, limit what the reader sees of Qoheleth, he sets the initial boundaries of his 
character. These are boundaries which the reader mayor may not choose to 
expand (or narrow even further) as a result of his or her sequential reading 
and/or previous conceptions of king, son of David and so forth. 
As a character, no more need be said in the form of explicit commentary 
about Qoheleth. It is when the content of this story has passed, and the final 
depiction of Qoheleth in the epilogue (12.9-10) is given, that the elements of his 
character manifested collide and collage to form a unique, round picture. For 
now, the frame narrator's Qoheleth is far more flat. That is, it lacks the "ability" 
to deviate from a given set of characteristics or particular expectations. 
b. Eventual Implication 
As I have already noted, the superscription utilizes a common formula. Compare 
Provo 1.1: 
The proverbs of Solomon, son of David, king of Israel.' 
As in Proverbs, the descriptions of Qoheleth in the frame narrator's 
superscription are all static and not actantial. That is, while in this conventional 
mode of Hebrew syntax there is no explicit verbal form, there is a sense in which 
narrative. The backdrop is reiterated throughout Ecclesiastes: "Jerusalem" (1.12, 16; 
2.7, 9). Possible allusions to Jerusalem as a narrative backdrop are 5.1 (house of God = 
the temple?); 5.8 (the province = Judea?); 5.9 (a land with a king = Israel/Jerusalem?); 
8.10 (holy place = temple?; the city = Jerusalem?); 10.16-17 (a land with a king = 
Israeli Jerusalem?). Furthermore, there is no other explicit geographical reference but 
Jerusalem. 
7 Cf. Cant. 1.1 for another Solomonic ascription. 
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actions are implied. The phrase ""q:l obviously alludes to Qoheleth's birth. 
An implication of the activity of ruling is implied by the phrase Cc,tli,,':l ,c,~ . 
A verb of speech is implied in the construct nc,itp-":l" and refers to the event 
of communicating in his narrative. This activity fmds its functional counterpart in 
12.lOa: 
Qoheleth sought to fmd words of delight, and with integrity he wrote 
words of truth. 
At 1.1 the narrative act is implied, signified, but here (12. lOa) the active quality 
of Qoheleth' s communication is stressed and the means of it (being only implicit 
at 1.1) are made explicit. One could amplify 1.1: "These are the words which 
Qoheleth, son of David, king in Jerusalem, communicated." A wood engraving 
by Stefan Mart.in illustrates this declaratory aspect well .8 It shows Qoheleth (as 
King Solomon) holding a Hebrew "scroll" with the words of 1.1-2a written on 
it: 
figure 5. 
8 From J. Blumenthal (designer), Ecclesiastes, or The Preacher. 
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In his sketch Martin has recognized the allusion to activity in linguistically static 
constructions. In his reading he has taken words as signifiers of activity and 
enlarged their meaning. To take an example, the signified of r'I"MP-"~' is 
concise and of a particular nature. The phrase is comparable to what Barthes calls 
a "cover word": 
... the closing logic which structures a sequence [of activity] is inextricably 
linked to its name [Le. the "cover word" which signifies that sequence]; 
any function which initiates [for example] a seduction prescribes, from the 
moment it appears, in the name to which it gives rise, the entire process 
of seduction such as we have learned it from all the narratives which have 
fashioned in us the language of narrative. 9 
In a similar way, r'I"MP-"~' assumes a sequence of events. As an act which 
initiates the communication to follow, it signifies the "entire process of 
[communicating] ... such as we have learned it from all the narratives which have 
fashioned in us the language of narrative II • 10 
2. Plot and Desire at 1.1-2 
Published authors cannot escape the reality that they, in some sense, "have the 
reader in mind". That is, by the act of publishing the author in effect says III 
desire to communicate." No matter how IIpure" (Le. devoid of explicit 
indications of the desire to communicate) or avant garde the work is, every 
published literary work is evidenced by a common denominator: the desire of its 
9 "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives", in Image, Music, Text (ed. 
and trans. S. Heath; London: Fontana Press, 1977), p. 102 (italics mine). 
10 It is particularly tempting at this juncture to suggest that r'I"MP-"~' may signify 
more than speech; i.e., acts in general. Elsewhere, "~, in a noun construct often 
signifies what a character did (so of Solomon, 1 Kgs 11.41; Jerobo'am, 1 Kgs 14.19; 
Rehobo'am, 1 Kgs 14.29; cf. 1 Kgs 15.7, 23, 31; 16.5, 14, 20, 27; 22.39). Yet the 
constructs found at Prov. 30.1 and 31.1 suggest that, however tempting this may be for 
my own argument, it is unlikely that the construct signifies acts in Ecc1. 1.1. The idea 
particularly collapses in lieu of both Qoheleth's use of ,~, (5.2-3, 7; 9.17; 10.12 etc.; 
however, cf. the ambiguity of 1.8, 10; 8.1) and the frame narrator's later description of 
Qoheleth as one who sought to find r£)n-"~' (12.10). 
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author to be read. l1 In Ecclesiastes, that desire to communicate is more explicit 
than not. The frame narrator's narrative act is a focal point by nature of its 
location and his implicit desire is to communicate Qoheleth's words and not his 
own per se. This is integral to another feature of this narrative movement, the 
plot. 
The narrative act of 1.1 plainly suggests that the content of the words of 
Qoheleth are to follow. This prepares the sequential reader for the later events of 
Qoheleth's narrated experience. As such, that narrated experience is made 
possible (at least in the frame narrator's story-world) by the kernel narrative act 
of 1.1. The frame narrator's quotation of Qoheleth at 1.2 is part of this kernel as 
well. As Edwin Good, in his careful reading of Eccl. 1.2-11, observes, 
The sententious "says Qoheleth," followed by the repetition of hllbll 
hllbdlim not only underscores the phrase's importance but also makes us 
wonder what is going to be said about it and to what it will be attributed. 
The repetition of the phrase ... intensifies the expectation that it will be 
applied to something ... 12 
The frrst action of Qoheleth' s referred to is the narrative speech-act of 1. 2. By 
means of this and the superscription it becomes clear that Qoheleth' s character 
(Le. the evolution and manifestation of it in his "own" words) is to be the 
principal concern of what follows. This is a thrust behind much modem fiction. 
That is, to break away from the traditional notions of the beginning-middle-end 
procedure of the novel, not relying on the "primitive" desire to know ·what 
11 That this is a common denominator of literary works is convincingly argued by 
Wayne Booth, "True Art Ignores the Audience", in Rhetoric of Fiction, pp. 89-116. 
12 liThe Unfilled Sea: Style and Meaning in Ecclesiastes 1 :2-11", in J. Garnmie et 
al. (eds.), Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien 
(Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), p. 63. Good further defines the notion of 
expectancy he works with (and that I imply), which is worth quoting: ..... something in 
the work first sets up in the reader a tendency to respond, arouses the expectation of a 
consequent, then inhibits the tendency, and finally brings the (or an) expected 
consequent" (p. 62). While Good applies this principle only to the reading of 1.2-11, it 
can easily be extended to an expectancy aroused concerning the entire narrative strategy 
of Ecclesiastes. 
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happens next". 13 Instead, a plot may have as the centre of its narrative logic the 
revelation of character. Hence the expectancy aroused concerns a character's 
development through what it says and/or does and not necessarily how it interacts 
and develops in relation to others. 
This is not to say that there cannot emerge from such a plot more 
traditional ("primitive"?) qualities of narratives such as suspense and resolution. 
The expectancy created here is not immediately fulfilled, and is certainly not 
fulfilled, as Good points out, in 1. 3_11.14 Indeed, it creates a gap which can 
only be filled by the subsequent development of Qoheleth's character in both the 
frame narrator's and Qoheleth's mainly independent narratives. The way in which 
that character-oriented plot develops will be discussed in detail in Chapters 8 and 
9. The point for now is that such a plot commences in the full narrative 
movement of the frame narrator at 1.1-2. 
13 E.M. Forster has humorously depicted this "primitive" desire: "A ['modem'] 
plot cannot be told to a gaping audience of cavemen or to a tyrannical sultan or to their 
modem descendant the movie-public. They can only be kept awake by 'and then-and 
then-' they can only supply curiosity. But a plot demands intelligence and memory also" 
(Aspects of the Novel, p. 94). 
14 "The Unfilled Sea", pp. 71-72. 
Excursus 1 
QOHELETH AND THE MEANING OF '~M 
What shall I do with this absurdity-
o heart, 0 troubled heart-this caricature, 
Decrepit age that has been tied to me 
As to a dog's tail? 
-W.B. Yeats ("The Tower", pt 1) 
Before discussing the main passages in which the frame narrator appears, it 
would be wise to address the likely meaning(s) of ':lM, the most crucial key 
word for both Qoheleth and the frame narrator (in 1.2, for example, ':lM, in 
singular or plural form, constitutes five of the eight words). This brief excursus 
will aid both the narrative investigation at hand (in that it brings the content of 
what is narrated into sharper definition) and the investigation as a whole. The aim 
is not so much to establish some relationship between intent and meaning, but 
rather to establish the biblical semantic range within which ':lM likely operates, 
particularly as a signifier of judgment. 
1. ':lM outside Ecclesiastes 
In the Old Testament, excluding Ecclesiastes, at least eight distinct connotations 
of '~M may be found. They are, in descending order of frequency: 
A) breath/vapour (8X)1 
B) idols (8x)2 
C) worthless/false (7x)3 
I Pss. 39.6[5], 7[6], 12[11]; 62.10[9]; 94.11; 144.4; Provo 21.6 Isa. 57.13. This 
meaning, according to D. Seybold, is attested by "later Aramaic dialects that were 
influenced partly by the OT", and might suggest an onomatopoeic word formation in the 
Hebrew ("hebhel", mOT, III, p. 313). 
2 Deut. 32.21; 1 Kgs 16.13, 26; Ps. 31.8; Jer. 8.19; 10.8; 14.22; Jon. 2.9[8]. 
3 Jer. 16.19; 23.16; derivative ('»',:lM): 1 Sam. 25.25; 2 Sam. 16.7; 1 Kgs 21.13; 
noun and verb constructs (":lM" ':lMM): 2 Kgs 17.15; Jer. 2.5. 
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D) no purpose/useless (6x)4 
E) futile (4xi 
F) nothing/empty (3x)6 
G) fleeting (1 x: Job 7.16) 
H) deceptive in appearance (1 x: Prov. 31.30) 
Although there are some borderline cases in the distinctions I have made,? each 
occurrence shares the fact that it constitutes a judgment or is integral to one. In 
each case something is usually judged to be "~l"1. 8 Take, for example, Jer. 
16.19: "The nations will come and say, 'Our Fathers inherited lies, nothing! 
["~l"1], and there is no profit in them [i.e. lies, ,pru].'" Here it is lies that are 
associated with "~l"1 (which I take to mean, in this context, "false" or 
"worthless"). And in all of the biblical occurrences something obviously false or 
futile, empty etc., is likened to or actually named (e.g. Ps. 94.11) "~l"1. The 
judgments are both explicit (e.g. Jer. 16.19) and implicit (e.g. Jer. 10.15; Zech. 
10.2). 
In each of its occurrences, "~l"1 is negative in connotation; that is, 
negative in a literal sense-denouncing something as negative in contrast to that 
which is potentially positive (e.g. true versus false [Jer. 16.19; 23.16]; useful 
versus useless [Isa. 30.7]; consoling words versus empty words [Job 21.34; cf. 
Zech. 10.2]; substantial versus insubstantial [Ps. 94.11; Prov. 21. 6]). The 
opposites are, of course, usually implied. Take, for example, Provo 30.31a: 
'£I'l"1 "~m lMl"1 ,pru 
Charm is deceitful and beauty deceptive. 
4 Job 27.12; Isa. 49.4; Jer. 10.3; 10.15; Lam. 4.17; Zech. 10.2. 
s Job 9.29; Pss. 62.10[11]; 78.33; Isa. 30.7. 
6 Job 21.34; 35.16; Provo 13.11. 
7 For example, Ps. 78.33 could connote "futility" or "vapour", and it is unclear to 
me whether Lam. 4.17 suggests "having no purpose" or "futility". 
8 So also, Seybold: "the term expresses an evaluation of people or things ... [and 
usually] accomplishes a (negative) qualification" ("hebhel", p.. 314). It is worth noting in 
relation to this fact that a "~l"1 ("idol") may itself be judged "~l"1 (Jer. 2.5; furthermore, 
see below) and any association with idols judged disobedient (Deut. 32.21). 
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Here chann qnm is on a par with beauty ('~'M). Both were (in the author's 
opinion) sought after by the women of his day. This is borne out by the next 
contrasting stich: "But a woman who fears Yahweh is to be praised" (3D.31b). 
While some women might seek "~M (in the fonn of beauty) they are, it is 
implied, to be abhorred, for it is the woman who fears Yahweh who is to be 
praised. Both "~M and ,pW are negative "opposites" of the fear of Yahweh. 
There is often a textual link between what is "~M and what is idolatrous 
(such as customs etc.).9 The connection is apparent when the Q'''~M ("idols") 
themselves are considered futile or worthless. At 2 Kgs 17.15 this is especially 
evident: 
... and they went after idols and became false [or" ... after worthlessness 
and became worthless"]. (cf. Jer. 2.5) 
Any association here with the tl'''~M is "~M. 
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Perhaps what is most striking (in relation to Ecclesiastes) is the sheer and 
consistent quality of negation in each occurrence of the word regardless of 
dissimilar contexts and referentiality. If we grant that words acquire multifarious 
colourings through usage, and all the import of their fonner contexts (albeit only 
those known to the reader), then the biblical use of "~M fonned a paradoxically 
rich while bleak background, a blackboard of negativity on which Qoheleth could 
sketch his own nuances of his key word. 10 
2. "~M in Ecclesiastes 
As I have pointed out, all the uses of "~M outside Ecclesiastes constitute a 
9 See Jer. 10.1-15 in which "~M occurs 3x. 
10 Compare T. Polk's comments: "Words do not work [as empty ciphers] at all... 
Everywhere the connotation of hebel is thoroughly negative" ("The Wisdom of Irony: A 
Study of Hebel and its Relation to Joy and Fear of God in Ecclesiastes", SBTh 6/1 
[1976], p. 8). 
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judgment or are integral to one. The same holds true in Ecclesiastes. There is, 
however, a major difference. None of the ":l;' judgments outside of Ecclesiastes 
claim that since something is, for example, useless, it is therefore ":l;'. While 
beauty may be ":l;' (Prov. 31.30a), the fact that something is beautiful is not 
(necessarily) ":l;'. Only things, not situations, are ":l;'. The signifieds of ":l;' 
outside of Ecclesiastes do not include states of affairs within their scope of 
judgmentll-nor do they include, globally, "everything". It seems, then, that 
Qoheleth used the term quite unconventionally, for twenty-one of the thirty-eight 
occurrences in his book are judgments on situations. 12 Those twenty-one 
occurrences can be classified into two types: 1) it is ,,~;, that there is a divorce 
between deed and consequence in a certain situation (14x),13 and 2) it is ":l;' 
that a situation is the way it is (7 x). 14 
Here is an example of the first type, a divorce between deed and 
consequence (2.15): "And I said in my heart, 'As is the fate of the fool, so it will 
befall me. Why then have I become exceedingly wise?' So I said in my heart that 
this too was ":l;'." There is a disparity here. Qoheleth has become wise and he 
(as the reader is invited to) assumes that his fate should be different from the 
fool. There is no apparent logical relationship between (i.e. there is a "divorce" 
between) deed (becoming wise) and consequence (having the same fate as the 
11 As Fox argues, ":l;' in Ecclesiastes is used to report "facts" about the world at 
large, and outside of Ecclesiastes it is the lamentation psalms which come closest to this, 
but even these are very personal in nature and their scope does not extend to the world 
(Qohelet, p. 93). Similarly, see G. Ogden, "'Vanity' it Certainly is Not", BT38/3 
(1987), pp. 302-304, 306-307. 
12 I include neither the judgments with ":m as referent (see below) nor the strictly 
adjectival qualification of nouns or noun groups (5.7; 6.11,12; 9.9; 11.10). While 7.15 
could arguably belong to the latter category, I extend its scope to that of an implied 
judgment (Le. of the situation which immediately follows it-see below). It is worth 
noting that the semantic usage of ":l;' adjectivally in Ecclesiastes is similar to the more 
"common" usage of ":l;' elsewhere (cf. Job 7.16; Pss. 39.6[7]; 94.11; Isa. 30.7). As in 
the Psalter, these adjectival usages are not concerned with situations. 
13 2.15, 19,21,26; 4.7-8a (2x), 16; 5.10; 6.2; 7.15-16 (implied); 8.12a, 14 (2x); 
9.1-3. 
14 2.23; 4.4, 8b; 3.19; 6.9; 7.6; 8.11. 
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fool: death [2 . 16b]). The divorce is ':1'1. 
Here is an example of the second type, that a situation is the way it is 
(4.4): "And I observed that all toil and all skilful activity is the result of's one 
man's envy of another [tD"M""n~i']. This too is ':M and a pursuit of wind." 
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The situation is stated plainly: toil and activity are the result of envy. This is 
':M. In texts demonstrating this second type, Qoheleth literally calls things as he 
sees them, and this helps to form the core of the book's undisputed observational 
quality. He rarely if ever offers a response to such comments; his point instead is 
simply to elucidate the realities observed. And here lies the difference between 
the two types: while the first is demonstrated by a "divorce", the second is 
simply stated. In the second type, the divorce is assumed and not shown. 
What English word might therefore best encapsulate ':M in Ecclesiastes? 
One clue comes from a uniquely existential quality of Qoheleth's use of the word. 
With it, Qoheleth describes his most intensely personal experiences and yet 
relates them to a much wider scope of judgment. With this existential quality in 
mind, Michael Fox chooses to render the term by "absurd". Drawing on the 
work of Albert Camus, Fox defines "absurdity" thus: 
The essence of the absurd is a disparity between two phenomena that are 
supposed to be joined by a link of harmony or causality but are actually 
disjunct or even conflicting ... [quoting Camus:] L'absurde est 
essentiellement un divorce. 11 n'est ni dans l'un ni dans l'autre des 
elements compares. 11 nait de leur confrontation. 16 
The severance of deed from consequence, Fox argues, is explicit in Qoheleth's 
text itself: 
IS I take the particle .,~ here to have this resultant force (so Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 
p. 38; cf. Provo 14.30: "The bones rot [:1"] as the result of ['~] envy [Mlp]"). 
16 Qohelet, p. 31 (Camus quote from Le My the de Sisyphe). C.B. Peter has offered a 
far less-convincing comparison than Fox's of Camus to Qoheleth, although he does 
manage to create some ground for analogy between what he calls "Camusian Absurdity" 
and "Ecclesiastesan Vanity" ("In Defence of Existence: A Comparison Between 
Ecclesiastes and Albert Camus", BTF 12 [1980], pp. 26-43; esp. p. 40). Further on 
existentialism in Ecclesiastes, see Excursus 2. 
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What is crooked [rm,Q] cannot be made straight 
and what is lacking cannot be counted. (1.15) 
Consider the activity of God: 
For who is able to make straight 
what he has made crooked [,rm,]? (7.13) 
In this twisting (rm" "to twist, pervert") "is the severance of deed from 
consequence, which severance strips human deeds of their significance" . 17 
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This definition works well with the fourteen occurrences of the first type. 
However, the seven occurrences of the second type might best be translated 
"futile". In the example of 4.4 it is surely futile (or "of no purpose", "in vain") 
that all toil is the result of envy. The reader can only assume that Qoheleth 
thought it absurd as well. This is because the relation of deed and consequence 
can only be assumed, for there are no real deeds mentioned (no history, no 
events). Rather, the reader is expected to accept Qoheleth's opinion that all toil 
and all skilful activity have questionable motives. Furthermore, the reader is 
expected to assume that the deed (or "work"?) of envy (for Qoheleth an 
unquestioned reality) should not have toil as a consequence. Indeed, it is the 
consequence itself which is judged to be "~rt. 
There are related considerations that affect the choice of translation. For 
example, "~,, is closely connected to several other words or phrases that colour 
its meaning at particular pointS. I8 The proximity has led most scholars to 
assume a degree of semantic overlap between "~rt and such phrases as "a 
17 Fox, Qohelet, p. 47. 
18 It is important to note, however, that when "~rt is coupled with a phrase such as 
"a great evil" (e.g. 2.21, ~, rtl", "~,, "rCl) the culminative effect is metaphorical 
and not a strict equation of the two phrases. That is, one phrase is not used to qualify the 
other, but they are used together as a kind of collective metaphor to describe something 
else. For example, in 2.21 the two phrases together qualify the lamentable situation of 
leaving one's portion to someone who did not toil for it (2.21a). The phrases there 
clearly do not qualify each other. This frees the semantic field of "~,, to be defined by 
its referents (situations, concepts etc.) and not by other concrete phrases (furthermore, 
see Seybold, "hebhel", p. 315). 
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grievous ill"19 and "an evil ("wretched"?) occupation" .20 The most important of 
these phrases are m, 1"I,~,21 and n" l"~" 22 Both 1"1'~' and l"~' 
occur only in Ecclesiastes and are probably derived from the same root, ~~,. 
What that root means, however, is the problem. I will not rehearse all the options 
here,23 suffice to say that I am in agreement with the wide consensus (as 
witnessed by some modem translations: RSV, NIV, NRSV, NASB) and some 
linguistic testimony, 24 to translate "pursuit". More simply, I take m" when 
used with ':1~, to mean "wind" .25 The proposed translation of 1"1'~' and 
l"~" if correct, supports this translation of m, {the idea of pursuing one's 
"breath", for example, is difficult to imagine).26 In relation to ,~~, a "pursuit 
of wind", implying as it does a vexatious chore,27 can have no positive import 
and complements the sheer negativity of the word. 
The notion of "absurdity" to which I have thus far made reference is 
strictly intellectual. A divorce within the logical process is just that and nothing 
more. Yet couplings of ,~~ with phrases such as "a grievous ill" and so on, 
19 ~, ',n; "~ ~~2.17; 5.13, 15; 6.2. 
20 ~, l'l~-2.21; 4.8; 6.1-2; cf. 1.13; 4.3-4; 9.3; 10.5. 
21 Appearing with ,~~ at 1.14; 2.11, 17, 26; 4.4; 6.9. It occurs once on its own as 
a n" "judgment" at 4.6. 
22 Appearing with ,~~ at 4.16, and on its own in a n" "judgment" at 1.17. 
23 For this see the commentaries, particularly that of G.A. Barton for the translation 
tradition (Ecclesiastes [ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1959 [1908]), pp. 85-86). 
24 Admittedly this form could either derive from a verb common in Aramaic meaning 
"to desire" or from ~~, ("to shepherd" etc., the participle of which denotes "shepherd" 
at 12.11). The latter word is used specifically of tending animals (Gen. 4.2; 37.2 etc.) 
and more generally of grazing and pasture (Gen. 41.2; Job 24.2; Isa. 5.17 etc.). In any 
case it is plausible that an ironic sense lies dormant in the morphological assonance of 
both l"~' and 1"1'~' with the biblical ~~, (other possible forms include '~', 1"1'~', 
t:I,~,). Compare LXX'S rendering of ~~, in Ecclesiastes, 1tpoa1.pem~, which suggests 
an action involving a deliberate choice and, by extension, striving or pursuit. 
2S A related word such as "vapour", however, might work as well and would not 
take away from the inherent negativity of the phrase which I will suggest. 
26 For other meanings of n" in Ecclesiastes, see Chapter 8.4. 
rI Qoheleth significantly tags the phrase to an observation on the futility of labour: 
"Better a handful with rest than two handfuls with toil and a pursuit of wind" (4.6; cf. 
1.6). 
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carry a moral aspect (an aspect shared with uses outside Ecclesiastes). Obviously, 
», has moral overtones, and situations that are denounced as '':IT'l Qoheleth often 
clearly regards to be evil or unjust in themselves.28 Can the notion of absurdity 
be therefore extended to include the moral aspect? Yes, but this entails a choice. 
While it is probable that most readers consider what is absurd to be not good 
(»'), the word's intellectual sense allows the reader to choose to ignore its moral 
aspect. 
The choice to render '':IT'l by "absurd" (as with nearly every other 
rendering of '':IT'l) has been contested. For example, Daniel Fredericks (who opts 
for translating '':IT'l as "breath"), after surveying Fox's arguments, writes that 
we should not settle too soon for such despairing attempts to explain the 
complexities of a Qoheleth; rather perhaps there is a biblical meaning to 
hebel, contemporary with its composition, that would explain Qoheleth 
with greater coherency. 29 
Fredericks's objections are puzzling. Why can we not presume that the 
philosophical notion of absurdity was "contemporary" with Qoheleth's 
experience? What reason is there to nullify the use of "absurd" outside of its 
explication in, for example, Camus? There is none. Camus had sought to 
explicate an experience which he saw common to everyone. He (like Qoheleth) 
did not limit his own observations to a historical setting or movement.30 
What of other suggested meanings and translations for ":lM? One of the 
most interesting, coming from Edwin Good (followed notably by T. Polk), is that 
28 So esp. 1.13-14; 2.23; 8.14; cf. 7.6-7. 
29 D. Fredericks, Coping with Transience: Ecclesiastes on Brevity in Life 
(TBS, 18; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), p. 18. 
30 Furthermore, compare Fox's citation of the Camus scholar Cruickshank: 
"Whatever the special character of Camus's conclusions, the absurd itself remains a 
contemporary manifestation of a skepticism as old at least as the Book of Ecclesiastes" 
(cited in Qohelet, p. 32). It is worth noting (as C.B. Peter does) that Camus actually 
bracketed himself from the existential movement, choosing to disassociate himself with 
Sartre rather early on and focus on the particularly moral aspects of philosophy ("In 
Defence of Existence", p. 36). 
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':l:l"t has a fully ironic sense. Irony, it is argued, is aware of incongruity and 
smiles wryly at it. Like absurdity, it recognizes the disparity between human deed 
and consequence but goes further than absurdity within the reading experience: 
"Having observed an incongruity, irony pricks the bubble of illusion into which 
one has blown his life's breath. ,,31 While absurdity ceases at the point of 
observation, irony interprets that observation, choosing to believe that its overall 
purpose is to heal and not to destroy: "the basis of irony ... aims at amendment of 
the incongruous rather than its annihilation ... Wherever Qoheleth uses hebel 
... the subject is treated ironically. ,,32 While the ironic is surely entrenched in 
Qoheleth's use of ':l:l"t, a substantial interpretive measure must be taken to 
perceive it. This is why "irony" or "ironic" would be (as Good and Polk seem to 
agree) inappropriate as a translation. Indeed, translating ':l:l"t as "irony" would 
ironically rob the given referent (situation) of its inherent irony! For the joy of 
reading irony lies in the unearthing of its subtlety. 
Clearly, a word is needed that best represents the majority of the 
instances. "Meaningless" (NIV), for example, does not accomplish this. There is 
meaning even if a character's experience is meaningless (it would be impossible, 
I think, to show that Qoheleth ever regarded his experience as meaningless). The 
fact that experience is meaningless is meaningful. As Wayne Booth puts it, "to be 
caught in a meaningless predicament is a bad thing, in which case there is 
meaning" .33 There have been other more amusing, if inappropriate, suggestions 
such as Frank Criisemann's of "shit,,34 and F.C. Burkitt's of "bubble" .35 Other 
31 Polk, "The Wisdom of Irony", p. 7. 
32 E. Good, Irony in the Old Testament (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1981 [1965]), pp. 
27, 182. 
33 Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 298 (italics Booth's). In support, G. Ogden argues 
that the ':l~l"t judgments do not imply that life is vacuous or meaningless, but rather that 
the situations Qoheleth observed are in themselves anomalous, and that that is what is 
':l:l"t (" 'Vanity' it Certainly is Not", pp. 302-304). 
34 "The Unchangeable World: The 'Crisis of Wisdom' in Koheleth", in W. Schottroff 
and W. Stegemann (eds.), God of the Lowly: Socio-Historical Interpretations of the Bible 
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suggestions such as "vanity" (KJV, RSV, et al.) or "futility" (TLB, et al.) suffer 
from the same problem as "meaningless": they cannot express the ":lM-ness of a 
situation over and above that of a specified object (and in Ecclesiastes, 
remember, the situation judgment is more common than the calling-it-as-it-is 
judgment). Perhaps ironically, to preserve some semblance of meaning (albeit one 
that may leave a bitter taste), "absurd" is the best expression of Qoheleth's use of 
":li"1. All said, "absurd" remains the best choice throughout, if for no other 
reason than that the reader is enabled to perceive the thematic unity of the 
judgments. 36 
Outside of Ecclesiastes, ":m always has an immediate referent in its own story-
world. Here is a good example: "Nothing was missing, whether small or great ... 
David brought back everything" (1 Sam. 30.19). In all other biblical texts "~M 
refers to concrete nouns that act as simple referents. A lack of referent would 
therefore tell us something informative in that in such instances "~M must take on 
a unique, abstract definition/use. And, as we might expect, Ecclesiastes is again 
atypical in this respect. Of the eighteen occurrences of "~M eight inform this 
review in that they stand in (sometimes ambiguous) relation to ":lM,37 and only 
one of these appears to have a clear referent. 38 
(New York: Orbis Books, 1979), p. 57. 
35 Ecclesiastes: Rendered into English Verse by F. Crawford Burkitt, p. 9, passim. 
36 Fox is in agreement (Qohelet, p. 44). 
37 1.2, 14; 2.11, 17; 3.19; 7.15; 9.1; 12.8. Ecc1. 7.15 is the only verse in which the 
words occur yet are separated from each other, which creates an interesting ambiguity in 
itself ("in my absurd life I have observed everything ... "; further, see below). John Jarick 
has suggested to me in personal correspondence that the choice of placing '~M and ':lM 
together may be purposefully to portray a visual word-play. They occur together only in 
Ecclesiastes and the only visual difference between them is a serif-mark. 
38 9.1, if we allow for emendation, is the only of these with an antecedent. By reading 
":lM at 9.2a for MT's '~M and placing it immediately after the tlM"l!)' '~M of 9.1b, 
Qoheleth appears to say concerning the righteous and the wise that " ... everything before 
them [Le. their deeds and love and hate] is ':lM". 
Excursus 1. Qoheleth and the Meaning of "::lM 83 
The lack of antecedent is obvious with 1.2 and 12.8 (cf. 11.8, M::lW-"= 
"::lM, "all that comes is absurd"). There could, however, possibly be a referent 
for "=M at 3.19 if we take it there to mean "everyone" (all animals and humans; 
so 3.20, 3x). It seems more likely, however, that Qoheleth reflected that ('=) 
"::lM "=M (3 . 19b) as a result of comparing the circumstance of animals to that of 
humans (3.18-21) and that "=M at 3 .19 is therefore more generalized and 
abstract. The referents of the other three (1.14; 2.11, 17) are less evident. It is 
worth noting that all three verses have remarkably similar contents. At 1.14 
Qoheleth observes (MM') "all the deeds that have been done (C'tDl)Crr"= 
'Wl)lrD) under the sun" and concludes (roM) that "::lM "=M and a pursuit of 
wind. At 2.11 he considers (MlC) "all the deeds my hands had done ('tD'C-"=::l 
", ,tDl)rD) and the toil in which I toiled to do it", and concludes (roM) that "=M 
"::lM and a pursuit of wind and that there is no profit <1"n') under the heavens. 
Of these three, however, 2.17 is the most informative example: 
And I hated life, for the work which was done under the sun was grievous 
to me. Indeed, everything is absurd and a pursuit of wind ("::lM "=M ,= 
n" n",,). 
Here Qoheleth does not "consider" or "observe" work and then conclude that 
everything is absurd. Instead, the language of the judgment itself is more 
personal. It was grievous to him ('''' l)'). At 1.14 and 2.11, "everything" might 
exclusively refer to the work (or "activity") done under the sun. However, at 
2.17 it might also include everything; that is, every material thing, including the 
agents that do the activity. This fits well with uses of "=M outside of Ecclesiastes 
which always connote material things, including agents (e.g. Ps. 119.91).39 
Furthermore, some of the "::lM judgments refer directly to things and not to 
general situations,40 serving fully to demonstrate the dictum at 1.2: everything is 
39 Contra Fox (Qohelet, p. 37) who argues that the judgments refer only to activity. 
40 So 5.7[6]; 6.11, 12; 7.15; 9.9 [2x]; 11.10; cf. 1.4-7. 
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absurd. Because of the all-encompassing referents for ":;'M, ":1M must, it seems, 
be applied to all things without exception, including knowledge, wisdom and even 
the frame narrator's quite different epistemological priorities (see Chapter 5.3). 
Of the other uses of "~M in Ecclesiastes two are too vague to be of value 
in this survey (10.19; 11.5), four refer to "everyone" and as such do not inform 
the abstract sense (3.20 [3x]; 6.6) and one clearly has a specific referent (12.13). 
The remaining three are instructive and may be summarized as follows: in the 
days to come ":;'M will be forgotten (2.16); God has made ":;'M beautiful (or 
"appropriate", M£)') in its time (3.11); Qoheleth has observed ":;'M (all that 
happens to the righteous and the wicked?, 7 .15b) in his absurd days. Each of 
these references broadens the scope of ":;'M immensely. ":;'M is here not simply 
limited to human activity or things under the sun, but to the very activity of God. 
Although Qoheleth specifies that it is everything under the sun (WOWM nnrl)-all 
that God created-which falls under the scrutiny of his eye, by implication God 
himself is included. The incomprehensibility of the world is, to Qoheleth's 
thinking, linked to the inability to understand God's works. These factors are one 
and the same. God's activity is at once MEl' and ":1M (3.11). The human aspect 
of activity (and by implication the human understanding of God's activity) will be 
forgotten (2.16). Here is an absurdity manifest in the text itself without Qoheleth 
drawing our attention to it as such. God has made everything pleasing-fitting in a 
pleasant order-41and yet it is unknowable, undiscoverable and absurd (3.11). 
For Qoheleth, this absurdity prevents him from being truly wise (7.23-24). 
Indeed, Qoheleth reports elsewhere that to attempt to understand all that is 
done-all that is absurd-is futile: 
I observed all the activity of God. For humanity is not able to discover all 
the activity that has been done under the sun. Therefore, [although] 
humanity toils to seek it, still they will not discover it. Although the sage 
41 Cf. the use of MEl' at 5.18. 
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claims to know it he will not discover it.42 
In this text the principal referent of ,:m is the activity of discovery, failed and 
futile. '~M is, quite simply, everything under the sun which Qoheleth observed 
and of which he sought to discover the inner working. When the inner and outer 
logic of that immense quantity of matter and events eluded him, he declared it 
'~M. 
There are two particular effects that emerge from the linking of "~M with 
'~M. One is the emergence of a thread which links each of the '~M judgments. 
That conjunction, Fox argues, "implies that there is some meaning common to 
the various occurrences of the term ["~M, which] .. .infects the entire system [of 
Qoheleth's epistemology], making 'everything' absurd" .43 That link creates the 
second of these effects: the ability of "~M to encapsulate the great variety of 
situations to which the '~j! judgments refer.44 The phrase '~M '~M enlarges 
the field of the definition of "~M and thereby creates ample range for Qoheleth to 
usher in his "~M judgments. It is the generalization by abstraction of the entire 
text ('~M '~M being the ultimate abstraction). As such it works as what Bal 
terms a "mirror text"; a phrase that comes to signify the whole scheme of a story 
and which "lifts the whole narrative onto another level. .. [and] serves as 
directions for use" .45 Qoheleth's paramount judgment, then, is a standard by 
which all of his consequent experience shall be judged. There can be no challenge 
laid against it. For Qoheleth, there is no one who can say, "This is not "~M" 
concerning any activity or any thing he has experienced and judged so. 
42 8.17; cf. 11.5. Further on Qoheleth's indictment of God in the inscrutability of the 
world, see Chapter 9.3. 
43 Fox, Qohelet, pp. 35, 47; cf. p. 108. 
44 Furthermore, cf. T. Polk: "there is scarcely a topic in the book to which hebel is 
not applied" ("The Wisdom of Irony", p. 7). 
4S Bal, Narratology, p. 147. 
Chapter 4 
THE INNER BORDERS 
1. Q'''~i1 "~i1 in the Frame (1.2; 12.8) 
"Absurdity of absurdities tI, said Qoheleth, "Absurdity of absurdities"; 
"Everything is absurd." (1.2) 
"Absurdity of absurdities", said Qoheleth, 
"Everything is absurd." (12.8) 
These verses are unique in several respects. The initial superlative construct in 
each verse, Q'''~i1 "~i1, is peculiar to Ecclesiastes. The two verses together 
form what is widely agreed to be the most powerful narrative inclusio in the Old 
Testament. The final phrase in each verse ("~i1 "~i1) is also peculiar to 
Ecclesiastes and occurs six other times in the book (1.14; 2.11, 17; 3.19; 9.1;1 
12.8) forming one of the most concise and wide-sweeping judgments within the 
biblical literature. 
The superlative, which itself functions as a kind of frame at 1.12 and 
12.8, expresses the uttermost of what is absurd: "Absurdity of absurdities". Like 
"Holy of holies" (Exod. 26.33) and "Song of songs" (Cant. 1.1), that phrase 
simply expresses the uttermost of the quality expressed. But unlike its biblical 
counterparts, the phrase is also used as a generalized expression that is 
reminiscent of a lament. In Ecclesiastes this superlative has no other proper 
subject but the experience of the speaker himself. But there is a referent. The 
lone proclamation, "Absurdity of absurdities", begs the question, "What is this 
absurdity?" This absurdity, the sequential reader learns, is "~i1, "everything". 
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As discussed above, the definition of "~T't is made complete as the 
sequential reader progresses through the text. It is fully developed by the time the 
epilogue is reached, for it is at that point that the superlative appears again. Its 
occurrence at 12.8 lends the construct a finality. It is the alpha and omega of 
Qoheleth's judgments. The superlative phrase is limited to the frame narrator's 
text and the narrative representation suggests that the frame narrator has 
employed it in order uniquely to summarize the majority of Qoheleth's 
observations . 
While "~T't "~T't also functions summarily, it appears in Qoheleth's texf 
as well as the frame narrator's and therefore does not carry with it the same 
uniqueness or level of judgment as CI'''~T't "~T't at 1.2 and 12.8.3 This 
uniqueness is hard to overestimate. It suggests that not only is the frame 
narrator's understanding of Qoheleth himself seemingly complete, but also his 
understanding of Qoheleth's most crucial operating idea, "~T't-the "mental image 
which affects his thinking".4 The frame narrator is wholly aware, and makes 
explicit use, of this organizing principle of Qoheleth's story. 
In sum, the elements of 1.1-2 that create a readerly impact have now been 
discussed: the commencement of a narrative frame, shift in narrative level and 
voice, commencement of desire and plot, and the significance of "~T't to the 
frame narrator. All of these aspects can be seen to fonn the nucleus of the 
framing strategy. While this strategy is not limited to passages in which the frame 
narrator "appears" (for its strategy is to be an ever-present indicator), it is fitting 
2 1.14; 2.11, 17; 3.19. Also, see p. 84 n. 37. 
3 Seybold also recognizes the way in which CI'''~T't "~T't necessarily surpasses the 
level of the other hebel judgments: "The framework verses, 1: 12 and 12:8, display 
indeed an expansion into the universal and a heightening of emotional interest that cannot 
be demonstrated in the maxims. In this way the catchword and battlecry of Qoheleth is 
elevated to a summary ideological conclusion, the expression of a nihilistic judgement on 
the world and its values" ("hebhel", p. 320). 
4 Seybold, "hebhel", p. 320 
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to see in those passages both a formal structural strategy and springboards for 
discussion. 
2. A Momentary Intrusion (7.27) 
In terms of structure, the frame of Ecclesiastes is not so much a picture frame as 
a window frame with a thin partition in its centre. The frame narrator's intrusion 
at that centre serves to remind the reader that the frame narrator is still telling 
(on a level outside of the flow of narration) Qoheleth' s story. The intrusion is 
found in the midst of one of Qoheleth's most intense observations (7.23-24): 
All this I have tested with wisdom. I said, "I will become wise", but it 
was far from me. What has been is far off and deep, surely deep. Who 
can discover it?5 
While the "all this" (T'tr"~) of v. 23 most likely refers to all that he has 
observed until that point,6 it may likewise look ahead to the following 
observation, as a sort of thematic preparation. As with a Greek tragedy, the 
reader knows (by Qoheleth' s rhetorical question [v. 24b], suggesting his own 
ironic awareness of the situation) that Qoheleth will fail in becoming wise. He 
establishes his own demise and the anticipation builds (7.25-26): 
I turned, I and my heart, to understand, to search out and to seek wisdom 
and the sum of things; to understand harmful folly and the foolishness of 
madness. And I found more bitter than death the woman who is traps and 
her heart nets, her hands chains.' He who pleases God will be delivered 
5 Cf. Job 11. 7-8, where Zophar asks Job if he can find out OGOn) the deep 
soundings of God ('T't"M 'pnT't) which are deeper than Sheol ("'MU10 T'tPOl». Like Job's 
deep soundings, Qoheleth cannot discover that which has been. This is the subject of his 
discourse here: what he cannot discover. Qoheleth addresses the issue similarly at 1.17; 
2.12; 8.16-17. Further on this passage, see Chapters 7.1, 9.3. 
6 Or at least to the section that precedes it (7.19-22). Further, see p. 206 n. 84. 
7 "T't'" CI"'OM T't~" CI'o,n, CI"'I30 M'lT,WM ... ", "she is traps, her heart 
nets, her hands chains ... " The first and second descriptive nouns are used of hunting and 
fishing (cf. Ecd. 9.12, 14), and the first and last possibly have military connotations 
(Lam. 3.52; Judg. 15.14; cf. Eccl. 4.14). However, the contention of K. Baltzer that this 
passage is primarily about war and the role of women therein is not convincing. For 
example, Baltzer argues that while the second and third terms have counterparts (her 
"heart" and "hands") the first does not and one must be offered (he suggests "breasts"). 
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from her, but he who sins will be taken by her. 
He claims that he turned ('lM 'n'~O) to know (n,.,,), to explore ("n,,) and 
seek (fD?~') wisdom and the sum of things: to understand the antitheses of 
conventional wisdom's rewards, folly and madness (7.25b). This grouping of 
"quest" verbs suggests that the forthcoming conclusion is paramount, for 
Qoheleth has enlisted all of his powers of observation to discover it. 8 But this is 
not yet the most important of conclusions. 
See, this I have found, said Qoheleth9 ([adding] one to one to find the 
sum, which my soul has continually sought but I have not found): one 
man among a thousand I have found, but a woman among all of these I 
have not found. See, this alone I have found: God made humanity upright, 
but they have sought many devices. 10 (7.27-29) 
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Rather, in 7.27 the greater emphasis arrives: "See, this I have found ... " (adding 
m riM' to the lone verb of discovery at 7.26a), and the emphasis continues 
("said Qoheleth") as Qoheleth informs the reader of his process of discovery, 
something which until now he was unable to discover. Finally (adding .,~., to the 
already heightened formula of 7.27a), Qoheleth offers an observation that is 
integrally related to the first in this section (understanding is unattainable). The 
fact that he found a man among a thousand (even though we cannot know exactly 
But this is unnecessary as it is likely that a counterpart is already present in the pronoun 
M'rI (see "Women and War in Qohelet 7:23-8:1a", HTR 80/1 [1987], pp. 127-32; esp. 
128-29). Despite such attempts to avert our attention from the inherent misogynism, this 
text is potentially offensive. Compare another unconvincing attempt (in a wholly different 
vein) to "redeem" the text: Duane Garrett, "Ecclesiastes 7:25-29 and the Feminist 
Hermeneutic", CTR 2/2 (1988), pp. 309-21. 
8 The OQ/fD?~ coupling, as M. Fox and B. Porten ("Unsought Discoveries: 
Qohelet 7:23-8:1a", HS 19 [1978], pp. 26-38) have pointed out, is unique and effective 
here, highlighting Qoheleth's own experiential ground (heightened further by the varying 
uses of tx)n at 7.23; ibid., pp. 27-29). Each occurrence of one generates occurrences of 
the other, and the word play is often rich or ironic (as in Qoheleth's discovery [00] that 
there is too much seeking [fDP~], 7.29; ibid., pp. 37-38). 
9 That this is the frame narrator's text and neither Qoheleth's self reference nor a 
later editorial insertion, see p. 41 n. 83. 
10 n'l~fDn, "sums"; LXX A.oyt.a~O\)~. Cf. Wis. 1.3: " ... crooked reasonings 
[A.ay\aJ,l01.] separate one from God" (and see Wis. 3.10). 
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what is meant by thisll), but among the same amount of people he found no 
woman, is presented as a kind of evidence that humanity was first upright, but 
they now have sought many devices ("reasonings" which lead them astray). And 
this is how a thoroughly negative tone is conveyed: failure to discover, regardless 
of the object, is Qoheleth's vexation in life. 
The framing here is multi-layered. Not only are these observations 
narrated particularly in the guise of Solomon (which he rarely does as explicitly 
elsewhereI2), but it is at the heart of this key passage that the frame narrator has 
chosen to remind the reader that he is still remembering and recounting 
Qoheleth's story. By heightening this particular observation syntactically and by 
employing the guise of Solomon more distinctly than usual, this passage is 
invariably memorable. The frame narrator's insertion aids in its "setting aside", 
marking its importance for Qoheleth's narrative.13 
11 Wbybray indicates the important fact (widely overlooked) that Qoheleth does not 
inform the reader either just what it was he was seeking in this instance or precisely what 
is meant by the hyperbolic "one man among a thousand" (Ecclesiastes, p. 127). Further, 
see my discussion at Chapter 9.3. 
12 For the Solomonic aspect and a treatment of Qoheleth's strategy in this passage, 
see Chapter 7.1. 
13 Lohfink agrees that the frame narrator's intrusion here serves to highlight his 
observation in contradistinction to others (as cited disapprovingly in Whybray, 
Ecclesiastes, p. 126). 
Chapter 5 
THE OUTER BORDERS: II 
So, naturalists observe, a flea 
Hath smaller fleas that on him prey; 
And these have smaller fleas to bite 'em, 
And so proceed ad infinitum. 
Thus every poet, in his kind, 
Is bit by him that comes behind. 
-Jonathan Swift ("On Poetry", 1. 337) 
The epilogue l may be divided into four sections based both on form and content: 
1) the narrative inclusia (12.8, the counterpart to 1.2), 2) the final description of 
Qoheleth (12.9-10), 3) the warnings to the frame narrator's son (12.10-11) and 4) 
the final word of advice to the reader (12.13-14). Of course, in the epilogue the 
frame narrator comes to life as a character in his own right. In the first section he 
recalls Qoheleth's ultimate observation, laying claim again to a complete 
understanding of Qoheleth' s story. In the second he offers an individual view of 
Qoheleth's activity (cf. 12.10- "words of delight" and "with integrity he wrote 
words of truth"). In the third he makes clear his epic setting (of speaking to his 
son) and upholds what he regards to be the ideal epistemological process (see 
below). In the fourth he brings everything (" all that has been heard", 12.13) to a 
seemingly orthodox conclusion. 
Unlike the superscription, there are not many exact structural parallels to 
1 Whether or not this section is the work of one or more epilogists or redactors is 
not pertinent here. However, some argue that the epilogue does not begin until 12.9 (e.g. 
Murphy, Whybray). This overlooks the fact that 12.8 is an intrusion of frame narration. 
One must admit at least the presence of both Qoheleth and the frame narrator there, if 
not the frame narrator alone. The fact that it is only within 1.2 and 12.8 that the phrase 
C":ll"1 ,:ll"1 occurs sets these texts sharply apart from Qoheleth; further, see Chapter 
3.1a. 
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the epilogue in other ANE frames. 2 G. Wilson has pointed out a structural 
similarity between this epilogue and the prologue to Proverbs. However, the 
connections he makes are strained.3 While comparisons to overall structures and 
framing strategies are useful, it is best to treat this epilogue within the limited 
context of the story it frames.4 
The epilogue has brought to the fore some interesting interpretive issues. 
Many commentators have seen in this passage a clue to the process of 
canonization within the Bible.s Also, the relationship of this passage's 
composition to that of the body of the book has merited much discussion and has 
been connected to the issue of canonization as well. While I will touch on these 
issues where relevant, my own discussion will focus largely on the questions 
2 See Chapter 2.2. Some ANE frames, for example, further the inner narrative more 
than Eccl. 12.8-14 does (e.g. Kagemni). 
3 Wanting to stress a thematic connection of the collections of Proverbs to 
Ecclesiastes, Wilson argues that the "common elements" in Provo 1.1-8 and Eccl. 12.9-
14 serve to "bind all between more closely together" ("'The Words of the Wise': The 
Intent and Significance of Qohelet 12:9-14", JBL 103/2 [1984), p. 183). The evidence 
offered is that both the prologue to ProVo 1.1-7 and Eccl. 12.9-14 emphasize the 
importance of justice (tQ£)rD~, Provo 1.3; Eccl. 12.14; cf. Eccl. 3.17; 8.5-6) and (making 
a connection between Deuteronomic notions of justice and wisdom) that the "fear God 
and keep his commands" of Eccl. 12.14 served to link the late near-canonical forms of 
both books together (pp. 189-92). Hence, the "canonical editors" of both works added all 
the superscriptions and Eccl. 12.9-14, "making explicit the connections implied in 
Proverbs 1-9" (p. 190). The analysis fails on three accounts. 1) The material which is 
indeed comparable is, as Wilson admits, fairly stock wisdom material Gustice, fearing 
God etc.; p. 181); 2) Wilson does not sufficiently deal with the content of Qoheleth's 
narration, thereby overlooking the immediate function of the frame narrator; and 3) if the 
connection was made as arbitrarily as Wilson suggests then it need not be taken as 
seriously as he suggests (e.g., "This movement [of editing) so binds these two works 
together that now each must be read in the larger context of the other and in the light of 
the hermeneutical principle [fearing Yahweh/God) laid down in prologue and epilogue"; 
p. 190). 
4 This said, I accept the opinion of Wilson and others that in 12.11-14 the emphasis 
of the frame narrator moves beyond (while still including) the subject of Qoheleth. 
!I See Chapter 7.3 and, in particular, Childs, Introduction, pp. 584-89; J. Goldin, 
"The End of Ecclesiastes: Literal Exegesis and Its Transformation", in A. Altmann (ed.), 
Biblical Motifs: Origins and Transformations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1966), pp. 135-58 (Goldin deals mostly with the epilogue in relation to the Jewish 
canon which includes the Talmud); G. Sheppard, "The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theolog-
ical Commentary", CBQ 39 (1977), pp. 182-89; Wilson, "Intent and Significance". 
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raised by the unique and tense relationship between the one framing and the one 
framed. 
1. The Inclusio (12.8) 
"Absurdity of absurdities", said Qoheleth, 
"Everything is absurd." 
I have already pointed out the correlation of this verse to the superscription, and 
that it is identical except for the lack of repetition of the phrase "absurdity of 
absurdities". What has yet to be discussed is the strategy of inclusion at hand. 
Inclusion is a well-known device in nearly all forms of literature. It is a kind of 
framing, a formal mark of structure with a forceful rhetorical function. The 
inclusio serves to mark off a specified section of text. In this case it surrounds 
precisely Qoheleth's narration and nothing else. Thinking in different terms, one 
might compare the inclusio to two identical doors at either end of the same 
room-serving as the only entrance and exit respectively-or perhaps the ornate 
covers of a book which serve to create a unique sign, a quality of separateness. 
Just as book covers give the most obvious appearance that the book is physically 
stable (even though its real stability comes from the binding of the loose leaves 
inside), so the inclusio is the most obvious structural marker and thematic sign in 
Ecclesiastes. 6 
It is worth noting that the content of this inclusion is itself inclusive. That 
6 So also, P. Viviano, "The Book of Ecclesiastes", p. 80. A.G. Wright has suggest-
ed that the location of this structural marker is numerically significant: "it is quite clear 
that the editor does take a carefully counted book of 216 verses ... and he does in fact 
build that book to a total of 222 verses by the addition of six verses of epilogue and thus 
bring the book into perfect balance (1111111). It seems beyond reasonable doubt that he 
was aware of the numbers 111 and 216 and that the production of a perfectly balanced 
book is not something that he blundered into" ("The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited", p. 
44; see also pp. 43, 45 on the significance of the "::lM phrases in the inclusios). Of 
course, Wright admits that the Masoretic versification may flaw his argument, but 
considers it "consistent enough" for his purposes. 
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is, its content (the superlative in particular) is a summary, taking into account all 
that it frames, reckoning everything. This type of abstract reckoning creates the 
first notable incongruity between the frame narrator and the one framed. By 
being overtly aphoristic, the frame narrator flies in the face of Qoheleth's more 
open style of reasoning. As such, Michael Payne remarks, the frame narrator is 
"at odds" with Qoheleth, who is 
antiaphoristic, complexly dialectical, and thoroughly dramatic ... It is not 
so much that Koheleth rejects [for example, the orthodox ideas expressed 
in 12.13-14] ... as it is that he holds a larger, more comprehensive view, 
his meditations requiring the orthodox views to which they are a 
dialectical response. 7 
It is at the inclusion that this anti-dialectic finds its beginning. 
What about the relation of 12.8 to the rest of the epilogue? Fox has 
offered an interesting paraphrase of 12.8: "Utterly absurd! (as the Qohelet used 
to say). Everything is absurd! ,,8 By understanding the perfect, '~M, as a 
frequentative simple past, Fox highlights the frame narrator's interpretive 
presence which is about to unfold fully. Although it is the imperfect (or vav-
conversive) and not the perfect which usually suggests such a sense,9 the story 
aspect is justifiably amplified as a paraphrase. The frame narrator is about to 
commence something of a biographical nature. 
2. The Final Portrait (12.9-10) 
Furthermore, Qoheleth was a sage. He continually taught the people 
knowledge, and he listened,IO and studied [and] composedll many 
7 "The Voices of Ecclesiastes", p. 264. 
8 Qohelet, p. 347 (italics mine). 
9 See Davidson, An Introductory Hebrew Grammar (New York: Scribner's and 
Sons, 24th edn, 1932), §46.I1.2. Compare the frequentative aspect found, for example, 
in Job 1.4: "[Job's sons] used to go ('O':Im) to feast. .. and they would invite (,n':lw, 
'M1") their sisters ... " 
10 Reading lt~' at 12.9 as the piel perf. of ltM ("to hear"~upported by ancient 
versions; cf. Provo 1.5-6; 12.15; 18. 15--1istening is an activity of the wise) and not as a 
derivative of the ill-attested Q'ltM~ ("weights", "scales"; so RSV and a few 
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proverbs. 12 Qoheleth sought to find words of delight and with integrity 
he wrote words of truth. 
While the other, latter texts of the epilogue (such phrases as CI'I~O n'fD~ at 
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12.12 etc.) have received much attention, this section has received surprisingly 
little. In terms of Qoheleth as the frame narrator saw him, it is the most 
informative text in Ecclesiastes and presents the reader with a well-defined final 
portrait. While the effects of the frame narrator describing Qoheleth as if he lived 
(lifting him, in a sense, out of a fictive context) have already been touched on 
above, the content of that description remains to be explored. 
This commencement proper of the epilogue reiterates the authority of the 
frame narrator as Qoheleth' s foremost interpreter. First, his "historical" existence 
is (albeit modally) insisted upon: Qoheleth was (l"I'l"IrU). Secondly, his activity is 
described: Qoheleth did such and such. The existent and actantial modes together 
suggest a complete description. The frame narrator begins that description with 
something that should not take us by surprise: Qoheleth was a t=n. 
Much ink has been spilled over the meaning of t=l"I. Some have endowed 
it with a political sense; that is, one successfully dealing with powerful people, 
knowing how to get what he or she wants. 13 Or R.E. Murphy, for example, sees 
a t=n as one who is concerned with the things of the wise (the question of "what 
is good", "profitable" etc.) and argues against the notion that there was a 
professional class of "the wise" .14 Amongst the plethora of Old Testament 
commentators). See Fox, Qohelet, p. 323. 
11 On these verbs ('tin and lpn) see below, n. 18. 
12 For examples of the semantic range of "fliO see M. Eaton, Ecclesiastes (TOTC; 
Downer's Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1983), p. 153. Because a "flio could include 
such "genres" as parables and allegories, it is perhaps an apt nomen for the diverse 
quality of devices Qoheleth employed in his narration. 
13 For example, Whybray (citing Fitchner approvingly), "Prophecy and Wisdom", in 
R. Coggins et al. (eds.), Israel's Prophetic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), p. 187, passim. 
14 "The Sage in Ecclesiastes and Qoheleth the Sage", in SIAN, pp. 265-67. 
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passages concerning wisdom, Job 15.2-6 and Provo 1.5-6 are particularly 
instructive regarding the activity of the =n. The former passage suggests, by 
negation, that it is the responsibility of the wise to speak words of substance 
which end in profit (v. 3), are rooted in the fear of God (v. 4a), promote 
meditation (v. 4b) and testify to the integrity of the speaker (v. 6). (This last 
aspect is echoed in the frame narrator's description of the manner in which 
Qoheleth wrote: 'fD'; cf. Provo 22.20-21.) Proverbs 1.5-6 suggests that the 
purpose of wisdom is both to gain skill (v. 5) and to make one cunning with 
words (v. 6). One common Old Testament idea (developed particularly in 
Proverbs) is that the ability of the wise derives from learning, or from the 
presumably self-induced action of fearing Yahweh (esp. Provo 1.7; 15.33). 
However, in passages such as Exod. 36.1-2,4, 8; Deut. 1.13, 15, the wise are 
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so because Yahweh has enabled them. And according to Sir. 38.24ff., wisdom is 
something acquired only if one has the lUXUry of time to pursue it. 
Qoheleth's own views on wisdom are varied. Wisdom itself is surely good 
(2.13,26; 7.11-12, 19; 8.1-2; 9.13-18) and is clearly helpful for his own task at 
hand (1.13; 2.3, 9; 7.23) . Yet wisdom is under the scrutiny of Qoheleth' s eye as 
something to be wary of (1.17; 2.12; 7.25; 8.16-17) and is even in itself a 
vexation (1.18; also, compare 2. 16b; 6.8a; 7.7; 8.17; 9.11 [bread does not come 
to the wiseD. In light of this, Murphy is certainly correct to point out that 
Qoheleth the sage is one who concerns himself with the question of what is good 
for humanity (2.3, 24-25; passim; cf. 4.9-12)IS and, of course, of what is 
IS Whereas Qoheleth makes it a point to test what is good (::1,tD) for humanity, the 
narrator of Proverbs is very much in the habit of telling the reader what is good (Prov. 
13.2, 4, 21; 19.8 [wisdom leads to what is good]; 28.10; passim). Interestingly, one 
finds a middle position in Job. At the outset Job piously asks if he can rightly receive 
what is good while rejecting what is bad (',,.,, 2.10). However, later he complains that 
he will see no more good (7.7), and that when he sought what was good, evil (") came 
(30.26). Also, compare Elihu's statement concerning the "case" of Job-that they should 
consider together among themselves "what is good" (34.4; NRSV). 
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advantageous (having l"n'; 1.3; 2.13; 3.9; passim). The description, then, that 
Qoheleth is a =n (given Murphy's bend to the interpretation), surely comes as 
no surprise to the reader. 
Against such a semantic background the frame narrator (who was at least, 
it is implied, familiar with the "words of the wise") claims that Qoheleth was a 
=n. Qoheleth's myriad character fits well the varied hues of what it meant to be 
a sage. It would be difficult to claim, then, that the frame narrator has added 
anything new to the reader's understanding of Qoheleth at this point, except 
perhaps that by regulating him to this particular nomen Qoheleth is, once again, 
to whatever limited extent possible, "normalized" by the one who frames him. In 
fact, by stating that Qoheleth was a =n the tension between the kind of wisdom 
Qoheleth employed and the "being wise" that he searched for (see Chapter 9.3) is 
glossed over. 
What, then, does the frame narrator add to the portrait of Qoheleth? In 
what follows does he begin to inform the reader beyond what can be adduced 
from the body of Qoheleth's narration? Is there a tension? Are the activities 
described really manifest, or even implied, in Qoheleth's story? And what can we 
learn from differences between Qoheleth's self-understanding and the 
understanding the frame narrator has of him? 
From Qoheleth's narration the reader may assume that he was certainly 
qualified to teach about the subject of knowledge, a concept which, for him, 
worked as a matrix of interpretation by which to observe the world. However, 
that he actually engaged in teaching is not so clear. Or indeed, that he had an 
association with "the people,,16 is a difficult concept to reconcile to his 
16 C»M from Exodus to Joshua often refers to Israel (Exod. 1.20; 3.12; 4.16 etc.). 
This is usually due to the Israelites being the contextual antecedents of the word, but the 
word comes to mean Israel in later use (1 ebron. 13.4; cf. Ezra 3.1; Pss. 106.48; 
144.15). There is a more ~eneral meaning found elsewhere which might denote 
"humanity" (Isa. 42.5 [01''']; cf. Prov. 29.2; cf. LXX's hvepom:ov for 01'M at Eccl. 
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narration. He speaks early on of "the people of old", and how they will or will 
not be remembered (1.11). In a parabolic proverb he speaks of a king of whom 
there was no end to "the people" who followed him (4.16). This gap in 
Qoheleth's story creates, as it were, a gap for the frame narrator to fill. But the 
Solomonic connection becomes particularly relevant here in that Solomon's 
prayer at 1 Kgs 3.8-9 could function as a necessary pretext: 
And your servant is in the midst of your people whom you have chosen; a 
great people (~'-Cn)... Then give to your servant a discerning heart 
(norD ~") to judge your people and be able to discern between what is 
good and evil... 
There are plenty of examples in the Old Testament of leaders explicitly teaching 
"the people" and often in a sustained role, and the request of Solomon, that he 
might judge Yahweh's people "in the midst" of them, suggests that he desired a 
continual role of instruction in Israel (cf. 1 Kgs 4.33-34 [5.13-14]). Qoheleth's 
own connection to Solomon (see Chapter 7) might fill-in the gap and show that 
the reader has again gained relatively little additional knowledge. In fact, the very 
notion of teaching in the Old Testament is so diverse and ambiguousl7 that the 
frame narrator's description is incapable of filling in the gap of Qoheleth's 
narrative. 
The following three delineations of Qoheleth's character in v. 9b qne, 
12.9). Because of the Solomonic context (see below), cnn at Bcc1. 12.9 probably refers 
to Israel-Le., whatever that had come to mean in Qoheleth's location in history. 
17 Moses taught Israel (or at least thought he should-Deut. 4.14; 6.1), but we are 
never told what that entailed. The subject of the piel of '0" is sometimes indirectly 
conveyed by commands to parents to teach their children (Deut. 4.10; 11.19; cf. Jer. 
9.14[13], 20[19]), or God himself is the subject (ps. 25.4-5; Jer. 32.33). We do not 
know who the "teachers" of the narrator of Ps. 119 are (v. 99). Daniel was presumably 
taught by court officials of some kind (Dan. 1.4). Among many other words which 
suggest teaching (n,', hiph.; "=W; '1'M, hiph.), compare some diverse examples-n,': 
an idol can "teach" lies (hiph.; Hab. 2.18); Job will "teach" Bildad about the hand of 
God (Job 27.11)-1~: "teachers" (hiph. part.) served in David's entourage (1 Chron. 
25.8) and the Levites "taught" all Israel, being holy to the LoRD (2 Cbron. 35.3). 
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M:l'M C"flic 181pn 'pn,) taken together might, as M. Fishbane has argued, 
relate directly to the composition of Ecclesiastes. Drawing on examples of 
cognate verb fonns in Assyrian and Babylonian colophons, Fishbane concludes 
that the epilogist wrote a similar kind of colophon, borrowing widely from the 
"professional" language of his cultural milieu, creating a "stylized variation of 
conventional scribal tasks well known in ancient Israel" .19 His work seems to 
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have found wide acceptance. 20 However, there are some difficulties. Besides 
some weaknesses in his linguistic assumptions,21 there is no evidence, beyond 
the description of Qoheleth, that the epilogue refers to any tasks or processes 
beyond those that are present. Fishbane offers three examples of colophonic 
phrases grouped together which suggest scribal activity and concludes that the 
epilogue of Ecclesiastes was written consciously in a similar pattern. The main 
problem here, however, is that the frame narrator's immediate concern is not so 
much to shed light on the scribal activity of a sage as to offer a very personal 
assessment of Qoheleth which adumbrates his character profile (hence such 
qualitative, value-laden adjectives as r~n, ,rtJ' and nOM; see below). 
That Qoheleth composed or arranged "many proverbs,,22 echoes the 
18 On the first of these three verbs <ltM) see above, n. 11. The second ('pn, "to 
search out", "examine thoroughly", "investigate" [hence by extension, "to study"]; 
sometimes of land [Judg. 18.2]; sometimes in contradistinction to the "unsearchability" 
of God [Job 28.27; Provo 25.2; cf. Job 5.27]) certainly resounds of Qoheleth's 
descriptions of himself in passages where he proclaims that he intends to search out and 
discover the nature of wisdom and the world (cbs. 2 and 7 esp.). The third verb <lpn, 
"to set in order", "make straight"; Bccl. 1.15; 7.13; cf. Dan. 4.36[33]) is not well 
attested in the Old Testament. The sense of composition, which is likely meant at Bccl. 
12.9, finds a parallel in Sir. (Heb.) 47.9, of Singers "composing" music. Murphy has 
made the attractive suggestion that these latter two verbs might echo Qoheleth's critical 
faculty as illustrated in Bccl. 7 and 8, in which case they suggest praise (Ecclesiastes, p. 
125). 
19 Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), p. 31. 
Fishbane reads the three verbs as " ordered" , "examined" and "fixed" respectively. 
20 See Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. 127. 
21 See Fox, Qoheleth, p. 323. 
22 As is widely noted in the commentaries, "many proverbs" does not necessarily 
suggest the book of Proverbs, but more likely refers to the specific sayings of Qoheleth 
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superscriptions found in Proverbs, and as a description the effect is surely to 
mollify some of the "solipsistic or elitist" elements of Qoheleth's text.23 That is, 
if any reader be tempted to think that Qoheleth was not involved in the more 
traditional activities of such sages or scribes as the "men of Hezekiah" (Prov. 
25.1), they need not doubt. With this and the previous three verbs associated with 
the activity of the wise, the frame narrator is perhaps at odds with Qoheleth's 
Solomonic guise. While kings might have discovered and even "composed" 
proverbs, it is doubtful that they actually "wrote" them down; such was the task 
of the scribe. Furthermore, Qoheleth's actions in his own narrative seem to fit 
more the picture of a king who is not so much concerned with teaching, study 
and proverbs, as with the political acumen by which he amassed his great 
wealth24 and the issues that arose from his consequent failures. Qoheleth's self-
depiction is again at odds with the frame narrator's. 
Such incongruence is admittedly less clear, however, in v. 10. The shift 
here to a more personal description resonates more clearly with the body of 
Qoheleth's narration. In one way, this description anaclactically expands the plot; 
for Qoheleth sought, but the question may be raised, Did he find! As Fox points 
out, the frame narrator does not "commit himself as to the success of this attempt 
[at seeking out words of delight]".25 But even more to the point here is the 
tension in contrasting descriptions concerning what Qoheleth actually did. As to 
whether there is incongruence, the issue rests largely, I think, on the phrase 
"delightful words" (r£)n-"'~'). It is likely that the phrase refers to what G.A. 
Barton termed an "elegance of form,,26-Qoheleth sought to write in a pleasing 
(particularly in chs. 7 and 10). 
23 So G. Sheppard, "The Epilogue to Qoheleth", p. 184. 
24 This is particularly evident in ch. 2, esp. v. 8; cf. 1 Kgs 4.20-28. 
2S Fox, "Frame-narrative", p. 101. 
26 Ecclesiastes, p. 199. 
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and elegant manner.27 First, there is a potentially harmonic point to make. 
Perhaps Qoheleth found words that brought pleasure to a life that was otherwise 
vexatious and unbearable. Such well-chosen words might have escaped the .,~;, 
judgment of 5.2-7: "For with many dreams and absurdities [there are] many 
words-but fear God" (5.7). But as a summary the description is seriously flawed. 
In Qoheleth's own terms he sought not "delightful", elegant words, but the very 
existence and quality of all that is under the sun. He sought what was deep and 
far off (7.23-29; 8.17). What Qoheleth sought was substantially more than what 
his interpreter would have us believe and, according to Qoheleth's own 
estimation, he failed in discovering it (see Chapter 9.3). 
It is significant that the frame narrator's description of Qoheleth remains 
at a distance from him. Besides the broad descriptive term =n, he does not 
really tell us anything about Qoheleth. Was Qoheleth difficult to get along with? 
Did he love and serve his God all his days? He sought to write uprightly, but was 
he, like Job, truly ,Ui,? Although there are reasons for (careful) readers to 
disbelieve (at the story-level) the frame narrator's description, that description is 
made with confidence. The activities described are not exactly radical or 
surprising, but he is nonetheless an explicit biographer, offering a final view of 
Qoheleth which the reader must have as the last "taste" in his or her mouth. The 
questions are left for readers to engage. 
27 In Ecclesiastes the word has two senses: 1) The usual Old Testament meaning, 
"delight", "pleasure" (5.3; 8.3-the king does "whatever he pleases [= freedom]"; 
12.1-"having pleasure in" [without vexation or pain; cf. the phrase before it: "Before 
the days of misery (;'37';' '0,) come ... ", which are days in which you cannot take 
delight]); 2) the more obscure Old Testament meaning, "matter", "thing" (3.1,17; 5.8; 
8.6). The usual sense (1) at 12.1, borne out by the poem that follows it with its 
contrasting themes of delight and misery (12.1-7), likely influences what is found here at 
12.9. 
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3. Warnings and Admonitions to a Preferred Epistemology (12.11-12) 
The words of sages are as oxgoads, and as implanted nails28 are [the] 
collected sayings29 given by one shepherd. 3o Yet beyond these, my 
child, take heed:3! [of the] making32 of many33 books there is no end, 
and much study wearies the body. 
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The translation and general sense of this section present one of the most difficult 
tasks to Qoheleth-studies. In v. 11 the metaphors at work are arranged in a 
difficult syntax. There are several rare idioms including the hapax leg., '''l)~ 
n'ElOM (v. l1c), the precise meaning of which would be enormously instructive 
28 n"~to~; "nails"-something which keeps something else fixed (cf. Isa. 41.7; Jer. 
10.4). 
29 mElOM '''l)~, "the owners (or "masters") of collections (of sayings?)". "l)~ at 
Eccl. 5.13 and 10.20 undoubtedly means "owner". There is a figurative use of "l)~ 
found at Eccl. 10.11: a l'U;" "l)~ (lit. "owner of a tongue ") could mean "one skilled in 
speech" or one who controls a snake's tongue and who therefore "charms" a snake (cf. 
Ps. 58.4-5[5-6]; Jer. 8.17; Sir. 12.13; also, see Whybray, Ecclesiastes, p. 154). Joseph, 
for example, is a n'~"nM "l)~-a "dreamer"; a maker or craftsman of dreams; a 
"specialist" (Gen. 37.19). Although "l)~ usually refers to people, it is unlikely that 
"people" would be given by a shepherd, even in a figurative sense. The sense should be 
extended to that which represents people; i.e., their writing, hence complementing the 
preceding parallel, "the words of sages"~ence "the collected sayings [of the sages]". 
30 "Shepherd" is often a metaphor for God (Gen. 49.24; Pss. 23.1; 80.1; Isa. 40.11; 
Jer. 31.10; Ezek. 34.12 etc.). It could refer to Solomon as a patron of wisdom or to 
Qoheleth himself. All that is clear is that since the shepherd here is the subject of lN, 
"it" is the source of the collected sayings just referred to and therefore plays a part in the 
dual parallelism at play. Since this shepherd is clearly the source of the sayings one 
might rule out a human referent, although such figures as David and Moses come to 
mind as sources of psalmody and law respectively. Solomon (or QohelethlSolomon?), 
then, should not be ruled out here (contra Gordis and Fox). Whether or not ,nM is an 
enumerator (RSV et al.) or an indefinite article (Fox) affects the sense little. 
31 'MtT'1; cf. 4.13, where it is used of an old and foolish king who, no longer 
"taking heed", is thought worse off than a poor but wise youth (cf. Ezek. 33.4-6). It is 
associated with teaching (hiph.) at Exod. 18.20. 
32 0"1:10 n,ton has received much attention. There is wide agreement that Mton 
here denotes composition of some sort; that is, the physical making of books. P.A.H. De 
Boer makes the suggestion that nton refers to "working at" books. This can be rendered 
by metonymy as "book learning" (R.B.Y. Scott), or "use of books" (NEB; see De Boer, 
"A Note on Ecclesiastes 12: 12a", in R. Fischer (ed.), A Tribute to Arthur Voobus 
(Chicago: Lutheran School of Theology, 1977), pp. 85-88. Since De Boer's suggestion 
does not exclude, for example, copying or transcribing books (p. 86), something at the 
level of composition may still be allowed for. 
33 That ~'n should be understood as "many" as opposed to the adverbial "endless" 
(hence "endless making of books"; so H.L. Ginsberg) see Goldin, "The End of 
Ecclesiastes", pp. 145-46. Also, cf. Eccl. 12.9bP. 
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as regards the process of any kind of "professional" wisdom in ancient Israel. In 
v. 12 the antecedents/referents to "these", "the making of many books" and 
"much study" are unclear. This is likely a text full of the jargon of a closed 
community.34 
To help untangle the metaphors in v. 11, a close reading of a kind is 
necessary. The first parallel seems clear: 
words of sages = oxgoads 
The words of the wise direct and prod one as a goad prods an ox. The recipient 
of those words plays a passive role while the role of the sages themselves is a 
hybrid between activity and passivity. 3S But this metaphor must be reconciled 
with the verb "to give" at the end of the sentence. Therefore, if the oxgoads and 
nails are both given by a shepherd then the following parallel is possible: 
giving/use of oxgoads and nails by shepherd = use of words by sages 
Just as a shepherd uses goads and nails to prod and fix, so sages use their words 
to inflict; the metaphorical sense breaks down somewhat and the parallel becomes 
more analogical. The words themselves are just as "dangerous" to human 
recipients (who now function metaphorically with animals that are prodded) as 
goads are to animals. 36 
A more widespread understanding of the verse (presuming a more natural 
34 Compare Sheppard's comment: "[the frame narrator] speaks of 'these' [12. 12a] as 
though he can assume a recognition of their identity by his readers" ("The Epilogue to 
Qoheleth", p. 188). 
3S The limits of the metaphor can be pushed further. The ox works and is therefore 
not passive, but is the very engine of the work of which it is a part. The ox, however, 
does not decide where it goes; this is the nature of its passivity. Its direction is 
determined by the prodding of the goad. In the same way, the student studies much (the 
student provides impetus) and the way ("') of wisdom must be kept to at all costs. Yet 
the direction must be determined by the teacher (passivity) and the (force of the?) 
teacher's words (12.11c). Furthermore, an ox must be goaded to pull the cart and keep it 
on the road ("'), yet Qoheleth says to his reader, "Walk in the ways of your heart ('!)' ~"!)". 
36 So Fox, Qohelet, pp. 325-26. 
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flow in the Hebrew) sees the "collections of sayings" as being given by the 
shepherd (as opposed to oxgoads and nails) and creates the following dual 
parallelism: 
words of sages = goads II implanted nails = collected sayings 
(that are given by a shepherd) 
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In this sense the words of sages and the collected sayings are each analogous to a 
"flxing", shepherding image. Both words and collections are able to inflict, 
correct and so forth. 
Both readings reveal something similar about the frame narrator. The less 
metaphorical sense, suggesting that the giving of words is painful in its 
correction, implies that the one framing views the method of conveying wisdom 
(the use of the shepherds' goads and nails is like the use of words by the wise) as 
a framing process itself. With the process expressed by two "flxing" images 
(goads and nails) it propounds a forceful impression of the transition of wisdom 
and knowledge. The recipient of wisdom is forced (as the direction of the ox is 
forced) to fix his or her attention (and indeed, intellectual enterprise)3? on the 
giving of wisdom. The other, more common reading suggests that the words 
themselves (those of Qoheleth are flrst to come to mind) and the collected sayings 
(Qoheleth is included inasmuch as he is part of the economy of wisdom as a 
sage) are somehow endowed with the ability to correct and keep one on the 
"straight and narrow". The overall strategy of framing is evident in both 
37 Compare O.L. Burns comments on the midrashic understanding of Eccl. 12.11-
12: "In the midrashic texts themselves ... [there is] a relentless preoccupation with the 
force of interpretation ... 'The Words of the wise are like goads', and so on-is a 
favourite of the rabbis because it concerns the point of midrash, its practical as against 
purely academic context ... The words of the wise are situated; their meaning is 
embedded in their situation" ("The Hermeneutics of Midrash", in R. Schwartz [ed.], The 
Book and the Text [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990], pp. 203, 20S; italics Burns's). Torah 
(the fixed collections) and sage (the words of the wise) enjoy a relationship of 
appropriation. That is, the words of the wise, like goads, force an application, an 
appropriation of meaning, onto the life of the community. 
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readings. The one who frames prescribes the boundaries of interpretation and 
adumbrates this with the metaphors. The frame narrator, as Qoheleth's presenter, 
fits his own partial description of the process of the wisdom tradition more 
closely than Qoheleth himself does. This is even more apparent from the 
following verse. 
The thrust of v. 12 is one of admonition and warning, but the precise 
content of that warning is difficult to discern. If the antecedent for "these" 
(;'~;'~) is the "collected sayings" just mentioned, then the admonition to the son 
(the frame narrator's student) is to not "go beyond,,38 the "collections of the 
masters" (Qoheleth being one of them). However, if the antecedent is the story of 
Qoheleth (hence, "these [words just related]"), then the epilogist seems to be 
offering veiled praise of Qoheleth's wisdom. In any case, some literary content is 
being referred to, beyond which the frame narrator does not wish his audience to 
extend any intellectual endeavour; perhaps even a fixed canon of literature is in 
mind. 39 
38'M'; cf. Eccl. 12.9: "Furthermore ("besides what you have just read"), Qoheleth 
was a sage." Compare Est. 6.6-Haman says to the king, "'Whom would the king wish 
to honour besides me? ('~~~ 'M", "beyond, more than")''' The phrase suggests an 
exceeding of the subject it qualifies in a way which has already been done. Hence, the 
student has been instructed, by implication, as to what is good, but studying or 
"composing" more than this is not recommended. 
39 For Sheppard the antecedent of "these" is "a set of extant collections or books 
inclusive of, but larger than, Qoheleth" ("The Epilogue to Qoheleth", p. 188). J. Goldin 
points to the Anshe Keneset Ha-Gedolah of the Abot which is representative of the 
mishnaic understanding of Eccl. 12.12 as an admonition to maintain the integrity of the 
Torah ("The End of Ecclesiastes", p. 156; passim). Hence "these" are the "collections" 
of Torah. Therefore it was said, "The Torah is sufficient", even, "preserve instead the 
more carefully edited readings provided" (ibid., p. 149). Even the tI'r=n ,~, at the 
beginning of this section might refer to a "knowable body of knowledge", although there 
is little evidence to suggest that it refers exclusively to the books of Proverbs and 
Ecclesiastes (contra Wilson and, partly, Sheppard; see Wilson, "Intent and Significance", 
pp. 176-77). Goldin's arguments might be supported by the Deuteronomic admonitions to 
not "add to" ('\!10M M') the commands that the loRD has given, lest things not go well 
(Deut. 4.2; 12.32). Also, see Roger Beckwith (The Old Testament Canon of the New 
Testament Church [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985], pp. 319-20) who argues that 
12.12 refers to work outside of Ecclesiastes. 
5. The Outer Borders: II 106 
As the verse progresses, the warning is elaborated. The warning suggests 
that if one were to go beyond the fixed literature, the composition (or "working 
at" in general) of a great number of books would result and the hapless victim 
would be drawn into much study. The picture is one of the student wearying him 
or herself with labour and the sentiment is perhaps surprisingly congruous with 
some of Qoheleth' s own notions of absurdity: 
For the dream comes with much concern q'~S), 
and the voice of a fool with many words. (5.3; cf. 1.8) 
For with many dreams and absurdities [there are] many words-
but fear God. (5.7) 
For Qoheleth, too, the sheer quantity of things are a mechanism of the absurd 
(cf. 1.18; 5.11; 6.3, 11). (It is interesting to note that the frame narrator did not 
use ":lM to describe what was "no end" and "a weariness to the body". Qoheleth 
undoubtedly would have.) 
The congruity in this passage, however, ironically contributes to its 
incongruity. Qoheleth does not suggest himself that there is a fixed body of 
knowledge which must be adhered to, without which dire consequences would 
follow. For Qoheleth, the answer to what is "no end" and a "weariness of the 
flesh" (what is absurd) lies not in the wisdom tradition-for wisdom itself has 
failed in liberating him from the incongruence he has observed (see Chapter 
9.3}--but rather in the enjoyment with which God empowers people to escape 
absurdity. The answer rests with God. Even more incongruent is the fact that 
Qoheleth often suggests that for him such absurdity could only be observed and 
not overcome by mere resistance. 40 
Do the warnings of 12.11-12 reveal a preference, then, for the frame 
40 4.1-3 is the best example of this; further, see Excursus 2. 
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narrator's own epistemological outlook?41 To approach this question I would like 
to pick up on the phrase "limits of knowledge". First it should be clarified what 
kind of knowledge is meant. The distinction offered some time ago by Michael 
Polanyi, of two types of knowledge, will serve my purpose here.42 
The first type is tacit knowledge, which is inarticulate in form. It is 
received. Like a map that fixes one's location in relation to the recognizable 
features of a landscape, this kind of knowledge is a-critical in nature and is 
formed from "systematically collected observations". 43 The crucial point in 
relation to this analysis is that it is received essentially unaltered. (Tacit "ability" 
is most apparent in the acquisition of language skills, as in the general 
observation that children learn a new language more quickly than adults.) 
The second type is explicit knowledge. As the word implies, this 
knowledge can only be created through a process of discovery. The content of 
explicit knowledge is, in fact, tacit knowledge. That is, in the example of the 
map, the formulated knowledge which makes it up is expressed through a process 
of discovery that uses many forms of tacit knowledge (notes, surveys etc.). Such 
41 Epistemology is perhaps the most basic of philosophical inquiries and is therefore 
beyond anything like a thorough treatment here. I refer the reader to Fox's superb 
treatment of the subject in chapter 3 of Qohelet, "The Way to Wisdom: Qohelet's 
Epistemology". Fox emphasizes Qoheleth's personal acquisition of knowledge. His 
conclusions are summed up well in his own words: "The sages prided themselves not on 
having created knowledge but on having taken it to themselves. Whereas Qohelet's 
favorite verb of perception is 'seeing', theirs is 'hearing'" (ibid., p. 98). It is worth 
noting, however, the warning offered by J. Ellul, that most philosophical "labels" foisted 
on Qoheleth are undeserved: "At most we could concede that the 'subjects treated' by 
Qohelet are also philosophers' favourite subjects--subjects that metaphysics has dealt 
with. But nothing more ... Let us leave metaphysics to the metaphysicians, then, so that 
we can listen to Qohelet speak without metaphysicians' discourse interfering. This way 
we will see that he speaks differently from them" (Reason for Being: A Meditation on 
Ecclesiastes [trans. J.M. Hanks; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990], p. 27; see also 
pp.26-30). 
42 As elaborated in The Study of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1959), pp. 
11-40, which is the introduction to his longer works, Personal Knowledge and The 
Liberty of Logic. 
43 Polanyi, The Study of Man, p. 17. 
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a process is doubtless evident in Qoheleth's text, in that it is his explicit 
refonnulation of the tacit knowledge of wisdom which allows for his seemingly 
distinct brand of critical observation.44 For example, in 3.16-17 Qoheleth 
observes some "stock" elements of wisdom~lements that could be considered the 
fabric of tacit knowledge: 
But still I observed under the sun that in the place of justice there was 
wickedness, and in the place of righteousness there was wickedness. I said 
in my heart, "God will judge the righteous and the wicked"; for [there is] 
a time for every matter and for every deed. 
It is the intensely personal narrative element ("I said in my heart") that marks 
Qoheleth's sentiment as a refonnulation, a judgment, an explicit idea about 
common human experience. Qoheleth thinks about wisdom. To "go beyond", in 
such a way, the established parameters of tacit knowledge might well be seen as 
futile or perhaps something more threatening. Polanyi, while stating a 
hypothetical case, makes the surprisingly applicable comment: 
... the establishment of a completely precise and strictly logical 
representation of knowledge ... might be championed as an ideal [and] any 
personal participation in our scientific account of the universe [is] a 
residual flaw which should be completely eliminated at once.4S 
While one cannot, of course, strictly equate Polanyi's notion of "scientific 
account" with the frame narrator's notion of fIXed learning and knowledge, the 
point remains relevant: moving beyond what is fIXed is always a threat to the 
establishment that fixes it. In the case of the biblical wisdom literature, such 
44 It should be noted that the comparison being made here is not to the kinds of 
processes of discovery found in Job, Proverbs or any other wisdom literature. As has 
been widely noted (most especially by O. von Rad), similarities abound in the way in 
which sages acquired knowledge in the ancient world (cf. Crenshaw's comments on 
Qoheleth's "examination of personal experience" in his review of Fox's Qohelet, in JBL 
109 [1990], p. 715). The comparison is strictly limited to the fixed notions of knowledge 
as found in the epilogue. 
45 The Study of Man, p. 18. Polanyi goes on to refute this position as self-
contradictory in that the "most distinguished act of thought consists in producing such 
knowledge" (ibid.; italics Polanyi's). 
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conservatizing elements as the frame narrator's text may well have buttressed the 
establishment of power-;>olitical and social. 46 
It is Qoheleth's narrative setting that creates his epistemological 
foundation. He knows by experience. It is through the narrating "I" that he sets 
out his own limits of what he knows of and in the world.47 The frame narrator, 
it appears, has attempted to override that method of knowing with his own tacit 
preference. But it should be remembered that the frame narrator's epistemological 
"preference" is only that. It is clear that his own priorities (what his student 
should heed) differ from Qoheleth's, but the reader has always had the option of 
choosing his or her own limits of interpretation. The force reflected in the 
midrashic readings of this passage, for example, was chosen by those readers. 
Indeed, the option always remains open to readers~e epilogue simply makes the 
options clear. 
The epistemological tension can be further illustrated by Qoheleth's use of 
the language of shepherding, which is reversely paralleled in the epilogue. Both 
of the frame narrator's shepherding images (the goads which prod animals and 
the shepherd figure who is perhaps the source of something like implanted nails) 
serve to depict that which is fixed, even trustworthy (not departing from "these" 
will guard the student from weariness of the body; 12.12b). The knowledge 
within which the student is to stay (presumably a knowledge with which the 
frame narrator was well-acquainted) is tacit and is sure. For Qoheleth, however, 
the language of shepherding is suited to a contrary purpose: to depict that which 
46 So W. Brueggemann, "The Social Significance of Solomon as a Patron of 
Wisdom", in SIAN, pp. 126-27. Although Brueggemann does not mention Qohelcth's 
frame narrator, he speaks of the "proverbial wisdom" of ancient Israel that assumed of 
the world a "studiable system [with] constancy and durability, experienced as regularity 
and predictability" (p. 127). This is a perceived order which "is not questioned or 
criticised ... [and] outside of which questions are not raised" (ibid.; italics mine). 
47 Of course, it is disputed as to whether "I", as a literary device, is a viable entity 
which is capable of representing anything like a unified "self". Further, see Chapter 8. 
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is not fixed. So the refrain, "Everything is absurd and a pursuit of wind." 
"Pursuit of wind" suggests, among other things surely, that the object considered 
is not under contro1.48 This is particularly significant when Qoheleth's ability to 
know is under consideration: "And I set my heart to know wisdom and 
knowledge, madness and folly. I knew that this too is a pursuit <1"»') of wind" 
(1.17). It should be noted that it is not wisdom and knowledge that are a pursuit 
of wind, but rather the fact that he set his heart to know them was like a pursuit 
of wind. It is Qoheleth's personal attempt at reaching true understanding which is 
not fixed or able to be controlled. It is not something received and/or graspable. 
Two illuminating examples of the play between the language of 
shepherding and of pursuit are worth noting. First, Provo 15.14: 
The heart of the understanding seeks knowledge (n».,..wp:l'), 
but the mouths of fools feed on (i"I»") folly. 
Second, Hos. 12.1a [2a]: 
Ephraim herds the wind (n" i"I»') and pursues (""; cf. Bccl. 3.15) the 
east wind all day long ... 
As Crenshaw says of these two instances, "both examples mock the behavior of 
shepherding, whether rounding up the wind or feeding on folly" .49 Indeed, both 
examples show the capacity of Hebrew language and thought to suggest the ironic 
sense likely present in Qoheleth's narration, a sense which stands at odds with the 
frame narrator's more fixed usages of the terms. 
The irony inherent in warning against the composition of many books in 
the epilogue of a book can hardly be overstated. It is a clever deconstructive tum 
48 The close association of ,:li"l (as the name "Abel") with the verb i"I" at Gen 4.2 
is interesting to note here: 1~ i"I" ,:ll"r"i"l" ("Now Abel was a keeper of sheep"). 
The LoRD was pleased with Abel (,:li"l) and his offering (4.4), and Cain states that he 
was not the keeper ('017) of Abel (,:li"l, 4.9). Cain was unable either to account or be 
responsible for ":li"l. Of course if the author of Ecclesiastes was aware of the word 
association in Genesis it would be of some significance, but this remains speculation. 
49 Ecclesiastes, p. 73. 
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which one could imagine even Qoheleth would admire. Many times in my studies 
I have heard the phrase "of the making ... etc." quoted jokingly in face of the 
stress of a large amount of work ahead. Likewise, I have often felt the absurdity 
of my own writing of a "book" about a "book" which denounces the activity 
involved in "making" one. The frame narrator was surely aware of the simple 
irony, and that assumption by the reader (that he was aware of it) further 
contributes to the enjoyment of the irony. The irony serves to alienate the frame 
narrator yet further from Qoheleth; for one can easily assume that the warning is 
an ill-concealed dissent from Qoheleth's own way of knowing. The creation of 
books might involve the creation of new knowledge, of thinking and of the 
critical reformulation of ideas to which the frame narrator seems opposed.so 
To return to the phrase, "limits of knowledge", in this passage the 
language of fIxing, guiding and shepherding abounds. This is the language of 
framing. The use of such language itself frames an alternative to Qoheleth's 
epistemology. After establishing the boundaries of Qoheleth's character in 12.9-
10, the frame narrator thereby goes beyond those boundaries to establish (prod 
and fIx) his own epistemological preferences for his audience, thereby setting 
himself at odds with Qoheleth. 
4. The Final Word (12.13-14) 
[This is] the end of the matter--everything has been heard-fear God and 
keep his commandments; for this [applies to] everyone. 51 For God will 
bring every deed into judgment concerning all that is hidden, whether 
good or evil. 
so Even the warning against much study carries this association. IT'l'', a hapax leg., 
is possibly related to the Arabic lahija, "be devoted", "apply oneself greatly" (see BDB, 
p. 529b). However, by following many commentators and taking this to be a defective 
form of T'IlT'l, suggesting an intense investigation (cf. Job 1.8, "meditate day and night"; 
Pss. 1.2; 63.6[7] [where it is synonymous with ~']; 77.12[13]; etc.) my argument is 
supported even more strongly. 
51 On this "pregnant Hebrew phrase" (C'Mrr&,= T'Ir'=) see the examples compiled 
by Gordis (Koheleth, p. 345). 
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That the epilogue leaves the reader with a more conservative sentiment than 
Qoheleth would likely have offered (indeed, did offer [12.7]) has hugely shaped 
the overall understanding of the book. As Murphy remarks, "The orientation 
provided by vv 12-14 exercised great influence in the history of the exegesis of 
Ecclesiastes. ,,52 There is no evidence that the epilogue contributed to the 
acceptance of Ecclesiastes into the canon, and there seems to be no other viable 
reason for this conservatism than that the frame narrator is again overriding 
Qoheleth's more radical message with his own more tacit priorities. This 
conservative emphasis is tied into the frame narrative set-up. Discussing this 
section, Fox comments that the 
author blunts objections to the book as a whole by implying through use 
of a frame-narrator that he is just reporting what Qohelet said, without 
actually rejecting the latter's ideas. The epilogist thus allows the more 
conservative reader to align himself with him, so that a reader need not 
reject the book, even if he does reject the views of Qohelet.53 
Many conservative readings of the book may be "explained" this way. To cite 
one example, because Ecclesiastes "ends" this way, I.S. Wright can say the 
following of the book: 
To summarize its contents, the book constitutes an exhortation to live a 
God-fearing life, realizing that one day account must be rendered to 
him. 54 
To be fair, it is not misleading to suggest that the frame narrator is in fact 
offering a summary of the "book" at 12.13-14. The phrase l)OrDl "!)M at 12.13a, 
in light of the narrative context (the epilogist has told Qoheleth's story to his 
son), could be paraphrased, "When Qoheleth's story has been heard, what should 
be remembered is ... " The fault of such readings as the one I have just cited is 
that the summary of the frame narrator is a-critically adopted as a good summary 
S2 Ecclesiastes, p. 126. 
S3 Fox, "Frame-narrative", pp. 103-104 (italics Fox's). 
S4 "The Book of Ecclesiastes", in J.D. Douglas et al. (eds.), New Bible Dictionary 
(Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 2nd edn, 1982), p. 296 (italics mine). 
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of Qoheleth' s thought, which it surely is not. Worse yet, the verses are often 
misconstrued as Qoheleth's own words when readers overlook the fact that 
another voice is narrating at the epilogue. Critical misunderstandings are then 
bound to occur. Take the example of L. Ryken: 
The writer himself [whom Ryken takes to be Qoheleth] signals the two 
types of passages that make up Ecclesiastes with a pair of metaphors near 
the end of his collection... The "under the sun" passages are like goads 
that make us unable to settle down complacently with life lived on a 
purely earthly plane. The positive, God-centered passages are fixed points 
of reference. ss 
113 
The frame narrator has allowed many generations the opportunity to misread and 
compress Qoheleth's inquiries into such misdirected homily, and the fact that the 
epilogue has engendered such assessments is yet more evidence that the frame 
narrator's epistemology is a tacit one. 
Of course, Qoheleth offered his own conservative sentiments, but these 
can be accorded undue significance, for they are nearly always spoken in a 
critical context. The most cited example of his conservatism, for instance, has 
sharp critical undertones: 
Whenever you vow a vow to God do not delay to pay it, for there is no 
delight [taken] in fools. Pay what you vow! Better that you do not vow 
than that you vow and do not pay. Do not let your mouth cause your flesh 
to sin, and do not say to the messenger that it was an error. Why should 
God be angry at your voice and ruin the work of your hands? For with 
many dreams and absurdities [there are] many words-but fear God. 
(5.4-7) 
This could hardly be summarized as "Fear God and keep his commands." Indeed, 
this passage emits a strong "aroma of paranoia"s6 which is out of keeping with 
SS "Ecclesiastes", in Ryken and Longman (eds.), A Complete literary Guide, p. 272 
(italics mine). 
56 So Zimmennann (Inner World, pp. 37-41), who suggests that this passage is 
evidence that Qoheleth believed fiercely in what Zimmermann calls the "omnipotence of 
thoughts" which contributed to his neurosis: "Qohelet is so self-punishing [in 5.1-7] that 
no margin for error is allowed" (p. 40). If this is right, Qoheleth's critical capacity here 
seems severely hampered. 
5. The Outer Borders: II 114 
the very positive effects which fearing God is meant to engender elsewhere, not 
least of which is the beginning of knowledge! (Prov. 1.7; cf. 1 Sam. 12.24; 
Provo 3.7-8) Furthermore, in a celebrated passage, Qoheleth does in fact play 
havoc with one of the commandments of Torah: 
Rejoice, 0 young man, in your youth. 
And let your heart gladden you in the days of your youth. 
And walk in the ways ('!),,:l ''';'') of your heart, 
and in the sight of your eyes. 
And know for certain [that] concerning all of these things 
God will bring you into judgment. (11. 9) 
In Torah, the fringe that the Israelites were instructed to wear on the comer of 
their garments was there to prod them to 
remember all the commandments of the Lord and do them, and not to 
follow after (',nM ",nn) your own heart and your own eyes, which 
you are inclined to go after. (Num. 15.39; cf. Job 37.7-8) 
In Qoheleth's variation on this text he has put a twist to the notion of keeping 
God's commands. He reformulates the commandment and appropriates it to his 
own purposes. He certainly, in a sense, goes beyond it. 
The frame narrator, however, is more cautious to not "go beyond" 
anything. This is perhaps most evident in 12.13-14, which has been frequently 
compared to Sir. 43.27:57 
More than this may not be concluded, the end of the matter, "He is all in 
all. ,,58 
While any literary relationship between Ecclesiastes and Sirach is rarely claimed, 
and while the position of this verse in Sirach is not "epilogic", some comment is 
worth making. After a long description of the glory of the works of the LoRD 
(42.15-43.26), the narrator in Sirach has reached a point where any more 
57 See Gordis, Koheleth, p. 345. 
58 Translation by Sheppard, "The Epilogue to Qoheleth", p. 187. 
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comment strikes him as superfluous. The end of such speech would be 
unreachable. Likewise, Qoheleth's frame narrator seems to say that there is no 
more that he wishes to (or can) say to his student. Such speech would "go 
beyond" what is required. Perhaps Sirach felt, along with the frame narrator, that 
words are unnecessary since the "whole of humanity" lies elsewhere. 
In his closing verse the frame narrator's views on judgment echo Qoheleth 
once more (cf. 3.17; 11. 9b). The echo is ironic in light of all the discord the 
epilogue offers the reader. The frame narrator wishes to impose his tacit 
epistemology on "everyone", that they might fear God and keep his 
commandments without, it seems, the kind of critical refonnulation and 
expressive thinking that Qoheleth embodies. 
Chapter 6 
FRAMING THE FRAMER: FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THIS FRAME 
The prologues are over. It is a question, now, 
Of final belief. So, say that final belief 
Must be in a fiction. It is time to choose. 
-Wallace Stevens ("Asides on the Oboe") 
It might be contested that I have been unnecessarily hard on the frame narrator. 
Yet I stand by what I have said above. Of course, some of the extent to which 
(and the manner in which) he summarized Qoheleth's story was necessary. The 
frame narrator was not at pains to write his own book and in this respect he was 
in keeping with his own views on the proliferation of knowledge. Indeed, the 
frame narrator kept relatively close to a common practice of ancient epilogues. 
As M. Wiebe notes of other ANE frames, 
The epilogues of [the geme ot] Instruction all reflect back on the 
instruction [Le. inner story of the frame] and sing its praises ... The 
epilogues of Kagemni, Ptahhotep, Merikare, ANY, and Amenemope stress 
the importance of following the letter of the instruction presented and the 
continuance of the tradition of the "sayings" or "writings." These 
epilogues refer to the instruction as the "sayings of the past" and the 
"words of the ancestors" and to the instruction itself as if it were a well-
known written text. 1 
Like other ANE frames, the frame narrator reflected backward, sang Qoheleth's 
praises and likely referred inclusively to Qoheleth's work as "words of the 
sages", while claiming that Qoheleth wrote "sayings" himself. However, he 
differs from ANE frame narrators in that his approval of Qoheleth' s procedure of 
knowing is far less evident. In no way did he "stress the importance of following 
the letter of the instruction presented". Why, then, as a narrative character, did 
I Wiebe, "The Wisdom in Proverbs", p. 42. 
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the frame narrator bother to tell Qoheleth's story at all?2 
In a way, I have obliged myself to answer this question. I offer the 
following, tentative, answer. The frame narrator did not demand anything like 
strict adhesion to Qoheleth's words. He did, however, stress that his (implied) 
audience should not go beyond a flxed body of knowledge which likely included 
Qoheleth's story. It may be assumed, therefore, that his commitment to 
Qoheleth's story was only partial and that his duality of opposition and 
commitment to Qoheleth is to be explained by it. However, since the frame 
narrator lent such ample credence to Qoheleth's story by his act of framing, this 
seems unnatural. From the summary of the epilogue it is clear that the frame 
narrator did not agree with Qoheleth's approach to wisdom, God and tradition, 
bound, as they were, to his wholly different epistemology. Therefore, given the 
flction of the presentation, the frame narrator comes across as a rather reluctant 
scribe who had to do what he could with what he had (knowing that he had the 
last say in any case), and this with evident respect to Qoheleth's words, which 
were, to his great annoyance, part of the wisdom tradition themselves. 
To compare, again, frames of modem flction, it is certainly not unusual 
for a fictitious frame to purposefully question the material it frames. Note Linda 
Dittmar's assertion about some flctitious frames: 
Faulkner and [fllm director] Kurasawa use their frame stories to question 
the very truth of the narrated materials they contain. Accounts [in the 
inner narrative] conflict with one another, yet each has a claim on us-the 
claim of the flctive come to life through acts of narration. The inner 
narratives reveal the extent to which subjectivity [like Qoheleth's "1"] 
governs all knowledge ... [Furthermore,] a disjunction between story and 
frame puts into question the audience's relation to all accounts. 3 
2 I speak here only in a fictional sense, for, historical considerations aside, the frame 
narrator is a character who, we are asked to believe, knew Qoheleth, was his foremost 
interpreter and told his story. On the composition of Ecclesiastes, see below. 
3 "Fashioning and Re-fashioning", pp. 192-93, 199. Compare Mary Ann Caws's 
comments: "[inner narratives] can be expository, necessary to the [outer] plot, voluntary, 
or free in their function, and of the play-in-the-play sort; their relation to the frame is 
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This is one of the greatest assets of framing: to put into question "the audience's 
relation to all accounts". A frame compels the reader to asses and evaluate the 
work at hand. By presenting his assessment, the frame narrator solicits the 
reader's own, personal assessment. 
One reason the epilogue allows for such diversity of reading is that while 
the formal structure created by the frame around Qoheleth seems unbendable and 
unshiftable, the interpretive boundaries it sets are not strictly so. As Mary Ann 
Caws contends, 
the frame is valuable as a concept for the imagination, even in its strictest 
limits, as is the very act of "trotting around" it occasions, plainly self-
inclusive and self-framing ... [Frames are,] above all, aids to 
perception ... [and] all frames are constantly open to shift and exchange. 4 
That is, it is absurd to think that reading involves the imagining of polarized 
opposites which in no way share a flux of meaning between them. A frame 
involves both the interpretive borders which define itself and the content which it 
frames in creating its effects. In fact, there is open-endedness within the frame 
narrator's text itself. For example, the frame of Ecclesiastes raises the plot-
oriented question of the audience's reception within the story presented: Will the 
"son" accept what has been spoken about Qoheleth? Note Wiebe's comments: 
The presence of ... [the] frame surrounding the instruction ... [and t]he 
progression within each Instruction ... raises narratological questions such 
as, How will the son respond to the instruction?, and, Will the instructor 
witness a receptive audience for their instruction?.. Answers to these 
questions are suspended until the Instruction returns to the narrative frame 
in the epilogue.s 
Wiebe fmds this concern present in only four of the Instructions, where all but 
then of various kinds, but in every case the content is different from the content of the 
outer or framing text" (Reading Frames in Modem Fiction, p. 270 n. 16; italics mine; 
also, see pp. 269-71). 
4 Reading Frames in Modem Fiction, pp. 4-5 (italics Caws's). That frames do not 
always lend themselves to neat division in the form of "diagramming", see P. Brooks on 
Conrad's Heart of Darkness (Reading for the Plot, pp. 256-57 and p. 351 n. 8). 
S Wiebe, "The Wisdom in Proverbs", p. 43. 
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one of the epilogues is lengthy: Kagemni. Kagemni (as noted above) bears a 
formal resemblance to Ecclesiastes, and the effect of the respective epilogues is 
comparable. According to Wiebe, in Kagemni the frame narrator "answers any 
question[s] of the reception of this instruction by those instructed".6 Can the 
same be said of Ecclesiastes? Yes, but only to the extent that the frame narrator 
has made it relevant; and that happens to be minimal. That is, while the purpose 
of the epilogue of Ecclesiastes is to admonish the recipient of Qoheleth' s story, 
the whole question of reception becomes overshadowed by the opposition that the 
frame narrator has made to Qoheleth. The question is never answered. 
Qoheleth's frame narrator does, however, "close" at least one issue. 
Frames which have symmetricality provide the reader with a sense of origin and 
ending. For frames 
validate the interpretive act by foregrounding the story-telling context at 
least in the beginning and end of the text ... Thus, once we realize that 
Alice's adventures are a dream framed by her falling asleep and waking 
up, the puzzle falls into place; we may continue to wonder about that 
Cheshire cat, but we trust the frame as a guide to the narrative within 
it ... [For] frames normalize their content by attributing to it an origin and 
a context.' 
This is precisely what Qoheleth's frame narrator does. By giving us an origin 
(from the mouth of the king) and a context (geographical,s of speech and of 
character [the epilogue)), the frame narrator wins our trust and summons our 
attention, however much we may still wonder about Qoheleth, that Cheshire cat.9 
6 "The Wisdom in Proverbs", p. 44. 
7 Dittmar, "Fashioning and Re-fashioning", p. 195. 
8 I.e. Jerusalem; see p. 67 n. 6. However, see Zimmermann, Inner World, pp. 
123ff. 
9 That context of origins also contributes further to the work's authentication. This 
is done through allusions to historical figures and to some kind of authorial presence. So 
K. Gittes: "The 'real' world of the framing story (and sometimes the less real world of 
the tales themselves) is usually authenticated by historical figures and by the authorial 
presence. Such authenticating makes the often unreal and fantastic events in the enclosed 
tales appear more credible" ("The Frame Narrative", p. 189). The "historical figures" in 
the epilogue are QohelethlSolomon and the sages, while an authorial presence is 
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One consistent concern about the epilogue has been how it does or does 
not inform our understanding of the book's historical composition. And here 
again the issue of incongruence can be raised, this time in relation to the analogy 
of picture frames as discussed in Chapter 2. I-in particular, the question of with 
whom the responsibility of the production of the frame rests. 
Did Qoheleth, like some wealthy artist, have the lUxury of choosing the 
frame himself? That is, does the whole work-painting and frame--come from one 
hand? It would seem strange for an artist to choose a wholly unsuitable frame, 
unless we allow that, as with Pissaro and Picasso, there was a clever and 
subversive strategy at hand. Of course I cannot stop anyone believing that 
Qoheleth was so cleverly subversive, but I suggest rather that someone chose the 
frame for him, so to speak. If this be the case, then was the one who chose the 
frame intending to give the work itself as smooth and orthodox an inception into 
the gallery/public as possible? In this regard, it is interesting to note that some 
painting frames overpower the painting, imposing their own ideology and 
"message" to such a degree that the "message" of the painting and frame become 
confused to observers. We have seen this to be the case with the conservative 
readings of Qoheleth based, as they were, on the frame and not the "picture". 
There is, however, a difficult interpretive balance to maintain in all of this. 
To take the first option, if one grants, as does FOX,10 that a hyper-self-
conscious real author, in a vein of Romantic Irony, wrote the entire text, 
knowingly playing with the literary conventions of the day, one might be 
suspected of anachronistically foisting on Qoheleth literary circumstances and 
conditions which should, at the least, be considered circumspect. To take the 
discerned in the act of transference, the very telling of Qoheleth's tale. 
10 Fox clearly intends more than a "final-form" study of Ecclesiastes, rather, "The 
author has given him [the frame narrator] a conventional~d fIctional~pic situation" 
("Frame-narrative", p. 104). Throughout his article, Fox maintains this assumption. It is 
particularly evident in his effective defense of "single-handed" authorship (pp. 85-91). 
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second option, if one grants that author what Romberg calls an "unconscious 
infringement of point of view", 11 the risk runs in the opposite direction. That is, 
in assuming that the author took no conscious effort in depicting the frame, the 
reader is likely to overlook the multifarious effects it creates, thereby implying 
that ancient writers and readers were not in fact capable of literary sophistication 
(Le. the chronological fallacy). This is perhaps why, in recent years, the 
incongruity of the epilogue to the body of the book has been underplayed or the 
relationship ignored altogether. 12 The discrepancies are, however, evident and 
informative, and analysis of the relationship helps to unpack Qoheleth's own 
strategies. Were I forced to speculate on matters of history, I would be inclined 
to imagine that the frame narrator was himself a sage of a more moderate 
temperament than Qoheleth, who was obliged (to his annoyance-and perhaps by 
an edict the reasons for which were not made clear to him) to present Qoheleth's 
largely pre-formed story in his own garish, "establishment-issue" frame. I hasten 
to add that I for one am glad he did so. 
Now, finding a suitable point of departure to discuss Qoheleth's narrative strategy 
is a daunting task. The rubric na"ative can easily include such aspects as 
characterization (of narrators, implied authors and audiences etc.), setting, voice, 
distance, fictive versus historical assumptions and so forth. Here is where the 
tone of the work must determine the questions we bring and the approach(es) we 
take. Because Qoheleth's character-as discussed in Chapter I-is so intimately 
11 Studies in the Narrative Technique, p. 335 (in reference to Rousseau's 
problematic use of his name with the fictional editor in La Nouvelle Heloise ... ). 
12 For example, among modem commentators some virtually ignore the relationship 
(Crenshaw, Eaton, Fredericks, Wilson [who is concerned more with the epilogue's 
relation to Proverbs)) or see the tension the frame narrative creates as a "corrective" of 
Qoheleth's thought (Childs). Some see the tension as essentially positive, laudatory 
(Murphy, Ogden), or essentially at odds with Qoheleth in purpose (Fox [although see 
Qohelet, pp. 315-16], Gordis [in part], Sheppard). 
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constructed and conveyed in the first person, his narration lends itself naturally to 
questions of identity, self-hood and implied authorship, which lead to questions, 
as shall become evident, of the subject. Such is the concern of the following three 
chapters of the thesis: the strategies of Qoheleth as a narrative, speaking subject. 
I begin with what I believe is the most empirically graspable (in the sense that it 
lends itself to analysis most forthrightly) of Qoheleth's narrative strategies, and 
yet perhaps the most playful and elusive. 
Chapter 7 
THE SOLOMONIC GUISE 
He played the King as though under momentary apprehension that 
someone else was about to play the ace. 
-Eugene Field (critiquing a performance of King Lear, Denver 
Tribune, c. 1880) 
Ecclesiastes was written in a sometimes elusive Solomonic guise. 1 However, the 
employment of it is not, as shall be seen, as simple a strategy as has been widely 
assumed. Its presence suggests some pertinent questions. What strategies are 
ascertainable in the use of the guise? What problems has the half-hearted pres-
ence of the guise created for reading the book of Ecclesiastes as a whole? What 
motivation[s] might be suggested, if any, for the creation of such a guise by the 
real author (Le. why is it there?)? And in what ways do the real author, implied 
author,2 Qoheleth and the frame narrator relate to one another in terms of the 
Solomonic guise? In order to address such questions the guise itself will need 
some delineation. 
1. The Scope and Strategy of the Solomonic 
Many of Qoheleth's interpreters insist that his Solomonic guise (or royal fiction, 
as it is often called) is strictly "contained" in the first two chapters, after which 
the guise is, for all intents and purposes, dropped.3 Not only is there no more 
seemingly explicit Solomonic allusion, it is held, but any rhetorical function of 
1 Implied by 1.1; 1.12-2.26 and other verses, as will be argued below. 
2 The definition of these terms will be fleshed out below. Suffice to say that I am 
relying substantially on the distinctions of Wayne Booth in Rhetoric of Fiction. 
3 The list includes A. Barucq, B. Childs, J. Crenshaw, F. Ellermeier, K. Galling, 
H.L. Ginsberg, R. Gordis, R.B. Salters, G.T. Sheppard and W. Zimmerli. I will state 
most of their positions specifically below. 
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the guise is apparently spent after ch. 2. All agree that the superscription (1.1) 
commences both the book and the Solomonic guise proper (1.1 and 1.12-2.26-0r 
1.1; 1.12-2.17, according to some). 
From its beginning the guise reveals its ambiguous quality. The phrase 
"king in Jerusalem" (C'ID"':1 ,,~), for example, is peculiar to Ecclesiastes. 
The preposition, :1, compounds the ambiguity, and "Jerusalem" is difficult since 
when speaking of an Israelite king in the Old Testament, "Israel" is usually 
referred to as the place of power. Given the ambiguity, is there any possible 
connection to Solomon? The issue rests mainly on the phrase, ""-1:1, "son of 
David". James Crenshaw has suggested that this phrase "in Hebrew usage ... can 
refer to grandchildren or simply to a remote member of the Davidic dynasty". 4 
While there is some biblical evidence that 1:1 can, as Crenshaw also suggests, 
denote a "close relationship of mind and spirit"S or simply affection (eg. 1 Sam. 
24.16), nowhere in the Old Testament does ""-1:1 mean anything other than a 
biological son of David and only once is it other than Solomon (2 Chron. 11.18). 
Admittedly, "sons of David" can be used of people other than Solomon,6 but the 
point remains that the singular nomen "son of David" does not seem to carry any 
figurative meaning. There is nothing to suggest that Eccl. 1.1 is an exception to 
this usage. The title may therefore make implicit reference to King Solomon, to 
whom was ascribed Proverbs 1-29. 
Even the name Qoheleth (1.1, 2, 12; 7.27; 12.8, 9, 10) can be understood 
in reference to Solomon. The verb ,rtF' (of which qiJhelet is a participle), "to 
assemble" or "gather", is only used of people being assembled, and particularly 
of Solomon's assembling the elders of Israel for the Temple's dedication (1 Kgs 
4 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 56. 
, Ecclesiastes, p. 56. 
62 Chron. 13.8 = kings ruling Israel in general; 23.3 = Davidic line of kings (cf. 
32.33); Ezra 8.2 = David's descendants returning from Babylonia. 
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8.1-2).7 In that narrative, the derivative "i1P-"~ (1 Kgs 8.14, 22, 55, 65) is 
used to denote "all of the assembly of Israel" which Solomon has gathered and 
speaks to. It is well known that participles were often used to denote the activity 
or profession of a person (e.g. Ezra 2.55, 57, n'£)Oi1 ["scribe"] and n'~£) 
C"~3i1 ["one who tends gazelles"] are used as masculine names). Conceivably, 
"Qoheleth" has a similar function. It is not the "concrete" Solomon we are to 
picture but rather a facet of his traditional persona/profession as king and wise 
man-assembler of the people. 8 Already both the "concrete" and the ambiguous 
forms of the Solomonic guise seem present. I will return to the unique problems 
this creates below. 
Just to clarify that Qoheleth was an Israelite king (as opposed to another, 
e.g., Persian) the place of Qoheleth's kingship is explicitly stated in what has 
been called the book's "second title" (1.12): 
9C"Ui"'~ "M,fD"-", ,"0 'n'''i1 n"i1? "lM 
Here Qoheleth makes his first introduction and, as if mercilessly to amuse 
himself at the reader's expense, suggests by the use of "n"i1 not that he is a 
king, but that he was a king. This has been a serious problem for those holding 
Solomonic authorship dear, since Solomon reigned until his death (1 Kgs 11; 2 
7 Crenshaw rightly points out that this does not necessarily imply that "Qoheleth" 
denotes an "Assembler" of the C'''rz.tO of the epilogue (12.9; Ecclesiastes, pp. 33-34). 
8 There has been no shortage of suggestions to understand the reason of the 
name "Qoheleth". Most accept that it is a proper name (see O. Eissfeldt, The Old 
Testament: An Introduction [trans. P.R. Ackroyd; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974], p. 
492). Jacques Ellul has made the interesting suggestion that "Qoheleth" be understood 
"in terms of the book's content rather than etymologically". For Ellul, "Qoheleth" may 
function as an antonym to the rest of the book: a feminine form in a text which is anti-
feminine (Reason/or Being, pp. 17-18). It is difficult to imagine, however, that the kind 
of obscure literary environment necessary for such an antonym was even available to the 
author. 
9 For the term "king over Israel". cf. 2 Sam. 19.22 and 1 Kgs 4.1 (of Solomon). 
H.L. Ginsberg's thesis that '!\'?9 should here be pointed ,'i.~. denoting a land owner, 
requires the unlikely corruption of'" (among other problems) and has received virtually 
no acceptance (H.L. Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth [New York: Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America, 1950], pp. 12-15). 
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ehron. 10). For example, the medieval scholar Ibn Ezra felt compelled to suggest 
that "Solomon wrote it [Ecclesiastes] in his old age, and appeals ... to the new or 
rising generations, and tells them such and such things I tried in my lifetime. ,,10 
T.A. Perry suggests that the statement is to be understood figuratively: 
... the retired king is introduced less for autobiographical purposes than to 
bring to the center of debate the question and value of withdrawal from 
public affairs and, by extension, worldly involvement. .. [the] withdrawal is 
not a philosophical one ... he has come to the conclusion, through the 
frustrations of experience, that life is simply not worth the bother.lI 
Whether figurative or literal, the textual ambiguity here does not seem to 
diminish the effect of the guise, for the real effect is not so much to fasten 
Qoheleth's persona immovably to that of the historical Solomon as to create a 
unique interpretive freedom (indeed, one that might have been exploited in the 
way Perry suggests). 
The next possible allusion to Solomon occurs at 1.16: 
I spoke to myself in my heart, saying, "Behold, I have increased greatly 
in wisdom, more than all who were before me over Jerusalem. " 
This verse picks up the thread of identification begun at 1.1 (and reiterated at 
1.12). By the description, the wise king meant here is surely Solomon;2 but the 
"all who were before" him could be either (the house of?) David or a long line of 
10 As cited and translated by C.D. Ginsburg in, Coheleth (Commonly Called the Book 
of Ecclesiastes) (London: Longman, 1861, p. 268). 
11 Dialogues with Kohelet: The Book of Ecclesiastes (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp. 39-40. Perry is the only scholar I have 
read who has made any attempt to read the guise as present through the whole work: 
" ... on inspection, the royal fiction is both pervasive in extant and remarkably complex. It 
portrays ambivalence less about the king's political status than about his psychological 
commitments and reservations" (p. 40; cf. p. 38). Perry sees a literal dialogue at play 
throughout the book and briefly explores the relationship between the kingship of one 
and the critical attitude towards kingship of the other. 
12 This verse likely draws on such tradition as 1 Kgs 3.12-13; 4.29-30; 10.23. See 
esp. 1 Cbron. 29.25: "Now King Solomon was greater than all the kings of the land with 
regard to riches and wisdom" (RSV). 
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Jebusite kings (more strange ambiguities).13 What is more to the point, however, 
is Qoheleth's self-depiction. By it he sets himself up to conduct his tests and 
observations in a mode that is extreme. He is not just conducting them as a wise 
man but as the wisest king. This suggests that the conclusions he reaches are to 
be absolute. Yet it also implies that if he fails it is that same absolute wisdom that 
fails with him, and such constitutes a critical indictment of Solomon's wisdom 
and all for which it might have stood. And royal wisdom such as Solomon's 
wisdom, it has been suggested, may not have been a signifier of a time of peace 
as much as of a time of turmoil and exploitation.14 
The strain is picked up again at 2.9: "And I became great and surpassed 
all who were before me in Jerusalem; also, my wisdom remained with me." As 
in 1.16, David is a likely candidate for the "all who were before" Qoheleth. 
What would be a crucial error seems purposeful because of its recurrence. 
Qoheleth has hereby caused problems, again, for interpreters relying on 
Solomonic authorship. For example, Targum Qohelet solves the problem by 
suggesting a creative referent for "all": "I am the one who multiplied and 
increased wisdom more than all the sages who preceded me in Jerusalem ... illS 
13 Cf. Gen. 14.18; Josh. 10. Given the absence of David's God Yahweh, the latter 
may be preferable. But this is made unlikely since it is difficult to imagine that the author 
envisages any other way of being "over" Jerusalem than the way of Solomon-Le., as a 
tribal descendant of Israel. 
14 Frank Spina argues that Qoheleth's use of the Solomonic constituted a repudiation 
of the manipulation of people and events for strictly political ends which such royal 
wisdom affected: " ... for the theology and ethic of Qoheleth is virtually opposite to that 
of Solomon, the king who made paganism fashionable, normative and even enviable, 
paving the way for all those 'wise' fools who followed in his footsteps and instituted 
policies that resulted in the ashes in the midst of which Qoheleth composed his eloquent 
rebuttal" {"Qoheleth and the Reformation of Wisdom", in H.B. Huffmon et al. [eds.] , 
The Quest for the Kingdom of God: Studies in Honor of George E. Mendenhall (Winona 
Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1983), p. 279. Spina quotes 2 Sam. 14.1-21 (Joab and the 
Tekoan woman); 16.20-17.23 (the deceitful counsel of Hushai) and other passages to 
support the idea that royal wisdom was oppressive and ethically inimical to Israel's 
"ancient religious traditions" (see pp. 274-77). 
IS P.S. Knobel (trans.), The Targum of Qohelet (The Aramaic Bible, 15; Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1991), p. 22 (italics Knobel's); see C.D. Ginsburg, Coheleth, p. 273. 
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The ambiguity in Qoheleth's text again suggests that his association with 
Solomon, while undeniably present, is purposefully nebulous, allowing Qoheleth 
to preserve his individuality with congruity to his association with Solomon. 
Entering ch. 2, however, the identification of Qoheleth's character as King 
Solomon is made somewhat more definite. 
Briefly, then, the chapter is a relatively undisputed unit (which properly 
begins at 1.12) that relates Qoheleth's extreme experience as a king, and his 
consequent "considering" (2.11) and "observing" (2.12, 13,24) that lead him to 
hate (MlfD, 2.17, 18; cf. 3.8a) and to despair (rDM', 2.20). It can be broken down 
into three stages: 
1) Consideration of pleasure/ success (2.1-11) 
a) Introduction-how he will test (2.1-3) 
b) Test proper-what he tested (2.4-8) 
c) Conclusion (2.9-11) 
2) Consideration of wisdom and folly (2.12-17) 
a) Test proper (2.12) 
b) How he tested/conclusion (2.13-17) 
3) Consideration of toil (2.18-26) 
a) Introduction-reasons for experiment (2.18-20) 
b) Test proper (2.21-22) 
c) Conclusion (2.23-26) 
For each particular item listed in the first stage of Qoheleth's experiment 
(particularly in 2.4-8), a parallel exists in the biblical narratives about King 
Solomon!6 And there are other, more peculiar likenesses in the chapter. 
Qoheleth's taking of whatever his eyes desired (2.10), for example, echoes the 
motif in 1 Kings that Solomon took (or was given) all that he desired. 17 Clearly, 
The LXX simply drops the problematic preposition "over" of 1.16 and reads "~cI£p­
OUGaATJ.1" instead-presumably to denote all of the wise as opposed to a ruler? 
16 Especially "silver and gold" (2.8); cf. 2 ehron. 1.15: "Solomon made silver and 
gold as common as stone, gathering them from provinces" (RSV). There is, however, one 
major defect in the list. Solomon's most celebrated achievement is missing: the 
widespread use of chariots and horses. 
17 See 1 Kgs 5.7-12; 9.1, 11. For other linguistic parallels (even in word order) 
compare 1 Kgs 4.11 to Eccl. 2.24; 3.13; 5.18; 8.15. F. Zimmermann also suggests that 
such textual echoes strengthen Qoheleth's identity with Solomon (Inner World, p. 83). 
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the affinity with Solomonic tradition is too established to conclude from this 
section that it is only a fiction of "general kingship". 18 It is more likely that the 
author was simply exercising a freedom that is witnessed in such roughly 
concurrent "Solomonic" texts as the Song of Songs which offers an imaginative, 
if inaccurate, description of Solomon's vineyards (Cant. 4.12-5.1; 6.2, 11; 8.11-
12). 
Although there may be a practical strategy at hand,19 Qoheleth has once 
again linked himself to the Solomonic for the purpose of critique. By first citing 
lists of improbable items and amounts ("concubines and concubines!", 2.8) and 
imaging to his younger self an omnipotence of imposing skill, know-how and 
entrepreneurialism, and then concluding that, 
I considered all the deeds my hands had done and the toil in which I had 
toiled to do it. And behold, everything was absurd and a pursuit of wind, 
and there is no profit under the heavens (2.11), 
his point is made in binary opposition: material profit versus true profit. Material 
profit in the light of considering where it actually gets you (the fate of the fool 
and the sage-the unsuccessful as well as the successful-is the same 
nonethelessio becomes immaterial. Indeed, if Walter Brueggemann is correct in 
suggesting that wisdom in the context of such power and riches usually becomes 
"trivialized", then Qoheleth, in ch. 2 at least, trivializes Solomon's wisdom in the 
context of his (Le. Solomon's and, by implication, Qoheleth's own feigned?) 
power and riches. 21 
18 So Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 71. 
19 The Solomonic perspective helps make sense, for example, of Qoheleth's lament at 
2.21 that one must leave his reward to someone who did not toil for it; presumably his 
son. Normally, it would be good to leave an inheritance for a son (Prov. 13.22; 19.14 
etc.). But in Qoheleth/Solomon's case it is "~M that Rehoboam should receive it (cf. 
Targ. Qoh. 1.1-2 which sets up the whole book as an exposition of the loss of Solomon's 
kingdom). 
20 A recurring idea of 2.13-23. Further, see my application of the actantial model in 
Chapter 9.3, particularly the discussion of wisdom as Helper. 
21 "Social Significance", p. 131. 
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The assertion that the guise ceases after ch. 2 is usually founded on the 
(legitimate) claim that such obviously Solomonic allusion no longer occurs after 
this point. The following related question, however, has not been (but should be) 
asked: "Why cannot the Solomonic guise be admitted as an interpretive strategy 
intended to encompass the whole of Qoheleth's narration?" I suggest that the 
guise is not wholly turned from; indeed, at times it is subtly reinforced. If my 
thesis can be accepted, that question becomes rhetorical. 
One of the reasons proffered to limit the extent of the guise is that the 
perspective of the narrating Qoheleth has changed from that of ruler to subject 
after ch. 2. It is also argued that particular passages (3.16-17; 4.1-3; 5.8; 8.2-9; 
10.5-7, 16-17) undermine Qoheleth' s "royal" character since they are the 
opinions of one who "lacks power to correct human oppression,,22 (and to 
correct human oppression was to be expected of an Israelite king23), or "of a 
commoner who fears royal authority". 24 Most of the scholars listed in n. 3 
above at one point or another list the above texts in marshalling their arguments 
but do not actually engage with those texts. This practice continues unabated, as I 
have recently discovered in a 1995 essay by O. Kaiser: "the viewpoint in ivI3ff., 
vii 19, viii 2ff. and x 16ff. is clearly that of a subject, not a ruler [case 
closed]. ,,25 This "argument" is typical of those who reject the scope of the guise 
and who then often go on to make an issue out of Qoheleth's rejection of the 
Solomonic guise as either ironic cleverness or evidence of a redactional layer. 
One of the disputed passages suggests that Qoheleth was a keen observer 
of oppression: 
22 J. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction (London: SCM Press, 
1982), p. 146. 
23 An imperative forcefully expressed in Ps. 72 (esp. vv. 4, 14); Prov. 29 etc. 
24 So R.B. Salters, "Qoheleth and the Canon", ExpTim 86 (1974-75). 
2S "Qoheleth", in J. Day, R.P. Gordon and H.O.M. Williamson (eds.), Wisdom in 
Ancient Israel: Essays in Honour of J.A. Emerton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 83-93 (84). 
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Again I sawall the oppressions26 that are done under the sun. 
And behold, the tears of the oppressed~ 
and there was no comforter for them. 
Yet from the hand of their oppressors (Cn'ptDV) was power-
and there was no comforter for them. (4.1) 
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This is an observation, a calling to attention. Quite simply, the whole question of 
intervention seems absent. There is no injunction to act positively and Qoheleth's 
concern, it seems, is only to make the reader aware. And if Qoheleth is counting 
himself among the "upper class", as Gordis suggests,27 his position is morally 
bankrupt within the proverbial tradition and the Solomonic thereby undermined. 
For to relieve the suffering of the poor is to correct injustice (cf. Ps. 146.7; 
Prov. 14. 31 ~ 22 .16 ~ 29.13 etc.). But in one respect the moral framework is 
secondary here, for Qoheleth observes that although the oppressors had power it 
remains that there was none to comfort their victims. The real atrocity, for 
Qoheleth, is not so much the oppressions themselves but the very existence of 
both the oppressors and the oppressed. It would be better if all had never been 
brought into being (so the force of his ensuing argument in vv. 2-3). If an "anti-
royalty" sentiment were really meant here it would have been far more effective 
for Qoheleth to count himself among the oppressed, but he counts himself among 
no one. Yet there is a moral aspect as well. Like a journalist, he reports his 
observations without "taking sides", yet, as with some journalists, his compassion 
is implied in the rhetoric of his account and it is a compassion that could have 
been intended to inspire his readers to do justice. For Qoheleth's dramatic 
"Behold!" (run) and his effective repetition of the lament, "there was no 
comforter for them" ,28 may suggest that his observation, while not explicitly 
26 "OppressiOns" (from PrDV) may denote different types of oppression: political 
(Prov. 28.16; Bccl. 5.8), economic (Prov. 14.31; 22.16; Amos 4.1), of labour (Mal. 
3.5). 
27 Koheleth, p. 77. 
28 CruD at 4.1 ("comforter") is neither a soft nor passive word, but suggests decisive 
action (cf. Pss. 23.4; 71.21; 86.17; also, see Whybray, Ecclesiastes, p. 81). Bccl. 4.1-3 
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commanding action, was intended to stir it. To push the analogy a little further, 
when journalists in "closed" countries such as China and Saudi Arabia risk their 
lives to observe and then relate injustice and oppression they take a profound 
moral stance. There is no reason why the observational quality witnessed here 
and the narratorial voice of kingship in general, or even of Solomon, cannot 
validly co-exist. 
Again, Qoheleth observes oppression (5.8-9): 
If you see oppression of the poor and the plundering of justice and 
rights29 in the province, do not be amazed at the matter; 
for a high one is watched over by a higher, 
and the highest is over them. 
Here is something which, on the whole, benefits the land: 
a king, for the sake of agriculture. 30 
Do not be surprised at oppression and injustice (says Qoheleth), for the 
hierarchical system is such that there are no safeguards.31 This verse comes at 
is strikingly similar to some of Isaiah's and Jeremiah's laments in the course of 
judgments on Jerusalem. Cf. Isa. 51.19, where the prophet says to Jerusalem, "These 
two things have befallen you-who will grieve with you?-devastation and destruction, 
famine and sword-who will comfort you?" (here the NRSV follows variants ["Gk, Syr, 
Vg"] where the MT offers, "how may I comfort you?" l17:1roM '7:1]; the basic effect of 
the rhetorical question, however, is the same in that the plight is highlighted); cf. Jer. 
4.23-26 (where observation plays a similar, emotive role) and 15.5. 
29 See Provo 31.9 (King Lemuel's mother to him): "Open your mouth, judge 
righteously (p,rt!l£)fl1), maintain the rights of the poor and needy ('lV 1'" 
1"::1"')" (RSV); cf. Provo 8.15 and Isa. 32.1 also on this sense of i"J as the duty of 
kings. 
30 On this translation of 5.9 see D. Garrett, "Qoheleth on the Use and Abuse of 
Political Power", TrinJ 8 (1987), p. 164. Garrett extends "tilled field" ('::1Vl M'W") to 
"agriculture" by metonymy. 
31 Hence the meaning of ClM'''V CI'M::1l' ,7:lfl1 M::1l "V7:I M::1l '!). The consecutive 
adjectives of comparison (M::13, "high") reflect increasingly higher persons of rank (cf. 
Ezek. 21.26 [21.31]) and a system which in essence traps people at the bottom (so 
Whybray, E~clesiastes, p. 97). Note that the BHS margin offers tlv';~~ 1:':);' for 
tlV';~ tI'l)::1~' (v. 8 [7]), making the final official singular and possibly making clear a 
reference to God (the plural could accomplish this as well, although not as clearly), 
fitting more appropriately with 5.1-7 which calls for the fear of God. Qoheleth may here 
be invoking God as judge over the entire schema of activity (as he does at 3.16-17 where 
he declares God to be judge over the righteous and the wicked, himself standing as 
observer-one who sees [M"']-as here and as woven substantially throughout 
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the end of a small but potent critique of religious activity (5.1-7) and is in sharp 
contrast to the seriousness with which the addressee's relationship to God is to be 
taken. Do fear God, says Qoheleth (5.7), but this will not shield you from seeing 
oppression. Indeed, if God is the highest one who watches over the whole justice 
system (reading the divine plural), there is nothing you can do; for God is in 
heaven and you are on the earth (5.2). As in 4.1, Qoheleth is standing apart from 
the system, perhaps as a king (as the positive assertion of 5.9 might support), to 
comment critically on it. 32 But again there is perhaps a positive aspect to 
Qoheleth's critical, even cynical outlook. Compare Garrett's slightly overstated 
but still (in my opinion) sound conclusion: 
[Qoheleth] is far from naive and will not be shocked at the existence of 
corruption in high places when he sees it ... he does not, in self-righteous 
arrogance, avoid the dirty world of politics ... The Sitz im Leben of a large 
portion of Ecclesiastes is the power struggle in the royal court. 33 
It could even be that Qoheleth observed injustice with such intensity, embittered 
with the idea that nothing (actually, wisdom and success in particular) can change 
the fate of the poor, the worker, the sinner, the sage-indeed of anyone (cf. 9.1-
3)-that his words of advise had to be, Do not be shocked at what you see (cf. 
7.16-17). Even a king and a wise man can do nothing to alter the absurd, which 
includes everything. This need not imply that Qoheleth did not accept the 
possibility of change at a more personal level (cf. 4.9-12, esp. v. 12 where 
empowerment in community can overcome oppression), for this observation 
concerns the system of justice (higher and higher authorities; not "lower and 
lower", where one-to-one change is accessible), which for Qoheleth was what had 
Ecclesiastes [2.3, 13,24; 3.2, 16,22; 4.4, 7, 15; 8.10, 16, 17; 9.11]). 
32 Contra H.L. Ginsberg (Studies in Koheleth, p. 13). Even if Qoheleth is criticizing 
the monarchy, it is ludicrous to assume (as Ginsberg does) that a king cannot (according 
to some unspoken principle?) be self-critical of the system of which he is a part. This 
assumption is basic to most scholars who deny any presence of the fiction after ch. 2. I 
will return to this faulty assumption below. 
33 "Qoheleth on the Use and Abuse of Political Power", TrinJ 8 (1987), pp. 176-77. 
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been made crooked and was never to become straight (cf. 1.15; 3.16-17; 7.13). 
It has been suggested that another passage reveals Qoheleth's incongruity 
with royal authority (8.2-5): 
Keep34 the command of the king, because35 of an oath of God. 
Do not leave in a hurry from his presence. 
Do not stand your ground about an unpleasant matter, 36 
for he takes delight in all that he does. 37 
The word of the king is supreme, and who can say to him, "What 
are you doing?" 
One who keeps a command will know no hann, and the heart of the 
wise will know the time and procedure of a matter. 
Indeed, for every matter there is a time and a procedure; although 
humanity's misery lies heavy upon them. 
Is there a "sense of fear of royal authority" here?38 Certainly, in 8.1 the king' s 
command is not to be questioned. Qoheleth is offering friendly advice to the 
court sage to prevent embarrassment incurred by confronting the king. 39 The 
idea presumes the commitment of this implied reader to an oath. 4O The oath 
once made is tantamount to "an offer you can't refuse". All we can ascertain 
34 'lM here is probably a scribal error. It makes little sense at all in this context and 
is not represented in any ancient versions. 
3S On n'~' "3) meaning "in order that" or "because", see Dan. 2.30, where Daniel 
will interpret the visions and thoughts of the king "in order that the interpretation be 
made known" (M'rDEl " n~"-'17), and cf. Eccl. 3.18 ("concerning"). This meaning 
fits well with the word of the king being "supreme" (8.4, from CO"rD). 
36 That is, "Do not persistently champion an idea which the king opposes" (see 
Garrett, "Qoheleth on the Use and Abuse of Political Power", p. 169). 
37 flln' 'rD"-"~ ,~ (lit., "for all that he delights in") functions as the object of 
l"trD17 here. For a similar construct, cf. Est. 6.7. 
38 Thus R. Gordis (Koheieth, p. 41). For further evidence (besides 8.2-5) Gordis 
points out that there is a noticeable lack of any "national motif" throughout Ecclesiastes, 
but the consequences of this lack, and why such a motif should be present in the first 
place, are not made clear. Childs (Introduction, p. 584) also relies on this passage to 
support the limitation of the guise to the first two chapters. 
39 See Murphy's comments, Ecclesiastes, pp. 82-83. 
40 Is it an oath made by the implied reader (a courtier?, sage?) to God, or is it an 
oath made by the king to God? Despite the linguistic ambiguity (lit., "because an oath of 
God") the latter hardly makes sense (how could the king's oath bind him to a sage or 
courtier except in unusual circumstances?). Translations are therefore probably correct in 
adding "your" to oath or "you made an oath" (e.g. NIV, NRSV, RSV, TLB). This finds 
support from Qoheleth's own seriousness on the issue of the reader's behaviour before 
God (5.1-7). 
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from such counsel, however, is that Qoheleth knew well the workings of the 
court, knew how sages came to be embarrassed and, being a sage himself, 
appreciated the task of dealing with a difficult king, who in any case should take 
heed of the words of the wise ("Better is a poor but wise youth than an old but 
foolish king who no longer knows to heed advice", 4.13). After establishing this 
counsel (vv. 2-4), Qoheleth brings wisdom itself into the equation. The sage will 
know the best time and way to escape tyrannical hann (v. 5). If the king is 
sinister or inexperienced (cf. 4.13; 10 .16-17) then this becomes particularly 
relevant: obey the king's command with shrewdness. Even so, Qoheleth 
continues, no one can retain the spirit, nor escape the ultimate tyranny of death 
or war (8.6-8). Qoheleth hereby proceeds beyond the sphere of obedience and 
disobedience and seeks to contrast disobedience to the king with matters on a 
much larger scale. (He does so in the vein of wisdom after having praised 
wisdom at 8.1; cf. Provo 16.15.) Again, wisdom may change one's fate at the 
person-to-person level, but it cannot deliver from those larger hazards in life that 
are connected to systems and institutions (war) or to God (death). Yes, Qoheleth 
is contemplating the misuse of authority (v. 9) and there is perhaps a latent attack 
on despotism, but to say that Qoheleth is himself jearing authority can only be 
speculation. 
Two other texts have been cited as examples of the perspective of a 
subject, as opposed to that of a ruler or king: 10.5-71 and 10.16-17. 
There is an evil I have seen under the sun, as it were an error which 
proceeds from the ruler: 
fools are set in many high places and the rich dwell in a low place. 
I have seen servants on horses 
and princes travelling as servants do, on foot. (10.5-7) 
Woe to you, 0 land, when your king is a child, 
and your princes eat [a great deal?] in the morning! 
41 In particular, by Salters who labels it a criticism of "corrupt leadership" 
("Qoheleth and the Canon", p. 341). 
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Happy are you, 0 land, when your king is the son of nobles, 
and your princes eat at the proper time-
for strength and not for drunkenness. (10.16-17) 
The first example is preceded by a word of caution: "If the anger of the ruler 
rises against you, do not leave your place, for calmness will quell great 
offences." Like the knowledge of "court practice" demonstrated in ch. 8, this 
word of caution makes best sense coming from one who has seemingly had 
opportunity to grant forgiveness for an offence against a king (Le. a king!),42 
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and such a construct of the speaker (as king) works nicely in the verses that 
follow as well (vv. 5-7). These verses just as likely form a lament of one who 
has known that place of power (and who regards this situation as an evil of direct 
consequence) as they do the reflections of a subject. However, given the presence 
of the guise we have so far seen and the absence of a change in that narratorial 
voice (as king), the former must be preferred. The same can be said of 10.16-17, 
where Qoheleth simply grieves the fact that in some lands power is not in the 
proper hands. And again, we might expect such words from someone in a 
position of power. 43 
What else does Qoheleth have to say about kings? There are two pericopes 
(4.13-16; 9.13-16) which, while mentioning kings, seem merely to use the idea 
of kingship to contrast the poor man's praiseworthy wisdom. Their significance is 
marginal. Eccl. 4.13-16 is best summed by its first verse: "Better is a poor and 
42 Compare Prov. 16.14: "A king's wrath is a messenger of death, and a wise man 
will appease it" (RSV); or, "My son, fear the LoRD and the king, and do not disobey 
either of them" (Prov. 24.21 [RSV]; also, cf. Provo 16.15; 25.6). The theme of 10.4 
(proper behaviour towards a ruler) is reiterated at 10.20 in which Qoheleth simply 
praises wise demeanour towards a king: "Even in your thought, do not curse the 
king ... for a bird of the air will carry your voice." This is in keeping with other 
proverbial convention on the matter: "He who loves purity of heart, and whose speech is 
gracious, will have the king as his friend" (Prov. 22.11, RSv). 
43 Provo 19.10 offers a similar charge: "It is not fitting for a fool to live in luxury, 
much less for a slave to rule over princes" (RSV). Whybray suggests that 10.16-17 may 
reflect a reaction against Hellenistic attitudes towards kingship at a time when child kings 
were becoming more common (Ecclesiastes, p. 156). 
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wise youth than an old and foolish king who no longer knows to heed advice" 
(4.13). The poor youth became king, and it is "~l"1 that none who come later will 
rejoice in him (4.16; cf. 1.11).44 The latter (9.13-16) is a more complicated 
narrative in which the poor man (although not a king) delivers a city from a great 
king by wisdom. From this Qoheleth draws a clear conclusion: 
And I said, "Better wisdom than might." 
But the wisdom of the poor man is despised, 
and his words are not heeded. 
The calm words of the wise are heeded 
more than the shouting of a ruler among fools. (9.16-17) 
In these passages there is neither criticism nor praise of kingship, but kings are 
the stratagem by which Qoheleth brings the wisdom of the poor into sharp relief. 
Perhaps ironically he thereby fulfils a mandate to be concerned for the poor-for 
he has "opened his mouth" in their favour (recalling the instruction of King 
Lemuel's mother at Prov. 31.9). 
We have seen that there is an assumption in Qoheleth-studies which runs 
something like this: "Monarchs cannot be self-critical, or critical of the monarchy 
of which they are a part. ,,45 There is one ancient work concerning a monarch, a 
Roman emperor, which casts this assumption into a suspicious light: The 
44 G. Ogden has argued that this pericope is a thesis (the Tob-Spruch of 4.13) with 
an observation that verifies it (4.14-16) and that the youth who went on to become 
"counsellor" (Ogden's reading of ,,,O~ at 4. 14a) may be a veiled historical allusion to 
Joseph or David. While I accept that some kind of allusion may be present, in order for 
Joseph to be a candidate Ogden is forced to argue for a rather ill-attested reading of ,"0 
and to ignore the contrast present of the youth becoming king with an old king, which 
contrast gives full breadth to the point made in the Tob-Spruch ("Historical Allusion in 
Qoheleth iv 13-16?", vr 30 [1980], pp. 311, 312-13). 
4S Obviously, I am generalizing the nature of the assumptions. J. A. Loader is one 
scholar who objects more thoroughly to what I am suggesting than most. His only 
objection that I have not yet dealt with, however, is that II [i]f the whole book were royal 
fiction, one would have expected it to occur in the first pericope [1.3-11], which is not 
the case" (making reference to Ellermeier in, Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet 
[BZAW, 152; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979], p. 19). The problem with this objection is that 
the word "occur" begs definition. Why is it that the distinct identification of the narrator 
at 1.1-2, as well as its subsequent development, cannot continue to hold sway without its 
(perhaps unnecessary?) explicit reiteration? 
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Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. In this semi-autobiographical work, Aurelius 
offers some reflections on the state of concurrent political structure. I have 
chosen examples which, given the assumption I have just mentioned, could not 
have come from the mouth of a ruler or king. 
Be not Caesarified [i.e. a courtier], be not dipped in the purple dye; for it 
can happen. (6.30) 
... envy , tricking, and dissimulation are the character and consequences of 
tyranny. (1.11) 
Be neither slave nor tyrant to anybody. (1.31) 
Consider ... how many tyrants, who managed the power of life and death 
with as much insolence as if themselves had been immortal.. . and here you 
will find one man closing another's eyes. (4.48; cf. esp. Bccl. 4.1; 5.8)46 
The work was written c. 175 CE and has some affinity with Bcclesiastes.47 The 
narrator is a monarch who reflects on the mismanagement of political power 
structures. Like Ecclesiastes, the narrative of the Meditations is veiled in an 
obscure genre. As B. Rutherford puts it, the Meditations has no real literary 
counterpart, and "the absence of a familiar generic background" proves a 
hindrance to study, for "no single genre will provide the master key" .48 Here is 
an individual expression of criticism of corrupt power structures coming from one 
in power. As with Aurelius, if Qoheleth was critical of the monarchical or 
otherwise power structure of his day (as I believe is likely at Eccl. 5.8; 8.2-9; 
46 All translations are taken from The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (trans. J. 
Collier; rev. A. Zimmern; London: Walter Scott, 1887), except for the first (6.30), 
which is from B. Rutherford's The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Study (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 65. Rutherford comments that the tyranny (Wpavv1.1C1l) in 
question may have often been self-referential (ibid.) . 
.r1 I note here that the only other significant comparison of Ecclesiastes to Aurelius'S 
Meditations I have come across is that of O. Loretz (following W. Rudolph), who 
suggests that both works employ a journal-keeping method ("Tagebuchaufzeichnungen") 
("Zur Darbietungsform der 'Ich-Erzlhlung' im Buche Qohelet", CBQ 25 [1963], p. 52). 
H. Fisch does, however, make a brief comparison of Qoheleth's notion of circularity to 
Aurelius's of the same ("Qoheleth: A Hebrew Ironist", p. 194 nn. 15-17). 
48 Rutherford, Meditations, p. 7. 
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and perhaps 4.1) it need not in any way preclude his consistent and mischievous 
reference to Solomon.49 To strike a modem analogy, there are a large number 
of lecturers in North America and Britain who are often more than self-critical of 
the educational systems in which they participate! The assumption is faulty. 
Thus far I conclude that it is unfair to suggest that a royal fiction is either 
undermined or forgotten after ch. 2. But what else suggests that Solomon is 
alluded to? Besides 1.12-2.17 (27?) there are two other traces of a particularly 
Solomonic guise. It is a tradition of Solomon as a recognizable individual who 
had experiences peculiar to himself that the first passage, 7.25-29,50 conceivably 
draws upon. 51 
I turned, I and my heart, to understand, and to search out and to seek 
wisdom and the sum of things; and to understand evil, folly and the folly 
of madness. And I found more bitter than death the woman who is traps 
and her heart nets, her hands chains. He who pleases God will be 
delivered from her, but he who sins will be taken by her. See, this I have 
found, said Qoheleth ([adding] one to one to fmd the sum, which my soul 
49 It is interesting to note on this score that Jewish rabbis of the middle ages were 
not afraid to associate kings with "anti-royal" sentiments. In 4.1-3 of Targ. Qoh. there is 
no attempt made to enhance the moral aspect, and sometimes even David was implicated 
in "anti-royal" sentiment (e.g. Qoh. Rab. 1O.4). One may also compare some remarks in 
the ANE text, The Instruction/or King Merikare (ANET, pp. 414-18). In the mouth of 
the king who is father of Merikare we find such advice as "impair no officials at their 
posts" (line 48; italics in ANE1), and "there is no one free from a foe" (lines 114-15). It 
would clearly be spurious to suggest that since in these verses (decontextualized as they 
are) there is no explicit, glowing reference to the king, or anything to suggest clearly that 
the speaker is not a subject of the king, that the narrating perspective is therefore not that 
of a king. 
so For textual comments and my treatment of the frame narrator's strategy in this 
section, see Chapter 4.2. For the question of Qoheleth's strategy in relation to the quest, 
see Chapter 9.3. 
'1 That tradition is a cohesive one from which a very particular character emerges. 
On this point (concerning 1 Kgs 1-11 in particular) see B. Porten, "The Structure and 
Theme of the Solomon Narrative", HUCA 38 (1967), pp. 93-128. Porten argues that 
from 1 Kgs 1-11 emerges a recognizable pattern of promise and fulfilment which 
created an unambiguous Solomonic tradition (see esp. pp. 94ff., 113-14, 124). F. 
Zimmermann assumes such a cohesive Solomonic tradition in his psychoanalytic 
treatment of Solomon in relation to Qoheleth, in Inner World, chapter 10. I am not 
suggesting that the case cannot be stated more loosely, as, for example, Brueggemann's 
remark that the author of Ecclesiastes "appealed to some abiding memory of the 
connection between Solomon and wisdom" ("Social Significance", p. 119). 
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has continually sought but I have not found): One man among a thousand 
I have found, but a woman among all of these I have not found. See, this 
alone I have found: God made humanity upright, but they have sought 
many devices. 
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Solomonic tradition portrays an exorbitantly xenophilic man concerning women: 
N ow King Solomon loved many foreign women ... from the nations 
concerning which the LoRD had said to Israel, "You shall not enter into 
marriage with them ... for surely they will tum away your heart after their 
gods"; Solomon clung to these in love. He had seven hundred wives, 
princesses, and three hundred concubines; and his wives turned away his 
heart ... and his heart was not wholly true to the LoRD his God ... So 
Solomon did what was evil in the sight of the LoRD ... Then Solomon built 
a high place for Chemosh ... And so he did for all his foreign wives ... 
(1 Kgs 11.1-8, RSV) 
It seems that in order to make some sense of this flaw in Israel's great wisdom 
teacher the "historian" turned to a seemingly simple and time-honoured solution: 
ascribe the problem to women. There is already a hint of this at 1 Kgs 11.3b; but 
only a hint. At Neh. 13.25-26 the excuse theme is picked up more clearly: 
.. .1 made them take an oath in the name of God, saying, "You shall not 
give your daughters to their sons, or take their daughters for your sons, or 
yourselves. Did not Solomon king of Israel sin on account of such 
women? Among the many nations there was no king like him, and he was 
beloved by his God, and God made him king over all Israel; nevertheless 
foreign women made even him to sin." (RSV)S2 
God's displeasure ("Solomon did what was evil in the sight of the LoRD") has 
been miraculously transformed into God's beneficence (" and he was beloved by 
his God"), and Solomon's shame ("his heart was not wholly true") to his 
exaltation ("there was no king like him"). This character make-over may have 
52 The editorial cleansing of bad character traits is a well-known feature of the 
biblical historical books. One extreme example is that of Manasseh who, according to 2 
Kgs 21.1-17, was irredeemably evil; and only by his own accord (21.16b). His evil 
results in a judgment from the "LoRD'S prophets" (21.10-15) and the final summary of 
his life is not good (21.17). However, the Chronicler (2 ebron. 33.1-20) apparently 
thought that Manesseh's image needed a good wash. Not only is the LoRD's judgment 
replaced with a story of Manesseh's repentance (33.10-17), but the final summary has 
been redeemed (even presented as an example of repentance worthy of emulation!; 
33.18-19). 
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reached yet another peak in Bccl. 7.25-29. First we need to remember that 
nothing stops the reader from reading with the same Solomonic context that is 
well established by the first two chapters. Furthermore, this passage is in no way 
an isolated text. It is entrenched in the course of narration (particularly, as we 
have seen, in that of the frame narrator's), couched in the language of experiment 
that is such a distinctive mark of the guise "proper" (see n. 59 below) and 
comprises an experience which is alluded to by the narrator: "I found more bitter 
than death ... " (v. 26). 
And in what context did Qoheleth search for one woman? Perhaps he 
searched in the numerical context of Solomon's experience: one woman among a 
thousand (of Solomon's wives?-1 Kgs 11.3) he could not find. Solomonic 
tradition is the ideal backdrop for this experiment. The "woman" (note, not a 
particular woman or "women") is likely a generic term meaning women in 
general (as CI'" is so often used generically to refer to men; cf. 2.8). Just as 
Solomon "fell victim" to women, "woman" is the accident waiting to happen to 
our unsuspecting QohelethlSolomon (the military imagery of traps and hunting 
reflects this; cf. 9.12). By offering such a hapless picture, however, Solomon 
may here be criticized for being too willing a "victim", and Solomonic tradition 
may thereby be under scrutiny. 53 
It has been suggested that the frame narrator, in the epilogue, ignores the 
guise of Solomon.54 But does the description, for example, of Qoheleth as a 
sage suggest an image incongruous with that of "king"? While the association of 
sage with king is not explicit in the epilogue, it is possible that the epilogue 
53 Ellul is in agreement on this point, but for very different reasons (Reason for 
Being, p. 20). Ellul notes that in the mouth of QohelethlSolomon the passage becomes a 
challenge to Solomon himself. But for Ellul the challenge consists of the idea that this is 
what Solomon would have said "were he truly wise" (p. 202). Both F. Zimmermann 
(Inner World, p. 86) and O. A. Barton (Ecclesiastes, p. 141) suggest a general 
Solomonic context as well. 
54 Notably, J. Crenshaw (Ecclesiastes, p. 29). 
7. The Solomonic Guise 142 
allows the already established image of Qoheleth as king in his narrative to merge 
with that of a celebrated image of sage.55 Such Solomonic tradition as the 
following may be compared: 
[Solomon] was wiser than all others ... and he uttered three thousand 
proverbs [a,rv~] ... And they came from all peoples to hear the wisdom of 
Solomon, and from all the kings of the earth, who had heard of his 
wisdom. (1 Kgs 4.31-34 [5.11-14]) 
As I argued in Chapter 5.2, the epilogue implies that there are tI,a,rtJO not 
included that the epilogist could have selected (12.9) and may therefore draw on 
such tradition as this concerning Solomon's great literary activity. 56 Further, the 
use of "shepherd" (i't,,0, 12.11) may have found its prototype in such tradition 
as 1 Sam. 25.7, in which shepherds are likened to Israelite kings, possibly 
presuming Qoheleth' s association with royalty. 57 Finally, if "shepherd" refers to 
God (see p. 102 n. 30, above), the divine origin both of Ecclesiastes and of 
Proverbs may here be asserted, and hence the putative author of both (Solomon) 
indirectly referred to. 
One could easily imagine that the Qoheleth described in the epilogue is a 
king. The association brings the proverb to mind, "It is the glory of God to 
conceal things, but the glory of kings is to search things out" (Prov. 25.2, RSV). 
SS In rabbinic literature, ,,=,O was sometimes substituted for tl:)M at 12.9. Again, no 
quandary was found in associating the two (e.g. Targ. Qoh. 12.8-10). One MS (110 of 
the Bibliotheque nationale, Paris) reads at 12.9: "King Qoheleth was wiser than all the 
people ... " (as cited in Knobel, "The Targum of Qohelet", p. 54). 
56 See also, Fox, "Frame-narrative", p. 100. It was this tradition of Solomon having 
encyclopedic knowledge and being a prolific writer which the frame narrator may have 
seized upon. Hezekiah (reigned c. 71lH>87 BeE) may have been responsible for fostering 
hugely popular legends of Solomon's great literary reputation (so R.B.Y. Scott, 
"Solomon and the Beginnings of Wisdom", in M. Noth and D.W. Thomas (eds.), 
Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East (VTSup, 3; Leiden: Brill, 1955), pp. 271, 
272-79), and perhaps this vibrant tradition is alluded to in the epilogue. 
57 J. Crenshaw has suggested a possible association with Egyptian literature which 
likens shepherds to pharaohs (Ecclesiastes, pp. 32-33). Further, see Chapter 5.2, where I 
argue that in 12.9 it is Qoheleth's connection to Solomon that fills in an alluring 
gap-i.e., Who is the teacher? and How did he teach? 
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And the possibility that King Solomon is alluded toS8 (even celebrated!) as the 
sage in question (v. 9) works well with the notion of the frame narrative's 
incongruity to Qoheleth's narrative in that by connecting Qoheleth to Solomon 
without any of the apparently subversive strategies that Qoheleth evidences in his 
use of the guise, the frame narrator evidences an orthodox, Solomonic summary 
of Qoheleth's life that serves to marginalize his bitter-sweet cynicism. 
The Solomonic guise is not simply a matter of a text here and there that 
"supports" it or remains silent about it. Besides what I have already touched on, 
the guise, which all admit is present in the first two chapters, is entrenched via 
the repetition of certain motifs that have their origin in the Solomonic guise 
proper of 1.1 and 1.12-2.26.59 The fact that those motifs have their origin there 
suggests that the Solomonic is deeply embedded in Ecclesiastes. Also, it follows 
that the guise proper is likely not, as has been suggested,c)() a product of 
redaction. Attributions that are the product of redaction might more resemble that 
found at Provo 10.1, where (unlike Ecclesiastes) what follows is not narrated 
S8 Thus also, Michael Eaton: "The epilogue portraying Qoheleth has all the 
appearances of referring to an actual historical character: a wise man, a collector of 
proverbs, a teacher and writer. Who else but Solomon?" (Ecclesiastes, p. 23). 
S9 These "throw-backs" to the guise proper are numerous. There are such recurring 
phrases as "absurd and a pursuit of wind" and "What is crooked cannot be made 
straight" (compare 1.15 at the commencement of the king's reflection to 7.13), which 
both can be found in the Solomonic guise "proper". Also, the experimental quality of the 
guise proper is felt throughout Ecclesiastes. Take, for example, sayings which suggest 
that Qoheleth is testing: "I observed" (2.12, 24; 3.16, 22; 4.1, 4, 7, 15; 8.17; 9.11); "I 
gave my heart over"-i.e. "I applied myself' (1.13, 17; 8.16); "I tested" (2.1; 7.23); or 
in which Qoheleth is concluding: "I said in my heart" or "I said to myself concerning" 
(1.16; 2.1,2, 15; 3.17, 18; 7.23; 8.14); or the "~l"1 judgments (1.2, 14; 2.1, 11, 15, 
17, 19, 21, 23, 26; 3.19; 4.4 etc.). All are a natural validation of Qoheleth's narrative 
springing from the guise proper of cbs. 1-2. As Whybray says of the relation of ch. 2 to 
the rest of Ecclesiastes, "The reflections attributed to Qoheleth-Solomon are not peculiar 
to him but are echoed throughout the book; and since the whole book is expressed in the 
first person singular, it is impossible to be certain at what point the 'I' of Solomon gives 
place to the 'I' of Qoheleth himself" (Ecclesiastes, p. 46). 
60 E.g. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, pp. 28-29, 56-57. 
7. The Solomonic Guise 
strictly in the first person (as if the person introduced at the title continued to 
speak in that same person), but is a series of relatively isolated proverbs. 61 
144 
In some sense I agree with Fox that "the king fiction is a rhetorical 
device, not an attempt to assert Solomonic authorship for the whole book" .62 At 
times the narrator is an intensely personal "I" that is unconventionally non-
historical. But the guise continually reasserts itself. This is why Fox's statement 
cannot be principally agreed to. The Solomonic guise is more complex than that. 
It provides for the reader a sometimes elusive, sometimes insinuated context in 
which to grasp the experiments of Qoheleth. 
2. The Solomonic, the Canon and the Rabbis 
It is widely held that Ecclesiastes was received into the Jewish canon due mainly 
to its association with Solomon.63 We know that rabbinic debate about the book 
in general was abundant. Ecclesiastes and Esther were perhaps the most 
frequently discussed books. The precise issues of those discussions are, however, 
difficult to determine. 
First, we can likely rule out the issue of "canon". 64 After an exhaustive 
61 Compare D. Dimant's comments on the Wisdom of Solomon: "[The association 
with Solomon is] organic to the original framework [ ... Wis.] does not state explicitly 
the pseudonymic author, nor the precise circumstances of his life. Instead, it employs a 
complete system of biblical allusions in order to indicate the pseudonymic author" 
("Pseudonymity in the Wisdom of Solomon", in N.F. Marcos [ed.], UJ Septuaginta (V 
Congreso de La lOSeS) [Madrid: C.S.I.C., 1985], p. 245; italics mine). The same can, I 
believe, be said of Ecclesiastes. 
62 Fox, "Frame-narrative", p. 86. 
63 This view seems to have been "traditionally" accepted in biblical scholarship; 
recently advocated by Svend Holm-Nielsen ("The Book of Ecclesiastes and the 
Interpretation of it in Jewish and Christian Theology", ASTI 10 [1976], p. 55), R.B. 
Salters ("Qoheleth and the Canon", pp. 340-42) and R.N. Wbybray (Ecclesiastes, p. 3), 
although Wbybray is hesitant. 
64 As I.H. Eybers reminds us, the terms "canonical" and "canonization" are relatively 
new (fourth century CE) and do not appear in the discussions of the rabbis before this 
time ("The 'Canonization' of Song of Solomon, Ecclesiastes and Esther", in W .C. van 
Wyk [ed.], Aspects of the Exegetical Process [OTWSA, 20; Pretoria West: NHW Press, 
1977], p. 33). I use the word for convenience because of its acquired usage and the 
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analysis of the subject, Sid Leiman suggests that only books used in teaching and 
disputes by the rabbis were considered canonical; that is, part of a group of 
books accepted and recognized as Scripture that a given community uses to 
establish ethical and religious practice and ideology. In other words, a canonical 
book became such because it was used pragmatically and frequently in rabbinic 
circles. This is why talmudic discussions reveal indifference towards the question 
of a book's "use", for its canonical status was already assumed in any such 
discussion. Instead, according to Leiman, the discussions give greater weight to a 
book's ability/inability to "defile the hands" ,65 or to its inspirational status in 
general. 66 Take, for example, t. Yad. 3.5: 
All the holy writings defile the hands [l'MCt!)C U;'Pi1 ':ln~-"~ 
C"'l'T'"nM]. The Song of Songs defiles the hands, but there is a dispute 
about Ecclesiastes. R. Jose says: Ecclesiastes does not defile the hands, 
but there is a dispute about the Song of Songs. 67 
Other factors suggest that canon was not an issue. Discussions at the so-
specific definition I take on board should become clear. 
6S That a book is capable of defiling the hands shows that it is holy or inspired. This 
notion was "a protective measure which the rabbis enacted in order to keep sacred 
literature from being mishandled" (S.Z. Leiman, The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture: 
The Talmudic and Midrashic Evidence [Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1976], p. 116; 
also, see pp. 104-20). Some books were considered both uninspired and canonical (e.g. 
Megilloth Taanith; ibid, p. 112), including, at least for some rabbis, Ecclesiastes. After 
reviewing a plethora of rabbinic discussion on the matter, Leiman argues that the 
definition of canonical as that which is used pragmatically (instead of only inspired) 
corrects a misunderstanding in biblical scholarship with a long history. In opposition to 
Leiman, D. Kraemer argues that Leiman falsely assumes that "the challenge to ... [the] 
inspiration [of the books in question] could have been divorced from the question of their 
inclusion in the canon" (liThe Formation of Rabbinic Canon: Authority and Boundaries", 
JBL 110/4 [1991], pp. 628-29). But Leiman does not attempt to "divorce" these 
questions as much as to show the lack of evidence for their causal relationship. Besides, 
it may be that the question of the defilement of hands was not one of inspiration per se. 
As James Barr comments, "the question is a truly ritual one: the discussion is not, 
whether this or that book is canonical, but whether it, canonical or not, had certain ritual 
effects" (Holy Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism [philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1983], p. 51; see also, pp. 49ff.). 
66 E.g. t. Yad. 2.14 (see below). 
67 Translation from "Yadayim", in The Babylonian Talmud (trans. I. Fishman; 
London: Soncino Press, 1948). See also, t. Yad. 2.14; 'Ed. 5.3; Meg. 7a; Lev. R. 28.1. 
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called Council of Jamnia (c. 90 CE) suggest that Ecclesiastes was in danger of 
being deemed t~l-"that which is stored away"-since it fostered heretical ideas. 
But the reported debate likely served to confirm its canonical status early on, 
since only problematic canonical books were at risk of being "stored away".68 
Also, the Solomonic connection fades to the background. In none of the 
discussions at Jamnia was Solomonic authorship even mentioned, and in the end 
no books discussed at Jamnia were withdrawn from canonical use. 69 Ecclesiastes 
was spared t~l, but not because of any association with Solomon.7o 
Furthermore, as early as the second century there were rabbis who were 
unwilling to divulge (or who were truly ignorant about) the origin of uneasiness 
about the inspiration of Ecclesiastes (and, at the time, the Song of Solomon). 
They believed that "their uneasiness went back to their predecessors". 71 This 
forms, again, an ironical reflection of Ecclesiastes' long-standing canonical 
68 So Leiman, Canonization, pp. 79-80, 86, 104-109. 
~ Indeed, Jamnia may have only been an "academic discussion" which made no 
"authoritative" decisions (so Beckwith, The Old Testament Canon, pp. 276-77). 
70 Contra R.B. Salters, G.A. Barton and R. Gordis. It is most likely that 
Ecclesiastes survived a selection process by which it was finally deemed orthodox (late 
third century CE?) because it "begins and ends with Torah". As Qoh. Rab. at 1.3 reads, 
"Is it possible that the words might be applied to man's labour in the Torah?" (taken 
from "Midrash Rabbah Koheleth", in The Midrash, VII [trans. A. Cohen; London: 
Soncino Press, 1939]; all citations of Qoh. Rab. are taken from this edition). That is, one 
should not toil for one's own material need but for and in the Torah (and, according to 
Qoh. Rab., Ecclesiastes ends with the Torah at 12.13). This might have been appealing 
at a time when wisdom and religion were at a low ebb (so Salters, who suggests this 
tentatively as an alternative; "Qoheleth and the Canon", p. 341). According to some 
Talmuds, it was only because the men of Hezekiah had copied and examined 
Ecclesiastes, finding it acceptable, that it was saved from t~l (along with the Song of 
Songs; cf. David Halperin, "The Book of Remedies, the Canonization of the Solomonic 
Writings, and the Riddle of Pseudo-Eusebius" , JQR 72 [1982], pp. 277-78,281; cf. 
Prov. 25.1). L. Ginzberg (The Legends oJ the Jews [7 vols.; Philadelphia: The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1968], VI, p. 368) notes another "legend" concerning 
the men of Hezekiah in which Ecclesiastes was withdrawn by them from public use 
because of its "unholy nature". Overall, it is precarious to determine just how 
Ecclesiastes escaped tll. 
7J Halperin, "The Book of Remedies", p. 277. Halperin also argues that 
discrepancies between Yad. 3.5 and Meg. 7a concerning the Ushan authorities cited, "add 
to the impression of uncertainty in traditions". 
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status. Its canonicity may never have been disputed. As Roger Beckwith puts it, 
Is it not possible that the disputes [i.e. rabbinic disputes in general] were 
about books long acknowledged as canonical. .. and all of them privately 
studied as Scripture, before and during the period of the disputes, no less 
than afterwards?72 
This may explain why the Shammaites who argued that Ecclesiastes did not 
"defile the hands" nevertheless expounded verses from the book publicly, treating 
it, according to Leiman, canonically. In their infamous dispute on this topic with 
the school of Hillel, Solomonic authorship was not brought into play.73 
Finally, in the early third century CE we find the reported opinion of R. 
Simeon ben Menasya: 
The Song of songs defiles the hands, because it was spoken through 
Divine inspiration; Ecclesiastes does not defile the hands, because it is 
[only] Solomon's wisdom. They replied: Did he write this alone? 
Scripture says, "He spoke three thousand parables, and his songs were a 
thousand and five" (1 Kgs 5.12), and "Do not add to [God's] words, lest 
He rebuke you and you be found a liar" (Prov. 30.6).74 
And again from Jerome: 
... the Hebrews say that, among other writings of Solomon which are 
obsolete and forgotten, this book [Eccl.] ought to be obliterated 
[oblitterandus], because it asserts that all the creatures of God are in 
vain. 7S 
In both examples any correlation to Solomon was irrelevant (or even damaging) 
71 Beckwith, The Old Testament Canon, p. 276. Evidence outside the rabbinic 
disputes may further substantiate this claim. I.H. Eybers lists several possible allusions to 
Ecclesiastes from the Thanksgiving Hymns at Qumran (fragments dated 150 BeE). In my 
opinion, only the following allusion seems plausible: compare lQS 6.7 to Eccl. 11.9, 
which both employ the rare biblical idiom, "the way of thy heart" (Eybers, "Some Light 
on the Canon of the Qumran Sect", in S.Z. Leiman [ed.], The Canon and Masorah of 
the Hebrew Bible: An Introductory Reader [New York: Ktav, 1974], p. 26). The New 
Testament betrays no sure knowledge of Ecclesiastes, which tips the scale of judgment in 
neither direction. Additionally, although any substantial use of Ecclesiastes was slow-
coming among the early Christian church (see below), there is no evidence among the 
fathers of dispute over its use. 
73 t. Yad. 3.5; 'Ed. 5.3. 
74 t. Yad. 2.14 (with variations); b. Meg. 7a (trans. by Halperin, "The Book of 
Remedies", p. 277). 
7S As cited by C.D. Ginsburg, Coheleth, p. 15. 
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to Ecclesiastes' canonical status. 
Usually debates instead focused on some of the acknowledged 
contradictions of the book (even the "defiling of hands" debate may have had this 
problem at its centre). Qoh. Rab. 11.9 records what was perhaps the most serious 
of debates on Ecclesiastes: 
The Sages sought to suppress the Book of Koheleth because they 
discovered therein words which tend toward heresy. They declared, "This 
is the wisdom of Solomon that he said, 'Rejoice, 0 young man, in thy 
youth!'" (Ecct. 11.9). Now Moses said, that ye go not about after your 
own heart (Num. 15.39) ... Is restraint to be abolished? Is there no 
judgement and no Judge? But since he continued, "But know thou, that for 
all these things God will bring thee into judgement", they exclaimed, 
"Well has Solomon spoken" . 
It seems natural to assume that in order to solve such dilemmas rabbis would 
have turned to the argument that Solomon was incapable of heterodoxy, and that 
since he wrote Ecclesiastes, there must be some other explanation (Le. other than 
that "Qoheleth" was in fact a heretic) to account for its heterodoxy.76 However, 
there is no evidence to suggest that this critical line was ever taken up. In the 
example above, it is only what can at best be called a contrived reading of Eccl. 
11. 9b that "redeemed" the text. 
Most debates of ancient readers are mainly concerned with the content of 
Ecclesiastes. In fact, the references to the use of the book seem to act as a ruse to 
discuss what is in it and how it affects one's reading of it.77 Ancient readers did 
not seem to be bothered with the much asked modem question, Why is 
Ecclesiastes in the canon? And we cannot come up with a satisfactory answer 
anyway. We have seen that there is no evidence to suggest that any association 
76 So, for example, Gordis, Koheleth, p. 42. 
77 Compare Eybers's statement: "the discussion surrounding these books [Cant., 
Eccl., Est.] were more of an academic exercise, based on certain objections which could 
be raised against these books" ("Canonization", p. 34). 
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with Solomon was responsible for it.78 Other suggestions, however, have been 
offered. For example, J. Jarick suggests that, in the end, this "little scroll ... was 
simply too attractive to be surrendered" .79 S. Schloesser suggests that the 
profoundly moral stance of Qoheleth's scepticism (a more honest and authentic 
expression of experience than the older schools of wisdom) is what granted it a 
place in the canon.80 While these suggestions are more feasible to me than the 
Solomonic connection, in this case, of the making of many speculations there is 
no end, regardless how well-informed. Ancient readers did not seem to question 
the fact that for one reason or another Ecclesiastes was there. The connection 
with Solomon was assumed but did not raise any significant interpretive issues 
(compare section 5 below). As T. Perry suggests, the more interesting question 
than "How did Ecclesiastes get into the canon?", is "What is the nature of a 
canon that includes such books?,,81 To the reader who would demand a seamless 
cohesion of ideology, its nature is strange and potentially graceful. 
3. The Solomonic and the Pseudonymic 
Putting a label on the device that I have until now for the sake of convenience 
called the Solomonic guise is made difficult by the fact that there is little 
concurrent with Ecclesiastes which is like it: the ruminations of a "Qoheleth" (of 
any kind) who playfully, elusively and problematically sets his words in the 
78 1. Barton is in agreement (Oracles of God: Perceptions of Ancient Prophecy in 
Israel after the Exile [London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1986], p. 62). 
79 larick further suggests that Solomonic authorship was relevant to the extent that it 
would have placed the writing of Ecclesiastes before the time when, traditionally, "the 
Holy Spirit ceased out of Israel" (Gregory Thaumaturgos' Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes 
[SBLSCS, 29; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990], pp. 288, 317-18). 
II) '" A King is Held Captive in her Tresses': The Liberating Deconstruction of the 
Search for Wisdom from Proverbs through Ecclesiastes", in 1. Morgan (ed.), Church 
Divinity (Bristol: Cloverdale Corporation, 1989-90), p. 228. 
81 Dialogues with Kohelet, p. 48. 
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mouth of a king. 82 A host of appellations have been offered: "Organ of 
himself", "abstraction of the historical", "Pseudo-Solomon", "effective foil", 
"nom de plume", "putative author" and so forth. 
Is it a pseudonym? Strictly speaking, the answer is no. The name of 
Solomon appears nowhere in the book. However, this may be attributed to the 
fact that, in a culture whose notion of authorship was much more fluid than our 
own,83 the association to Solomon may not have required the name. Such 
fluidity may have meant, in the end, that Qoheleth's readers found only a blurred 
distinction between Solomon and QohelethiSolomon. That "construct" of 
authorship is partly assumed of the reader by the use of the name "Qoheleth" in, 
for example, the superscription; for even a secondary editor would there have had 
ample opportunity to anchor the work more solidly and clearly to the name of 
Solomon. Also, the fictitious quality of the frame narration coupled with 
Qoheleth's imaginative use of Solomon and first-person narration suggests a 
seemingly conscious effort to achieve pseudonymity. 84 That is, it seems that 
82 Martin Hengel is in agreement: "The semi-pseudonymity of the work is unique" 
(Judaism and Hellenism, I, p. 129). Hengel goes on to compare Ecclesiastes to other 
pseudonymous works roughly concurrent with-e.g., Wisdom of Solomon (he dates this 
about 200 years later than Ecclesiastes) and the final recension of Proverbs. 
83 For example, school children in the Hellenistic empire of the third to second 
century BeE were expected to write a Xp£UX" ("fable") as part of their secondary school 
literary studies, and attribute it either to Aesop or "some sage of antiquity". Ecclesiastes 
may therefore have been written in a culture whose populace was at least familiar with a 
loosely structured form of pseUdonymity from an early age (see I.H. Marrou, A History 
of Education in Antiquity [trans. G. Lamb; London: Sheed and Ward, 1956], p. 174). 
Furthermore, J. Barton argues that within the biblical tradition itself existed a very fluid 
concept of authorship; Le., as to the "historicity" of authors (Oracles oj God, p. 61). 
Modem readers have been uncomfortable with the notion of pseudonymity or anonymity. 
As Foucault comments, "We cannot tolerate literary anonymity. We do not welcome its 
enigmatic quality" ("What is an Author?", PrtRev 42, [1975], p. 609). Indeed, according 
to Foucault, we apply principles that reach back to the time of Jerome to determine 
whether a text was written by the author it is purported to be written by and thereby 
rubber stamp its "authenticity" (ibid., pp. 609-10). 
84 Geyer (The Wisdom oj Solomon [London: SCM Press, 1963], p. 18), contrasting 
Ecclesiastes to the Wisdom of Solomon, argues that the nature of the guise had the effect 
of anonymity; i.e., the book deceived no one and was hence rendered anonymous (E. 
Bickerman [Four Strange Books oj the Bible (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 
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there is an effort, to whatever degree, to achieve a suspension of disbelief that 
involves "believing" that Solomon is the primary narrator and therefore the 
"author" of the framed material. To speak in such a guise, then, is partly 
analogous to pseudonymity. 85 
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The use of the "semi-pseudonym", it is widely recognized, did not likely 
create moral problems for readers. The "voice" of Solomon in Ecclesiastes was 
simply an amoral strategy of communication, one that ancient readers would 
likely have recognized as such.86 Readers were neither fooled into thinking this 
was Solomon nor were they concerned about the issue anyway. 87 This said, to 
what extent did readers come from Ecclesiastes with the impression that this, as 
Michael Eaton comments, is "what Solomon would have said had he addressed 
himself to the subject of pessimism "?88 To answer that in real terms is 
impossible, but we can conjecture good reasons for the author of Ecclesiastes to 
have wanted readers to believe it. 
First, in an odd way, Solomon's "presence" in the book protects Qoheleth 
from himself. As Brevard Childs puts it, since the book functions as an "official 
142] agrees with Geyer that Ecclesiastes was essentially anonymous). This is only partly 
true. While the theory of anonymity does justice to Qoheleth's individuality it leaves no 
room for the rather complex relationship Qoheleth undeniably has, as a character, to 
Solomonic tradition. 
as Compare the comments of David Meade, who suggests that the authoritative stamp 
of revelation in the tradition of God revealing himself to Solomon is "passed on", as it 
were, to Ecclesiastes through the use of the Solomonic guise. Says Meade, "Authorship 
[in the Israelite wisdom tradition] is more concerned with authoritative tradition than 
literary origins [and Ecclesiastes represents] an entirely new work issued under the 
authority of another ... [If] this is not the essence of pseudonymity, what is?" 
(Pseudonymity and Canon [WUNT, 39; TUbingen: Mohr, 1986], p. 59). 
86 However, that pseudonymity was not so readily "amorally" accepted in antiquity, 
see S. Robinson, "Lying for God: The Uses of Apocrypha", in G. Gillum and C. Criggs 
(eds.), Apocryphal Writings and the Latter-Day Saints (Religious Studies Monograph 
Series, 13; Provo, UT: Religious Studies Center, Brigham Young University, 1986), pp. 
138-40. 
Ir7 This is widely accepted and impossible to refute but I cannot account for the fact 
that no one questioned the idea of Solomon as author until Luther. Further, see section 
5b below. 
88 Eaton, Ecclesiastes, p. 24. 
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corrective" to/against more traditional wisdom texts, the Solomonic guise was 
necessary to guard it from "interpretations which would derive Koheleth's views 
from his changing moods or pessimistic disposition rather than to see them as 
playing a critical role within Israel's corpus of wisdom literature" . 89 If this is at 
all true then the guise is, as the frame narrative, analogous to the modem picture 
frame. Just as some producers of frames used more socially acceptable frames 
which would guard it from "interpretations which would derive [the painter's] 
views from his changing moods or pessimistic disposition", so the guise enables 
Qoheleth's words a "smoother" entry into a dialogue with other works (in a 
larger, better attended "gallery") that would not have been otherwise possible. 
Second, it may be that the power of Solomon's "voice" was not limited 
only to the immediate Jewish culture, but that it earned Ecclesiastes a hearing in 
a wider Hellenistic culture. The garb of Israel's skilful orator of wisdom, 
Eissfeldt suggested, was conceivably respected among Greeks who prized 
rhetoric.90 Indeed, any of the pseudo-Solomonic works at the time may have 
intended to demonstrate, says Hengel, "the great age and ... superiority of the 
national wisdom over against that of Greece" . 91 This was the natural outworking 
of hero worship and it may have struck critical chords in the traditions that 
89 Childs, Introduction, pp. 584, 588. To evaluate Childs's claim that Ecclesiastes 
functioned as a "corrective" against a particular school of wisdom it would be necessary 
to discern Qoheleth's alleged counterparts with at least some degree of definitude. While 
this is beyond the scope of this thesis, Childs's point (that the guise would have 
functioned as a distraction from Qoheleth's overall tone in order for his readers to better 
focus on the content of his thought) can be readily accepted. This would also grant 
Qoheleth's unorthodox wisdom (as troubled the rabbis) a graver tone in Solomon's 
mouth. J. Crenshaw agrees (ironically, in light of his fractured view of the Solomonic 
guise) that the connection to Solomon was made in order to keep the book's authority 
from being questioned (Ecclesiastes, p. 28; similarly, see Meade, Pseudonymity and 
Canon, pp. 49, 56). 
90 Introduction, pp. 429-30. 
91 So Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, I, p. 129. Hengel strengthens his argument 
with other plausible suggestions: "The riches and the wisdom of Solomon form a pendant 
to the splendour of the Ptolemaic kings [like Solomon] the richest and most learned of 
their time" (p. 130). 
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surrounded it. Similarly, D. Dimant has suggested that the Wisdom of Solomon 
was written in a vein much like that of concurrent Hellenistic literature (e.g. 
Pythagorean treatises on kingship, Jewish apocrypha such as the Letter of Aristeas 
[second or fIrst century BCE] etc.). For Dimant, the author of the Wisdom of 
Solomon utilized the Solomonic partly because Solomon was a character who 
traditionally had enough of something like stoic virtue and could meet the stoic 
and Platonic criterion of "proof from example" (1t<xpa8£t'YJ.1<X); hence its 
"teaching" would receive a hearing. 92 If Ecclesiastes is at all connected with a 
Hellenistic culture (as Hengel and others suggest), then a similar background is 
possible. In this regard, as Christopher Rowland has argued concerning the 
biblical prophets, the pseudonym may have been used to communicate, in effect, 
with more authority. 93 
Finally, with the guise Qoheleth may have been enabled to tum 
conventional notions of general kingship (as particularly expressed in Prov. 
16-22.16) on their heads, particularly the idea, as W. Lee Humphreys describes 
it, that "Yahweh's powers and judgement and his ultimate incomprehensibility" 
place the king "in a sphere above other human beings".94 If it can be accepted 
that the king was placed on a level above human understanding (often equating 
92 Dimant, "Pseudonymity", pp. 249-50, 254-55. 
93 This phenomenon, Rowland argues, was very common in the prophetic tradition, 
and there is no reason to suggest that it was foreign to the wisdom tradition either 
(although Qoheleth does not make any prophetic claims-i.e. as one "speaking for" God; 
the closest Ecclesiastes comes to this is the frame narrator's comments at 12.10-11). To 
speak (even partly) in the voice of a great figure of the past would have lent a greater 
credibility to Qoheleth's conclusions (see The Open Heaven [London: SPCK, 1982], pp. 
61-70). J. Barton argues similarly concerning the prophetic tradition (Oracles of God, p. 
210). Interestingly, Targ. Qoh. begins, "The words of prophecy ... " (again at 3.11; 
4.15; 9.7; 10.7; cf. Qoh. Roo. 1.1-2). 
94 "The Motif of the Wise Courier in the Book of Proverbs", in J. Gammie et al. 
(eds.), Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien 
(Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978), p. 182. Humphreys is not suggesting that the king and 
Yahweh are "interchangeable" nomens, but that the king was more divine than human, 
and that that interchange could sometimes be made without significantly altering the 
meaning of the text. 
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the king with Yahweh) then it must be said that Qoheleth, because he is a king 
and because he is unable to discover the nature of things (see chapter 9.3), makes 
the king thoroughly human, and has, in a sense, derobed him of his heavenly 
powers of discernment. 
I have still not considered a question which the rabbis did ask about the 
guise: Why Solomon? There is one obvious answer: The association with 
Solomon was determined by the nature of the book. Wisdom literature is attracted 
to the name of Solomon as the Psalms are to David, or nomic texts to Moses. 
David was a "psalmist", Solomon a "wise man".95 The choice was natural. But 
this is likely only a fraction of the answer. 
Qoheleth does not lose his identity in Solomon's. He enjoys the unique 
opportunity of being "Solomon the Qoheleth", or simply the more elusive 
"Qoheleth" -at times a wholly separate identity. Ultimately, one must answer the 
question "Why Solomon?" with the question: "Who else but Solomon could have 
spoken with such vehement denunciation on the vanity of riches, wealth, and 
even human existence?" As R. Eleazar is reputed to have so aptly noted, "but for 
Solomon ... I might have said that this man who had never owned two farthings in 
his life makes light of the wealth of the world" . 96 But historically, Qoheleth is 
an unknown man to us, whose "pretentiousness would have amused Rabbi 
Eleazar" . rn 
9S B. Porten concludes thus by comparing Psalm ascriptions ("The Structure and 
Theme", p. 117). While it is doubtful that ",,, (the "ascription" at the beginning of 
each of the Davidic psalms) was an attempt to claim Davidic authorship, the slight nature 
of the ascription may be similar to what we have in Ecclesiastes (see Peter Cragie, 
"Psalms and the Problem of Authorship", in Psalms 1-50 [WBC, 19; Waco, TX: Word 
Books, 1983], pp. 33-35). This said, that "",, sometimes suggests actual authorship has 
recently been convincingly argued by Hebraist Bruce Waltke ("Superscriptions, 
Postscripts, or Both", JBL 110/4 [1991], pp. 586-88). His most illuminating biblical 
examples of such a use of "",, are Isa. 38.9-10 and Hab. 3.1. 
96 Qoh. Rab. 3.11. 
'17 So Bickerman, Four Strange Books, p. 142. 
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To summarize so far, Solomon's lurking presence in Ecclesiastes is obviously 
multi-faceted. Solomon's authority (for all it is worth) is present in the text on its 
own terms. That there are no "apologies" from the editor or the narrator, or any 
appeal to superlative virtues (Le. apart from the Solomonic), suggests that the 
authority already imbued in the figure of Solomon rendered redundant any appeal 
to further authority by the author of Ecclesiastes. It was already present in the 
Solomonic tradition. Only a Qoheleth with the meandering aid of that "Solomon" 
could deliberate a critique on the ", of wisdom which would be received 
earnestly. However, in the next two sections I will tum to those issues that my 
exploration of the questions raised by canon and pseudonymity has not 
satisfactorily dealt with; namely, the problems that the guise presents to reading. 
4. The Implied Author and/as Qoheleth/Solomon 
["Mythologized" writing is] a transposition of the person into symbolic 
figures, references, etc., which may be taken from events private in the 
[real author's] ... experiences and therefore not known to the reader (unless 
the writer explains them), or may be taken from external sources-from 
books, other men's experiences, and so forth ... even if the reader manages 
to identify them [the external sources etc.], he cannot know their points of 
contact with the writer's person, which gave them their potency for [the 
author]. 
-Patrick Cruttwe1l98 
It was Wayne Booth who first coined the phrase, which is now frequently found 
in biblical and literary studies, "implied author". Booth argues throughout his 
book The Rhetoric of Fiction that the implied author is a "solid" existant which 
has its own moral codes and is an implied version of the author's self. The idea 
has not been without its critics99 but the basic notion of this "second self" has 
98 "Makers and Persons", HudR 12 (1959-60), p. 493. 
99 Chatman rightly points out, for example, that the codes of the implied author may 
not only be moral, but cultural and aesthetic as well (Story and Discourse, p. 149). 
Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan also validly criticizes Booth's "second-self", calling it a 
"construct based on the text" (which Booth would likely admit!). So, instead of being a 
"voice" or "speaker" the implied author is a set of implicit norms (Narrative Fiction, p. 
7. The Solomonic Guise 156 
proven valuable as a model for thinking about the writing process and enables 
consideration of the relationship between the narratorial "voice" and the author's 
commitments or passions as expressed in the text. 
This second self is a creation (conscious or not) of any and every author. 
But the construct itself is a product of the text in that authors are capable of 
presenting many different implied authors in various works (e.g. we present 
different implied versions of ourselves as we write letters to different people for 
different reasons). In the case of Ecclesiastes the implied author is made 
prominent through the narrative of Qoheleth, the language and style of which is 
teeming with self-referentiality (see Chapter 8), particularly that which arises 
from the elements of autobiography. With the further "complication" of the 
Solomonic guise, Qoheleth the character is sometimes masked, and we are not 
sure who lies "beneath" or for what commitments expressed in the text that 
masked character is responsible. 
It may very well be that the immediate success of Ecclesiastes depended 
upon the extent to which the real author lurked safely behind the implied author. 
For, according to Booth, in fiction, real technical brilliance lies in the successful 
transformation of explicit norms (the author's loves, hates and judgments) into 
norms that are implicit-veiled in the codes of the implied author. While 
Ecclesiastes was probably not written as fiction per se, its narrator is used to 
"persuade the reader to accept [the work that it functions within) as living 
oracles". For with the real author's untransformed, plain revelation of opinion, 
failure to persuade is likely at hand. 1oo In relation to this effect, Booth discusses 
how, in fiction, the plain and boastful intrusion of the author makes for inevitable 
failure: "An author who intrudes must somehow be interesting; he must live as a 
87). My own understanding of Booth's construct is defined in the light of such 
criticisms . 
100 Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, pp. 218-21; cf. also p. 86. 
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character ... dull minds have produced dull statesmen who emphasize their dulness 
by claiming to be brilliant. ,,101 (Although this may smack of a highly evaluative 
view of what makes "good literature", the issue is a different one-Booth is 
suggesting a rhetorical and hence readerly and subjective effect.) One way such 
failure is avoided is to have the narrator take on an "implicit character". The 
"Qoheleth" of Ecclesiastes has/is such a character. Even when he is Solomon he 
is not heavy-handed. This is evidenced, for example, by the liberty exercised in 
the list of Qoheleth's experiment of 2.4-8. The subtleness of Solomon's presence 
allows Qoheleth to be more effective. Thus, as Qoheleth reflects on his 
experiment, the author's own opinion is not ponderous: "And I considered all that 
my hands had done ... and behold, everything was absurd ... " (2.11) Who is 
speaking? The real author as Qoheleth, as Solomon. 
This protection which the implied author tenders is fortified by the use of 
the name Qoheleth. The identity of the real author has been so well hidden that 
very little can be said about him or her as a historical character; as "one who 
lived". The complexity of the guise, and its relation to Qoheleth as an individual 
character in the text, is the main contributor to our lack of surety on this 
score. 1oo Through this use of "Qoheleth", the Solomonic guise may be an 
attempt to be rid of "ego-ridden private symbols" and to transform the text's 
vision into "something that is essentially public". 103 This is what the implied 
101 Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 219. 
102 This is because the Qoheleth which can be "known" is strictly the Qoheleth of 
Ecclesiastes; there is no other authorial referent. As Chatman rightly comments, "the 
speaker of a literary work cannot be identified with the author". That is, unless we are 
given a "pragmatic context" by the real author we may only reconstruct the "character 
and condition of the speaker ... by internal evidence alone" (Chatman citing M. Beardsley, 
Story and Discourse, p. 147). In this sense it is by virtue of Ecclesiastes' being written 
after the time of Solomon, and by virtue of the displacement of origins that the frame 
narrator has effected, that there is no such "pragmatic context" concerning the real 
author. Qoheleth (for readers) is a truly separate existent from the real author and from 
the tradition of Solomon. 
103 Booth's description of the real author's use of the implied (Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 
395). 
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author does. In this process of separation the author is able to create a person 
who is accessible to his or her reading public. In the case of Ecclesiastes, that 
accessible person was, to a large degree, Solomon. To speak about the Solomonic 
aspects of the implied author, however, is in no way to equate the traditional 
persona of Solomon with the implied author. The implied author is bigger than 
the Solomonic of Qoheleth. 104 In fact, the investigation of the implied author 
yields the "totality of meanings that can be inferred from a text"IOS and 
embodies the cultural and moral values which both Qoheleth and the frame 
narrator, on the whole, express. 106 
5. Solomonic Readings and Readers 
Before proceeding I will clarify what I mean by a "reading". I do not refer to the 
sense associated with reader-response criticism, where a "reading" may entail an 
entire vision of reality which shapes the whole interpretation of a literary work. 
A feminist reading, for example, would require that the reader reads as a woman. 
This is not merely a matter of assuming sexual and "gender inflections", but 
seeks to encapsulate "the way in which the hypothesis of a female reader changes 
our apprehension of a given text" .107 Instead, my notion of "reading" is more 
text-based. By a "reading" I mean any given comment, interpretation and so on, 
104 In the same way, it should be noted, Qoheleth and Solomon do not merge 
seamlessly into one character but remain somehow separate. As P. Hoffken remarked, 
"Qohelet sagt zwar auf eine individuelle Weise 'ich', aber so, dass diesses Ich sich in der 
Rolle der Salomo artikuliert" (as cited in Isaksson, Studies in the Language of Qoheleth, 
pp.41-42). 
lOS Bal, Narratology, pp. 119-20. Similarly, Booth: "the implied author includes ... 
the intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic whole; the chief value to which this 
implied author is committed, regardless of what party his creator belongs to in real life" 
(Rhetoric of Fiction, pp. 73-74; italics Booth's). 
106 Michael Fox brings this duality well into focus when he argues that the epilogist 
and Qoheleth both vie equally to be the dominant content of the implied author ("Frame-
narrative", p. 105). 
107 Jonathan Culler citing E. Showalter in, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism 
after Structuralism (repr.; London: Routledge, 1989 [1983]), p. 50 (italics Culler's). I 
am oversimplifying in order to illustrate the essential difference present. 
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as to the nature of the book in question. By Solomonic reading I mean any such 
expression by a reader who reads in the belief that Solomon is the real author of 
the given work. 
a. The History of Solomonic Readings 
The most substantial biblical narrative about the eventual dispersement of 
Solomon's kingdom (1 Kgs 11.9-40) is sparse, even ambiguous. Ambiguity leads 
to a proliferation of explanations, and this particular ambiguity may have been 
the impetus for a number of legends about Solomon. 108 In those books 
attributed to him (including Ecclesiastes) early Jewish tradition sometimes made 
attempts to understand the particular circumstances of Solomon's writing. The 
most fascinating example is that of Solomon and the demon Asmodeus. 
According to the legend,I09 when Solomon gained too many wives for himself 
and desired too many horses and too much gold, the Book of Deuteronomy (i.e. 
the Law) stepped before the LoRD and requested that Solomon be chastised. The 
chastisement was Solomon's dethronement. While Solomon was dethroned the 
demon Asmodeus assumed his likeness and took his place. During that time 
Solomon experienced the life of a beggar and consequently returned to his throne 
in Jerusalem, a repentant king.ll0 Targum Qoheleth says that Asmodeus was 
108 The same holds true in regard to the process of "character-cleansing". For 
example, since Israel's hero is reputed to have followed after foreign women there is an 
attempt via legend to make sense of his flaws (see Svend-Holm Nielsen, "The Book of 
Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of it in Jewish and Christian Theology", ASTI 10 
[1976], p. 71). That this attempt is present in biblical accounts as well, see above in 
section 1 of this chapter. 
109 Knobel ("The Targum of Qohelet", pp. 22-23) discusses the presence of the 
legend in the Targum and concludes that although Targum Qoheleth is dated to the 
seventh century CE, this version is known among other Babylonian and Palestinian 
talmuds and the source for them is not known. This tradition possibly pre-dates those 
talmuds (as early as 200 CE). 
110 As cited by Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews, IV, pp. 165ff. Of course, this is 
wildly different from the biblical account of Solomon's punishment which was that the 
kingdom was to be tom away from him. But this with two consolations "for David's 
sake": 1) the kingdom would be tom away from his son after his death, and 2) his son 
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sent because Solomon became too proud. Solomon went about the world weeping 
during his dethronement, saying, "I am Qoheleth, who was previously named 
Solomon", and it was in this time of dethronement that Solomon wrote 
Ecclesiastes. 
A midrash tradition of authorship relates to Solomon's whole life. In his 
youthful lusts, it says, he wrote the Song of Songs, while Proverbs contained "the 
ripe fruit of a man who knows life [middle-age]; but when he became old he 
composed Ecclesiastes" .111 And another states that "Solomon wrote Qoheleth in 
his old age, when weary of life 'to expose the emptiness and vanity of all worldly 
pursuits .. .' ,,112 While the Solomonic in such readings is not exploited in order 
to colour the meaning of specific texts, such readings do attempt to understand 
the whole book in the context of Solomonic authorship. To say, for example, that 
Solomon wrote Ecclesiastes in a time of dethronement is a commentary on the 
nature of the book as a whole. It implies that the content of the book is 
necessarily bitter and cynical (being written before Solomon's repentance and 
specifically during his weeping). It makes sense of the content of Ecclesiastes by 
ascribing to Solomon a disposition at the time of writing. 
Targum Qoheleth drives home the notion that Solomon not only wrote 
Ecclesiastes, but did so by the Holy Spirit: 
When Solomon king of Israel saw through the holy spirit that the kingdom 
of Rehoboam his son would be divided with Jeroboam the son of Nebat 
and that Jerusalem and the Temple would be destroyed and the people of 
the household of Israel would go into exile, he said to himself, "Vanity of 
vanities ... of everything for which I and David my father laboured." (1.1-
2,4) 
Here we are told to read Ecclesiastes as an exposition of the vanity which is the 
would have one tribe to rule, "that David may always have a light before [the LoRD] in 
Jerusalem" (1 Kgs 11.13). And then an adversary, Hadad the Edomite, was raised 
against him (v. 14; and even more adversaries later, vv. 23-25). 
111 Ginzberg, Legends o/the Jews, IV, pp. 301-302. 
112 As cited by Barton, Ecclesiastes, p. 19. 
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loss of Solomon's kingdom.113 The Targum continues (1.13), "And I set my 
mind to seek instruction from the LoRD at the time when he revealed himself to 
me at Gibeon" (cf. Bccl. 1.13; 1 Kgs 3.5-9). This link with Solomon is subtle. It 
is not to support a particular rabbinic argument or (as far as we can tell) to 
correct some previous misunderstanding of Bccl. 1.13, but rather it is to 
underscore the presence of Solomon as the primary narrator/author of these 
words. The perspective of Solomonic authorship is kept throughout the 
Targum.114 
What of early Christian readings? On the whole it seems that there was 
little value attached to the idea that Solomon actually wrote Ecclesiastes. Origen 
began the Christian tradition of a "Solomonic corpus" which included 
Ecclesiastes, and, as R.E. Murphy states, this "context created a way of looking 
at the book". 115 There were some Church Fathers who explicitly indicated 
and/or made significant use of Solomonic authorship in their paraphrases or 
commentaries, such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgos, 
Cyril, Chrysostom, Jerome and Augustine. 
From Gregory (a student of Origen) onwards it seems that Solomonic 
context was significantly more than the fonnulaic "Solomon said ... " As 
Gregory's paraphrase begins we are left in little doubt as to the importance of 
Solomonic authorship: 
Solomon (the son of the king and prophet David), a king more honoured 
and a prophet wiser than anyone else, speaks to the whole assembly of 
113 Svend Holm-Nielsen argues that in Targum Qoheleth there are instances in which 
"the verity of the words [of Qoheleth] is not denied, but their validity is restricted to 
certain situations to be found in the history of Israel" ("The Book of Ecclesiastes", p. 64; 
here commenting on 1.2). See also R.E. Murphy, "Qohelet Interpreted: The Bearing of 
the Past on the Present", \IT 32 (1982), p. 335. 
\14 In fact, such emphases are not limited to the "royal fiction" section (1.12-2.17); 
for example, Targ. Qoh. 3.12; 4.15; 7.27; 9.7. 
\15 Cf. R.E. Murphy, "Qohelet Interpreted", pp. 331-32. 
7. The Solomonic Guise 
God ... (1.1)116 
John Jarick, in his study of the paraphrase, states at length the influence of 
Solomon throughout the work: 
This presumption of Solomonic authorship gives rise to certain motifs in 
Gregory's interpretation. One idea referred to throughout ... is that 
Solomon lost and subsequently regained wisdom-he had received wisdom 
from God but had afterwards rejected it ... And since Gregory sees 
Solomon as being ... a prophet, a number of statements are treated as 
speaking in a somewhat visionary way of the cosmic battle between the 
forces of good and eviL .. this apocalyptic motif reaches its climax in an 
ingenious paraphrase of the final chapter's "Allegory of Old Age" as a 
prophecy of the end of the world. 117 
And Gregory was not alone in fmding Solomon's presence worthy of note. 
162 
Augustine, for example, stated (c. 410 CE) that "Solomon, the wisest king 
of Israel, who reigned in Jerusalem, thus commences the book called 
Ecclesiastes, which the Jews number among their canonical Scriptures: 'Vanity of 
vanities, said Ecclesiastes .. .'''1l8 More importantly, however, he rejected 
Origen's interpretation of Eccl. 1.9-10 (that it suggested the cyclical nature of all 
things until they returned to their original state): "At all events, far be it from 
any true believer to suppose that by these words of Solomon those cycles are 
meant. ,,119 In the latter example, it may be that the appeal to Solomon was an 
attempt to clinch the argument. 
Chrysostom (c. 370 CE) has unusually high praise for the words of 
Solomon in Ecclesiastes when he says, in the flow of another topic of discussion 
altogether, "[Solomon] who enjoyed much security ... that very sentiment of 
Solomon ... so marvellous and pregnant with divine wisdom-'Vanity of 
Jl6 Translation by J. Jarick, in idem, Gregory Thaumaturgos' Paraphrase of 
Ecclesiastes (SBLSCS, 29; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), p. 7. 
117 Gregory Thaumaturgos' Paraphrase, pp. 314-15. 
Jl8 City of God, XX.3. 
119 Augustine, City of God, XII.13; Origen, de Prine., m.5.3. 
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vanities. ",120 However, it is Jerome (c. 400 CE) who is the first of the 
Christians to have written substantially about Ecclesiastes. He grouped it with 
Proverbs and the Song of Songs, each representing successive stages of Christian 
growth. He often used the "fact" that Solomon wrote Ecclesiastes to make sense 
of certain texts. Following the rabbis, at Eccl. 2.18-19, where Qoheleth lamented 
the fact that he must bequeath the reward of his toil to a fool, the fool becomes 
Solomon's son. 121 
These examples reflect a secure standing in the early church of both the 
status of the book (Solomon's words are safe) and the notion of Solomonic 
authorship in general. This notion of authorship among the early Christians is, on 
the whole, only assumed and not really exploited. This is most evident where 
allegorical interpretation held sway. With allegory the character of Solomon 
eventually became lost among other concerns. While with midrashic interpreters 
there is a concern for "earthly" matters (e.g. expositing the history of Israel) it 
was more the habit of the early Christians, with their "Jesus is the Ecclesiast" 
approach, to allegorize to the extent that a Solomonic framework was rendered 
unnecessary.122 For example, Gregory of Nyssa identified the "Ecclesiast" with 
the true king of Israel, Jesus. 123 The basis for the typology "Ecclesiast" could 
have come from any figure. And it should be pointed out that the inconsequence 
of Solomon's presence is not found only in the Christian texts. In Qoheleth 
Rabbah authorship becomes a non-question early on since the more pressing 
concern is to have a forum for rabbinic discussion on an unbelievably vast array 
of topics. The Solomonic context was only faintly kept. 
120 Concerning the Statues (cited in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers edition, IX [New 
York: Christian Literature Co., 1889], pp. 439-40). 
121 Ad loc., Commentarius in Ecclesiasten. See Svend Holm-Nielsen, "The Book of 
Ecclesiastes", p. 70. 
122 So M. Hirshman, "The Greek Fathers and the Aggada on Ecclesiastes: Formats of 
Exegesis in Late Antiquity", BUCA 59 (1958), pp. 155-57. 
123 Referring to In 1.49. See Hirshman, "The Greek Fathers", p. 147. 
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While the relative importance of the "fact" of the Solomonic authorship of 
Ecclesiastes seems to have either been constant or diminished only slightly 
through the centuries, in Jewish and Christian readings it is not until Luther that 
the "fact" itself is challenged. 
b. The Consequences of (Not) Reading Solomonically 
The Solomonic guise is perhaps stylistically comparable to the frame narrative of 
Ecclesiastes. Both help to create suspensions of disbelief that enable the reader to 
focus the reading process through interpretive frames. For inasmuch as Qoheleth 
and the frame narrator are made believable as characters, so the Solomonic codes 
they each employ are made credible tenets. l24 But what about when Solomonic 
authorship is considered more critically by readers? That is, what happens when 
the reader reads against that strategy and refuses to suspend his or her disbelief? 
In Luther's Table Talk he is reported to have said that 
Solomon himself did not write Ecclesiastes, but it was produced by Sirach 
at the time of the Maccabees ... It is a sort of Talmud, compiled from 
many books, probably from the library of King Ptolemy Euergetes of 
Egypt. 125 
He was followed by Hugo Grotius in 1644 who wrote that Ecclesiastes was a 
collection of opinions of different sages "written in the name of this King 
Solomon, as being led by repentance to do it" (he goes on to cite Ezra, Daniel 
124 That is, the (implied) reader "pretends" that Qoheleth is Solomon and helps to 
create the "Teller of this tale" and believes it "as if" it happened. The Solomonic illusion 
is created by the reading of Solomonic allusion. See Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 430. 
125 Either this is unreliable or it represents a change of opinion after Luther's 
Commentary on Ecclesiastes (1532), for in the commentary he is emphatically of the 
opposite opinion: "[Solomon spoke these things] after dinner, or even during dinner to 
some great and prominent men ... and afterwards what he said was put down and 
assembled ... This is then a public sermon which they heard from Solomon" ("Notes on 
Ecclesiastes", in J. Pelikan [gen. ed.], Luther's Works.XV.Notes on Ecclesiastes, 
Lectures on the Song of Solomon, Treatise ... [St Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1972], p. 12; cf. also pp. 22, 28, 38, 144, where Luther appeals to the notion of 
Solomonic authorship to make sense of what is happening in the text). 
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and the "Chaldee paraphrasts" as the sources).126 After Grotius, critical, non-
Solomonic readings escalated in Germany, reaching a plateau of sorts in the 
nineteenth century. 127 Today, that critical stance is universally held even by the 
most conservative of scholars. 
Relatively suddenly, commentators were free to speak about the disunity 
of Ecclesiastes as a manifestation of its non-Solomonic authorship. For example, 
Paul Haupt in 1894 wrote, "[Ecclesiastes] reminds me of the remains of a daring 
explorer, who has met with some terrible accident, leaving his shattered form 
exposed to the encroachments of all sorts of foul vermin". 128 Or take Elias 
Bickerman's more recent, simple observation that "[Qohelet is] a scholar turned 
haranguer" .129 Both are "random" selections yet are representative of a 
prevailing attitude since Luther's ground-breaking observation. This general shift 
in view of Ecclesiastes' overall meaning reflects a shift in the "consensus" 
perception of the implied author. Of course, there may be much to commend both 
the new and the old perceptions. One inescapable result, however, is that 
Qoheleth is no longer sitting comfortably behind any Solomonic mask. That 
whole conglomerate of protection, criticism and commentary is suddenly vacant 
in readings. Because of the new vision of authorship that scholars operate with, 
the "remains" of the (oddly unified) implied author, as Solomon as, Qoheleth are 
much more scattered. Allow me to offer two examples of readerly consequences; 
first, a contrast to an ancient example. 
The early Christian paraphrast Gregory Thaumaturgos understood 
Qoheleth's need for wisdom to be a result of Solomon's historical loss of a 
126 Quotes from Luther's Table Talk and Grotius are from G.A. Barton, 
Ecclesiastes, p. 21. 
127 Barton lists five from the eighteenth century and reports many more in the 
nineteenth century, when, apparently, only a few scholars argued seriously for 
Solomonic authorship-notably, Wangemann in 1856 (Barton, Ecclesiastes, pp. 21-22). 
128 Cited in G.A. Barton, Ecclesiastes, pp. 27-28. 
129 Bickerman, Four Strange Books, p. 143. 
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wisdom which was once divinely imparted. As I outline in Chapter 9.3 below, 
Qoheleth did seek wisdom and could not find it. If we therefore read Ecclesiastes 
with the idea that Qoheleth, as QohelethlSolomon, once had true wisdom and 
understanding, his need to find it becomes indicative of the divine punishment 
inflicted on him instead of becoming an example or even metaphor of the human 
predicament of folly. To state the case more generally, Qoheleth as just Qoheleth 
is able to be owned by anyone. He is able to be placed in our own historical 
contexts because he is context-less. Reading Qoheleth as not Solomon enables 
readers to appropriate his experience of wisdom and the world and the text 
becomes, in a way, more open. Now I offer a more modem example. 
In my research I came across an anonymous work from 1880 (which I 
later discovered was written by D. Johnston) entitled, A Treatise on the 
Authorship of Ecciesiastes. 130 It is a 557-page scathing attack on the arguments 
of Ginsburg, Bleek, Hengstenberg, Grotius and Delitzsch who each represented 
fairly well-received "non-Solomonic" approaches of the author's day. One half of 
the book is an impressive compilation of grammatical analysis. But the author 
proceeds a posteriori in his thesis, for anything like pseudonymity in a biblical 
book makes for a near-blasphemous denial of that book's general trustworthiness 
(see esp. pp. 413-18). While the work does not appear to have achieved 
acceptance, it remains an interesting example of one author's dilemma about 
authorship. Any incongruity between what Johnston saw to be the implied author 
(the sum of the Solomonic codes and norms which Johnston believed Ecclesiastes 
to express) and the (nineteenth-century constructed) real author of Ecclesiastes 
(i.e. not Solomon) was entirely unacceptable. (And yet by writing anonymously 
he refused to take responsibility for how readers might understand his own work 
in this respect!) 
130 London: MacMillan and Co., anonymous edn, 1880. 
7. The Solomonic Guise 167 
In sum, perhaps the biggest obstacle to the approaches of canon and 
pseudonymity, in terms of exegetically unpacking the guise, is the relationship 
between the effects of the guise I have suggested and historical constructs of 
milieus that are largely intangible (such as a reading audience's given 
understanding of pseudonymity). Yet the model of implied authorship is useful 
since a text that allows for such complicated constructs of authorship as 
Ecclesiastes solicits decisions from readers. We are free to choose, for example, 
whether the implied author of Ecclesiastes is "in agreement" with the real author. 
Or perhaps the real author exercised irony in the form of a critical commentary 
on wisdom or Solomonic tradition. The complexity of the implied author, I 
believe, suggests that "he" is not always in agreement with the real author. This 
was the real author's way of cluing the reader in on the character of Qoheleth's 
discourse-not of Solomon's, but of Qoheleth's, who sometimes speaks as, 
sometimes evokes the authority of, Israel's King of wisdom. 
Chapter 8 
QOHELETH AND THE BIBLICAL SELF AMONG THE DECONSTRUCTED 
For words, like Nature, half reveal 
And half conceal the Soul within 
-Tennyson ("In Memoriam A.H.H.", Canto 5 [1850]) 
Run my name through your computer 
Mention me in passing to your college tutor 
Check my records, check my facts ... 
Pore over everything in my C. V. 
You'll still know nothing 'bout me 
-Sting l 
This chapter addresses the fact that readers of Ecclesiastes often gain the 
impression that they somehow "know" Qoheleth. It seems that an interaction 
takes place, one in which the reader feels the concern of identity and of the 
formation of Qoheleth's character. That transaction is not likely superficial, for if 
there is any intimation of Qoheleth's "self" it refers to something embedded 
deeply in his narrative. I refer to a transference of identity, the reader's to the 
narrator's, whereby a self is recognized whose experience is identifiable and able 
to be appropriated. The readerly experience this entails is undeniably difficult to 
grasp. Elizabeth Stone makes the following poignant remark that reflects the 
experience well: 
Like a candleflame in mist, we cannot see him or touch him or name him, 
and yet he is there. And as surely as food gives a fragrance and drums 
resound, Koheleth gives us his own particular light, whether he is one or 
many men, whether the page has felt the point of one or many pens.2 
How do we get at that candleflame in mist? What makes it shine at all? How can 
1 "Epilogue (Nothing 'bout me)", from the album, Ten Summoner's Tales (A & M 
Records, 1993). 
2 "Old Man Koheleth", p. 98. 
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a reader say with such confidence that Qoheleth "is there", as sure as the 
fragrance of a good meal to the nose and the tenor of music to the ear? 
1. Self-Presence? 
You could not discover the limits of the self, 
even by travelling along every path: 
so deep a logos does it have. 
-Heraclitus (frag. 45) 
The self ... is infinitely difficult to get at, to encompass, to know how to 
deal with: it bears no definition; it squirts like mercury away from our 
observation; it is not known except privately and intuitively; it is, for each 
of us, only itself, unlike anything else experienced or experienceable. And 
yet, the man who commits himself to the whole task of the autobiographer 
intends to make this self the subject of his book and to impart some sense 
of it to the reader. 
-James Olney3 
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As discussed above (Chapter 1.3), readers of autobiography naturally expect the 
source of its cohesion to be the author's self, and Qoheleth's "chosen" form of 
narration, whether we like it or not, is that of autobiography. His narrative is 
primarily concerned with his experience. And so, as with all autobiography, 
Qoheleth's form of narration allows him his loose approach to his subjects. This, 
as I have already mentioned, forms the literary integrity of Ecclesiastes. It does 
so because the reader is enabled to follow the lexical signs that indicate that the 
character who is speaking and experiencing throughout the narrative is one and 
the same. Yet while the autobiographical form intimates self, it leaves largely 
open the question of that selfs essence and substance. In other words, the 
autobiographical form gives it a name, a history and a foundation for its action, 
but its principal function is to be only the arena through which the narrator may 
discourse all the past of its life in a particular interpretive light. 
3 Metaphors of Self: The Meaning of Autobiography (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 23. 
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It is because the flrst-person form at least intimates self that we are prone 
to see something more imbedded in it-Stone' s candleflame in mist. As Ian 
Michael remarks, "It is easy to regard the flrst person as more than a 
grammatical category, it seems to contain the speaker's conception of himself as 
being distinct from other people. ,,4 Michael is alluding, of course, to a reading 
experience. Likewise, the density of the autobiographical form in Ecclesiastes 
gives one the impression, as Elizabeth Stone expressed, of brushing with the 
narrator's person, a self that is somehow more than a grammatical category. 
The self can have so formidable a presence in autobiography as to solicit 
from the reader a query, an invitation to question its sincerity. In Ecclesiastes the 
combination of the autobiographical form and the frame narrator's historical 
presentation contribute to this invitation. Is this a believable self? Does not "I" 
beg the question of sincerity? When we read "I" we want to know if the author of 
that "I" is telling the truth.s If there is only "I", the witness to what the "I" 
asserts becomes nothing less than the very integrity of that speaker, and this 
becomes an issue. Because the author speaks about him- or herself (however 
indirectly) the question is begged: does he or she offer a true reflection of 
(narrated) experience? The frame narrator reflects this concern when he finds it 
necessary to assert that Qoheleth did in fact write words of truth with integrity 
(12.1~d how can he know that Qoheleth was, like Job, ,W,,?). This is a 
question of character, and character is a question of identity. Just what kind of 
person are we dealing with? And because what this person says is so 
individualized and affecting, how do we judge that it is true? 
4 Cited in R.C. Elliott, The literary Persona (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982), p. 30. 
S That is, the "I"'s narrator or historical author. The distinction can become blurred. 
This is true in the case of Ecclesiastes due to the fictional premises of the frame 
narrative. I will use the word "author" to denote the character who says "I" because 
Ecclesiastes, despite its fictional premise, is autobiography, and assumes the telling of 
someone's life. That "I" therefore makes the kind of claim to truth I am here discussing. 
8. Qoheleth and the Self 171 
That we live in a society obsessed with questions of identity and sincerity 
is evident. The question of who or what people are (of their individuality or 
essence) rears itself again and again in popular culture, and the crisis is clear: 
instances of the media's failure or relative success in communicating the essence 
of a self demonstrate the fallibility of image and also the popular concern of 
identity. In the early 1970s American popular culture suffered a "minor crisis" 
when the notion was put about that the real Paul McCartney of the Beatles had 
died a few years previously and been replaced by the winner of a Paul 
McCartney look-alike contest. The furore ceased when people came to accept that 
as long as the face and the voice were essentially the same, it mattered little who 
the flesh and blood person actually was. The veracity of Paul McCartney's self 
was reduced to the quality of an audio-visual image.6 In the spring of 1994 in, 
yet again, America, 0.1. Simpson shocked millions who were under the illusion 
that they, in some significant sense, knew him. When the sports celebrity was 
implicated in the murder of his ex-wife and her friend the protective walls of his 
public persona came tumbling down.7 The image of the self, whether text or 
media-based, is elusive and virtually unknowable by its signs. 
In Qoheleth-studies scholars have often made similar assumptions 
concerning our ability to "know" Qoheleth's self through referential signs. For 
example, Frank Zimmermann sees in Ecclesiastes "a mirror of the chain of 
neuroses that afflicted [Qoheleth]". 8 This is because Zimmermann, like Leon 
6 So Michael Sprinker, "The End of Autobiography", in Olney (ed.) Autobiography, 
p.322. 
7 Jonathan Alter, in an incisive piece on the Simpson case in Newsweek International 
("Television's False Intimacy", 27 June, 1994, p. 25), argued that the public at large fell 
victim to the false intimacy created by television. The Janus face of the television 
personality given to the world is at one time friendly, yet born of violence. The visual 
image elicits judgments. We are invited to decide for ourselves who is speaking the 
truth. The frame of reference that people in the u.S. made use of in their time of 
disillusionment was that of Simpson's media character which, while familiar, was 
unknowable. 
8 Inner World, p. ix. 
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Edel, views the semiology operative in a literary text as "symbols of ... [the 
author's] self, signature of his inner being".9 Also, Michael Fox is able to 
perceive in Ecclesiastes a "single brooding consciousness" through which all of 
Qoheleth's observations are filtered. 1O Why? Of course, Fox presents his 
evidence (mostly concerning Qoheleth' s epistemological procedure), but is what 
Fox sees so obvious that we shouldn't even ask why? Kurt Galling recognized 
that Qoheleth's autobiographical style was necessary to depict his "prevailing 
inner posture" . 11 Michael Eaton feels confident enough to say of Ecclesiastes 
that "Within its pages there is a person who unobtrusively appears in the words 
'says the Preacher'. ,,12 Is Eaton recognizing the signified of a linguistic sign? 
Harold Fisch regards so seriously the density of first-person forms in Ecclesiastes 
that he is confident to remark that "Qohelet could have said with Montaigne, 'It 
is my portrait I draw ... I am myself the subject of my book.' ,,13 How or why 
aside, all of these scholars have in some way or another felt the weight of 
Qoheleth's self in his narration. 
Of course, in literary criticism authorial presence has been a nearly 
constant point of contention. For example, a committed notion of authorial self-
representation was expressed in John Frey's 1948 article, "Author-Intrusion in the 
Narrative." He surnarizes the "objective" view thus: "Self-presentation occurs 
when the author actually appears as a character in his story, as in some novels of 
9 Zimmennann, Inner World, p. xiii. He then aligns himself with an even more 
emphatic expression: "Anatole France has said that it makes no difference whether a man 
writes about a fly or Julius Caesar, he is not writing so much about his subject as about 
himself" (p. xiv). 
10 Qohelet, p. 159. 
11 That is, his "jeweiligen inneren Haltung" ("Kohelet-Studien", ZAW 50 [1932], p. 
281). 
12 Ecclesiastes, p. 21 (italics mine). Ironically, the words he refers to are the frame 
narrator's. 
13 " Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist", p. 158. 
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the Romanticists", and this is prima Jacie observable. 14 But this position is 
rarely, if at all, to be found today. Towards the more popular and subjective end 
of the spectrum, Judith Fishman suggests that authors enjoy a richness of choice 
in how they represent themselves (or selves) as characters: 
The insight into self as character ... within the narrative, both of self and 
others, opens further still the complexity and richness of choice ... [and] 
writers of autobiography must first know "how much fiction is implicit in 
the idea of a 'self'''. IS 
Whether the essence of its narrator is made purely of symbolic signatures or 
embedded in the rich fictive choices of character open to authors, autobiographic-
alliterature will always be approached with some notion of the self in mind. As 
in popular culture, however, we are faced with the problem first that the self 
seems virtually unknowable by its signs, and second, as we shall now observe, 
that we cannot even be sure what we mean by "subject" or "self". Are we 
dealing with a soulful or a soulless sign? And how can a review of Qoheleth's 
attitude both of himself and the self inform this discussion? 
2. The Deconstructed Subject 
Ours is the age of what Robert Elliott once termed "the denigration of the 
subject" .16 Critics such as Barthes, Foucault and Derrida have argued (to a wide 
and receptive audience) that the subject (i.e. ego, self-see below) is a construct 
determined by its socio-linguistic context, whose only reference is itself and 
nothing more. The author, who had been thought for ages to lurk stealthily 
14 "Author-Intrusion in the Narrative: German Theory and Some Modem 
Examples", GR (1948), p. 278 (italics mine). Frey himself argues that there are no pre-
established tenets that determine exactly what the author's intrusion is (if any), but 
rather, the more significant question to ask of self-representation or intrusion, is How?: 
"how harmonious a constituent of the whole work is it made?" (p. 289). 
15 "Enclosures: The Narrative within Autobiography", JAC 2 (1981), pp. 27-28 
(citing Elizabeth Bruss). 
16 The Literary Persona, p. 119. 
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behind the text simply waiting to be unearthed with the appropriate tools, is now, 
quite simply, dead. As Barthes wrote in 1968, in his classic essay, "The Death of 
the Author", the linguistic subject "I" is "empty outside of the very enunciation 
which defmes it", 17 and at least one critic has observed that the death of the 
author has heralded the death of the self.18 The present impasse in speaking 
about the self, then, is coming to terms with its death. 
To come to terms with the self or subject at least as an issue, an attempt 
at definition will help. The Concise Oxford Dictionary offers the following two 
(among 14!) defmitions of "subject": 1) philosophy-"a thinking or feeling entity; 
the conscious mind; the ego, esp. as opposed to anything external to the mind" 
("the central substance or core of a thing as opposed to its attributes"); 2) 
psychology-"the ego or self and the non-ego; consciousness, and that of which it 
is or may be conscious". In both definitions the concept of difference is 
operative. Compare the same dictionary's first defmition of "self": "a person or 
thing's own individuality or essence". (The second definition is "a person or 
thing as the object of introspection or reflexive action [the consciousness of 
seif)" .) To be a subject in the sense that I have thus far used the word is to be a 
self (ego) capable of consciousness and able to be distinguished from another. 19 
The deconstructed view of self (which heralds the death of author and 
self) has difficulty maintaining that sense of difference and otherness. Where it 
17 Barthes, "The Death of the Author", in idem, Image, Music, Text, p. 145. 
18 So Sprinker, "Fictions of the Self", pp. 324-25. 
19 In his book, Oneself as Another (trans. K. Blarney; Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), Paul Ricoeur fills out the idea of otherness implicit in the idea of 
self. Commenting on the philosophical intention of his work, Ricoeur states that implicit 
in its title is the notion that "otherness of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate 
degree that one cannot be thought of without the other ... [and to] 'as' I should like to 
attach a strong meaning, not only that of comparison (oneself similar to another) but 
indeed that of implication (oneself inasmuch as being another)" (p. 3). That is, for the 
self to exist it must be in relationship to the other as much as it is the other for another. 
Self and the other, for Ricoeur, enjoy a transferential relationship. My use of "self" and 
"subject" assumes this concept of otherness. This will become particularly relevant when 
discussing Qoheleth's concept of the self and its connection to the notion of otherness. 
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differs from an older, Cartesian view is in its emphasis on the self's origin, and 
therefore its relationship to the text and the reader. In his recent book, Narrative 
and the Self, Anthony Paul-Kerby neatly sums up the deconstructed position: 
II self arises out of signifying practices rather than existing prior to them as an 
autonomous or Cartesian agent" .20 This statement is key to Kerby's position and 
forces him into the unfortunate position of regarding the computer named HAL in 
Stanley Kubrick's film 2001 as more of a person than the preverbal child.21 To 
be fair, as Kerby states, HAL is not, of course, a person by our "societal 
defInition" which entails embodiment, and the Cartesian as opposed to language-
based subject, for Kerby, is only a way of accounting for the notion of self-
identity which, he admits, we all have, and which is expressed in our narratives 
(and what Kerby calls our quasi-narratives-the constructs by which we attempt to 
understand the events that propel our whole lives). However, Kerby cannot 
escape the absurdity of his alarming admission that persons can only exist through 
acts of expression. We are all, in Kerby's world, soulless selves, hollow bodies 
except for the mental constructs of language. And, of course, the question that he 
never addresses, presumably because he cannot answer it, is "What is the source 
of language itself (not only its genesis, but the determinism implied in its ongoing 
development) if it is not the (even preverbal?) self?" Furthermore, how can any 
one self relate to another self with any real signifIcance? Is the whole idea of 
communication between selves that are able to exist outside of the linguistic act 
absurd, since "I" has no referent? Indeed, Kerby says of his own implied self as 
conveyed in the fust person of his text that he can only live with the absurdity of 
its presence, for his own "I" has no referent. The problem of referentiality is the 
20 Narrative and the Self(SCT; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 1. 
Kerby draws heavily on continental deconstructionist theory and as his treatment of such 
issues relates specifically to the relationship between theories of the self and their 
expression in narratives, I will discuss and critique his work (as representative) the most. 
21 Narrative and the Self. pp. 70-71, 123 n. 11. 
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most serious for the deconstructive theory of the subject, but most especially for 
Mr Kerby since he cannot exist.22 
Other well-known implications of Kerby's position are worth restating. 
Because of the paradigm shift from Cartesian to deconstructed self, language is to 
be regarded as strictly material and no longer "merely" the tool of a Cartesian 
self but rather the house of Being where "meaning is only provided by a 
systematic arrangement of differences"?3 Self, then, has become a product of 
language. Language can no longer be regarded as "a more or less neutral medium 
of communication for ideas". 24 External reality requires language to be what it 
is. Semiotics has overthrown the metaphysics of referent, for a referent only IS in 
a closed system of signs. Kerby himself suggests that this overthrowing of the 
self from its previously privileged place has engendered a crisis; namely, "a loss 
of causal efficacy for the self and a stress on the subject's social setting".25 
(Such a loss is reflected in the popular media crisis in identity discussed above.) 
What can a study of the self in Qoheleth's narration contribute to this 
22 Narrative and the Self, p. 14. See also Michel Foucault's, "What is an Author?", 
where he argues that the self (particularly as author) can no longer exist outside of its 
enunciation. Foucault's arguments overall suffer from the conflicting notions that writing 
refers only to itself, yet, in order for it to create the space through which the subject 
(does he mean author?) can continually disappear (which "transference" is, for Foucault, 
the "true" function of authorship) it must pass outside itself, by which is assumed a 
notion of self (see esp. pp. 604, 608). This is, in my view, the most potent critique 
against the deconstruction of the subject: that in order for meaning to occur, some kind 
of referential movement (not necessarily metaphysical!) must take place. See 
furthermore, B. Polka's comments on the paradoxical self-referentiality of Freud's 
critique of religion ("Freud, Science, and the Psychoanalytic Critique of Religion: The 
Paradox of Self-Referentiality", AAR 62/1 [1994], pp. 59-81; esp. pp. 67-68, 74, 78-81). 
Polka sees in Freud's critique of religion the assumption that the neuroses of individuals 
and communities are indeed accessible to the critical psyche, and that in championing 
that assumption Freud commits what is his perception of religious illusion. As Sprinker 
comments, Freud's psychoanalytic approach as adopted by Jacques Lacan has been an 
important motivating force in the modem (particularly French intellectual) deconstruction 
of the self ("The End of Autobiography", pp. 324-25). 
23 R. Coward and J. Ellis, Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology 
and the Theory of the Subject (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 3. 
24 Kerby, Narrative and the Self, p. 3. 
2S Narrative and the Self, p. 5. 
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discussion? How can different versions of the self (Le. meta-narratives-see 
section 5, below), such as Qoheleth's and the deconstructed, be viewed in light of 
each other? If the subject (indeed, the language) of the self is so problem-ridden, 
why even bother to bring it to bear on Ecclesiastes? The evidence we have seen 
for readers (others) seeing a self (subject) in Ecclesiastes is essentially credal and 
suggests that Ecclesiastes, perhaps more than any other biblical book (we shall 
see if this is so), is a text that is self-attesting. And there may be plenty that 
Qoheleth has to say about his own self and the self as subject, to the extent that 
he perhaps "re-privileges" the self to the centre. 
3. The Biblical Self 
I have already discussed the way in which first-person narrators refer to 
themselves in biblical Hebrew. The presence of the suffixed 'I is the most 
prominent feature of this self-referentiality. But how does the Old Testament 
convey the self as a subject? In my own review of this question, three words 
have consistently come to the forefront: :l", u7Cl and m, ("heart" or "mind", 
"soul" and "spirit"). There is no Hebrew word for "self" or "person" (WC) 
comes closest), but the idea is often conveyed through the use of these words. 
The Old Testament authors preferred both to speak indirectly of the self and to 
assume its palpable (sometimes even tactile) existence. To grasp something of the 
composition of the human person in the Old Testament-the "candleflame in the 
mist"-I will explore the semantic possibilities of these words, and review two 
particularly informative passages (Job 10.8-11, 18-22 and Jer. l.4-to). 
a. :l~"Jlean"J "Alind" 
The [Hebraic] heart is 'the very hearth of life's impulses-tbe supporter of 
the personal consciousness, combined with self determination and activity 
of the reason-the training place of all independent actions and conditions 
... In the heart are found the postulates of speech ... and all by which ~; 
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and ID~; is affected, comes in :l, into the light of consciousness. ,26 
Obviously, the word "heart" carries with it an impressive modem repertoire of 
images. By it we signify our romantic inclinations, our emotional disposition, our 
stamina and so on. In the Old Testament, :l' carries with it just as impressive a 
repertoire. The word is used more than any other in the biblical literature to 
make reference to the metaphorical "insides" of a person. It conveys a wide 
range of emotional, intellectual and physical experience. It can be applied to an 
individual psalmist or to the whole nation of Israel whose heart melts in sight of 
the enemy. The semantic range is extraordinary, and a look at some informative 
examples will demonstrate why this can be said confidently. 
One of the most well-known examples of the word shows its volitional 
connotations. The :l' of Pharaoh is described in a series of Leitmotifs (in Exod. 
7-14) as being hardened (/MIDi') by Yahweh. The end of this is always to control 
the outcome of Pharaoh's decision, and results in an inability on Pharaoh's part 
to listen.27 The realm in which the word operates here is the will-it is to change 
or it is not to change, according to the disposition of the :l'. Hardness of heart 
reveals a stubbornness to conform to God's will, to not hear it (Le. obey, 'OlD). 
In a similar example, Ezekiel informs us that Yahweh will give Israel one heart 
and a sanctified spirit. He will remove their heart of stone q:lM :l') and replace 
it with a heart of flesh (,fD:l :l'). The new heart, being now able to listen, will 
enable them to follow the statutes that he provides (Ezek. 11.19-20; 36.26). 
Elsewhere, it is the :l' of the people itself (along with their IDI)~) that must seek 
Yahweh for the purpose of building a sanctuary (1 ehron. 22.19); that is, its 
26 I. Cohen, citing Beck, in, "The Heart in Biblical Psychology", in H.J. Zinunels 
(ed.), Essays Presented to Chief Rabbi Israel Brodie (London: Soncino Press, 1967), I, 
p.47. 
I1 E.g. Exod. 7.13. It is interesting to note, however, that despite the exerted 
control on Pharaoh, the hearts of his servants are able to change (14.4-5). Compare 
Prov. 21.1-2, in which Yahweh is said to control the hearts of kings as he does the flow 
of rivers. 
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ethical imperative is to seek the will of Yahweh. 
Another volitional aspect is the pliability of the ~,,; that is, its "ability" to 
become soft. With Job the softness results in his being terrified by Yahweh's 
presence (Job 23.16). Similarly, the ~" may melt like wax and become utterly 
demoralized (Josh. 2.11; 5.1; 7.5; 14.8; 2 Sam. 17.10; Ps. 22.14), implying 
inversely that the ~" may be a source of courage. In the ~" may be found the 
capacity to (courageously?) enjoy life, as well. It can be gladdened with wine 
(Judg. 19.5, 6, 8, 9; Ps. 104.15; cf. Bccl. 2.3; 9.7; 10.19) and strengthened with 
nourishment (tiM") for the tasks ahead (e.g. Gen. 18.5). 
The ~" can also be a source of moral judgment and conscience. David's 
heart smote him (violently struck him, T'1!)~) after he counted Israel (2 Sam. 
24.10). If a person has no integrity of speech they may be described as speaking 
with a double intention (~", ~,,~, Ps. 12.3),28 reminiscent of the Hollywood-
ized Indian's indictment, White man speak with forked tongue! And because the 
inner self (~'P) and the ~" are deep (PCP), they are aloof, difficult to 
understand, and potentially deceptive (Ps. 64.6; cf. Ps. 51.6). Connected to this 
moral sense is Israel's stated duty to love the LoRD their God with all (":"; i.e. 
not doubly) their ~", tDl)~ and strength (Deut. 6.5-6), by which the words 
Yahweh speaks shall be inscribed upon their hearts. 
The ~" has an important intellectual aspect as well. It should be applied 
qro) to wisdom and truth (Prov. 22.17; 23.12; cf. Bccl. 1.13; Ezek. 44.5). 
Also, to speak in one's heart (~,,~ 'CM) suggests a kind of thinking or 
considering, an inner thought process. At 1 Kgs 12.26, for example, Jeroboam 
thought to himself (~,,~ ... 'CM) that his actions might secure the kingdom. Such 
an insight into his inner plotting is key to the way in which that narrative unfolds. 
Shimon Bar-Efrat cites several examples of this phrase as an effective narrative 
28 Cf. the Ezekiel texts above that refer to the one heart that Israel should have. 
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device for referring directly to a character's inner thoughts and feelings. 29 
Some miscellaneous meanings are worth mentioning. It is the ~c, that 
reveals the true person.30 The word itself can even signify wisdom or "good 
sense" which protects its possessor from evil or foolishness (Prov. 19.8;31 Hos. 
7.11). Acquiring ~c, gives one the sense to carry out acceptable human 
behaviour. Hence when Nebuchadnezzar's heart was exchanged for that of an 
animal he lost his capacity to be human and became like an animal (Dan. 4.13). 
It may also seek truth through reflexive meditation (Ps. 77.6). 
As I. Cohen has suggested, and as the intellectual nuance especially 
implies, the ~c, is often the centre of consciousness, of thinking about something 
as a subject, revealing "the states and condition of the self as experienced in 
various circumstances". 32 That is, it serves as an indicator through which 
experience of the self is expressed. Through it, in it and by it a person can 
experience an express change of will, fear, courage, pangs of conscience and the 
consciousness of intellectual enquiry. The heart thereby serves as a focal point 
for thought, will and strength. 
b. rDCl- n Soul" 
This word is probably the closest Hebrew can come to the English "person" (see 
Gen. 27.4; 49.6; Num. 31.19,28, in which each occurrence signifies a whole 
physical person, an entity that acts). Of course, the most emphatic expression of 
29 Narrative Art in the Bible (JSOTSup, 70; Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989), pp. 63-
64. Further, see below. 
30 So, for example, Provo 18.2: "The fool takes no delight in understanding, but 
only in expressing himself" (~c, M,C,lM1"I:n::lM '!), the hitp. of 1"IC,l meaning "to 
become known", "manifest"; cf. Gen. 9.21). 
31 In this text the heart as a general noun actually benefits the rD!)l-for the one who 
loves their soul will gather ~C" "good sense". 
32 "The Heart in Biblical Psychology", p. 43. He states elsewhere, citing M. 
Lazarus, that the heart "is the most all-embracing expression which 'comprises the whole 
world of psychic phenomena'" (p. 41). 
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the person as fli~l is found in the genesis of human creation (Gen. 2.7). God 
fonns the first human from the dust as a potter would fonn ('~') a pot of clay. 
The result is a living fli~l in which God's breath is blown. The physical created 
separateness of God and humanity (in contrast in particular to the physical 
correspondence between humanity and the gods found in other ANE myths) is a 
fundamental tenet expressed by this text-the imago dei. Through creation, 
humanity has not become simply a part of the substance of the Other, but has 
become separate from the Other-the Another of the Other. I will take up this 
important point again below. 
The word fli~l occurs several times in one particularly curious 
anthropological fonnulation, Lev. 17.10-11: 
If anyone of the house of Israel. .. eats any blood I will set my face against 
that person [fli~l] who eats blood ... For the life [rD~l] of the flesh ['W:l] 
is in the blood; and I have given it to you to make atonement for your 
lives [fli~l] on the altar; for, as life [fli~l], it is the blood that makes 
atonement. 
The person (fli~l) is judged for violating the life element (fli~l) of the physical 
body (that which makes the flesh live, God's breath) that is in the blood. Eating 
the blood is cannibalistic in that by consuming it one consumes the essence of 
Another, and the fundamental tenet of separateness is thereby deftled. Oneness of 
the body ('W:l) and the life element (rD~l) is central here, as it is in biblical 
fonnulations of human rights elsewhere (cf. esp. Gen. 9.4-6). 
This said, fli~l also lends itself to the most dualistic notions of person in 
the Old Testament. Many passages imply that the soul is a separate entity from 
the body (e.g. Gen. 6.17; 7.15, 22; Josh. 11.11; Job 34.14-15; cf. Eccl. 12.7), 
and when that final separation occurs, human existence ceases (cf. Job 14.22; 
Eccl. 9.10). However, rather than concluding from these instances that the rDl)l 
is only part of the whole self, we should understand them, suggests R. Laurin, 
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"as expressions of the life principle in specific functions of the organism". 33 
That is, since the soul often appears to be the motivating life-force of the body 
(that which causes life), it cannot enjoy proper human existence outside of the 
body (as evidenced by the Leviticus text). Although the tl1~l is separate, it 
remains dependent on the body to live. 
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Finally, the tl1~l, like the ~", makes up that part of a person that interacts 
with God's grace and judgment. It is encouraged to seek things out of its own 
accord (1 ebron. 22.19; cf. Deut. 6.5), and, as is particularly evident in the 
Psalms, the tl1~l is capable of seeking Yahweh as an act of worship or of 
blessing (Pss. 42.1,2; 103.1,2; cf. 131.2), and yet it may very well experience 
painful bitterness towards Yahweh (Job 7.11). It is the centre in and from which 
God's grace can be experienced-affirmed or denied. 
Although there are some informative examples elsewhere,3s it is in the book of 
Job that n" has its most significant nuances for this analysis. 
At 7 .11 Job remarks that he cannot restrain his speech. He is so overcome 
from the distress ('~) of his n" that he must give vent to his speech and 
complain in the bitterness of his tl1£)l. The idea occurs again, more forcefully, at 
32.18-19, this time from Elihu: 
I am bursting with speech! My spirit within me constrains me. Behold, 
my insides are like wine with no vent, like new wineskins ready to burst! 
I must speak to fmd relief. I will open my lips and reply. 
33 "The Concept of Man as a Soul", ExpTim 72 (1961), p. 132. 
34 As discussed above (excursus 1), n" is one self-referential word that Qoheleth 
put a fascinating twist to. Here I will limit myself to the more narrow question of its 
significance to the Old Testament notion of the self. 
3S A few significant examples: the psalmist's m" along with his tl1£)l, is actively 
self-reflective (Ps. 77.6); God has a n" which acts in creation (Gen. 1.2); at death, the 
n" returns to God who gave it (Ps. 104.29; cf. Eccl. 12.7); the n" has a moral aspect 
(as a "place" of iniquity; Ps. 32.2). 
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Elihu describes his insides q~~) as a bursting wineskin, and his m, is so 
overcome that it is in danger of restraining his speech. He is full of discourse 
(CI'''O 'n"o; cf. Job 30.9). That is, his inner person is so full of experience 
waiting to be expressed that it must fmd release. Through speech he will find the 
space to relieve his pent up emotions.36 We learn from 32.1-5 that he had 
become angry that Job had "justified himself" and that his three friends had given 
no answer to him, and he had now waited as long as he could stand. In other 
words, his experience, which had become internalized, motivated his speech to 
the point where it could be controlled no longer. The disposition of both his 
physical q~~) and spiritual (n,,) self so affected him that his actions became 
determined. This movement from the inner self to outward speech (i.e. the image 
of the self as source of speech) is apropos for the age of the lexical and soulless 
self. 
Our term has an intellectual nuance in Job as well. At 20.3, Zophar states 
that "a spirit (n,,) from my understanding ('ro'~O) answers me" (here 
paralleled to a word of instruction ['0'0] that has just "defamed" him). And, 
foreshadowing God's final speech, Elihu states that it is not so much the passing 
of days and years that teaches wisdom (the experience of growing old), but "it is 
the spirit (n,,) in a person, and the breath of the Almighty, which causes 
understanding (~'~n)" (32.8). The notion that the n" in a person provides 
understanding above and beyond that of acquired wisdom or received instruction 
adds an interesting ingredient to the discussion on Qoheleth and the self which 
will be concocted below. 
36 The metaphor of wineskins makes the aspect of space come to life here. In that 
constrained amount of space, too much wine will press outwards in search of an expanse. 
Also, keeping in mind that m, often means "wind", it is worth noting that it is through 
the physical release of air that we speak as well as breathe. 
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d. Two Texts of Interest 
1. Job 10.8-11, 18-22. Well into the stride of his complaining, Job states that he 
will tell Yahweh that he has despised the work of his own hands. Job loathes his 
metaphysical predicament-he has been created intricately and wonderfully by 
Yahweh, yet the same creator, it now seems, has turned upon him to destroy him 
(10.8-11): 
Your hands fashioned and made me; 
yet at the same time you tum and destroy me. 
Remember that you fashioned me like clay 
and you will return me to dust. 
Did you not pour me out like milk 
and curdle me like cheese? 
With skin and flesh you clothed me, 
and with bones and sinews you knit me together. 
Job somehow knows what God has done-how God has formed and fashioned 
him-and uses this argumentatively. His argument is expressed in highly stylized 
speech. In the first two strophes of vv. 8-11 the activity of God vacillates 
between first creating, then destroying, then creating, then destroying. In the final 
two strophes he is only creating, and this is where the emphasis lies. The 
materials for creation (skin, flesh and bones) and even their corresponding 
expressions (milk and cheese) are raw and tactile. Even the operative metaphors 
for creation itself are textile (clothing and knitting). This self, the existence and 
eventual destruction of which Job is lamenting, forms as tangible an experience 
for the sufferer as the covering of a coat on a windy day. 
A little later in the same chapter Job asks Yahweh (10.18-22), 
Why have you taken me from the womb? 
o that I would expire-that no eye would have seen me; 
that I would be as though I had never been, 
carried straight from the womb to the grave! 
Are not my days few? Cease! and leave me alone! 
Let me fmd a little comfort before I go (and I shall not return!) 
to the land of darkness and of deathly shadow. 
Job wishes things were different, and the implied anthropology is striking. In the 
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extraordinary statement of v. 19a (T't'T'tM 'n"l"rM" ,wac) , he wishes his very 
existence away. Existing itself has become the source of his misery (cf. Eccl. 
4.3; 6.3-5). His existence consists in the absolute opposite of nothingness, and 
because God actively took him from the womb, Job could not have escaped the 
experience that his self now faces. The existential dilemma foregrounds the self 
as an experiencing subject (further, see Excursus 2). 
2. Jeremiah 1.4-9. 
And the word of Yahweh came to me saying, 
"Before I formed you37 in the womb, I knew you. 
Before you came out of the womb, I sanctified you. 
As a prophet for the nations I appointed you. " 
I said, "Ah, Lord Yahweh, behold, I do not know how to speak, 
for I am only a youth. " 
Yahweh replied to me, "Do not say 'I am only a youth', 
for to all to whom I send you, you shall go, 
and all that I command you, you shall speak. 
Do not fear their presence, for I will be with you, 
in order to deliver you", said Yahweh. 
Then Yahweh put out his hand and touched my mouth; 
And Yahweh said to me, "Behold, I have set my words in your mouth." 
As Jeremiah is faced with Yahweh's call, an impotency of the human spirit 
freezes him-he is unable to speak.38 For Jeremiah, this impotence is the critical 
problem that Yahweh is addressing, and he addresses it by affirming Jeremiah's 
created origin and the tangibility of his self. The substance of that self existed 
before birth and constituted, in some sense, a person-for Yahweh himself knew 
it. It could even be set apart, made separate; for his principal activity in life (his 
profession?) was/is determined. Jeremiah can face the conflict with the 
knowledge that Yahweh will be with him and will place his words in his mouth 
(cf. Isa. 49.1-3). 
37 From 'U, the steel forger's word-d. Exod. 32.4; 1 Kgs 7.15. 
38 -0, 'n"n'""M"; cf. the strikingly similar phrase at Ecc1 1.8: W'M "~''""M'' 
-0.,". 
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The prophet is concerned about the futility of his speech, impaired by his 
youth. The concern, then (if speech is so connected to the quality of being), is 
for the formation of his character. "The most striking literary achievement of that 
chapter [Jer. 1]", Sean McEvenue suggests, "is to render in words a most 
sensitive encounter of a divine self and a human self ... Jeremiah presents an 
imposed upon and querulous and suffering self. ,,39 The self that Yahweh knew 
before bringing it into being will now be affirmed by asserting (as in Job's case) 
the expression of its speech by which it will be self-empowered. Although the 
self is inner and not humanly graspable, it is affirmed in this encounter between 
Jeremiah and Yahweh-through the promise of its being sent (to the nations) and 
its empowerment (speech). Here speech fmds its genesis in the creator and in 
tum has a determinative effect on the subject. 
Of the very few studies of the Hebraic conception of the self, most or all seek to 
address the issue of Hebraic wholeness over against that of Western dualism 
(body/soul) which, some hold, fmds expression in the New Testament.40 My 
review confirms that stance against Western dualism. The self as expressed 
through the metaphors may be contrasted to other "parts" of the self, but it can in 
no way be made separate, especially those metaphors that are organic.41 Other 
words that refer to the inner person are lto~ ("belly", "womb"), M""!) ("kid-
39 Personal correspondence, January, 1995. 
40 See G. Whitlock, "The Structure of Personality in Hebrew Psychology", Int 14 
(1960), p. 10; Laurin, "The Concept of Man as a Soul", pp. 131-32; Cohen, "The Heart 
in Biblical Psychology", p. 41; E.W. Marter, "The Hebrew Concept of 'Soul' in Pre-
Exilic Writings", AUSS 2 (1964), pp. 106-107; M.J. Boivin, "The Hebraic Model of the 
Person", JPsT 19/2 (1991), p. 159. Boivin argues that the duality that scholars have 
argued against has been oversimplified, but agrees with the basic assertion that the 
Hebrew notion of self is far more holistic than the more Platonic notions assumed in the 
New Testament. 
41 I.e., of human organs. ruEll may be related to cognate words meaning "throat" or 
"breath" (cf. BOB, p. 659a) or "stomach" (see Marter, "The Hebrew Concept of 
'Soul'", p. 103; m, can mean "breath"; ~., can refer to "heart" as the physical organ 
(e.g. 2 Kgs 9.24). 
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neys", Ps. 139.13}, and simply ~'P (that which is inner). The former two are 
obviously physical, while the latter can refer to the physical inside of a person as 
well as the emotional and intellectual psyche. The physical overtones constitute 
an intricate part of the portrait of the individual. As Edmund Jacob argues, the 
person in the Old Testament "is a psycho-physical being and physical functions 
are bound so closely to [its] physical nature that they are all localized in bodily 
organs which themselves only draw their life from the vital force which animates 
them" .42 Or, as R. Gundry puts it, the Hebraic person doesn't have a body, it is 
a body.43 
R. Murphy is surely right in suggesting that "there is no logical 
consistency within the OT regarding the terms used to convey the make-up of the 
human individual" . 44 Yet from this brief analysis a portrait, if incomplete and 
even partially fragmented, of the Hebraic understanding of the self has emerged. 
It is whole, physical, created by God, a centre of existence, of courage, of will, 
of worship, of meditation and of intellect. For most biblical writers the identity 
of self was individual, for the prophets in particular it was national. Yet there is 
an awareness in all of the biblical texts that God creates something solid-a self 
that is as substantial as the metaphors suggest. The idea of self, as far as can be 
implied from these examples, is not merely language-based. Indeed, in the Old 
Testament the self-construct pre-exists the process of speech. The language of 
self is referential, referring beyond itself to Another. That Another (self) is an 
object of mystery which, like God, cannot be empirically known but is intuitively 
sensed-felt in the most extreme of circumstances (Job, Psalms, Jeremiah), yet 
42 As cited in Boivin, "The Hebraic Model of the Person", p. 161. 
43 As cited in Boivin, "The Hebraic Model of the Person", p. 161. Boivin goes on 
to relate the consequences of this understanding of the physical person to psychoanalysis: 
"the essential aspects of personhood ... extend to the actions performed by the flesh 
(behavior), as well as to the physiology which mediates those actions" (p. 161); and this, 
says Boivin, is just the sort of corrective psychoanalysis needs. 
44 Ecclesiastes, p. 37. 
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assumed in everyday existence (Pentateuch, Proverbs). It is made up of the body 
(the heart, the breath, the guts) and what we might call the mind or heart, soul or 
spirit; yet each is bound to the other. The self in the Old Testament is full of 
significance and tangibility. 
4. Qoheleth on the Self and his Self 
How did Qoheleth assume (or not?) the kinds of constructs of the self we have so 
far seen? To what extent did the Hebraic portrait of the self figure in Qoheleth's 
own? What thoughts or themes echo between them? To determine this I will 
mimic the outline of the last section by reviewing in Ecclesiastes the three key 
biblical words of self-reference. After that I will discuss some key passages in 
which Qoheleth delineates not only the self as subject, but the centre of his own 
experiencing self. This will bring us back, at section 5, to the forum of our initial 
concerns about the self and will show the kind of alternative Qoheleth's meta-
narrative of the self and his self-portrait offer in the deconstructed age. 
Two of the three words of self-reference, !:)" and m" are among 
Qoheleth's favourite words, and while u7~l is not a favourite word, its presence 
is still relevant to the topic at hand. The first two words occur with surprisingly 
high frequency. In fact, n" has its highest relative frequency in the Old 
Testament in Ecclesiastes, at 5.36 occurrences per 1000 words (Haggai and Job 
have the second and third highest frequencies with 4.33 and 2.54 respectively). 
Also, !:)" has its second highest frequency in Ecclesiastes, with 9.15 occurren-
ces4S (proverbs is just ahead of Ecclesiastes with 9.77, and Obadiah follows on 
with a paltry 4.57). 
4S Although these statistics show the relative frequency as against occurrences in 
other biblical books, it should be noted that !:)", not n", has the highest absolute 
frequency in Ecclesiastes-42x as opposed to 23x. u7~l occurs 7x. 
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a. :la, 
In Ecclesiastes this word can be classified into seven aspects, with few borderline 
cases. They are as follows (in descending order of frequency): 
A) instrument46 of searching and/or testing (llx)47 
B) instrument of moral "good sense" (or its opposite) or belief (10xt8 
C) seat of reasoning, inner-dialogue (6x)49 
D) seat of joy, gladness (6x)50 
E) seat of vexation, striving (4X)51 
F) instrument of knowledge (3X)52 
G) instrument of speech (1 x, 5.1) 
Among the biblical connotations reviewed in the previous section, it is the 
intellectual that finds its fullest expression in Ecclesiastes. For example, when the 
word is used in connection with Qoheleth's procedure of discovery (A), it is the 
:la, that is marked to advance along the lines of intellectual inquiry, to seek and 
to explore by wisdom all that is done under the sun. It is the instrument by which 
Qoheleth makes his observations, and in this capacity it appears to take on a life 
of its own. In fact, it is the :lc, itself which often does the observing. At 9.1 
Qoheleth states, "I set my mind53 to all of this [Le., all that he had just 
46 Most instances display an understanding of the :lc, as instrumental in human 
experience. That is, it is an instrument of (channel of, vehicle for) Qoheleth's 
experiences (and of humanity's or "the wise"); experiences that primarily consist of 
testing the value of wisdom and coming to know its vexation. 
47 1.13, 16b, 17; 2.3 (2x); 2.10 (2x); 7.25; 8.9, 16; 9.1. 
48 7.2,4,7,21,26; 9.3 (2x); 10.2 (2x), 3. At 7.26, the:lC, of the woman that 
Qoheleth observes is like the nets of a hunter. Although the heart can be 
anthropomorphized (2.10; cf. 2.20, 22, 23), this is the only instance where Qoheleth 
uses another concept to illustrate the nature of theta heart. The woman's heart, for 
Qoheleth, exhibits her moral essence/sense. For in v. 25 he states that he is determined 
to understand evil and he then states in v. 26 that the woman is more bitter than death 
and that the sinner is taken by her. 
49 1. 16a; 2.1,15 (2x); 3.17,18. 
so 7.3; 9.7; 11.9a, 10. At 11.10 the removal of 017~ may be aligned with the 
previously mentioned "gladdening" (:ltfl') of the heart. 
5. 2.20, 22, 23; 8.11. 
'23.11; 7.22; 8.5. 
'3 The MT margin reads ':l&,-nM 'MN for ':lr,-r,M 'Mru. Either way the sense 
remains that Qoheleth's :lc, is being applied to the matter at hand. On the use of c," with 
!)a" see n. 58, below. Also, most translations offer "mind" as opposed to "heart" for !)a, 
(although cf. LXX which, in typically literal fashion, opted for lCapSux instead of, e.g., 
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observed in the previous section, the unit of 8.15-114], and [my mind] observed 
it all-that the righteous ... " By this he makes clear that his procedure of discovery 
revolves around the activity of the :l' itself. For Qoheleth, this centre of 
consciousness is vital to the overall tone of his queries. 
It is perhaps significant that the first occurrence of :l' (both the first 
intellectual nuance and the first occurrence of :l' in the book) coincides with 
Qoheleth's proper introduction of himself. At 1.13 he sets out clearly what arenas 
of the self he will be operating in-observation, knowledge and the mind: 
I set my :l' to investigate and to search out by wisdom all that has been 
done under the heavens. It is an evil business God has given to human 
beings to be busy with. 
The duality present here has unique implications. Because Qoheleth invokes his 
:l' as a separate entity, he invites the reader to explore and observe his inner 
person as he does, for Qoheleth is, as Fox contends, "his own field of 
investigation" .55 The :l' enjoys this privileged place as Qoheleth's intellectual 
centre, and it is from here that all of his observations will flow. Is this centre 
therefore the same as the "I"? Not always. Qoheleth would have us view his 
experiences as he does, through a diversified lens. For example, at 1.16b it is 
again his :l' that does the actual observing, acting as a narrative focal point for 
the reader. And in the next verse Qoheleth applies qn~) his :l' for the purpose 
of knowing wisdom and folly (1.16-17) :56 
I said to myself, "Behold, I have become great and increased in wisdom 
more than all who were before me over Jerusalem"; and my mind 
observed much wisdom and knowledge. And I set my mind to know 
wisdom and knowledge, madness and folly. I knew that this too was a 
v~, "mind"). I shall discuss the distinction further below. See above on the intellectual 
nuance of :l', which is likely present here. 
S4 See p. 206 n. 84. 
55 Qohelet, p. 87. 
56 This duality features in most of the occurrences in the intellectual categories (A, 
C, F), particularly when the :l' is applied to something or does the actual observing. In 
fact, any usage in which the :l' is instrumental (A, B, F, G) implies separateness. 
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pursuit of wind. 
His ~, justifies its own private existence as a narrative character and, along with 
the "I", the student and the frame narrator, serves to fill out Qoheleth's tale. 
Another undertone that emerged from the biblical overview and which is 
present in Ecclesiastes is the capacity to employ "good sense"; that is, "sound 
judgment in practical behavior and practical affairs". 57 For example, it is better 
to avoid the house of feasting, says Qoheleth, and the living will "take this to 
heart" (~'r'M 1M', 7.2).58 Yet the same phrase has a subtly different 
implication in 7.21, where Qoheleth urges his student in a moral tone: 
To all things that are spoken do not set your heart, 
lest you hear your servant cursing you. 
Surely your heart knows that many times 
you yourself have cursed others. (7.21-22) 
While the subject matter is different, the imperative to "not take to heart" (or 
better, "not believe") remains a moral one, ratified by the "golden rule", "Do 
unto others ... " 
At 9.3, the moral significance of the heart is made more clear. The ~, of 
the children of humanity, Qoheleth laments, is full of evil and there is madness 
(M""T'1) in their hearts59 while they live---md afterwards, to death. The heart 
here is a moral place, a nexus of being as over against behaviour, and lies at the 
core of Qoheleth' s reflections on the fate of humanity. Whether they are wise or 
foolish, whether they sacrifice or do not sacrifice, what matters is that their 
hearts are full of evil~r, as he says elsewhere (8.11), the heart of human beings 
is set on doing evil~nd this bears witness to the fate that humanity will be 
51 Fox, "Wisdom in Qoheleth", in L.G. Perdue et al. (eds.), In Search of Wisdom 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/lohn Knox, 1993) p. 118. 
S8 Qoheieth uses the stock biblical idiom :'T"M. Compare, for example, Gen. 6.6 
(God was grieved to his heart); 2 Sam. 13.33 (David believed [CI'fD] in/to his heart that 
his sons were dead); 2 Sam. 19.19 (Shimea asks David not to remember-not set [CI'i1) 
to heart-what he has done); cf. Bccl. 9.1. 
~ =~'~-the only occurrence of the related form, ~~.,. 
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unable to avoid in this life. Compare Gen. 6.5: 
The LoRD saw that the wickedness of humanity was great in the earth and 
that every imagination of the thoughts of their hearts (M::lfDMO ,~,..c,:l' 
~c,) was only evil continually (C,'irC,:l V, i"). 
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Here, as in Qoheleth's text, the concern is with the moral quality (V,) of inner 
life (the '~'-intent, imagination [cf. ,~, from the same root in the Jeremiah 
text above]-of the thoughts of the mind/heart). It is a question of being that 
motivates behaviour. In fact, at Ecel. 9.3 and elsewhere, the only characteristic 
of people that Qoheleth seems sure of is that which comes within the sphere of 
being and which involves the ::lc,. He is sure that it exists outside of the 
enunciation that defmes it and that it is linked to behaviour. 
When Qoheleth is thinking, or reasoning at an inner, dialogic 
level60-that is, in the form of his "I spoke in my heart" sayings (::lc,::l 
'r.lM~quivalent to the phrase, "talking to oneself"? or not talking out loud?; cf. 
Gen. 24.45)-we are given a privileged glimpse inside his character. It is worth 
noting that ::lc,::l 'OM is a frequently employed device used to demonstrate the 
inner processes of a character in a narrative fashion. As Bar-Efrat comments, 
after reviewing a host of examples, the phrase, 'said in my/his/her heart' usually 
suggests that "characters wish to convince themselves that the action they are 
taking, rather than an alternative course, is the right one". 61 That is, the phrase 
represents an inner struggle. At Ecel. 2.1, for example, the implication is that 
Qoheleth's struggle is/will be with himself, essentially as another: 
I said in my heart ['::lc,:1 '~M 'M'OM], "Come, I will test you [his 
heart?] with mirth and enjoy good things." But behold, that too was 
absurd. 
Indeed, it is in ch. 2 that this inner dialogue culminates and the heart is 
60 Reference may be made again to Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet. Perry pushes the 
notion of dialogue between two major characters (p, the presenter and K, Koheleth) 
throughout Ecclesiastes, with interesting if sometimes excessive results. 
61 Narrative Art in the Bible, p. 63. 
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established as Qoheleth's fixed position of reference for the experiences of his 
youth that he reflects upon, and yet the intense inner-dialogic language persists 
throughout Qoheleth' s narration. His heart bears the brunt of his most vexatious 
and joyous experience (cf. 9.1a), and we are again left with the distinct 
impression of a tangible experiencing self. This leads us to another general 
biblical category of the word, the emotional. 
In his ~" Qohelethfeels despair, striving, even n,: "And I turned to 
despair my heart ('~',-nM rDM''') concerning all the toil at which I toiled under 
the sun" (2.20; cf. 2.22, 23; 8.11). And it is this disposition of misery that will 
fmd its redemption in the same place. That is, the ::l" will also be the locus 
where one of Qoheleth's most important themes is realized: joy and gladness. 
The heart is the place of Mn~fD: 
Everyone to whom God has given riches and wealth and has enabled to 
partake of them, and to take their portion and rejoice in their toil-this is a 
gift of God. Indeed, they will rarely remember the days of their lives, for 
God answers them62 in the joy of their heart (,::l" nn~fD::l). (5.18-19) 
Recent attempts to show the importance of joy to Qoheleth's narrative have relied 
heavily on this passage,63 but little if any attention has been given to the 
function of the heart here. The noun in the construct state possibly shows that the 
~" is capable of owning joy. But can joy be owned or is it something exper-
ienced? Does such a construct suggest a consistent quality of heart or an 
62 The root run is usually taken to mean "occupy" or "be busy with" (as is more 
clearly the case in 1.13 and 3.10, where it plays off of l'lD, "occupation"). But cf. the 
convincing arguments of N. Lohfink ("Qoheleth 5: 17-19-Revelation by Joy", CBQ 52 
[1990], pp. 625-35; esp. pp. 626-29). Lohfink's article takes MlD here to mean "answer" 
or "reveal" ("God answers [reveals himself] by/in the joy of humanity's heart"). The 
consequence is the startling proposal that Qoheleth's theology is revelatory, being offset 
by his more cynical approach to God and wisdom, but not overcome by it. Lohfink 
suggests that 5.18-19 is representative of a theme which permeates throughout the book 
via such key phrases as "fear of God" (3.14-15; 5.6; 7.18; 8.12-13; 12.13) and the joy 
theme in other passages; all part of the "divine gift" of the knowledge of God. 
63 Particularly the influential articles of Lohfink ("Revelation by Joy") and Wbybray 
("Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy", JSOT 23 [1982], pp. 87-98). 
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encounter with joy (an event)? Other biblical occurrences of the construct suggest 
the latter. 
At Cant. 3. 11 the daughters of Zion are encouraged to 
Go forth! ... and behold King Solomon, with the crown with which his 
mother crowned him on the day of his wedding, on the day of the 
gladness of his heart O:l" r'ln~tD C,':l,). (RSV) 
Solomon's heart knows joy on an appointed day. It is a singular event. At Isa. 
30.29 the prophet informs Jerusalem (in contradistinction to Assyria) that they 
shall have a song as in the night when a holy feast is kept; and gladness of 
heart (:l:l" r'ln~tD'), as when one sets out to the sound of the flute to go 
to the mountain of the LoRD, to the Rock of Israel. (RSV) 
At Jer. 15.16, in the course of seeking the reassurance of his position, Jeremiah 
responds to the LoRD: 
Thy words were found, and I ate them, and thy words became to me a joy 
and the delight of my heart (':l:l" r'ln~tD"'); for I am called by thy 
name, 0 Lord, God of hosts. (rsv) 
In the above examples the construct state suggests not that the heart is to 
"become" always joyful, but that it is to experience joy as sacrament (Canticles), 
worship (Isaiah) and self-understanding (Jeremiah); that is, as a unique event. 
Likewise, in Ecclesiastes the place of the heart is partly to receive the reply of 
the divine to its own misery, enabling it for a time to forget the toil of living. 
Other texts, while just as important to realizing the overall theme, relate 
the :l" more indirectly to joy. For example, 
Better vexation than laughter; 
for with a downcast face the heart is made glad. (7.3) 
And in Qoheleth's celebratory passages: 
Go! Eat your bread with joy, 
and drink your wine with a glad heart; 
For God has already approved your deeds. 
At all times let your garments be white, 
and let oil not be lacking on your head ... (9.7-8) 
Rejoice, 0 young man, in your youth. 
And let your heart gladden you in the days of your youth. 
And walk in the ways of your heart, 
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and in the sight of your eyes. 
And know for certain that concerning all of these things 
God will bring you into judgment. 
Remove vexation from your heart, 
and take away misery from your body; 
For youth and the prime of life are fleeting. (11.9-10) 
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The heart should be glad (:mO) and it should gladden (~tO'). The reference to 
Num. 15.39, which states that the ways of the heart are not be followed after, is 
worth mentioning again (see the discussion at Chapter 5.4). The heart is what 
inclines a person. It is a motion of the will which, for Qoheleth, is a source of 
gladness. However, following after this inclination, according to the Numbers 
text, is no less than outright disobedience. The heart must be dedicated wholly to 
the LoRD, and any abberation is to be rejected. Qoheleth's reversal in theology is 
a reversal in anthropology as well. He has no fear of his experience, and affirms 
the episode of the heart to be authentic and human. 
In discussing this last aspect I have used the word "heart", since the 
emotional implications, I believe, cannot be rendered well by "mind". But 
"mind" is surely the best rendering in those instances when the ~" functions as a 
centre of consciousness-most clearly in the dialogic and intellectual instances of 
Ecclesiastes. It is due to elements such as these that Qoheleth has earned himself 
his reputation as the Old Testament's foremost individual thinker. Indeed, it is the 
intellectual self that rules Qoheleth's realms of thinking, yet it is offset by his 
acceptance of the emotional. While for Job the intellectual heart dominates, in 
Qoheleth we find a more balanced integration. Qoheleth's depiction of "heart" as 
a place of emotion is a breath of fresh air in the biblical wisdom literature. 
This word occurs only 7 times in Ecclesiastes. Three of those can be passed over 
briefly. The first instance signifies a receptacle of pleasure and occurs within one 
of Qoheleth's "better than" sayings (2.24). The second occurs in a narrative aside 
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in which Qoheleth asks rhetorically, "Why have I deprived my soul of good 
things?" (4.8). By such usage he effectively demonstrates an inner turmoil, and 
draws readerly sympathies. The third also employs the traditional sense of 
"person", and describes Qoheleth's procedure of discovery. It was his rz7£)~ which 
sought to know the sum but could not find it out (7.28). The remaining four 
occur in ch. 6, in a remarkable set of statements. 
Qoheleth's discussion in 6.1-5 is preoccupied with the satisfaction that the 
rz7£)~ is able (or not able) to obtain in its existence. The implication is that 
although some people enjoy a wealth of material goods, their inner selves remain 
insatiable. The lament is tragic and poetic: 
There is an evil that I observed under the sun, and it prevails upon 
humanity: [There is] a man to whom God has given riches and wealth and 
honour [so that] he lacks nothing for his soul from all that he desires; yet 
God does not enable him to partake of them. Instead, a stranger partakes 
of them. This is absurd and a grievous ill. 
If [that] man begets one hundred children and lives many years, 
though many be the days of his years, and his soul is not satisfied by 
[these] good [things]-and indeed, there is no burial for him-I said, "The 
stillborn child (''£)IT'l) is better off than he is." For in absurdity it comes 
and in darkness it goes, and in darkness its name is covered. Although it 
has neither seen the sun nor understood it, it finds rest rather than he. 
(6.1-5) 
Qoheleth is obviously not referring to himself, but to an example of absurdity and 
evil that he has observed. The tragic comparison of the stillborn (an "untimely 
birth" [cf. Job 3. 16]-" in absurdity it comes and in darkness it goes") to the lack 
that this man's rz7£)l experiences, suggests that the consciousness of absurdity and 
evil-which the rz7£)~ knows from living/experience-is worse than having never 
come into consciousness. The rz7£)l, then, is what participates in living. It is what 
separates the living from the stillborn-from those who cannot or will not be. If 
its name is covered it cannot be remembered and can never know existence. It 
has not been able to see or know the sun. (And remember that seeing the sun is, 
for Qoheleth, living, being conscious of existence-7.11; 11.7; 12.2 [inversely].) 
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The stillborn has not been aware of-nor has it perceived-the life the tD£)l knows. 
A few lines later Qoheleth twice puts a new twist to the word: 
All the toil of humanity is for their mouths, but the appetite [tD£)l] is 
not satisfied. 
What advantage has the sage over the fool? 
What have the foolish in knowing [how] to conduct themselves among 
the living? 
Better the sight of the eyes 
than the wandering of the soul. 
This too is absurd and a pursuit of wind. (6.7-9) 
Verse 7 serves as a neat summary of what has gone immediately before. The 
consciousness of the tD£)l is a vexation, for it has embodied an insatiable desire 
(cf. 1.8). In v. 9 the "sight of the eyes" probably suggests what is immediately 
obtainable and, by implication, desirable (cf. 2.10), keeping well within the 
present motif. However, the phrase "wandering of the soul" (or "desire"-
fDl)l\"MO) is the problem here. The phrase may be, as Whybray points out, a 
"circumlocution for dying" ,64 since the verb ,"M, in Ecclesiastes and elsewhere, 
can mean to "depart", as in "return to God". If this is so, then Qoheleth is 
rejecting death (not to be confused with Ecclesiastesan non-existence) as an 
alternative, even an alternative to the vexation of existence. This is a splendid 
example of the primacy of existence to Qoheleth's thought.6S 
Another divergence can be observed here between Qoheleth and the 
biblical tradition. Gone is any seeming duality between the !D£)l and the body. It 
is not so much that the !D£)l and the body are separate as that in Ecclesiastes they 
are not distinguished as such. The "experiences" of each are affirmed equally by 
Qoheleth. Indeed, the !DEll desires substance (~,to) as the body desires food. But 
the otherness of the !DEll and its inherent quality in defining existence remain 
intact. 
64 Ecclesiastes, p. 109. 
6S Further on 6.7-9 and the significance of ,"M, see my discussion in Chapter 9.2. 
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It is worth remembering that this word has its highest relative frequency in 
Ecclesiastes. I have already discussed the significance of the phrases n" n,», 
and m, 1"»' (see Excursus 1), which account for 9 of the 21 occurrences of 
n" in Ecclesiastes. But more significant to Qoheleth's concept of self are the 
remaining instances. Outside of the couplings with M»' (in all of which n" 
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most likely means "wind"), n" designates one of two meanings of "spirit": 1) a 
characteristic or trait,66 or 2) a "life-force" (of an animal or person).67 
The first meaning has some significance for our discussion. Two of the 
four examples occur in constructs in one of Qoheleth's "better than" sayings. A 
patient spirit (m.,-,,"), says Qoheleth in 7.8, is better than a proud spirit 
(n'''-l''Ol). (Note the spatial play: a long spirit is better than a high one!) Such 
adjectival usage is common in the biblical literature as a means of delineating the 
expected behaviour of a person or group, or simply of stereotyping for rhetorical 
effect. 68 As in Qoheleth's usage, it is a means of easily "understanding" one's 
relation to others and to the world. The next verse further expands on the "better 
than" saying: "Do not let your spirit be quickly vexed [,n'~ 'M~n-'M 
O"~']' for vexation rests in the bosom [p'n~l of fools." By assigning the 
quality of patience to the spirit,69 Qoheleth offsets his own ontological 
experience, for early on he had described his own self as racked with despair and 
vexation (1.18; 2.17-23 etc.), and will conclude in ch. 11 by admonishing the 
student to remove vexation from his heart (11.10). 
Where it occurs, the second meaning has generated much discussion. 
66 7.8 (2x), 9; 10.4. 
67 3.19, 21 (2x); 11.5; 12.7. 
68 Cf. Exod. 6.9; Num. 21.4; Job 21.4; Mic. 2.7. 
tR Qoheleth also associates the spirit with anger at 10.4, and prescribes calmness as 
its antidote: "If the spirit of the ruler ['W'CM] rises against you, do not yield your place; 
for calmness [MI)'C] will quell great offenses. " 
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More than any of the references reviewed in Qoheleth's narrative so far, these 
reflect a theological concept of person. The most elaborate formulation of this 
comes at 3.18-21: 
I said in my heart concerning human beings, "God has set them apart70 
to show them that they themselves are animals." For the fate of human 
beings and the fate of the animals is the same fate: as one dies, so dies the 
other, and all have the same spirit ("~" ,nM n",). Humanity has no 
advantage over the animals, for everything is absurd ("~M ":;)M ':;)). 
Everyone goes to one place. Everyone is from the dust and returns to the 
dust. Who knows whether the spirit of human beings goes upwards, or 
whether the spirit of the animals goes down into the earth? 
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It is significant that this group of observations is set in terms of inner reflection 
("I said in my heart"). Qoheleth's observation on what constitutes the human self 
and its fate is intensely personal. From the narrative structure that we are given 
we can only assume that this is what Qoheleth said as a result of his test of 
wisdom and pleasure "just" experienced in the first two chapters. Its primary 
narration is tunc (then as opposed to now), and roots the saying firmly in the 
experiential. Qoheleth himself knows that just as it is fair to say that the fool and 
the sage die the same death (2.14, 16), so it is fair to equivocate the fate of 
human and animal. The experiential strain is kept in the foreground. 
Qoheleth concludes that "the way of all flesh" (their wandering and their 
demise) under the sun is inherently flawed. He posits no blame to anyone or 
anything. That the human spirit is like this is simply a fact. It is the way things 
are, and it is connected to the absurd. It is due to7l "~M (Le. as a principle 
70 tI'M"MM tI'~'" "God set them (humanity) apart". "Set apart" or "separate" is the 
most clearly attested meaning for the root ,~, but does not agree with some 
commentators and most translations (RSV, NASB, NN, NRSV) which opt for "test". But, as 
Fox argues, with the accompanying verb "to show" (mM"" "[in order] to show 
them"; so the sense of Peshitta and LXX), "to separate" makes the most sense. It is by 
placing humanity below the heavens, to share mortality with the animals, that God shows 
them that they are like the animals, yet not (as made clear in Gen. 3) like God (Qohelet, 
p. 198). 
71 Such is the causative force of ,= in 3.19, as in, for example, 2.17; 4.10; 6.11; 
the second ,= in 9.5; and 12.3. 
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observed in the world) that the spiritual fate of humanity is reduced to the same 
as that of the animals of the earth ("C"~). 72 Qoheleth has already perceived that 
there is no logical relationship between deed and consequence, particularly as 
regards what he can grasp of the human predicament of toil and fate, so this 
comes as no surprise. It is inescapable, and the fact of it raises the question of 
advantage. 
This again sets Qoheleth apart from the rest of the biblical literature. The 
virtual equation of the human "life-breath" to that of the animal is not necessarily 
a radical one (Gen. 1.30; 2.7), but it is so rarely expressed in the Old Testament 
that it may seem so. Also, Qoheleth takes the Genesis formulation further; that 
is, to death. The prophets and sages had not asked, as Qoheleth does, what 
profits humanity given such a plight? If humanity is to Qoheleth' s experience so 
strictly isolated from God (3.18b; and cf. 5.2: "God is in the heavens and you 
are on the earth"), even in death, what can set them apart? To push the case 
further, what makes them human? What constitutes the self? Whereas elsewhere 
in the Bible the constitution of the self is assumed, Qoheleth raises questions 
about it. 
Another occurrence of n,., also brings out this concern. At the conclusion 
of Qoheleth's elegant contemplation on old age, his final words are as follows 
(and it is worth remembering that since the frame narrator commences his text in 
the next verse, these are Qoheleth's final words to the reader): 
And the dust returns to the earth as it was, 
and the spirit returns to God who gave it. (12.7) 
Here he alludes to the question at 3.21: "Who knows ... ?" But the narrative 
72 As virtually all the commentaries point out, the force of the question is negative 
and Qoheleth is likely refuting a concurrent notion that there was a difference between 
the fate of humans and of animals. In other words, people may claim to know that 
humans go one way and animals another, but as far as what is observable (and we should 
expect this meaning from the Bible's chief empiricist), their fate in death is the same. 
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context is significant. In ch. 3 Qoheleth's tunc stance placed his statement within 
an experiential context which made his question a rhetorical "fact" based on his 
own empiricism. Here, however, Qoheleth is at the story's end and he has shifted 
from observation to wise counsel. Indeed, the context of the poem itself forces 
the reader to allow Qoheleth a certain laxity with his technicity of vocabulary. 
This is not a formulaic statement, but a poetic climax imbued with a great deal of 
rhetoric so that the reader-as the poem has rhythmically established-should 
remember (further see Chapter 9.5). Here is a lyrical affirmation of creation's 
link with God, insinuating its intrinsic worth: the self originated from its creator 
and will return to it. 
There is one borderline case that is worth considering. At 8.8a Qoheleth 
states that 
No one has authority over the spirit (m':l to'''W) to retain the spirit 
(n"rrnM M'''!)'') and no one has authority over the day of death 
(n,O;' tn':l l'tO"W). 
If m, does mean "spirit" here73 then Qoheleth is reiterating human ignorance 
and impotence in the face of death. The spirit, its fate and movement, is not 
bound to the realm of human governance. The logical conclusion is that such fate 
rests in the hands of God.74 Like the tD~~ in the general biblical review, the 
prospects of the n" are likely caught up in the divine will, and this affirms, 
more explicitly than 3.18-21, the value of the human spirit and its essential 
freedom (that is, from human governance, but not from what may befall 
humanity at any time). 
While the Job texts reflect the idea that the m, in a person provides 
understanding above and beyond that of acquired wisdom or received instruction, 
73 So, for example, Gordis ("spirit of life", Koheleth, p. 280) and Murphy ("life-
breath", Ecclesiastes, p. 80), who perhaps opt for "spirit" over "wind" on the grounds of 
the following paralleled thought concerning the "day of death". 
74 Cf. 3.10, 18; 5.18; 7.14; 8.15; 9.1; 11.5; 12.7. 
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this aspect appears to be missing here. Also missing is Job's idea that the n" is 
a provocation of speech. Instead, in Ecclesiastes, this favourite word of 
Qoheleth's7s has more to do with the individual's relationship to the future 
unknown-death especially. More than in any other biblical texts dealing with the 
n", Qoheleth uses it to show a concern for the value of self-hood and the 
individual spirit and its freedom. 
d. Two Key Texts 
1. 1.12-2.26. What can we learn about Qoheleth's attitude to the self from what 
he has to say about his own self? First of all, Qoheleth tells us very little "about" 
himself. Apart from the frame narrator's text most of the relevant material comes 
from chs. 1-2. On its own that passage reads like the beginning of a good story. 
It is preceded by Qoheleth' s poem on the circuity of the cosmos and is proceeded 
by his list of achievements (2.4-10) which continues the story-telling style of the 
passage. There is, however, something odd about this passage that is likely 
noticed only on reflection. The quest is not happening as we read. We are 
reading about it as a past event. The tense fluctuates from past narration to 
present and back and so forth. It begins with a clear past tense (1. 12-13a) and 
then returns to the present with a conclusion/reflection (1. 13b). It is a style that is 
found elsewhere in the book but is particularly striking here. It is thoroughly 
engaging and continues throughout the passage: 
storytelling 
conclusionlreflection 
storytelling 
conclusion/reflection 
storytelling 
conclusion/reflection 
storytelling 
1. 12-13a 
1.13b 
1.14a 
1. 14b-15 
1.16-17 
1.18 
2.1a-b 
75 It appears 16th in Loretz's list of Qoheleth's 28 favourite words (cited in Murphy, 
Ecclesiastes, p. xxix). 
conclusionlreflection 
storytelling 
8. Qoheleth and the Self 
2.1c 
2.2-3 
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The effect of the reflections is to engage the reader in the present of 
narration/reading. It is to remind us that there is a critical distance being kept. 
And although the interspersed reflections precipitate Qoheleth' s final attitude to 
the story being told, it is the story-telling parts that dominate here. This suggests 
that the most important thing for Qoheleth is to relate his story. This dominating 
style sets the narrative tone for the whole book. The narration is "spoken" 
directly to the reader in that there is no intermediary figure; Qoheleth, as 
elsewhere, stands alone. This solitude is enhanced (if not caused completely) by 
the use of the first-person preterite. The preterite sets the story in the past and 
the narrator in the "present" moment of telling/reading, and unless there is a 
story-setting for the narrating moment, there is no audience but the reader. Like 
Job (see above on Job 7.11), Qoheleth will only fmd relief through this 
unhindered speech. His (remembered) experience is pent up and in need of 
release. The experiencing subject is thus foregrounded as the quest begins. 
He was a king (of sorts!), a builder of vineyards, of parks, of gardens; a 
wealthy man. He made these thingsjor himself (''', "for me", is the operative 
phrase that frequently occurs in the references to building and acquiring). In 
other words, he virtually "made" himself and leads us to believe that, as a result, 
he considered himself a man of great importance. His importance was both social 
and intellectual, for he defined himself in terms of status and material wealth. His 
intellectual ability had even become part of that status ("I said ... 'Behold, I have 
become great and increased in wisdom more than all who were before me over 
Jerusalem"', 1.16). It was this "defmition" of himself that he set out to test at the 
beginning of ch. 2: 
I said in my heart, "Come, I will test you with mirth and enjoy good 
things." But behold, that too was absurd. "To laugh", I said, "is madness; 
and to be merry, what use is it?" I set out in my heart to cheer my flesh 
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with wine (my heart conducting itself with wisdom), and to take hold of 
folly until I should see what was good for human beings to do under the 
heavens the few days of their lives. (2.1-3) 
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Here is a full-blown interest in the constitution of his own self, and it results in a 
concern for action: What is the best humanity can do given their situation? In this 
regard, it is no coincidence that the majority of Qoheleth's advice to his reader 
occurs towards the end of his narration, after the majority of his experiences have 
been related. 
As a result of the definition of self that Qoheleth chooses, he comes to 
despair his very life: 
I hated life, for the work that has been done under the sun was grievous 
to me. Indeed, everything was absurd and a pursuit of wind! And I hated 
all my toil at which I toiled under the sun, seeing that I must bequeath it 
to the man who comes after me; and who knows whether he will be a 
sage or a fool? Yet he will be master of all my toil at which I toiled and 
at which I was wise under the sun. This too is absurd. 
And I turned to despair my heart concerning all the toil at which I 
toiled under the sun. (2.17-20) 
His toil and reputation-that is, all by which he defmed himself-will leave him in 
death and will probably go to a fool. Qoheleth found little satisfaction in what he 
regarded his own self to be, and such failure was a source of vexation. 
This passage crystallizes the many subtle intimations to inner experience 
that Qoheleth makes throughout his narration. As W.P. Brown states, "The bulk 
of this book ... consists of a person who, like Job, shares his personal discoveries 
and bares his soul in a testimony without dialogic partners. 1176 For example, 
because each ":1;' judgment emanates from Qoheleth's "brooding consciousness" 
(Fox), an individual relationship to the absurd is evoked. The absurd is both 
dermed by Qoheleth's experience and the self which that experience reflects.77 
76 A soon to be published study on character formation in the wisdom books. 
77 Compare Brown's statement: "Hebel is as much a description of the absurdity of 
the cosmic and human condition as it is an indication of how the self is positioned in 
relation to the world in its totality" (soon to be published study). 
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2. 7.23-24. 
All this I tested with wisdom [l"1~~n~]. I said, "I will become wise 
[i"I~~nM]." But it was far from me. What has been is far off and deep, 
surely deep. Who can discover it? 
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Commentators have long recognized the glaring problem here. Qoheleth has 
clearly stated that he did achieve wisdom (esp. in ch 2), and even here wisdom is 
the instrument by which he will explore,18 but now he claims that becoming 
wise was far from him. To solve the dilemma it has been suggested that Qoheleth 
is employing two types of wisdom: the practical (by which he explores), and the 
elusive divine wisdom that he cannot attain.79 What has been outrightly 
overlooked, however, and which also sheds light on the passage, is both the 
significance of the verb ~n and its narrative context. 
What does Qoheleth mean by i"I~~nM? Of all 28 occurrences of the verb, 
~n ("be/become wise"), in the Old Testament only 3 are first-person singular: 
Eccl. 2.15, 19 and 7.23.80 Therefore, only in Ecclesiastes is the idea of 
becoming wise related so reflexively to the speaker. In the tunc of Qoheleth's 
story, becoming wise is within the grasp of the experience of his self. Unlike Job 
28 and Proverbs 8, where the poet seeks wisdom itself, Qoheleth seeks to be 
wise-to become wise. There is, perhaps, an intimation towards a philosophized 
sense of becoming here, a becoming which is far off and deep. This would not be 
too rarefied an idea to attribute to Qoheleth, particularly considering that he 
recognized "being" as an entity unto itself, including in the passage under 
consideration: "What has been [i"I'l"1u7] is far off. ,,81 The notion of becoming 
78 Note Fox: " .. .it is precisely bllJokmil-"by intellect"-that one inquires into such 
matters [as the frustration of inquiry)" ("Wisdom in Qoheleth", p. 119). 
79 E.g. Gordis, Koheleth, p. 270. See the discussion in Murphy, Ecclesiastes, pp. 
71-72. Also, see my discussion on wisdom as Helper, Chapter 9.3. 
aJ 7.23, as G.A. Barton noted, is the only instance of a cohortative verb in the book, 
and therefore "expresses strong resolve" (Ecclesiastes, p. 147). 
81 Other texts which reflect this recognition of "being" are 1.9; 3.1S; 6.10; 8.7; and 
10.14. 
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supports the idea that there are degrees of wisdom at work here, for Qoheleth 
draws a sharp distinction between practical and spiritual wisdom: one a wisdom 
of action, the other of being. 
The other instances of the first-person verb in ch. 2 refer to the past failed 
experiment. Eccl. 2.15 is especially notable: 
And I said in my heart ['::1"::1 '~M 'n'OM'], "As is the fate of the fool, 
so it will befall me." Why, then, was I exceedingly wise? ['nO!)n 1'10'" 
,n,' tM 'lM] And I said in my heart [':l":l 'n':l"], "This too was 
absurd. " 
The "::11'1 judgment suggests that becoming wise should have been a successful 
enterprise, but, as in 7 .23-24, it had clearly failed. To be sure, the language 
suggests that, if within the realm of possibility, becoming wise would involve the 
self in its entirety. 82 Furthermore, as with all the other "I said in my heart" 
passages, Qoheleth is referring to past experience. 83 This puts a striking twist to 
the observation. Qoheleth is narrating from an enlightened perspective. Having 
observed its trappings, he concludes resolvedly (in his heart) the failure of the 
process of becoming wise. This is enhanced by the fact that in 7.23-24 he, in 
effect, concludes from the preceding observations, which have to do with 
wisdom's value. 84 The failure of this process is one thing that Qoheleth can be 
sure of, and the narrative device heightens this sense of resolution. 
82 Note the repetition of "heart" and the emphatic '~M. 
83 2.1,2; 3.17,18; 6.3. In each of these cases the narrative stance is clearly 
reflective. Take, for example, 3.17: "[ said in my heart, 'God will judge the righteous 
and the wicked'; for [there is] a time for every matter and for every deed." And consider 
the context of 3.16: "But still I observed under the sun that in the place of justice there 
was wickedness, and in the place of righteousness there was wickedness." Like the test 
just narrated in ch. 2, Qoheleth is telling the reader his thoughts which result from self-
reflection and experience. 
84 That "all this" refers to the preceding observations of ch. 7 as opposed to the 
proceeding section (vv. 25-29) is supported by the fact that what precedes is also 
concerned with the failure of wisdom; particularly the ambiguity of its value (7.15-19). 
Admittedly, "all this" could serve as a link to what follows as well (cf. 7.28 esp.). 
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e. Splitting Image 
Were we to imagine Jacques Lacan's question, "Is the subject I speak of when I 
speak the same as the subject who speaks?", 85 delivered as a pensive, reflective 
aside in Qoheleth's narration, the result would be illuminating. The answer, as 
befitting Qoheleth's rhetorical style, would obviously be no. It cannot be yes 
since Qoheleth distances himself as a speaking subject, an observing subject. Both 
H. Fisch and W.P. Brown have observed this phenomenon in Ecclesiastes. For 
Brown it is because Qoheleth cites his "accomplishments" as failures that he 
makes his narrated self a "stranger", and therefore separates his "reputation" 
(public image) from his individuality or essence. Qoheleth thereby "steps out of 
himself" and creates a ghost.86 Fisch sees in Qoheleth's "self-duplication" an 
"ironic mode" which, by its smiling awareness of what happens to itself, 
constitutes something "near the very ground and origin of all irony". 87 
As autobiographer, Qoheleth is capable of distinguishing himself from his 
(narratorial) past point of view. That is, because he is aware that he is narrating 
his own subjective past (the "event of self-consciousness is inseparable from the 
history of saying '1'"88), he transcends it and creates two characters in the 
process: the one whom we envision writing or speaking-in real time-and the one 
who is written or spoken about-in narrated time. As James Olney says of 
reflective autobiographical literature, 
... while it is true to say that one can see with no other eyes than one's 
own, it is also true to say that one can, after a manner, see oneself seeing 
15 Cited in Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives", p. 112. 
16 "Character Reconstructed: Ecclesiastes", forthcoming. 
17 Fisch comments further that "even as the philosopher contemplates himself as the 
passive object of a universal process, his active contemplation of this process in the 
language of philosophy detaches him from the process, affirms his freedom and 
independence as a subject ... Irony brings together man as object, immersed in the world, 
and man as a subject, capable of rising superior to pains and pleasures" ("Qohelet: A 
Hebrew Ironist", p. 169; italics Fisch's). 
II Calvin Schrag, cited by G. Gusdorf, "Conditions and Limits of Autobiography", 
p.38. 
8. Qoheleth and the Self 
with those eyes: one can take a point of view on the point of view one has 
taken, and so ... transcend the point of view through the point of view.89 
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Qoheleth sees himself seeing with the same eyes. He sees a youthful king who 
saw that his life was abhorrent. He saw a sensitive sage who saw that the 
oppressed had no comforter to comfort them. Qoheleth is thus a thinker in that he 
thinks/sees/observes about thinking/seeing/observing. Qoheleth understands the 
process of (failed and, by implication, successful) understanding. In such a way 
Qoheleth transcends himself. Through his continually self-conscious narration 
Qoheleth demonstrates his awareness of the past. And so arise interpretive 
possibilities for the reader to participate in his transcendence of his past: does he 
smile wryly at it?; does he frown at his past folly?; does he weep? Both the self 
(subject) and Qoheleth's self, through his reflective redoubling, are brought into 
the sharpest relief. 
5. Accounting for the Self 
Qoheleth's way of accounting for the self offers an adequate measure of 
experience--a way of understanding what it means to be human-Qlld we may 
consider/judge it in contradistinction to the deconstructive approach of accounting 
for the self outlined above. I do not claim to pass judgment by some objective 
standard but rather I offer my subjective consideration. Mine is merely an attempt 
to question the adequacy of these distinctive world-views as a reader. 
I began this chapter by outlining two elements for consideration. 1) 
Qoheleth is, like a candleflame in mist, "there", in and through his narration. 
Readers reflect this experience of "brushing with" Qoheleth the person in their 
responses to and renditions of his story. I answered the "why" of this fact by 
suggesting that his narrative demonstrates a concern for character formation and 
19 Metaphors of Self, p. 43. 
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reflection on experience through autobiography, cohesion, the splitting of image 
and so on, through all of which Qoheleth leaves an indelible impression on 
readers. 2) The deconstructed notion of self heralds the death of the author and of 
the subject. The self is dead because we cannot find it. There is no referential 
link available that enables interaction with Another-with a person. The most 
important implication from this is that since the self can only be a product of 
language (and not vice-versa) self-existence is made difficult to affirm, establish 
or communicate. 
These two elements are separated by the fact that the first is a reading 
experience while the second is a broad theory that, while encompassing reading, 
attempts to account for human communication in general. They are, however, 
able to be linked by three points. I) The second element is discussed and 
formulated through writing and reading, and at any rate I have discussed the 
theory as it relates to narrative questions. 2) Both elements are credal. The first is 
founded on a reading hunch and yet can be critically discussed while the second 
asks us to believe that, contrary to our expectations, we do not exist outside of 
the enunciations that define us. 3) The first element is made "conversable" with 
the second in that Qoheleth's claims about his own self, as we have seen, amount 
to claims about the subject and the self in general. His treatment of the subject 
forces us to look hard at it- and "What you look hard at", said Gerard M. 
Hopkins, "seems to look hard at you. ,,90 
To clarify the matter, in Qoheleth' s concern for the formation of his own 
self is implied a wider view of the self. That is, the language that demonstrates a 
concern for his self acts metaphorically as a way to understand the concept of self 
as a whole-it is a mirror text. Qoheleth's narrated experience is a way of 
observing the development of the self over the expanse of time. As autobiography 
90 Cited in Olney, Metaphors 0/ Self, p. 33. 
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it becomes a way for readers to examine the arenas in which the formation of the 
self might take place. We look hard at Qoheleth's self (he gives us no choice) 
and our gaze is returned, with the frightening prospect that the quality of our own 
selves will be reflected (to be "~M?). 
Qoheleth's view shares an interesting trait with the deconstructive. 
Qoheleth acknowledges that he cannot discover the reasons why things happen the 
way they do and in this he is skeptical of ideologies that he has received.91 In 
fact, just as the deconstructive competes with the Cartesian, Qoheleth's way of 
accounting for experience, as has been widely commented on, competes within its 
own canon by overturning received ideas. But the similarity ends here. 
Qoheleth tests a way of accounting for his experience-one that is not 
unlike the deconstructive position-and is wholly dissatisfied by it. As the reader 
follows Qoheleth on his self-journeying (and this decidedly more intensely than in 
any other biblical book) the question of fate is a constant sub-text. What will be 
the end result of testing wisdom with his heart? How will Qoheleth's self (part 
Qoheleth, part Solomon, part disillusioned, part full of life) fare in the face of the 
absurd world? For Qoheleth attempted first to define himself in terms of wealth 
and reputation, and it failed miserably. In this respect it was the media-based 
image of self (an image connected as we have seen to the death of self) that 
Qoheleth tried and tested. He did attempt to define his own identity in reference 
to a public persona-based on material wealth and so on-and this failed him. That 
failure was itself absurd. For Qoheleth, the self was in need of a more substantial 
base for definition than the experience of extreme folly and mirth could offer. In 
the end result, the self must be further defined by an honest confrontation with 
the absurd. There are also, beyond the test of wisdom (which was really a test of 
his own self), some germane observations: relationships do fail (many are based 
91 Further, see my discussion of his ideological differences with the frame narrator in 
Chapter 5. 
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on envy, 4.4); the attempt to understand God fails (3. 11; passim); and Qoheleth 
asks repeatedly of human striving and of toiling for good things, For what 
purpose-what advantage-is it? Qoheleth's is the failure of living, for not only is 
it better never to have been born (cf. esp. 4.1-3 and ch. 6) but the day of death is 
better than the day of birth (7.1). To put it another way, the failure of living is 
the failure of the self to achieve definition satisfactorily-otherwise life is not 
absurd but merely meaningless. 
Ultimately, and most importantly, Qoheleth's narrating stance radically 
sets apart his idea of the self from the nihilism of the deconstructed self in its 
assertion of what it means to be human. Although the category of failures 
dominates his observations, it is precisely because they are in the form of 
observations that they cannot be said to emerge from a soulless self. That 
"brooding consciousness" is simply irresistible. To my mind it is this book's 
crowning achievement. It is no disembodied or immaterial construct of the person 
that can taste the bitterness of life in such a pungent fashion as Qoheleth's. In 
Qoheleth's acknowledgment of the failure of living he affirms the reality of the 
experience of those who live. By saying that the stillborn is better off than the 
living he affirms that it is because there is a defining faculty in the individual that 
that person, while living, is prevented from being consigned to the designation, 
"cipher of words". By thinking, by reflecting on events, by centring the place of 
experience and by feeling the weight of absurdity so deeply he acknowledges that 
the self is not simply a mental peg on which to hang his ideas and observations. 
The self is at the centre. The movement of expression is from Qoheleth's 
mind/heart, soul and spirit (all of which relate to Another and/or affirm the 
authenticity of the self2) to speech. In fact, Qoheleth exhibits the primacy of 
92 The ~, is the place of i1ncfU where God answers and where the act of feeling life 
is not feared but is affirmed. Although not linked directly to God, the rl1C~ establishes 
the primacy of existence by rejecting death as an alternative to vexatious existence. The 
n" returns to God who made it and the origin of the self and of its speech and the 
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existence (see Excursus 2}-and it is an existence not of words and the constructs 
of speech but of his self outside of the words that enunciate its presence, for 
those words are regardless "~M in the end and ultimately fail to express life's 
brightest and darkest experiences. God answers humanity not with words in the 
wind, but with joy in the heart, in the innermost and secret places. 
The crisis in which the self has lost its privileged place, and in which we 
can find no more "causal efficacy for the selr', is alien to Qoheleth's world. In 
Qoheleth's world the causes, if absurd, for the failure of the self are brutally 
clear. The world and the self's relationship to it are not as they should be. This 
places every individual in Qoheleth's world (everything and everyone under the 
sun) under the vexatious curse of futile toil and circular existence. There is 
redemption (and I will discuss that more extensively in the next chapter), but the 
point here is that the self cannot escape its very real existence. 
(intellectual) comprehension of its experience is thereby asserted. 
Excursus 2 
QOHELETH AND THE EXISTENTIAL LEGACY OF THE HOLOCAUST 1 
He who has a "why" to live for can bear almost any "how". 
-Victor Frankl, Holocaust survivor 
There is no why. 
-Simeon Levi, Holocaust survivor 
This excursus is a comparative study, and I feel the need to make two things 
clear about it from the start. First, Qoheleth's subject matter is, in one sense, in 
no way comparable to the Holocaust. 3 The Holocaust is a unique event in human 
history, and I do not presume to belittle the uncommon suffering of its victims by 
presuming an experiential likeness between their observations and those of 
Qoheleth (either diachronically or by regarding Qoheleth strictly as a narrative 
character). My interest lies in the themes that have emerged from reflections on 
the Holocaust-from its survivors and its commentators-and which bear likeness 
to some of Qoheleth's themes.4 Second, I do not regard the Holocaust as merely 
I This excursus is soon to appear in a slightly expanded form as an article in The 
Heythrop Journal. 
2 Both quotes cited by Leon Stein, "The Holocaust and the Legacy of 
Existentialism", in RTF, II, pp. 1943-55 (pp. 1951, 1945, respectively). Frankl's quote 
is directly from Nietzsche and it, along with another Nietzschean quote ("What does not 
kill me makes me stronger"), formed the starting point of his controversial psychological 
theories. 
3 Or "Shoah", as it is often called. Shoah (MM'W) is the modem Hebrew word for the 
Nazi Holocaust, meaning "catastrophe" or "devastation". 
4 The distinction between focus on reflections as against historical analyses is, as 
S.M. Bokolsky has shown, an important one. In his essay, "The Problem of Survivor 
Discourse: Toward a Poetics of Survivor Testimonies" (in RTF, I, pp. 1082-1092), 
Bokolsky discusses cases where the testimony of Holocaust survivors differs from 
academic historical accounts and the problems which such confliction raises. "[Students] 
of the Holocaust" , says Bokolsky, "do not listen to survivors to learn about historical 
facts" (p. 1087). The same point can be emphasized concerning my approach to this 
study. The truth I am after is that of the memory of experience, or even the experience 
of memory. 
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"an example" of the existential themes under review (whereas Qoheleth's thought 
is merely "an example"). Again, its uniqueness must be remembered. Why, then, 
am I making the thematic comparison at all? My reasons are twofold. 
First, comparisons at any level have the potential to shed interpretive 
light. Because of my lack of expertise in Holocaust studies and philosophy, I 
intend to shed light only on the themes of Qoheletb-any illumination beyond this 
is hoped for, but incidental. The second and more important reason is my own 
interest, which was initially sparked by a visit to the Yad-va-Shems Holocaust 
museum in Jerusalem. From my own subsequent reading and viewing of films on 
the subject (such as Claude Lanzmann's Shoah [1985],6 and Agnieszka Holland's 
Europa, Europa [1991]), I have been struck by the recurrent themes of absurdity, 
fate and death, and the thematic resemblance of them to Qoheleth's narrative. 
The step towards this excursus was, therefore, a natural one. 7 While some have 
drawn significant parallels between, for example, the Holocaust and Job,8 
Ecclesiastes and existentialism (see below, n. 33), and existentialism and the 
s OrD, ", lit. "hand and name"-symbols of the importance of remembering. The 
phrase originates from Isa. 56.5: "I will give in my house and within my walls a 
monument and a name [OrD, ,'] better than sons and daughters; I will give them an 
everlasting name [0"" 0fl1] which shall not be cut off" (RSV). 
6 Stein said of Shoah in 1989 that it was arguably "the greatest film of the Holocaust 
yet made" ("Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1953). 
7 It would be unfair of me not to admit, I think, another reason for my interest. With 
many others my attention has recently turned to the 50-year commemorations of VE day, 
and of the liberation of Belsen and other camps. A revival of general public interest 
seems to have accompanied these as well. I refer to a host of television specials and of 
course, Steven Spielberg's film, Schindler's List (1994). 
8 See Stein, "Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1949. Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, in 
his semi-autobiographical novel Night, describes the talk that surrounded him at night in 
the barracks of Auschwitz: "Some talked of God, of his mysterious ways, of the sins of 
the Jewish people, and of their future deliverance. But I had ceased to pray. How I 
sympathised with Job! I did not deny God's existence, but I doubted his absolute justice" 
(London: Robson Books, 1987 [1960], p. 53). It is worth noting here that I am in 
agreement with the sympathy underlying Frank Cliisemann's comment, "Koheleth brings 
Job to its logical conclusion" (liThe Unchangeable World", p. 61). 
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Holocaust,9 I have not come across any study that links the three I am attempting 
to link. 10 I will return to what precisely fonns the links below. 
1. Existentialist Themes: Material for a Response 
Existentialism for a long while dominated arenas of continental philosophical 
thought and has had a far-reaching influence on humanities areas such as 
philosophy, theology and drama. Defining existentialism is made a complex task 
by the fact that so many diverse thinkers have claimed the nomen as their own. 
While Seren Kierkegaard is widely regarded as the "founder" of modem 
existentialism, others point to Augustine, even Socrates. Even the mainly post-
World War II writers who are regarded as clearly existential (e.g. Sartre, Camus, 
Heidegger) differ amongst themselves on such central notions as the existence of 
God and the nature of human responsibility. Perhaps the best approach is to 
discuss existentialism in tenns of its defining themes. Key themes I will focus on 
are the role of extreme circumstances, (confrontation with) absurdity and 
(particularly in relation to the existential legacy of the Holocaust) the individual 
struggle with or against death and fate. 
As A. MacIntyre suggests, "stress on the extreme and the exceptional 
experience is common to all existentialism". 11 One prime example of this comes 
from the Preface (Exordium) of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, in which four 
9 I will be drawing heavily (as I already have for the title of this excursus) from 
Leon Stein's engaging and perceptive essay entitled, "The Holocaust and the Legacy of 
Existentialism". There he details the host of existential reactions that the Holocaust 
engendered-from its survivors (Victor Frankl, Filip Milller and others) to its 
reactionaries (Richard Rubenstein, Reinhold Niebuhr, Claude Lanzmann and others). 
10 It is worth noting, however, that in his photo-essay depicting each verse of 
Ecclesiastes, R. Short offers a photo of an Auschwitz survivor displaying the tattooed 
numbers on his forearm to (I presume) depict an irony in the meaning of 3.18, "I said in 
my heart concerning human beings, 'God is purging them to show them that they 
themselves are animals'" (A Time to Be Bom-A Time to Die [New York: Harper & 
Row, 1973], ad loc.). 
\I "Existentialism", in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, III (New 
York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 149. 
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versions of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac (the Akedah) are imaginatively devised 
and contemplated. In each one the emphasis is laid on a different aspect of that 
most extreme of experiences. In version III Abraham is racked with guilt by the 
notion that his willingness to sacrifice the best that God had given him was the 
most terrible sin he could imagine. In version IV it is Isaac who returns having 
"lost the faith", and who refuses to speak of the event for the remainder of his 
life. 12 In each it is the ramifications of the extremity of the ordeal that is drawn 
out and reflected upon. 13 In the absurdist dramas of the 1950s and 60s (of 
Beckett and Camus in particular), the heroes find themselves in drastic and at 
times unrealistic situations, and it is the flair and drama employed that has 
brought criticism on existentialism for being too out of touch and not concerned 
with the "ordinary" .14 As we shall see, however, its obsession with the extreme 
has made existentialism amenable to reflection on the Holocaust. 
For the existentialist, extreme circumstances breed the realization of the 
absurd. The extremity itself is defined by that frustration of hope or desire in a 
circumstance that suggests its opposite. In other words, it is the divorce between 
12 Written under the pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio (Fear and Trembling/Repetition 
led. and trans. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1983 (1843)], pp. 13-14). 
13 Isabel Wollaston has recently argued that the Akedah has functioned historically as 
an archetype for the traditional Jewish response to catastrophe. Simply put, in her essay, 
"'Traditions of Remembrance': Post-Holocaust Interpretations of Genesis 22" (in J. 
Davies, O.Harvey and W.O.E. Watson [eds.], WorcU Remembered, Texts Renewed 
[JSOTSup, 195; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995], pp. 41-51), Wollaston 
draws some significant parallels between Holocaust reflections and the Akedah, showing 
how modem Jewish appropriations of the biblical story operate with two basic strategies: 
1) the Holocaust is a "sacred parody" of the Akedah, and 2) the Holocaust is a "literal 
recall" of the story, a tale of "monumental faithfulness". It is interesting to note that the 
word "Holocaust" finds its roots in the Akedah. Isaac is offered as a &A.omp7tO)(nv 
(Heb. M'{l7), from which comes the derivative &A.om'\XJ'tov~d the now frightening 
definition, a sacrifice wholly consumed by fire (my thanks to Leon Stein for pointing out 
the derivation to me in personal correspondence). 
14 MacIntyre makes the following helpful statement in this regard: "It would 
be ... illuminating to see existentialism as the fusion of a certain kind of dramatization of 
social experience with the desire to resolve certain unsolved philosophical problems" 
("Existentialism", p. 153). 
Excursus 2 Qoheleth and the Existential Legacy 217 
deed and consequence (see Excursus 1) that defines the extreme. When one 
experiences the failure of, for example, a set of rules in a supposedly closed and 
secure social system, that circumstance is extreme by virtue of one's 
consciousness of the illogical relationships within it. Hence the absurd drama 
does not consist merely of the world and its systems, which are absurd in 
themselves, but also of humanity's participation, made up of the confrontation 
between the "wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart"15 
and the illogicity of the world; such a concatenation creates the absurd. The 
absurd itself is consciousness of that confrontation and defines, to a large degree, 
modem existentialism. 
The struggle with or against death and fate is the broadest of the 
existentialist themes I will touch on. These two certainties loom above the 
horizon of the absurdist drama and must either be rallied against or bravely 
accepted. Although it is a theme that pulsates through literature-from Hamlet's 
soliloquy to Hemingway's Frederic and Catherine in A Farewell to Anns-for the 
existentialist it is an all-encompassing issue. For example, in Samuel Beckett's 
most celebrated play, Waiting for Godot, the whole process of waiting takes on a 
quality of Sheol-like proportions. Two "bums" named Estragon and Vladimir, the 
"protagonists" around whom the play revolves, partake in idle but clever banter 
throughout the first act (being occasionally interrupted by a curious wanderer 
named "Pozzo"), and return to do the same in the second. The dialogue is 
infused with nebulous references to death and fate. Principally, neither of our 
heroes can leave as they are waiting for Godot, and although they are unsure why 
they continue, they do so, in circular frustration. In the second act Vladimir 
commences, in the same place as the first act concluded, with a song: 
A dog came in the kitchen 
U A. Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (trans. J. O'Brien; New York: Vintage Books, 
1991 [1942]), p. 21. 
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And stole a crust of bread 
Then cook up with a ladle 
And beat him till he was dead. 
Then all the dogs came running 
And dug the dog a tomb-
And wrote upon the tombstone 
For the eyes of dogs to come: 
A dog came in the kitchen ... 16 
218 
Of course, the resolution to the dilemma of Vladimir's song differs depending on 
whom one reads, but the dilemma itself remains essentially the same: life in its 
futility is circular, and attempting to escape it, and death within it, is futile. 
2. The Existential Drama Made Real 
As never before, the Holocaust brought each of these themes into sharp and 
painful relief. As Stein states the case, "Existentialism in all its forms-from 
Friedrich Nietzsche to Jean Amery-became a pervasive, unifying theme in the 
reaction of Western culture to the Holocaust. Existential thinkers and writers 
struggled to create meaningful responses to an overwhelming event that had 
shattered traditional frameworks of meaning. ,,17 This is because the Holocaust 
embodied existential themes in such a frighteningly real way that the critique of 
the "out of touch" drama of the existentialist could not be levied. Nietzschean 
myth had become flesh. Sartre's dictum, "existence precedes essence", became a 
response to the inhuman notion that (as in the manner that Nazis regarded Jews, 
Slavs and Gypsies) people were abstract objects whose essence was tragically pre-
judged. ls Challenges to the way in which Western culture was able to divorce 
itself from the responsibility of its view of the human subject, particularly early 
on in the War, had to be made. 
16 New York: Grove Press, 1954, pp. 37-38. 
17 "Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1943. 
18 Stein, "Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1943. 
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The theme of extreme situations is perhaps the most obvious that emerges 
from the Holocaust ordeal. The very idea of Holocaust, the extermination of a 
people based on who they are and not what they had done (that is, not fitting the 
classical notion of "criminal ") can only be couched in extremist terms. It required 
the employment of literally thought-less categories of the person, and made, for 
the Jewish people, existence itself a crime. And then there are the inconceivable 
facts. For example, of the 400,000 victims of the Polish concentration camp, 
Chelmo (German = Kulnhot), 2 survived. 19 Among the remains of the camp at 
Belsen today stand memorials which mark the deaths on those sites of, for 
example, 800, 1000 and even 5000 people. It is not possible to reflect upon the 
Holocaust without thinking in the most extreme of terms. 
Of course, such facts do not really need rehearsing, but in the circum-
stances which they reflect, the existential dilemma was made real for every Jew. 
There is the story, for example, of Solomon Perel, who at the age of 13 changed 
his identity to escape from the camps. He "served" in the Hitler Youth and daily 
faced his crisis of identity alone, until he no longer knew who he was. 20 Even 
those who accepted their identity had to face the fact that their oppressors did not 
regard them as human. In the camps, those who used the word "body" or 
"victim" to describe the Jewish dead were beaten. Instead, they were forced to 
use the Nazi word of choice, Figuren. 21 The incomparable suffering led many to 
feel as though their very selves had been hollowed out. In his novel, Night, Elie 
Wiesel describes such an experience. He reflects poignantly on his feelings after 
witnessing the burning of children not much younger than himself: 
It was no longer possible to grasp anything. The instincts of self-
preservation, of self-defense, of pride, had all deserted us ... the child I 
19 Their names are Mikhael Podchlebnik and Simon Srebnik and they are featured in 
Claude Lanzmann's film, Shoah. 
20 As told in the film, Europa, Europa, based on Perel's autobiography. 
21 As described by R. Glazar in Lanzmann's Shoah. 
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was had been consumed in the flames. There remained only a shape that 
looked like me.22 
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The extremities of the experience of the Holocaust were a theft of hope, and in 
existential tenns, a theft of the freedom to detennine and preserve the self. 
In the concentration camps, those who were intellectually sensitive found 
themselves tortured by the extremity of their experience and the unanswerable 
questions that it raised. 23 A recurrent theme of Holocaust literature and film is 
the inability to comprehend the inhumanity, and the pain involved in trying. 
Sensitive victims could say with Qoheleth, "With much wisdom (perception, 
awareness) comes much vexation, and those who increase knowledge increase 
pain" (1.18). The most tortuous of those unanswerable questions was surely 
"Why?", and attempting to answer it amounted to the fullest confrontation with 
the absurd. 
First, there are the bitter ironies which, especially in retrospect, reflect 
the absurd. Before the war, eighty percent of the Polish town of OSwi~cim 
(which "became" Auschwitz) were Jewish. As is well known, Jews were often 
among the social elite of Gennany-doctors, lawyers, scientists-and had won a 
high percentage of Gennany's pre-war Nobel prizes. At the conclusion of part I 
of Shoah, Claude Lanzmann illustrates the absurdity of the mechanical and 
dehumanizing policies of the Nazis by reading a letter issued from the 
headquarters of the Reich at the height of the War. The letter specifies, in the 
most calculating tenns and without a hint of irony, the changes needed for "gas 
vans" used to kill Jews. For example, since a lightbulb inside the vans was noted 
to usually have a calming effect, the letter recommended its use only at the 
beginning and end of journeys, so as to make loading and unloading easier. 
22 Night, p. 46. He later reflects that he detested the feeling of disjunction between 
body and self which the intense physical suffering caused (pp. 91-92). 
23 See Stein, "Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1953. 
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Images of an industrial city flash on the screen, highlighting the victory of 
technology over the human. The absurd thus becomes frighteningly clear. 
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And there are ironies of experience. Polish citizens of Treblinka witnessed 
some of the wealthier Jews from France and Holland arriving by train to the 
concentration camp in first-class compartments, under the impression that they 
were arriving to work in new jobs. Women on such trains were often seen 
applying cosmetics in anticipation of impressing their new "employers" .24 A 
deadlier and truly absurd irony was observed by Elie Wiesel. His first 
confrontation with real suffering at Auschwitz led him to question his existence. 
When he realised that the world had remained silent while he witnessed appalling 
sights, he asked himself if it were really possible, and had to pinch himself to 
prove he was alive.2S The silence of the world was not what he had expected. 
His basic trust in God (he was a devout student of the Talmud) and humanity had 
led him to expect an outcry. Its absence was absurd. 
The examples are, of course, endless. But what was the intellectual 
response? Leon Stein masterfully shows how Camus and others responded to the 
Holocaust through writing novels such as The Painted Bird (Kosinski, 1965) and 
treatises such as The Myth of Sisyphus (Camus, 1942).26 For Camus, the myth 
captured well the essence of the absurd. Sisyphus's apparent resignation to futile 
labour was a model for bravery in the face of the absurd. "Yet the Holocaust 
showed", says Stein, "that Camus's 'myth of Sisyphus' was real and deadly: 'In 
Auschwitz men and women carried gigantic rocks back and forth to no 
24 From Lanzmann's Shoah. Also in Shoah, and in a similar vein, historian Raul 
Hilberg relates stories of how the Nazis often stole the property of Jews in order to pay 
the travel costs they incurred for sending the same Jews to the death camps. Many of the 
Jews in effect paid for, as Lanzmann puts it, "the privilege of being gassed". 
25 Night, p. 41. 
26 Although likely not a direct response to the Holocaust, this work is proffered by 
Stein as an implied critique. 
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purpose. ' ,,27 
It was inevitable that the Holocaust experience caused many to reflect on 
their own fate, particularly the prospect of death. Because of the essential 
sameness of everyone's prospects, the question of fate transcended the individual 
and was made communal. Distinctions among people became blurred. As depor-
tation began in his ghetto, Elie Wiesel recognized such an awareness within the 
community: "There were no longer any questions of wealth, of social distinction, 
and importance, only people all condemned to the same fate--still unknown. ,,28 
Facing the unknown meant a denial of choice, and the denial of choice, both the 
individual's and the community's, heightened the struggle with fate. This was 
something which, as Thomas Keneally contends, Oskar Schindler came to realize. 
Keneally relates how Schindler purchased a burial place in a local churchyard for 
some Jews who were found dead in an abandoned rail car. When the parish priest 
told him that he could only offer plots reserved for suicides, Schindler reportedly 
answered that "these weren't suicides. These were the victims of a great 
murder. 1129 For the Jews there was no liberty of choice.30 
27 "Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1948. Stein is citing T. Des Pres, from his The 
Survivor. 
28 Night, p. 30. 
29 Schindler's List (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1994 [orig. Schindler's Ark, 
1982]), p. 387. Keneally relates elsewhere how witnessing the execution of the ghetto 
police ("the most faithfuL.as well as the most grudging") had convinced Schindler that 
the ability to "win over" life even through scheming or "obedience" had been completely 
obliterated (pp. 275-76). 
30 Of course, one must be wary of simplifying the notion of choice, of ascribing to 
Jews what Simone de Beauvoir has called an "atavism of resignation" or the nonsense 
that is "the mystery of the Jewish soul". Indeed, her comments are well worth noting 
here: Jews who were capable of an uprising at the Treblinka camp showed that "their 
helplessness in the face of their executioners was not the expression of some secret 
blemish ... [but] was due to the circumstances" (in the Preface to Jean-Fran~ois Steiner's 
Treblinka [London: Weidfeld and Nicolson, 1967 (1966)], pp. x, xiii). Further, Victor 
Frankl once wrote that there remained to the prisoner a "freedom to bear oneself 'This 
way, or that way', and there was a 'this or that''' (as cited in J. Hassan, "The Survivor 
as Living Witness", in RTF, I, pp. 1093-1104 [1095], from Frankl's Group Therapeutic 
Experiences in Concentration Camps). My point here, then, is not unlike that of de 
Beauvoir's: stolen (Jewish) choice was the fallen victim of absurd circumstance. 
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The awareness of fate laid so heavy on some that there was tremendous 
guilt for those who managed to escape. Inge Deutschkron, a Jew who lived in 
hiding in Berlin all through the War, felt that by surviving she had wrongly 
escaped fate itself. 31 Richard Glazar, a Treblinka survivor, states the feelings of 
foreboding which he related to a friend while in the camp: 
We're shipwrecked, but still alive, 
and we can do so little 
but watch out for every wave, ride it, 
and brace ourselves for the next wave. 
Ride the waves at all costs, nothing more. (from Shoah) 
The metaphor seems sadly appropriate. Waves are predictable and continual, each 
one feeding the other in a relentless circle. There is a reminiscence of Qoheleth 
here: "All streams flow to the sea, but the sea is not full; to the place where the 
streams flow, there they flow again" (Ecd. 1.7). Stein describes an instance of 
poetic consent to fate from Lanzmann's Shoah. It is the final scene in which 
a resistance fighter returns to the Warsaw ghetto and finds himself utterly 
alone: "I said to myself, 'I'm the last Jew. I'll wait for morning and for 
the Germans'" ... Here was pure amor fati, a love of fate, overwhelming in 
its serenity. Nietzsche would have envied him. 32 
While not all may agree with Stein's reference to Nietzsche, the bold acceptance 
of fate is lucidly present and shows again existentialism's amenability to 
reflection on the Holocaust. 
3. The Disillusioned Rationalist and the Holocaust 
Not a little attention has been given to the idea that Qoheleth is a precursor of 
31 As related in Shoah. J. Hassan comments that feelings of guilt were due partly to 
the sense of a loss of shared experience with other survivors, which in turn brought on 
feelings of isolation from the wider community of Jewish Holocaust survivors ("The 
Survivor as Living Witness", p. 1101). 
32 "Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1953. 
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sorts to existentialism.33 This is mainly because Qoheleth shares some distinctive 
qualities with the existentialists. Indeed, it seems it would not be untrue to fix on 
Qoheleth A. MacIntyre's designation of the existentialist, "disappointed 
rationalist".34 Besides what I have already touched on above,3s allow me to 
further outline some of those qualities. 
In terms of the above themes, Qoheleth is indeed an extremist. Like the 
dramatists, he has a flair for expressing the absurd in dramatically extreme terms. 
For example, nothing could be more absurd for a Hebrew sage than to play, as 
Qoheleth did, with the persona of Solomon. Under Qoheleth's auspices, 
Solomon's guise took on mythic proportions and his failure to succeed in 
Solomon's world (that is, the reliable world of retribution, wisdom and folly-for 
who is a fool and who is a sage in Qoheleth's eyes?) is a sublime piece of 
absurdist drama. The Solomonic scenario is Qoheleth's most potent rejection of 
the easy notion of retribution. The rejection was ultimately rooted, as Kenneth 
James states, in Qoheleth's realist principles: "Qoheleth ... recognizes the vanity of 
accepting the Hebrew theory of retribution, if by so doing the person becomes 
blind to the realities of pain and pointlessness which often form a part of a good 
person's life. "36 Qoheleth's world is polarized within two extremes: that of the 
King of wisdom, and that of the embittered sage who no longer knows even what 
33 So Kenneth W. James, "Ecclesiastes: Precursor of Existentialists", Bto 22 (1984), 
pp. 85-90; Peter, "In Defence of Existence"; Fox, Qohelet, esp. §O.2. Other writers 
have picked up on significant existential themes. The core thesis of Frank CIiisemann's 
article, "The Unchangeable World", for example, is the breakdown in Qoheleth's thought 
of the relationship between deed and consequence (further, see below). Brown 
("Character Reconstructed: Ecclesiastes"), following Fox's lead, compares at length 
Qoheleth's thinking to Camus's Myth of Sisyphus. Also, F.W. Nichols compares 
Ecclesiastes to Beckett's Waiting for Godot ("Samuel Beckett and Ecclesiastes: On the 
Borders of Belief", Ene 45 [1984], pp. 11-22). Nichols also mentions Vladimir's" A dog 
came in the kitchen" song in relation to Qoheleth. 
34 "Existentialism", p. 147. 
3S That is, that "::lM is best translated "absurd"; see the above examples and 
discussion in Excursus 1. 
36 "Ecclesiastes: Precursor of Existentialists", p. 86. 
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wisdom or existence is. 
Furthermore, Qoheleth presents himself to us as an observer of extreme 
situations. A good example of this is 4.1-3: 
And again I observed all of the oppressions that are done under the sun. 
And behold, the tears of the oppressed-but there was no comforter for 
them. Yet from the hand of their oppressors there was power-but there 
was no comforter for them. And I considered the dead who had already 
died [better oft] than the living who sti11live. But better than both of them 
is the one who has not yet been-who has not seen the evil activity that has 
been done under the sun. 
Qoheleth here reflects the experience of the sensitive sufferer in the camps. 
Although his later narrative stance will override his pessimism, his sensitivity 
brings him to the hopeless conclusion that non-existence is to be preferred to this 
kind of existence (cf. 6.3). For the oppressed whom he observes, oppression is 
the theft of hope, of a reason to live, even exist-a conclusion that echoes much 
of Holocaust reflection. 
As a result of his seemingly painful experience, Qoheleth advocated an 
avoidance of the extreme: 
I observed everything in the days of my absurdity: There is a righteous 
man perishing in his righteousness and there is a wicked man whose life is 
prolonged by his wickedness. Do not be greatly righteous, nor become 
exceedingly wise. Why be dumbfounded? Do not be greatly wicked and 
do not be a fool. Why should you die in a time not your own? Better that 
you take hold of the one and from the other not withdraw your hand-yet 
the one who fears God escapes both of them. (7.15-18; cf. 1.8) 
Qoheleth offers the examples of the end of both the righteous and the wicked as a 
generalization, a metaphor for "everything" he has observed in his absurd 
existence, and he refuses to be dumbfounded by them. One does not, after all, 
know what will happen. Excess in the realms of righteousness and wisdom can 
result in stupefication (tlDrD, "to be shocked, appalled"-<:f. Job 21.5). Excess in 
the realms of wickedness and folly may end in an unexpected death. Yet 
Qoheleth has witnessed those who escape the rules: the righteous who die by 
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their righteousness ('?'~:l ':lM) and the wicked who live long by their 
corruption (,nl)':l 1"MC). In his honest appraisal he can only hope to avoid the 
pain of perception. The thematic parallels to approaches to thinking about the 
Holocaust (there are no experiential parallels-Qoheleth is only observing) are 
doubtless striking. 
The absurd is an organizing principle of Qoheleth's thought, a standard of 
observation and thinking about the world, and his honest confrontations with it 
are easily recognizable as thematic links to the absurd themes of the Holocaust. 
Qoheleth observed the world and yet he did not attempt to reconcile its 
phenomena within a cohesive system of thought?' He is here racked with 
despair from his observations (2.17-18; 4.1-2; passim), there generous in his joy 
from the same (5.18; 8.15; passim); here bleak (1.2, 13; passim), there sanguine 
(7.19; 9.7-8; passim). Elsewhere the reader catches a glimpse of a more balanced 
vision of life (3.1-8; 8.6; 9.1-3a). There is a host of plain contradictions in the 
book's internal logic as well.38 Indeed, Qoheleth was, as Fox has pointed 
out,39 much like Camus's hero of the absurd who refuses to surrender to the 
explanations of institutions (divine or otherwise), or of the everyday, and chooses 
to observe the contradictory phenomena of life without reserve.40 Hence the root 
of his contradiction. Qoheleth's insistence on honest confrontation lies behind his 
37 It is wonh noting that Qoheleth was not a lone voice in the Hebrew Bible in his 
observation of the absurd. In Lamentations, for example, is the continual recognition that 
there appears to be little reason for the suffering of Israel. The theme culminates in the 
final prayer that boldly finishes in an insecure tone, with the following question: "Why 
have you forgotten us completely? Why have you forsaken us these many days? Restore 
us to yourself, 0 LoRD ... renew our days of old-unless you have utterly rejected us, and 
are angry with us beyond measure" (5.20-22; NRSv~f. 1.11-2.1; esp. 1.17,21). 
38 For example, Qoheleth asserts both that all toil is ':lM and yields nothing (2.11, 
18; 6.7), but also that enjoyment of one's toil is the greatest possible occupatio1l-Q gift 
from God (2.24; 4.9; 5.19-20; 8.15). 
39 In the Introduction of Qoheiet, esp. pp. 13-16. 
40 Compare Camus's comments: "The leap in all its forms, rushing into the divine 
or eternal, surrendering to the illusions of the everyday or of the idea-all these screens 
hide the absurd. But there are civil servants without screens, and they are the ones of 
whom I mean to speak" (Myth of Sisyphus, p. 91). 
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blunt and often contradictory observations on everyday existence and, like an 
ancient Elie Wiesel, he recognized that such unfettered observations could prove 
a vexation in themselves (7.16-17). Qoheleth experienced life as Camus's 
her~without screens. 41 
One of Qoheleth's prominent themes relates directly to the content of 
Holocaust reflection: the failure of words to express the absurd. Note the 
following comments compiled from interviews with Holocaust survivors by S.M. 
Bokolsky: 
If the oceans were ink and the sky was paper, there would not be enough 
ink or paper to tell of one hour in Auschwitz. 
You cannot say in an hour, or a day or a week what it was like in those 
years. It is not possible to tell you. 
There is not enough tape, not enough paper, not enough time and not 
enough words to make you understand what we went through. 
I cannot tell you-I cannot. There are no words to tell yoU.42 
Language fails to express the enormity and inherent absurdity of the event-of 
each experience of it. For Qoheleth as well, the failure of language is another 
contribution to the absurdity of his own experience: 
All words are wearisome-
One cannot express [it]. 
An eye is not satisfied with seeing, 
and an ear is not filled from hearing. (1.8) 
For with many dreams and absurdities [there are] many words-
41 Cf. esp. 2.15. Also, see 1.18; 7.3; 11.10. So Fox on this section: "Qohelet is 
teaching the avoidance of an extreme of wisdom (such as he himself acquired) because 
(we may deduce from the context) it makes one aware of inequities such as those 
described in 7: 15, and this awareness will leave one shocked" (Qohelet, p. 234). In a 
more lyrical vein, Gordis described the sensitive aspect of Qoheleth's observations thus: 
"This cry of a sensitive spirit wounded by man's cruelty and ignorance, this distilled 
essence of an honest and courageous mind, striving to penetrate the secret of the 
universe, yet unwilling to soar on the wings of faith beyond the limits of the knowable, 
remains one of man's noblest offerings on the altar of truth" (Koheleth, p. 122). 
42 "The Problem of Survivor Discourse". p. 1083. 
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But fear God. (5.7) 
Since there are many words that increase absurdity, what profit is there 
for humanity? (6.11) 
Who is like the sage? And who knows the interpretation of a thing? (8.1) 
Actually, not even the sage knows (8.17). Since the word for "thing" ('~') at 
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8.1 can also mean "word" or "act" (as in "The acts of King X"), the judgment is 
wide-sweeping. The failure comes in attempting to make sense of what one 
observes: the object of one's perception and understanding. It is a general failure 
that Qoheleth links to God's concealment of the comprehension of his works 
(3.11-14; 11.5 and elsewhere). It is a refrain found in Holocaust reflection: There 
is no why, there is no expression and there is no understanding. 
Qoheleth's fixation with death has long been recognized as an important 
theme,43 one intrinsically linked to the fate of humanity. Qoheleth' s attitude to 
death in itself was, however, not despairing. Qoheleth rejects death (not to be 
confused with Ecclesiastesan non-existence) as an alternative even to the vexation 
of existence (as in, for example, 6.7-9). Indeed, not "death in itself", says Frank 
Criisemann, "but only an early and untimely death was regarded as reason for 
despair; in itself death made life shine more brightly" . 44 This is spelled out 
clearly and poetically in 9.11-12 (cf. 9.1-3; 10.8-11): 
And again I observed under the sun: 
The race is not to the swift, 
nor the battle to the mighty. 
Neither yet is there bread to the wise, 
nor yet riches to those who understand, 
nor yet favour to the knowledgable. 
For a time of calamity will befall all of them. 
Indeed, humanity does not know their time. 
Like fish that are caught in an evil net 
and birds caught in the snare, 
43 See Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. lviii; idem, "Recent Research on Proverbs and 
Qoheleth", CR:BS 1 (1993), pp. 133-34 . 
.... "The Unchangeable World", p. 67. 
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So will human beings be snared by an evil time, 
when it falls upon them suddenly. 
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Like the operative principle of the absurd (the race is not necessarily to the 
swift), the time and quality of death remains obscured to our understanding. 
There is no fear, only the acknowledgment that knowledge is thwarted (cf. 3.2, 
19; 8.8). As Elie Wiesel recognized by more painful means, the future is 
frightfully unknown and the evil net may lie in wait, and choice is, as in 
Qoheleth's analogy of the hapless hunted animal, another victim of thievery. 
Consciousness of human fInitude and death is a theme which courses 
throughout Qoheleth's narrative. The following passage (8.6-9) can be taken as 
representative: 
Indeed, for every matter there is a time and a procedure, 
yet the misery of humanity prevails upon [humanity]. 
For they do not know what will be; 
for who will tell them how it will be? 
No one has authority over the wind to retain the wind 
and no one has authority over the day of death. 
And no one has discharge from war, 
nor will evil deliver those who practice it. 
All this I observed while giving my heart to all the activity that has been 
done under the sun, at a time when one person has authority over another 
to the other's harm. 
The prospect of the unknown ("humanity"-Qoheleth included-"does not know 
what will be") is precisely what makes Qoheleth so aware of the fate which 
befalls everyone. Since he has realized that he is powerless in the face of death 
(that he has no authority over it, n'~M C'I'~ 1'1m"rr11'M" 8.8; cf. 9.S) he 
gives himself no choice but to be painfully cognizant. Yet what makes this aspect 
truly interesting is the fInal phrase of the passage (8.9b). Qoheleth alludes to a 
cause of his awareness: his implied social situation. This has all happened "at a 
time when one person has authority over another to the other's harm" ('rr1M nJ) 
,., ",., CI'~ CI,at, t!)~). Even as a fIctive situation, the implication of the 
context is important. There seems to be no reason for the infliction of harm and 
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if we give Qoheleth the benefit of the doubt, he is powerless to stop it. Here is a 
consciousness of human impotence in the face of the unknown on a socio-political 
scale. 
There are likely other qualities that Qoheleth shares with the 
existentialists,4S and there certainly remain more links with Holocaust reflection 
to explore. Here are a few examples. 
1. Both strains of reflection are set in contrast to an ideology of reduction 
and unthinking retribution (for Holocaust victims a frightfully real one, for 
Qoheleth a likely fictive one), 46 each "at a time" when the overturning (or 
virtual shattering) of traditional frameworks of meaning is occurring. 
2. The subject (the experiencing self who makes decisions) is brought into 
sharp relief. In the case of Qoheleth it is always the formation of his own self 
that is in question-what will become of the sage who opts to search out 
everything under the sun?47 In the case of the Holocaust, the theft of choice 
established the subject's centrality. 
3. Qoheleth apparently rejected the nationalism of the Yahwists, and his 
observations reflect a community in exile. While there is no notion of 
45 For example, Kenneth James contends that Qoheleth shares with the existentialists 
"the commitment to existence as the primary condition for finding the meaning of life" 
("Ecclesiastes: Precursor of Existentialists", p. 86). 
46 Of course, there has been no shortage of proposals for the historical milieu of 
Ecclesiastes, but we need not "know" it to discern the clashing of ideology implied in 
Qoheleth's notion of '~n (the expected cosmology, which Qoheleth's experience 
opposes, can only exist as ideology~ presumably inherited one). It is also well 
demonstrated by his conflicting relationship with the frame narrator who seeks to restrict 
meaning while Qoheleth cannot contain it (God's works are unknowable, wisdom is a 
pursuit of wind). Furthermore, Qoheleth has "seen" a paradigm shift in power (5.7-9; 
10.5-7) and inexplicable evils under the sun (4.1-3; 8.11-13), and such contributes to his 
sense of ideological unease in his narrative world. 
47 Beyond what I have already suggested above about Qoheleth's notion of the subject 
(Chapter 8), if G. Whitlock is correct, there may be some existential significance in the 
biblical meaning of n". Extrapolating from the Joshua texts, and in reference to 
existentialist theologian Paul Tillich, Whitlock suggests that people need n" from God 
in order to muster the "courage to be", to exisHhat is, to be human and not "merely a 
clod of earth" ("The Structure of Personality in Hebrew Psychology", p. 6). 
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nationalism, there is one of community. In his "two are better than one" sayings 
(4.9-12), for example, he endorses companionship in difficult circumstance. 
Compare the following comment from Judith Hassan's study of the way in which 
Holocaust survivors coped: "In the concentration camp, individuals stood a far 
better chance of surviving if they were part of a pair or group. ,,48 
4. One may note a possible derivation of the word M~~rD from biblical 
Hebrew. The noun shares the same root as ",,-a word which, like '~M, is used 
to qualify the futility of idols and of false or deceitful words. It is one of the few 
words which comes closest to the meaning of '~M. 49 The noun itself is found in 
the prophets and wisdom literature to mean a tempest or ruin, which in a bitter 
twist of irony for its modem use, constitutes divine wrath (e.g. Isa. 10.3; Psa. 
35.8). 
5. Important questions remain to be explored in terms of the place of God 
in the whole comparison. If for some Holocaust victims God was to be 
implicated, while for others God was to be trusted in the face of human evil (in 
an act of "monumental faithfulness"), how is Qoheleth's apparent acceptance of 
the absurd, in a world in which God is seen to participate, to be reconciled? 
Indeed, Qoheleth's virtual celebration of "the everyday", coupled with his bold 
joy in a deceitful world devoid of rationale, stands either as an insult or a 
resonating intertext to the memory of the Holocaust victim. 
4. Survival and Memory 
In a world which was once familiar, Holocaust victims were made to feel 
alienated. Camus offered a thoughtful rendering of the problem: 
48 "The Survivor as Living Witness", p. 1093. Hassan goes on to discuss the specific 
activities such as sharing food and the importance of "organizing" (pp. 1100(1101). 
49 Cf. Exod. 23.1; Ps. 24.4; Isa. 1.13; Jer. 2.30; 18.15. It is used with '~M at Ps. 
31.7, where the Esalmist describes those whom the LoRD hates and who pay regard to 
vain idols (",r'''~M). 
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A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. 
But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and 
lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he 
is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised 
land ... [and] there is a direct connection between this feeling and the 
longing for death. 50 
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For many that longing proved too strong, but the same longing drove some 
victims to grasp for reasons for living which understandably suggest desperation. 
For example, Keneally tells of a woman at her wits' end in Auschwitz who 
makes motions to throw herself against an electric fence. The reason her friend 
offers to stop her seems to us, as Keneally comments, "perversely sane": "If you 
do that, you'll never know what happened to you." Yet in this case it sufficed.sl 
How can human value be affirmed in such a situation? Maybe this particular 
woman sought, for a change, to conquer the unknown. She would have bitter-
sweet victory over at least one absurd fate. She would choose to escape the 
hunter's trap. 
Qoheleth's reason for living seems an odd twist to this woman's story. 
One must push ahead with life and live fully, in spite of the fact (if not for the 
very reason) that you do not know what lies ahead: 
In the morning sow your seed 
and in the evening do not let your hands be idle. 
For you do not know whether this or that will be advantageous 
or if both alike will be good. 
Sweet is the light 
and it is good for the eyes to see the sun. 
Indeed, if one should live many years 
let that person rejoice in all of them. 
But let that person also remember the days of darkness, 
for they will be many. 
All that comes is absurd. (11.6-8) 
Here is reason to live life as fully as possible. In a manner quite different to that 
50 Myth of Sisyphus, p. 6. 
,. Schindler's list, pp. 348-49. 
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in Keneally's example, ignorance of the future is a motivation to continue living 
with all your capabilities, although many ominous days may lie in wait.52 
One way survival was managed in the camps was through the detennin-
ation to remember and be remembered, so that the world would not forget the 
atrocity of the whole event. The determination was wide-spread, and one does 
not have to listen long to a Holocaust documentary, for example, to hear a 
reference to it. As Stein comments, "Along with many victims, Alexander Donat 
said that the drive to bear witness was a 'sacred mission that would give me the 
strength to endure everything'. ,,53 
The importance of memory to Qoheleth can hardly be overstated. He 
frequently recognized the danger of losing the memory of past generations (and 
presumably the lessons thereby learned): 
There is no remembrance of the sage or the fool forever; in the coming 
days everything will have already been forgotten. How the sage dies just 
like the fool! (2.16b) 
This too I observed-[an example of] wisdom under the sun-and it seemed 
great to me: [There was] a small city with a few men in it, and a great 
king came to it and surrounded it, and built great siegeworks against it. 
And a poor wise man was found there who delivered the city by his 
wisdom. Yet no one remembered that poor man. (9.13-15) 
Sometimes the recognition takes the form of a lament: 
There is no remembrance of the people of old; 
nor yet of the people to com<>-[those] who will be. 
[There] will be no remembrance of [either of] them, 
[along] with those who will be after. (1.11) 
... the living know that they will die, but the dead do not know anything. 
And there is no longer a recompense for them since the memory of them 
52 Perhaps more akin to her story is Qoheleth's seemingly desperate sentiment, 
"Better a name than good oil [:l~ 1~ QUI :l~] and the day of death than the day of 
one's birth" (7.1; cf. 9.4). Death offered escape from the absurd world (a return to the 
eternal home-12.S; cf. 12.7) and the establishment of remembrance through a name. 
Both were better than the day of birth since, as Wbybray points out, at birth the future is 
still "entirely unknown" (Ecclesiastes, p. 113). 
'3 "Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1952. 
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has been forgotten. (9.5) 
By implication Qoheleth recognized the importance of the act of remembrance. 
Indeed, he fits well a description of Camus's "true rebel": "the artist who fights 
for decency and memory in an absurd world" . 54 
I believe in the sun 
though it is late 
in rising 
I believe in love 
though it is absent 
I believe in God 
though he is 
silent. .. 
-Anonymou~5 
5. Conclusion 
Holocaust survivor Filip Muller said of his traumatic experiences in Auschwitz, 
"We felt abandoned by the world ... [but] we came to know what life was. Where 
there is life there is hope ... we hoped against hope ... and survived. ,,56 With 
Qoheleth he could perhaps say, "Yet for one who is joined to all the living there 
is hope" (9.4a). As Qoheleth set up the bleak picture of the absurd divorce he left 
himself no option but despair (because he observed the divorce) . Yet Qoheleth 
did, for some reason, have hope. Francis Nichols compares Qoheleth's obstinate 
hope to the soothing words of parents to their children in the night: "Everything 
will be alright." But how do they know~7 Qoheleth has hope, and a confidence 
in the answer that God will give to the human heart in the midst of pain. For 
S4 Stein, "Legacy of Existentialism", p. 1949. 
55 Translated from the French by H. Schiff, in Holocaust Poetry (London: Harper 
Collins, 1995), p. 184. A note in this edition states, "Text from an unsigned inscription 
found on the wall of a cave in Cologne where Jews had been hiding." 
56 From Lanzmann's Shoah. 
57 "Samuel Beckett and Ecclesiastes", p. 20. 
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Qoheleth it is the joy expressed in 5.19-20 (and here is perhaps the most 
significant of Qoheleth's thoughts for Holocaust reflection) which will help 
victims of the absurd to "rarely remember the (painful) days of their lives"-to 
fmd healing not in the absence of recollection, but in the absence of the misery 
that it has long engendered-"for God will answer them in the joy of their 
heart" .58 
S8 On this translation, see p. 193 n. 62. 
Chapter 9 
QoHELETH'S QUEST 
Man is the shuttle, to whose winding quest 
And passage through these looms 
God ordered motion, but ordained no rest. 
-Henry Vaughan (Silex ScinJillans, "Man" [1650-55]) 
But where shall wisdom be found? 
And where is the place of understanding? 
Mortals do not know the way to it, 
And it is not found in the land of the living. 
The deep says, "It is not in me", 
And the sea says, "It is not with me" .. . 
It is hidden from the eyes of all living .. . 
Abaddon and Death say, 
"We have heard a rumour of it with our ears". 
-Job 28.12-14, 21-22 (NRSV) 
What we are dealing with in Ecclesiastes is a quest narrative such as one 
frequently finds in literature. It is not an aimless odyssey, for there is seemingly 
a definite goal at hand. It is not a trek, for there is no demanding physical 
journey (although, as we shall see, Qoheleth uses language that creates an 
impression of motion). It is not an intense search for a material object. Qoheleth 
is embarked on a quest. His is the act of seeking or pursuing a goal: an object of 
intrinsic but immaterial value. That act touches every comer of Qoheleth's 
narrative, and its intensity causes readers to recognize in Qoheleth a sincere 
commitment1 (although they might not always agree about what, precisely, 
Qoheleth is searching for). 
What makes this a narrative feature'? Any presentation of quest must 
1 Take, for example, L. Ryken's comment that "the writer of Ecclesiastes is a great 
organizer and stylist committed to the intellectual quest for truth" (Words Of Delight, p. 
320). 
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involve a proleptic element of story. We have seen how prolepsis works to create 
an initial tension in Ecclesiastes-for Qoheleth begins with knowledge and the 
reader is left to fill-in the details as to how he attained it. We have also seen how 
the plot is propelled forward by the frame narrator's kernel event at 1.1-2. It 
creates the expectancy that Qoheleth' s character will become rounded and full in 
the course of his narration. The plot concerns Qoheleth himself, for the outcome 
of his actions will only affect him. The whole notion of his quest, then, is related 
to the self, for it is the nature of his own self that Qoheleth tested and sought out, 
and part of what he discovers is just what he is "made of".2 
Qoheleth's dramatic quest often creates strong reactions in readers. 
Perhaps it is because stories of explorers have a luminous quality. With great 
interest some read the exploits of explorers who dedicate themselves whole-
heartedly to pushing boundaries which, to our own minds and to the canon of our 
culture's received ideas, are immovable barriers. Thinking analogically, 
Qoheleth's quest has its own reference points-its own boundaries and limitations 
which Qoheleth attempts to overcome. These are landmarks in a metaphysical 
terrain. And what is the purpose implied in his movement there? What are the 
recognizable features of that landscape of the heart and mind that Qoheleth 
travels in order to achieve his destination? What is it that readers seek to fmd in 
his exploits? Has he pushed beyond the constraints of some intellectual boundary 
that mirrors something more personal in our own intellectual experience? Has he 
found what he was looking for? Are his the remains, as Paul Haupt commented, 
"of a daring explorer, who has met with some terrible accident, leaving his 
2 Compare Fisch's comment: "What he [Qoheleth] mainly has to tell us of course in 
this extended discourse of the self is not the account of material achievements-we hear 
little of these after the sentences ... from chapter 2-but the account of his mental 
voyaging, his self-discoveries in the region of 'Wisdom'" ("Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist", 
p. IS8). 
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shattered fonn exposed to the encroachments of all sorts of foul vennin"'P And 
what is that elusive object he pursues? The concern of this chapter is to draw up 
a guide to that not necessarily tangible terrain. 
1. Success, Failure and Many Questions 
"Where is the rule then, and what hope can we have of success or profit?" 
-Pecuchet, Gustave Flaubert's Bouvard et Pecuchet 
There is a popular conception that Qoheleth sought out what H. Fisch calls the 
"aesthetic ideal", 4 and that this search fonns the overall structure and meaning of 
the book. In discussing the meaning of Ecclesiastes with friends who generally 
have no critical background in biblical studies I often find that Qoheleth is 
likewise seen as a maverick of sorts who was able to achieve fame and fortune 
and reject it all in a grand swipe of bitter cynicism-often in the guise of King 
Solomon. I like to think that the comments of my grandmother, Helen Ross, in a 
letter she wrote upon learning that I would be studying Ecclesiastes (and not 
much else!) for 4 years, are representative of a great deal of readers: 
So, you're studying the beautiful Book of Ecclesiastes ... But why so much 
time with one when there are 65 others that are beautiful too? .. I have 
read and re-read it many times and I try to understand it as I believe it 
was meant to be understood ... Solomon had the whole world at his feet, 
he drank deeply from the cup of life, monarchs came from every kingdom 
to marvel at his wisdom, wealth, temple, servants etc, he had 700 wives 
and 300 concubines (can you imagine?) but they did not satisfy his soul, 
for over and over he said "All is Vanity". (29 October, 1991) 
The key to this reading is the notion of success and competing failure. 
QohelethlSolomon did succeed at reaching one state of affairs and failed at 
another. I think the reading is well on the mark. The popular conception of 
Qoheleth's story as having won his personal success at the onset (Le. as his 
3 Cited in G.A. Barton, Ecclesiastes, pp. 27-28 . 
.. For Qoheleth, through MfX)M, "The aesthetic ideal is beheld, pursued, achieved, 
and also rejected" ("Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist", pp. 160-61). 
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initial proleptic stance from an older age) is one that is confirmed by the 
conclusions of the above review of the Solomonic guise: Qoheleth's 
proclamations are about a doomed enterprise. Rabbi Harold Kushner states the 
reading in another way: 
In his book, he tells us the story of his life. He writes of his successes and 
his frustrations, of all the ways in which he tried to be successful and 
make something of his life, and of all the reasons why the question, What 
does it all mean in the long run? was never really answered ... He is a 
man desperately afraid of dying before he has learned how to live.s 
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Kushner rightly grasps the smallest component of this overall scheme of success 
and failure: the question. What is it? Can it be answered? I will return to the 
notion of success and failure at the end of this chapter (again, the notion is on the 
mark, but will probably need some modification). For now, however, we can 
begin our own quest for Qoheleth's quest, and it makes good sense to start from 
the smallest unit, the question. 
Any question, any pursuit of fact, data, knowledge or human feeling, is 
part (indeed, the kernel) of the myriad expressions we use to signify the 
experience of human searching. A (non-rhetorical) question itself is the leaving 
open of possibilities and the absence of closure. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
without the proleptic element there is no sense of mystery, of quest or of the 
questioning character who is the characteristic of the book as a whole. In fact, 
prolepsis is about such absence of closure-4he story is incomplete, unfmished. 
Out of 222 verses in Ecclesiastes, 26 (11.7%) are or contain questions. 
All but two of these are seemingly addressed to the reader (2.2; 4.8). Instead of 
being directly questioned, like the audience of a doubting soliloquy we are 
frequently invited to seek to answer the questions with Qoheleth. And whether the 
, When All you've Ever Wanted Isn't Enough (Sydney: Pan Books, 1987), pp. 37-38. 
Compare Ryken's comment: "[Qoheleth's] quest is ... a journey of the mind and soul. It is 
the most crucial of all quests--the quest to find satisfaction in life" (Words' of Delight, p. 
321). 
9. Qoheleth's Quest 240 
question is stated indirectly or not there is always the possibility that the reader 
alone is being addressed. 
Qoheleth's style of questioning at first glance seems to involve the 
opposite strategy of prolepsis; that is, while it is partly to let questions remain 
without any obvious answer, most of his questions are in fact rhetorical and 
therefore seemingly closed. In a rhetorical question, however, the answer is only 
apparent-there is an uncertain tone. The question is a test, as if to say, "This is 
what is only apparent on the outside, but come test this theorem to see if things 
are actually as they appear." And here is where the openness of the questions lie: 
in the potentiality of Qoheleth's final attitude. That is, in the end, his attitude 
towards the implied statements of his rhetorical questions will determine their 
ultimate function in the book. The opening rhetorical question thus functions as a 
benchmark for all that follows. 
One of Qoheleth's most basic enquiries is into the value of toil, and such 
is the concern of his first question (1.3): "What profit has humanity in all their 
toil at which they toil under the sun?" Since no answer is given either Qoheleth 
genuinely does not know it or he relies on the absence of a readerly expectation 
for an answer. Of course we do not expect answers from rhetorical questions, yet 
in this we assume a living context between speaker and audience. If we create 
and sustain that assumption then the suggestion here is that there is and will be 
no profit. 6 A more direct answer comes later, as the result of Qoheleth' sown 
experience: 
6 Compare Murphy: "[the rhetorical question in Ecclesiastes] often tends, as here 
(1.3], to suggest a negation ... there is no profit in one's hard lot" (Ecclesiastes, p. 7); and 
Whybray: "(1.3 is] a rhetorical question to which the expected answer is 'Nonel'" 
(Ecclesiastes, p. 36). This is particularly significant for Whybray since he does not 
regard what follows (l.4-11, the poem on nature's circuity) as necessarily continuing the 
theme of the futility of toil as expressed in 1.3 (see Ecclesiastes, pp. 39-40; Idem, 
"Ecclesiastes 1.5-7 and the Wonders of Nature", JSOT 41 (1988], pp. 105-112). That is, 
it would work better for Whybray's argument if the answer to Qoheleth's question was 
not so clearly implied. 
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And I considered all the deeds my hands had done and the toil in which I 
had toiled to do it. And behold, everything was absurd and a pursuit of 
wind, and there is no profit under the heavens. (2.11) 
The theme of profit and advantage (/,n') occurs many times. Ogden refers to 
the query as Qoheleth's "programmatic question", which is constantly referred 
to. 7 The question is not only general (What profit is there under the 
sun/heavens?), but specific: What profit is there from owning many goods? 
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(5.11; cf. 5.16), from knowing wisdom and etiquette? (6.8) or from many words? 
(6.11). Yet his query is not conducted throughout the whole book (as Ogden 
would have it) but is limited to the first six chapters. 
There arises, then, an implication from the following "silence". The shift 
in questions is from What? to Who? Who knows the interpretation of a thing? 
(8.1); Who will tell humanity what will "come after them"? (6.12; 7.24; 8.1; 
10.14); Who can make straight what God has made crooked? (7.13; cf. 1.15). 
The question in 6.12, as A.G. Wright has shown,S works as a thematic link 
between the two halves of the book: 
For who knows what is good for humanity while they live the few days of 
their absurd lives which they pass as a shadow? And who will tell 
humanity what will be after them under the sun? 
It begins with the question of profit and at the same time introduces the Who? 
motif. The symmetry is not perfect (cf. the "Who?" questions at 2.19; 3.21-22), 
but the balance weighs in favour of there being a structural strategy at work. 
Also in favour of the strategy is the fact that in the latter half of the book, 
Qoheleth, after having reached a state of authentic ignorance, turns his attention 
7 Qoheleth (Readings; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987), p. 29. 
8 Wright persuasively argues that for a number of reasons there is a clear structural 
marker between chs. 1-6 and 7-12. He argues that the continuity arrives from the theme 
of Qoheleth's evaluation of experience in 1.12-6.9, having to do primarily with the 
question, What profit is there ... ? ("The Riddle of the Sphinx" , pp. 320-24) and that the 
second portion of Qoheleth's discourse (6.10-11.6), has to do with humanity's (Qoheleth 
included) inability to discover (ibid., pp. 324-25). The position of questions alone 
confinns Wright's thesis (Wright discusses them in part). 
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to instructing the reader/audience directly, and his concern is more with the 
formation of the individual than with broader intellectual questions-a concern to 
which the "Who" questions are well suited. But what matters most here is that 
the types of questions and their positions inform us as to the tone and inception 
of Qoheleth's quest, and that at this level of questioning, the smallest unit of 
human searching, the quest is purely intellectual. But how is the quest carried 
out? What linguistic clues are present to help us unpack the means by which 
Qoheleth searches? 
2. "And Move with the Moving Ships": Qoheleth's Physical Language 
I shall sleep, and move with the moving ships, 
Change as the winds change, veer in the tide. 
-Algernon Charles Swinburne ("The Triumph of Time", 1866) 
In the ironical play of consciousness the mind [of Qoheleth] is constantly 
in motion, trying different possibilities as it circles and seeks conclusions. 
-Harold Fisch9 
Although Qoheleth's quest is largely an intellectual one, there is a language 
element which suggests that we understand the quest, at least in part, as a 
physical journey, one which leaves the participant(s) exhausted and in dire need 
of rest. In this respect the language that suggests (or is closely related to-more 
on this below) movement/motion acts as a sign or signifier, providing a physical 
way of thinking about the quest. After listing the words that make up this 
language in Qoheleth's narrative (I exclude from consideration any occurrences in 
the frame narrator's text) I will discuss them in some detail. They are, in order 
of descending frequency: 
9 " Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist", p. 173. 
"go, walk" (30x) 
"come in, arrive" (15x) 
"pursue, chase" (lOx) 
:lW 
:l:lO/:l':lO 
la' 
1" 
"n 
T'1l~ 
pn,;p,n, 
POl) 
n~ 
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"return" (lOx) 
"encompass, surround" (8x) 
"go out, flee" (5x) 
"path, road" (4x) 
"reconnoitre" (3 x) 
"return" (2x) 
"distance, far off/away" (3x) 
"deep" (2x) 
"send, let loose" (Ix) 
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The ftrst question to deal with, is, How do these words relate to the 
concept of movement? In most cases this seems obvious. The translations offered 
here (with the exception of M~£)l~ are the words' well-established primary 
English renderings. All of them have a connection of some kind to walking or 
running, some to journeying. The following are often used directly to describe 
such movement: 1'M, M~, :l,fI7, :l:lO, la', "n, T'1l~ and n'fI7. Others have a 
less direct connection: 1" (what is travelled on), pn, and POl) (terms of 
geographical distance).l1 Some of these words, however, can have a ftgurative 
or metaphorical sense (e.g. 1'M = "living, conduct"; 1" = "manner, way"). 
In fact, in Ecclesiastes all of the listed words are usually used ftguratively-for 
example, "And the dust returns (:l,fI7) to the earth" (12.7), or "Just as [that man] 
came from (out of, Ia') his mother's womb naked he shall return (:l,fI7), going 
("M) as he came (MOO)" (5.15a), and so on. This raises a theoretical problem in 
the way that I am using them to make my argument. That is, it could be said that 
the figurative uses may somehow nUllify the primary meanings suggested. 
"The eyes of the wise are in their head, but the fool walks (1'M) in 
darkness" (2. 14a) offers an interesting case in point. Theoretically it could inake 
10 The primary meaning is "(tum to) consider", but see, e.g., Josh. 22.4 and 1 Kgs 
10.13, for some physical connotations. 
II See Fox and Porten, "Unsought Discoveries", p. 37. At this point in their article 
the point is made that Qoheleth uses verbs of motion and a comparison is made to stories 
of seeking out physical objects in order to illuminate the question of what Qoheleth 
sought. The discussion is interesting but has no bearing on the kinds of implications I 
will draw from the use of motion-words. 
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for a borderline case in that it appeals to the literal sense of walking in order to 
be understood figuratively. But it is a metaphor. Technically, the tenor is the fool 
to whom is applied the vehicle of walking in darkness (movement). I categorize 
this as figurative. The walking is figurative; we accept that here it means living, 
conduct and so on. But is the literal sense lost completely? Can it be separated 
from the newly created meaning? Indeed, why is "walking" the chosen vehicle? 
Metaphors are two things becoming something new. They are the combination of 
two or more ideas/concepts to create a new idea. Walking and darkness, together 
with "the fool", make up the rather negative picture of one who stumbles; who 
gropes to find something to hold but fails; who is unable to advance in life 
because of the lack of wit and wisdom to do so. In other words, in the working 
idea of the impediment of progressive movement the vehicle bas retained 
something of its primary meaning. All of the listed words in one way or another 
will therefore contribute to the overall impression of motion, but some (whether 
figurative or literal) will be more informative than others. And this is where the 
real nettle lies: What is their relationship to Qoheleth's quest? 
The words of the list that Qoheleth uses to express the quest directly are 
,.,n (2.1), ~'ef (4.1, 7; 9.11), ~~o (2.20; 7.25), "n (1.13; 2.3; 7.25) and T'UI) 
(2.11, 12). In all but two of these instances (the infinitive of "n at 1.13 and 
7 . 25), the verbs function as opening remarks either to other verbs that describe 
precisely how Qoheleth will search, or directly to the content of his discoveries. 
They set the tone and commence the motion of the quest: 
I said in my heart, "Come (ru-roc,), I will test you with mirth ... " (2.1) 
I set out ('n,n) in my heart to cheer my flesh with wine ... (2.3) 
And I considered (turned to consider?, 'n'm) all the deeds my hands 
bad done and the toil in which I bad toiled to do it ... (2.11) 
And I turned ('rI'~I) to observe wisdom, and madness and folly ... 
(2.12) 
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All as if to say, "I go", "I tum", "I move", "I commence", "I continue the 
quest", "I journey on towards the goal": 
And I turned ('n'~O) to despair my heart concerning all the toil at which 
I toiled under the sun ... (2.20) 
And I turned ('n~fl1) and observed all of the oppressions that are done 
under the sun. And behold, the tears of the oppressed ... (4.1) 
And I turned ('~fl1) and observed an absurdity under the sun ... (4.7) 
I turned ('n'~O), I and my heart, to understand and to search out ("n,) 
and to seek wisdom and the sum of things ... (7.25) 
I turned ('~fl1) and observed under the sun: 
The race is not to the swift, 
nor the battle to the mighty ... (9.11) 
245 
As if to say, "I set out, yet I return to where I began and am unable to complete 
my journey; my heart has come back on itself again and again and again ... " 
Qoheleth is travelling. 
Those motion words that are not directly connected to the quest are used 
in wisdom sayings, vignettes or poems. However, even some of these are 
indirectly related in that they may be seen to mirror, even extrapolate, the quest's 
central themes. The best example among these is 5.13-17. I have set out the 
passage chiastica1ly (and shown Hebrew and italicized theme-words) in order to 
show some thematic parallels. 
A There is a grievous ill I observed under the sun: riches were stored 
up by their owner to his own harm. 
B But those riches were destroyed in a bad venture. And he had 
a son, and there was nothing for his hand. 
C Just as [that man] came from (a') his mother's womb naked he 
shall return (~'fl1), going (,'M) as he came (M~). 
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D And he will not take anything from his toil that he carries (1'M) in 
his hand. 
CC This too is a grievous ill: Precisely as he came (MOO), so shall he 
go (1'1"1); 
BB and what profit has he from toiling for the wind? 
AA Indeed, he consumes all his days in darkness, and great vexation, 
and sickness and resentment. 
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This passage is set within a larger investigation into the value of riches 
(5.10-6.9). However, it is clearly marked apart from what surrounds it12 in that 
it has the same subject throughout who is ftrst introduced here (this man) and 
who does not appear before or after; in that this section begins with Qoheleth' s 
typical introductory phrase for observations, "There is a grievous ill ... "; and in 
that the following section begins something new with its ruM ("Behold ... "). After 
some general remarks (5.10-12), Qoheleth then focuses on a test-case of what 
happens when someone is controlled by what they search for and desire. 
From A to B Qoheleth sets up the problem of the discussion: to him it is 
grievous and even sickening (M"n) that someone has consumed goods to their 
own harm (,n",; cf. " ", at 8.9 and my comments on this in Excursus 
2.3). In B he describes how this person then lost those goods (one would think 
that this might make Qoheleth happy?). There is a resonance between A-B and 
BB-AA. Key words of harm and illness are mentioned, and the prelude to 
Qoheleth's question at BB, "What proftt?" can he have from his pointless toil, is 
given at B: there was nothing for his hand. 
In the centre of this account comes the working image of motion: that 
man has come and will return, going as he came, and just as he came he will go 
12 I approach this differently to Fredericks who argues that this passage works 
chiastically in the whole of 5.10-6.9, making, for example, the coming and going here 
(5.15) parallel to the coming and going of 6.4; both of which fit into the larger elaborate 
chiasmus (Coping with Transience, pp. 71-74). 
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(C and CC). When he attempts to carry anything away he will fail (D). Like 
Qoheleth, this man has suffered vexation and illness from experiencing the 
absurd. Like Qoheleth, this man cannot help but end where he began. Qoheleth is 
caught in a circular motion in his quest; he can only repeatedly return to it. And 
what will Qoheleth be able to take with him? (What can this man take from his 
life?) What profit? Where does this man go? (Do not all go to the same place?-
3.20; 6.6-Sheol? [cf. 9.10)) Where will Qoheleth go? The questions raised about 
this man for the reader can easily be applied to Qoheleth and his quest. So easily, 
in fact, that it begs the question of whether or not there is a strategy at hand of 
mirroring Qoheleth's experience in vignettes such as these (cf. 4.7-8, 13-16; 6.1-
5; 9.13-16). 
Other indirectly related (motion) texts offer mirrors to Qoheleth's own 
experience. I have slightly modified the following texts to reflect this factor: 
Much like myself, someone is not satisfied (»:UVn-M") from the good 
things of their life, and even the stillborn child is better off, "for in 
absurdity it came (M~) and in darkness it shall go (1"n), and in darkness 
its name is covered" (6.3-4). Perhaps I too was better off in darkness, 
than in the circle of my quest, where I never would have seen (lived in) 
the light or known (understood) it (6.5); for this is the source of my 
vexation (1. 18). 
"Walk (1"n) in the ways of your heart, and in the sight of your 
eyes" (11.9b), and enjoy what you can, for you must "know for certain 
that concerning all of these things God will bring (M~) you into 
judgment" (11.9c). For in the end you will be returned to your 
beginnings. 
"Better the sight of the eyes (Q'l'l7 MM'O) than the wandering of 
the soul (rD£)rt"MO). This too is absurdity and a pursuit of wind" (6.9). 
Better even the vexation that comes from seeing the world as it is than the 
wandering (quest) of my soul for nourishment and rest. How long will my 
own soul wander? 
There is an interesting twist to Qoheleth's use of 1"n: its contrasting use 
in Proverbs. First it should be noted that at 30 occurrences in Ecclesiastes this 
word should be listed number 8 in Loretz's favourite-word list (Ml7', "evil", also 
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appears 30 times).13 It is in every sense a "key" word. Its distribution is spread 
evenly, occurring in every chapter, and it is often the operative image in texts 
widely noted to be significant, such as those cited above. We have seen the uses 
Qoheleth has for it: futile wandering, "inviting" himself (cynically?) to test his 
own heart, the absurd departure from a world from which you take nothing, and 
conduct that, to some extent, resembles reckless abandon. Now its primary use in 
Proverbs, as here, is figurative and not literal. But there is a telling difference. 
One who walks in Proverbs must walk in integrity (C~ 1"'7'1) and securely 
(n~:'l 1"', 10.9; cf. 3.23; 19.1). Those who in Proverbs walk in uprightness 
(7 1"'7'1) fear the LoRD (14.2; cf. 2.20; 15.21). Better is the poor man who 
walks in integrity (CM:'l 1"'7'1) than the rich whose ways (C'~") are perverted 
(28.6; cf. 10.9; 20.7; 28.18). Indeed, wisdom herself sets the wheel in motion by 
walking in the ways of righteousness and the paths of justice (8.20). And 
Solomon warns his son not to run with those who entice him to travel in the 
paths of the unrighteous (1.10-18). For wisdom will call out in the streets to lead 
him back to the perambulation of the upright (1.20-22). Walking in Proverbs is a 
moral activity, and when it arrives at Qoheleth's story it takes a deconstructive 
tum (for the worse?). The only path Qoheleth walks on is either to death, sheol, 
the unknown or that of his own heart. 
Does Qoheleth, however, walk and not grow weary? If one journeys 
constantly (and repeatedly back to the same place) one needs rest. It comes as no 
surprise to learn, therefore, that Qoheleth holds rest in the highest esteem. Of 
course, rest features prominently in narratives that revolve around a quest (for 
example, one has the impression from reading Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress that 
when Christian stops for rest in the fonn of food, wine and comraderie along his 
long journey, the moment is narratively highlighted and is meant to remain in the 
13 As cited in Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. xxix. 
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memory a long while). Qoheleth makes it abundantly clear that rest is a good 
thing and that he, along with others under the torment of toil, longs to know it. 
Note the place of rest in one of the texts discussed above (6.4-5): 
For in absurdity it came and in darkness it shall go, and in darkness its 
name is covered. [And] although it has not seen the sun or understood it, 
it finds rest rather than he. 
And further note these examples: 
What is there for a man in all his toil, and the striving of his heart that 
toils under the sun? For all his days are painful and his work a vexation. 
Even at night his heart does not rest. This too is absurdity. (2.22-23) 
Better a handful with rest than two handfuls with toil and a pursuit of 
wind. (4.6) 
Sweet is the sleep of the worker whether he eats little or much. 
But the surfeit of the rich man does not allow him to sleep. 
Qoheleth also makes clear that he was in dire need of rest himself due to the 
taxing nature of the quest: 
When I set my heart to understand wisdom, and to observe the business 
that is done on the earth-although by day or by night my eyes14 seeing 
no sleep-J observed all the activity of God ... (8.16-17) 
That motion and rest feature so prominently suggests that the quest is to 
be understood on a physical as well as intellectual level. Such language also 
offers clues to the narrative aspect of the quest. It enables us to think about 
Qoheleth's intellectual motion in very suggestive and visual terms. Indeed, some 
readers might fmd the universal quality of physical language, even when used 
figuratively, easier to come to terms with than abstract intellectual language. The 
overall impression of movement should make us stop; that is, give us, Qoheleth's 
readers, pause for thought . 
• 4 For the emendation to ftrst person see Fox, Qohelet, p. 255. Even if this is in the 
third person (as RSV etc.) the point remains in that Qoheleth includes himself in his 
statements about humanity. 
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3. The Quest and its Actors: Qoheleth's Search and the Actantial Model 
What I want to discover is the truth of things themselves. What I doubt is, 
in fact, that things are actually as they seem. 
-Paul Ricoeurls 
250 
The marriage of wisdom with the notion of searching is not unique to Qoheleth in 
the biblical literature (e.g. Job 28; Provo 8; Sir. 51.13-22 etc.). For example, the 
author of the Wisdom of Solomon, D. Winston suggests, displays a "single-
minded ... concentrated pursuit after wisdom" .16 Winston sketches out the way in 
which that author was set on his own spiritual odyssey. Like the author of 
Proverbs, the author of Wisdom sought wisdom herself, and not necessarily 
things that are closely related to "human" knowledge; that is, things deduced 
from empirical observation, know-how, book-knowledge and the categories of 
knowledge that come from collecting data (as with Solomon in 1 Kgs 4.32-33). In 
some biblical texts, however, such an implicit criticism of the tireless quest was 
simply not enough. In what reads like a corrective intended for Qoheleth, Ben 
Sira asserts, 
Do not seek for what is too hard for you, 
And do not investigate what is beyond your strength; 
Think of the commandments that have been given you, 
For you have no need of the things that are hidden. 
Do not waste your labor on what is superfluous to your work, 
For things beyond human understanding have been shown you. 
For many have been led astray by their imagination, 
And a wicked fancy has made their minds slip. 
(Sir. 3.21-24; cf. 18.5-8; Wis. 9.13-18)17 
But it seems Qoheleth did not heed any such warning (this one came too late for 
IS Paraphrasing Descartes, in Oneself as Another, p. 6 
16 "The Sage as Mystic in the Wisdom of Solomon", in SIAN, p. 383. He comments 
later: "[the author of Wis.] appears to be undaunted in his total commitment to the 
pursuit of the philosophy and science of his age with all its challenges" (p. 389). 
17 Adapted from Goodspeed's translation, The Apocrypha, p. 229. I am indebted to 
Winston's article for drawing attention to the significance of this passage and that of the 
contrasting references ("The Sage as Mystic", p. 388). 
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him in any case!). He conducted his test unashamedly and with a burning 
intensity, but what did he look for? Could he say with the author of the Pseudo-
Platonic Epinomis, "For I have sought this wisdom high and low [ann kai katO] 
and so far as it has been revealed to me I will try to render it plain to yoU,,?18 
What was it that Qoheleth sought for (far off and deep)? Was it wisdom? Was it 
"the good life", as L. Ryken maintains?19 Or was it the object of his thematic 
questions; that is, to know what is good for humanity the few days of their 
absurd existence?20 Or did Qoheleth "exhaust all avenues of investigation to 
understand ... 'what God is doing under the sun' "?21 Or was it some subtle 
combination of all of these? 
In Chapter 1 I discussed Qoheleth's first announcement of the quest (1.13) 
but did not investigate (W,,?) what he was searching for. To discover (taO?) 
what Qoheleth sought, what he used to fmd it and what ultimately enabled him to 
get it or kept him from getting it, I will enlist the help of the actantial model 
developed by Greimas and Todorov (based largely on the work of Propp) which 
is meant to account for the basic structure of any narrative. Although the model 
has been criticized for failing to represent the relationships of complex stories,22 
it is more than adequate for Qoheleth's simple tale. 
The actants of the model, and what they do, are as follows: 
Subject The actant that desires/wishes for something. 
18 As Cited in Winston, "The Sage as Mystic", p. 385 (italics mine). 
19 literary Guide, pp. 251-52. 
~ See Fisch, "Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist", p. 163, who contrasts this theme to Mic. 
6.8: "He has showed you 0 man (C'M) what is good; and what does the LoRD require 
(rth,) of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk (,r,M) humbly with 
your God?" Fisch concludes that Qoheleth finds himself incapable of sharing in the love 
and intimacy with his creator that Micah implies, but settles for a few rainy days instead. 
21 A.R. Ceresko, "The Function of Antanaclasis (m~' 'to fmd' IIm~' 'to reach, 
overtake, grasp') in Hebrew Poetry, Especially in the Book of Qoheleth", CBQ 44 
(1982), p. 569 (italics Ceresko's). 
22 See, for example, Chatman, Story and Discourse, pp. 112-13. 
Object 
Power4 
Receiver 
Helper 
Opponent 
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The thing that the Subject desires. 23 
What enables the Subject to obtain the Object 
(and ultimately determines if the Subject is successful). 
The actant that ultimately receives the Object (usually the 
Subject). 
What offers often incidental help in obtaining the Object. 
What incidentally opposes the Subject in its search for the 
Object. 
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A simple example will help to illustrate the model. In the sentence, "Dennis 
wants to date Rose but she is reluctant to say yes", the Subject is clearly Dennis 
and the Object is a date with Rose. Since Rose is indecisive she is the Power; 
that is, she ultimately allows or enables the Subject's success. The receiver in 
this case is the Subject (unless there were another competing subject [what Bal 
calls an anti-Subject] who obtained "a date with Rose"). The Helper could be 
many things: Dennis's employment prospects, good looks, charm and so on. 
Likewise, the Opponent could consist of the opposites of these things. Helpers 
and Opponents can be groups of people or things combined into a force, such as 
society, an army and so on. 
As Bal points out, the model functions on the premise that Subjects of 
stories undertake "thinking and action ... directed towards an aim", and are intent 
on either attaining something agreeable or avoiding something disagreeable.25 
And this is what best describes the relationship between the Subject and Object, 
suggests Bal: the verb "to wish" (and/or "to desire"). This is what I will assume 
of Qoheleth: that his thinking and activities are directed towards an aim. 
In Ecclesiastes we have the advantage of the autobiographical form, the 
23 Objects can be just about anything: a state of existence, a piece of gold and so on. 
Bal distinguishes among objects those of intention which may include "wisdom, love, 
happiness, a place in heaven, a bed to die in ... " (Na"at%gy, p. 27). Bal's discussion of 
the model is simply one of the best available, and so it is to her that I will primarily 
refer. 
2A Following Bal (Na"at%gy, pp. 28-29) who prefers this to the usual term, 
"Sender", since this element can be passive (such as money) or active (such as a person's 
will). 
2S Na"at%gy, p. 26. 
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predominance of which easily locates the Subject, Qoheleth. The Object, 
however, is not so easily located. 
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We may presume from ch. 2 and elsewhere that Qoheleth at one time 
desired many things and experiences (cf. 5.10; 6.7). But intellectually, Qoheleth 
applied his mind (sought) in order to understand specifically wisdom and folly 
(1.17; 7.23,26 25; 8.16-17a; 9.1), pleasure (2.1,3), what has been before him 
(7.23-24; cf. 1.9; 3.15; 6.10) and all the activity that has been done under the 
sun (1.13; 8.9, 16-17a; 9.1; cf. 2.11; 3.11b; 1O.14b). He also observed (MM') 
wisdom in order to understand it (2. 12a; 8.9; 9.1; cf. 7.15-18, 25) and sought to 
see (MM') what was good for people to do during their short stay under the 
heavens (2.3; cf. 5.18; 6.12; 8.15). All of these things are to do with the quality 
of his own understanding 0'" is a favourite word). His express goal was to 
better understand. 27 
Qoheleth himself best sums up the whole Object of his thinking and 
investigating in an intriguingly simple way when he offers an aside in the midst 
of a quite specific investigation (7.26-29) about a woman: 
See, this I have found, said Qoheleth ([adding] one to one to find the sum 
ll'OlfM aGO" riM"" rlMM], which my soul has continually sought 
[Mlfp~-"17] but which I have not found): One man among a thousand ... 
(7.27-28) 
It is a culminative comment. It is the best image Qoheleth can fmd to express 
what his soul has continually sought in its calculating, adding and configuring of 
wisdom and the world: the sum, a satisfactory and digestible answer. It is 
significant that Qoheleth uses a simple mathematical problem as the image of his 
search. He is basically stating that he sought an answer to his calculations and 
26 Taking the "all this" there to refer to his reflections on wisdom, folly, 
righteousness and so on that precedes this verse (7.15-22). See my comments above, p. 
206 n. 84. 
TI It is worth remembering at this point how sorely the frame narrator misunderstood 
Qoheleth in his summation, "Qoheleth sought to fmd words of delight ... n (l2.10a). 
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observations that would put things into place and make things understandable and 
graspable. The answer should be as simple as "2", and such would allow him to 
understand the world in simple dichotomies: wisdom/folly, long life/death, and so 
on.28 But 2 is, alas, not as simple as it appears. To the Greeks it was a source 
of mystery. 
The early Greeks were uncertain as to whether 2 was a number at all, 
observing that it has, as it were, a beginning and an end but no middle. 
More mathematically, they pointed out that 2 + 2 = 2 x 2, or indeed that 
any number multiplied by 2 is equal to the same number added to itself. 
Since they expected multiplication to do more than mere addition, they 
considered two an exceptional case. 29 
As in the speculation of the Greeks, what Qoheleth called the sum was perhaps 
only a sum in appearance. He could not find it since, despite its simplistic 
appearance, its quality remained illusive. In fact, Qoheleth uses the same word, 
rQ~, just a few verses later (v. 29) to refer to the opposite of humanity'S 
simple beginning which was upright and uncomplicated: the concurrent human 
search for deception, "devices" (LXX, ).,oyt0J.10t; see p. 89 n. 10). Instead of 
offering closure, the idea of 2 might have opened more possibilities than 
expected. The Object that his soul had continually sought was an understanding 
that was of an initially naive quality. This Object was reflexivo-to better 
understand his own experience of the world and hence his own self-but wisdom 
is tied in with the enterprise, and the nature of wisdom is a problem here. 
This leads us to the question of the Helper. Qoheleth used (at least 
attempted to use) wisdom to his advantage in his search (1.13; 2.3, 9; 7.23). He 
consistently held wisdom in high regard (7.11-12, 19; 8.2; 9.13-10.1). The wise 
profit (2.13) and see the world more clearly than fools (2.14). Qoheleth worked 
28 This is the foundation of Qoheleth's realization that true knowledge/perception is 
in fact neither graspable nor knowable, as I sketched out at Chapter 5.3. 
29 D. Wells, The Penguin Dictionary of Curious and Interesting Numbers (London: 
Penguin Books, 1986), p. 41. 
9. Qohe/eth's Quest 255 
at becoming wise (2.19) and became wise in order to test wisdom's value (2.15; 
cf. 7.23). But this is where wisdom the Helper fails him; even with it to guide 
him while he searches he is not able to find the Object of understanding. Indeed, 
he does not understand why wisdom makes no ultimate difference to one's 
existencellife, for the wise and the foolish have the same fate regardless. The 
problem comes into sharp focus at 2.13-14: 
I observed that there is more profit from wisdom than from folly, as 
[there is] more profit from light than darkness. 
The eyes of the wise are in their head, 
but the fool walks in darkness. 
But I realized that one fate befalls both of them. 
Given the description of material profit in 2.4-10, and the fact that he has just 
stated, "And I considered all the deeds my hands had done and the toil in which I 
had toiled to do it" (2.11), Qoheleth is here likely recognizing the value of 
wisdom "generally speaking". That is, generally speaking, wisdom does help one 
gain material goods in a much more effective way than folly (1.16; 2.9), just as 
light generally helps one to see more clearly and to make effective progress in 
life (see my comments on this passage in section 2, above). This makes the 
equivalent fates of the sage and the fool all the more acute and all the more 
obscure to Qoheleth's understanding. What seems to affect their fate much more 
than wisdom is what God will choose to do (see below), and that is beyond his 
understanding as well. Wisdom, in fact, deceives him; wisdom turns from being 
Helper to becoming Opponent, even to the point of causing him vexation (1.18; 
cf. 2.15, 19; 7.23). It functions like a false lead in a detective novel. Perhaps 
because of what it brought him (power, fame, wealth) he initially believed that it 
implicitly promised him the desire of his heart, understanding. 
Besides failed wisdom it may be that there are no other real Opponents. 
There are factors such as toil, weariness, pain and hate, which frustrate Qoheleth 
to no end (see esp. 2.17-23), but these are not so much Qoheleth's opponent as 
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they are built into the structure of the world as Qoheleth sees it. And this brings 
us to the question of the Power: What (or indeed who) ultimately decides whether 
Qoheleth will succeed in understanding all that has happened to him in the realms 
of wisdom and folly? 
As in the above example of Dennis and Rose, we know the Power by 
knowing the reasons for the failure or success of the Subject. Dennis will be 
successful if Rose says yes. Qoheleth will be successful if something will allow 
or disallow him to obtain his goal. While it was wisdom that initially helped him, 
we must not confuse the Power with the Helper. What ultimately determines 
Qoheleth's success is the accessibility of understanding itself (that is, of being in 
a position clearly to understand wisdom, conduct, the activity of God etc.). 
Qoheleth did succeed in placing himself in a position to test and evaluate 
the prospects of his becoming wise. He did "become great", he did amass 
treasures, he did know folly and madness frrst hand. And then he considered it 
all and found that it was "~n. That is, when he pushed further to understand he 
came up against an insurmountable barrier. This is especially evident in texts 
where Qoheleth attempts to obtain the Object but fmds himself denied by the fact 
that everything is absurd: 1.13-14; 2.11, 15-16,22-23; cf. 4.4, 8; 6.2; 7.23-24. 
In each of these instances the Power is the existing structure of deed and 
consequence, the way things are. This insurmountable fact is hinted at from 1.2 
and as such suggests that we are reading a tragedy. Things are such that it is not 
possible to ascertain the how and why of their nature (1. 9-10, 15 [cf. 7.13]; 
9.11-12).30 So far I have described the passive nature of the Power, but what of 
30 This has been recognized by others as a key feature of Qoheleth's thought. Stephen 
Schloesser has put a fine twist on this notion. He argues that Qoheleth turned the 
traditional notion of wisdom as graspable and of sages themselves as having unsearchable 
minds (epitomized by Provo 25.2-3) on its head to mean the oppOsite: For while it was 
the glory of kings to search things (words?) out (presumably with the help of God who 
knew the way), with Qoheleth it was the nature of things (and words?) themselves which 
was unsearchable, and the minds of kings (i.e. Solomon) themselves subjected to failure 
9. Qohe/eth's Quest 257 
the active? Who or what is responsible for this immovable structuration? 
There can be no question that it is God who lies behind the Power. 
Simply put, God is the enabler of human experience; the fate of everyone is in 
his power. Now fate is part of the Object in that it is the end/use/purpose of, for 
example, wisdom and toil (activity) that Qoheleth wants to understand: in the 
end, where does it take you and leave you? It is in this sense that God is the 
Power since Qoheleth cannot understand just how God influences what happens 
on the earth. "Just as you do not understand the way of the life-breath in the 
formation of bones in the womb, so too you do not understand the activity of 
God who does everything" (11.5), whose influence is everywhere and who 
determines the end of us all. Qoheleth even goes on to implicate God in his 
design of the world as by nature inscrutable (3.11; 7.13; 8.17; cf. 9.10). 
Bewilderingly, God has made the world such in order that people will fail to 
understand it: "God has set eternity in their hearts so that ['tl1M ''=':10; cf. Jer. 
2.15] humanity cannot discover the activity that God has done from beginning to 
end" (3.11b; cf. 6.12; 7.14; 8.17; 9.12; 10.14).31 God's role in establishing the 
way things are is essentially negative: "it is an evil business God has given to 
human beings to be busy with" (1.13b; cf. 6.1; 8.6). Yet God has also made it 
this way so that people will fear his presence (3.14; cf. 8.12-13) and (as we shall 
later see) he also empowers people to enjoy life. This duality further reflects the 
success of the Power in keeping the Subject from the Object, understanding. 
Taken altogether, the actants can be represented as follows: 
("'A King is Held Captive in her Tresses''', pp. 205-28, esp. pp. 210-11). He further 
comments that the Proverbial search for the meaning of words is precisely "the classical 
search which third-century philosophy in general [like Qoheleth?] abandoned out of 
'weariness'" (p. 223 n. 21). 
31 Humanity's experience mirrors Qoheleth's quest in that they too are unable to 
discover what God has done and their own fate. Indeed, humanity in this case may well 
come close to Bars notion of a competing anti-Subject. And yet Qoheleth belongs to 
humanity and therefore the Subject and anti-Subject will both fail in their quest. 
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~ He/per -__ 
~ (wisdom [?], observation) -- -- ____ _ 
Subject 
(Qoheleth) 
------~) Power 
~e structure of the world) 
Object 
(understanding! 
knowledge) 
Opponent 
(failed wisdom) 
figure 6. 
Qoheleth presents actantial analysis with a not uncommon situation in that 
the Subject and Object are confounded.32 This confounding, however, confirms 
the relevance of another of Qoheleth's narrative strategies to the quest: 
autobiography. As we have seen, Qoheleth is introspective. The autobiographical 
form shows that he is anxious to see his own identity somehow established in a 
world where everything else is in flux. The discussion of W.K.C. Guthrie about 
the conclusion of Heraclitus, "I searched out myself", sheds an interesting light 
on the matter: 
The verb has two main meanings: (1) to look for ... (2) to question, 
inquire of somebody, find out ... Thus by the two [Greek] words of fro 
101 Heraclitus meant, I suggest ... "I turned my thoughts within and 
sought to discover my real self ... to discover the real meaning of my self-
hood; for I knew that if I understood my self I would have understood the 
logos which is the real constitution of everything else as well. ,,33 
And by this, continues J. Olney, Heraclitus "anticipated the entire history of 
autobiographical literature" . "You could not discover the limits of the self", said 
Heraclitus (frag. 45), "even by travelling along every path: so deep a logos does 
it have. ,,34 Was such the subtext of Qoheleth's search? By travelling <17M, ~'flI, 
acI', "n etc.) along every path (1", ~,~o etc.) was Qoheleth attempting to 
32 There also occurs the ironic confounding of Object and Power: the Object of 
Qoheleth's attempt at understanding is largely (the activity of) the Power itself, God. 
33 As cited in Olney, Metaphors of the Self, p. 7. 
34 Metaphors of the Self, p. 7 (the translation is Olney's own adaptation from 
standard translations). 
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know the limits of his own self?35 Like Heraclitus, however, Qoheleth was not 
able to discover those limits since their logos (reason/end/ use/purpose) had been 
set too deeply. Qoheleth described that position as '':IT'l and traced its logos to the 
inscrutable Power, God. 
4. Gustave Flaubert's Bouvard et Pecuchet: A Comparison 
NATURE: How beautiful Nature is! Say this every time you are in the 
country. 
-Flaubert, "The Dictionary of Received Ideas" 
Qoheleth's tale has been compared to other stories before. 36 One of the most 
interesting comparisons I have come across is from a Literature Ph.D. thesis by 
Deborah Pierce, a third of which is about Flaubert's Bouvard et Pecuchet. 37 
Flaubert's novel depicts the experiences of two copyists living in Paris who 
become inseparable friends, one of whom inherits a substantial fortune. In love 
with the idea of an idyllic country life, they set out to live "off the land" on a 
farm in the town of Chavignolles, Normandy, in 1841. The novel follows their 
attempts at learning to achieve wealth and success through the aid of knowledge, 
particularly, if not solely, from books. When they cannot understand the way the 
world is working, they tum to books of every kind under the sun. Such was the 
story's encyclopedic range that Flaubert is said to have consulted over 1500 
35 Fisch agrees that this is the subtext of Qoheleth's search ("Qohelet: A Hebrew 
Ironist", pp. 158-59). 
36 See, for example, L. Kreitzer, who compares particularly the themes of birth/death 
and life/loss in Ecclesiastes to Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms, in chapter 5, "A 
Farewell to Arms: 'A Time to Give Birth and a Time to Die"', in idem, The Old 
Testament in Fiction and Film: On Reversing the Hermeneutical Flow (TBS, 24; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994). Also, see my introductory remarks at 
Chapter 1.3. 
37 D. L. T. Pierce, chapter 3, "Bouvard et Pecuchet: The Gatherers of Wisdom", in 
idem, "Echoes of the Past in Flaubert's 'L 'Education Sentimentale', 'Bouvard et 
Pecuchet' and 'Salambo'" (Ph.D. Dissertation; Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1992). 
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volumes in its writing, taking "assiduous" notes on each, even causing his eye-
sight to go bad. 38 Flaubert spent 16-18 years writing the novel in the late 1860s 
and 70s up until his death in 1880, but never completed it, leaving us instead 
with an enticing plan, written in point form, of the ftnal, incomplete tenth 
chapter. 39 While it is unlikely that Flaubert drew directly from Ecclesiastes for 
his inspiration, he was aware of the book, stating40 in the novel that 
our two worthy men, after all their disappointments, felt the need to be 
simple, to love something, to find peace of mind. They tried Ecclesiastes, 
Isaiah, Jeremiah. But the Bible frightened them with its prophets roaring 
like lions, the thunder crashing in the clouds, all the weeping in Gehenna, 
and its God scattering empires as the wind scatters clouds.41 
(It is difftcult to say whether such a likening of these works was a satirical 
remark on Bouvard and Pecuchet's shallow rejection of things they disliked or a 
reflection of Flaubert's own [lack of?] understanding of them.) 
Pierce devotes much of her discussion of the novel to a comparison with 
Ecclesiastes. She begins the comparison with the following remarks: 
... upon examining the two works it can be concluded that the import of 
Bouvard et Pecuchet is comprehended in a verse from Ecclesiastes which 
Flaubert might well have used as an epigraph: "And I applied my mind to 
seek and to search out by wisdom all that is done under the heavens; it is 
an unhappy business that God has given to the sons of men to be busy 
with [1.13]. ,,42 
One soon discovers that the Object of their quest, of that application of mind that 
Bouvard and Pecuchet share with Qoheleth, is to better know how to live; to 
38 So Pierce, "Echoes of the Past", pp. 101,104. See the "Introduction" by A.J. 
Krailsheimer, in Bouvard et Pecuchet (trans. A.J. Krailsheimer; London: Penguin Books, 
1976 [1881]), p. 9. 
39 A second volume which was to consist of large collections of quotes which 
reflected concurrent uncritical "received ideas" (which Flaubert despised) was to follow; 
there is a translated (at times hilarious) version of this available: "The Dictionary of 
Received Ideas", in Bouvard et Pecuchet, pp. 291-330. 
40 For convenience I will speak of "Flaubert" and the narrator of the story 
interchangeably. 
41 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 223. 
42 Pierce, "Echoes of the Past", p. 77 (italics Pierce's). 
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understand how things work; and to know what, exactly, is beautiful. The 
Object, as with Qoheleth, is understanding. As Pierce states, "Flaubert sets his 
protagonists ... to skim the surface of the world's knowledge ... they search for a 
truth, an unmediated knowledge that will allow them to answer life's 
questions. ,,43 Embedded in that search is a need for security. After learning of 
some convincing arguments against the faith of his new-found spiritualism, we 
learn of Pecuchet that, "His need for truth became a raging thirst ... 'Oh! Doubt! 
Doubt! I should rather have nothing at all. ",44 Desire often overcomes the pair, 
leading them to pursue their Object with unbridled fervour and display ambitions 
to control their environment and to gain answers (as Qoheleth perhaps naIvely 
began) that would explain things simply. 45 
Although they do not specifically enlist the help of, for example, wisdom 
or the powers of observation, Bouvard and Pecuchet rely constantly on their own 
grasp of the situation, their own grasp of what they have read, their own memory 
of some principle that they read about-and they are inevitably let down. They 
cannot grasp the nettle because they fail to understand the significance and true 
meaning of what they read. Even when they understand one author they are 
confounded by the fact that another disagrees (such was probably part of 
Flaubert's stratagem in undermining the value of "received ideas"). Although 
they are left in the dark as to the reasons for their failure, readers are left in no 
doubt. They are ignorant, even stupid. Typical is the description of their initial 
43 "Echoes of the Past", pp. 78, 80. Pierce also terms this aspect in both stories a 
"flirtation with the limitless" (p. 85). Compare the narrator's comment at the time when 
the two of them decide to give up the study of history: "But they had acquired a taste for 
history, a need for truth in itself" (Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 121). 
44 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 210-11. 
45 There are many examples of this. In fact, most of the chapters conclude with a 
failure on one subject and a burning desire to conquer the next. As for their desire for 
control, take, for example, Flaubert's description of their grandiose thoughts on 
discovering magic: "What takes centuries could be developed in a moment, any miracle 
would be practicable and the universe would be at our disposal" (Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 
197). 
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wonder at the possibilities of all that could be learned: "As they admired some 
old piece of furniture they felt sorry that they had not lived in the period that it 
was used, though they knew absolutely nothing about the period in question ... 
Worles whose titles they could not understand seemed to contain some 
mystery. ,,46 Even without their knowing it, true knowledge keeps at a distance 
and keeps things mysterious. There is a sense, therefore, in which their perceived 
Helper, knowledge, turns into (unperceived?) Opponent. 
Underlying their search is the admittance that they cannot understand what 
they seek. It is an admittance concealed in the guise of questions, such as the 
following from Pecuchet: "Where is the rule then, and what hope can we have of 
success or profit?"47 Like Qoheleth's, their questions are sadly rhetorical. And 
here lies the Power: the inaccessibility of understanding. Most importantly, they 
cannot understand the divorce between deed and consequence which they 
continually experience. They follow the rules but they are in tum deceived: 
When they were capable of utterance, they asked themselves the cause of 
so many misfortunes ... It was all beyond their comprehension, except that 
they had nearly died [after a fiasco in their chemistry "lab"] ... 
And, still early on in the story, they critically misjudge the cause: 
... Pecuchet concluded with these words: 'Perhaps it is because we don't 
know any chemistry!' ,,48 
But as they continue their search they start to formulate a cause. They eventually 
abandon chemistry, linking their failure to the "crookedness" of the created 
order: "Creation is put together in such an elusive and transitory fashion; we 
should do better to take up something else! ,,49 Later on, and more critically, 
46 Bouvard et Pecuchet, pp. 28-29. Compare the following passage: "If they did not 
know where they stood with ceramics and Celticism it was because they were ignorant of 
history, especially the history of France" (p. 118). 
47 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 56. 
48 Bouvard et Pecuchet, pp. 67-68. 
49 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 99. 
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they make a link which I believe constitutes a key passage for the overall plan of 
the book. Discussing myths, their conversation runs as follows: 
"How can you admit", Bouvard objected, "that fables are truer than the 
truths of historians?" Pecuchet tried to explain myths, and lost himself in 
the Scienzia Nuova. "Are you trying to deny the plan of Providence?" 
[asked Pecuchet] "I don't know it", said Bouvard. so 
And here lies the source of the Power which refuses them the attainment of the 
Object: God has made creation and "the plan of Providence" inscrutable. 
Qoheleth's story shares many qualities with Flaubert's, and some of the 
suggested reasons behind Flaubert's overall cynical outlook may make us wonder 
about the impetus behind Qoheleth's outlook. For example, it is commonly held 
that Bouvard et Pecuchet is a stinging satire on the concurrent tendency to take 
the published word as gospel truth. It is thought that the satire was aimed in 
particular at the concurrent idealistic project of Diderot to create an inexhaustible 
and authoritative compendium of knowledge, L 'Encyclopedie. 51 This raises the 
question of whether Qoheleth's story may have had some social satire in it. 
Perhaps since Qoheleth's character is set in fantastic circumstance, and the things 
he says are often hyperbolic, this is not too far-stretched an idea. Perhaps 
Qoheleth is himself a ruse of sorts to make a stinging satire out of those who 
"seek for what is too hard" (Sir. 3.21). I am, however, not sure that I believe 
this (it depends on circumstances that are unknown; with Flaubert we have many 
advantages in, for example, knowing who the author is). But in that we may 
account for Bouvard and Pecuchet's folly by such a theory we may be open to 
see an element of satire in Qoheleth's. In fact, the implied circumstance may not 
even be necessary in that the older Qoheleth provides the necessary sobriety that 
the image of the cynical Flaubert provides for the satirical theory of his novel's 
composition. Indeed, as there is sympathy from Flaubert for his fumbling 
50 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 123. 
51 Pierce, "Echoes of the Past", p. 81. 
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protagonists, there is sympathy from Qoheleth for his misapprehending younger 
self. It is the balance of sympathy against indifference (and mockery), however, 
that raises another question. 
Bouvard and Pecuchet's failures are plainly stated. They attempt to grow 
orchards and the trees end up dead for being poorly placed. They attempt to 
make preserves and the fruit rots for improper sealing. Usually their failure is 
due to a lack of implied common sense,52 but at all times they are up against 
insurmountable odds and there is nothing to help them. As a result they become 
islands to themselves and reject the community around them and attempts at 
friendship. Failure, for Bouvard and Pecuchet, leads to despair. Flaubert in his 
depiction of failure offers little sympathy for the two stumbling protagonists. 
Indeed, they are often regarded as a source of humour at their own expense. 
Sarcasm abounds. Flaubert describes their blowing up the chemistry lab as "a 
noise like a shell bursting" and how afterwards a servant "found a spatula in the 
yard".53 We learn that during their attempt in their "lab" to concoct the ultimate 
cream for baking, "Pecuchet mumbled calculations, motionless in his long 
blouse, a sort of child's smock with sleeves; and they considered themselves to 
be very serious men, doing a useful job. ,,54 Also, there is an implied 
condemnation from Flaubert in that Bouvard and Pecuchet are usually depicted as 
learning only in a cursory manner, and in a way to suggest that had they 
restricted their learning to one area and realized their limitations (as opposed to 
flirting with the limitless) they would have known success. It would be unfair, 
however, as A.J. Krailsheimer rightly suggests, to think that Flaubert simply 
52 Flaubert even depicts them attempting to understand the idea of "common sense" 
and then making a mess of it (Bouvard et Pecuchet, pp. 208-209). 
53 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 67. Perhaps the most amusing episode is that of Bouvard 
attempting to manipulate his body heat by wriggling his pelvis about in the bathtub for 
three hours, on the notion that "Some scientists maintain that animal heat is developed by 
muscular contractions ... " (pp. 74-76 [75]). 
54 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 66. 
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used these characters as "mere butts for [his] sarcasm and satire" .55 Flaubert 
often shows sympathy with their plight in striking fashion. He describes their 
emotions with a seemingly empathetic passion. When the local doctor mocks their 
attempts at medicine, we read that he "deeply wounded them" .56 When Bouvard 
imagines a loving child, realizing that he will never have one, we read that "the 
good fellow wept". 57 When they are devastated by the destruction of their crops 
by fIre we read that "Bouvard cried softly as he looked at the fire. His eyes 
disappeared beneath the swollen lids and his whole face seemed as if it were 
puffed out with grief. ,,58 There is even at times, in the characters' unmasking of 
the contradictions of books that they read, an implied respect for their however 
limited critical capacities. 
And here lies a curious likeness to Ecclesiastes. The older Qoheleth often 
implies condemnation of the younger. That is, by instructing the reader to enjoy 
life and not be vexed by the pain of observation, he castigates his former self. 
There may even be hints of mockery in the farce-like descriptions of his 
Solomonic experience ("I got myself male and female singers, and the delights of 
the sons of humanity: concubines and concubines!", 2.8b). At the same time (for 
he speaks only from one "later" narrative stance), however, he often identifies 
positively with the folly of the younger. That is, in lamenting he pities; in 
describing with poetry the grief that comes from the weight of absurdity he draws 
us to pity those who experience it with such hardship and endurance, as he once 
did. There are even hints, in his advice to the young and in his final poem 
especially, of melancholic longing, as if he somehow missed the vigour and 
adventure of youth. Such a balance raises questions (with whom do we 
sympathize? and why?) and our conception of it determines to an extent what we 
SS "Introduction", Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 15. 
S6 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 73. 
S7 Bou'vard et Pecuchet, p. 270. 
S8 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 51. 
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will take the overall meaning of the book to be. 
There are other likenesses among the two works that are worth noting. 1) 
"Both Ecclesiastes and Bouvard et Pecuchet", states Pierce, "return the 
protagonists, after a series of repetitious searches, to their starting point. ,,59 
There is a cyclical and perhaps pointless facet to the odyssey of Bouvard and 
Pecuchet in that there is no real progression in their quest, only "fixity and 
death".60 Also, they both literally return to their beginning. In the notes for the 
plan of the projected final chapter they return to Paris and again become copyists. 
Flaubert's last words in these point by point notes are, "They go to work." 
2) Like Qoheleth, searching led to frustration, even illness. Again and 
again the protagonists return to start their insatiable quest from nothing, having 
lost and been (sometimes physically) hurt in the process. "He was disturbed by 
doubts", we learn of Pecuchet, "... He wanted to reconcile doctrines with works, 
critics with poets, grasp the essence of the Beautiful; and these questions 
exercised him so much that his liver was upset. As a result he got jaundice. ,,61 
3) Flaubert's (anti?) heroes, in the occasional moment of graceful clarity, 
saw the divorce between deed and consequence clearly and painfully. When they 
contemplated suicide, they "tried to imagine [death] in the form of intense 
darkness ... anything was better than this monotonous, absurd, hopeless 
existence. ,,62 After realizing that folly truly disturbed them, they thought about, 
among other things, "the things people said in their village ... [and] they felt as if 
the heaviness of the entire earth were weighing down on them".63 
Obviously, there are a great number of texts that deal with universal 
59 Pierce, "Echoes of the Past", p. 81. 
60 Pierce, "Echoes of the Past", p. 83. 
61 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 145. 
62 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 219. 
63 Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 217. Krailsheirner suggests that this text is key to 
understanding the "overall plan" of the book ("Introduction", p. 13). 
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themes such as those I have touched on in this comparison, and the selection of 
texts for comparison is arguably arbitrary. Comparison, however, like laughter, 
enables us to hold objects to another light in order to see them in relation to 
something else, something which may be culturally closer to us. It has offered, in 
this case, a distinctly modem gauge by which to measure Qoheleth's story against 
itself (and has also thereby demonstrated the timelessness of Qoheleth's story-not 
presuming, however, that such a demonstration were necessary). And perhaps it 
has been beneficial to look at another book whose "ambiguities can never be 
resolved because they are part of the irony inseparable from any praise of 
folly" .64 
5. Redemption and Remembrance 
[An] attempt at remembering .. .is at the same time searching for a hidden 
treasure, for a last delivering word, redeeming in the final appeal a 
destiny that doubted its own value ... [the autobiographer] brings 
[reconciliation] about in the very act of reassembling the scattered 
elements of a destiny that seems ... to have been worth the trouble of 
living. 
-G. GusdorfS 
We live in memory and by memory, and our spiritual life is at bottom 
simply the effort of our memory to persist, to transform itself into 
hope .. .into our future 
-Miguel de Unamuno66 
I have already mentioned the fact that Qoheleth gradually moves from quest to 
expression-from ignorance to search, to knowledge, to the dictum that 
knowledge is absurd. There is another subtle shift. Most of the texts that directly 
express the quest occur in the first seven chapters. In the latter part of the book, 
however, Qoheleth speaks less of the story of his youth and more of his 
64 Krailsheimer, "Introduction", Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 16. 
65 "Conditions and Limits of Autobiography", p. 39. 
66 As cited in Kerby, Narrative and the Self, p. 21. 
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"present" concern. He addresses the reader with a certainty that betrays the style 
of questioning that I sketched out above, and that certainty has mostly to do with 
the fact that he admits his failures and his inability to know41e is certain that he 
is ignorant. In fact, he is adamant about his ignorance. For he understood (',') 
that he failed to understand wisdom and folly (1.17; passim). (At least in this 
regard he is, like a good postmodernist, content without closure.) That hard-won 
ignorance forms the basis of his strategy in the latter half of the book: the 
imparting of advice to the addressee. 
Qoheleth's advice does not simply arrive out of the blue, however. He 
explicitly links it to his narrated experience. At 7.13, for example, he asks the 
reader to "consider the work of God", and to conclude with him that what God 
has made crooked cannot be made straight. The sequential reader will remember 
that in 1.13-15 Qoheleth did precisely the same. He observed and considered 
what God had given humanity to be busy with as well as all the deeds that are 
done under the sun, and then concluded that "What is crooked cannot be made 
straight, and what is lacking cannot be counted" (1.15). He continues by giving 
the reader a reason to consider his own conclusions: "I observed everything in 
the days of my absurdity [in the days of my youth?]" (7. 15a). That is, this advice 
is based on the extreme circumstances of his youth when he observed all of the 
travesties and absurdities of "justice" (7.15b; cf. 3.16-17).67 In fact, all of his 
later words of advice are by necessity rermed in the ftre of the memorable 
experiences of his youth. Overall, the shift is from radical experience to 
knowledge (although not of a kind that he initially sought). 
The importance of advice and Qoheleth's attempt to crystallize it are 
reflected in the gradual change in narratorial voice-from the density of ftrst-
67 Even when advice is given on its own it is linked to experience. Passages such as 
8.3-5 have Qoheleth's Solomonic experience as their foundation. And 8.16; 9.1; 10.5 are 
clear examples of Qoheleth establishing an experiential basis for the observations and 
advice that follow. 
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person (ch. 2) to the density of second-person narration (ch. 11). The following 
graph shows this striking shift in relation to the first-person form. 68 
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The graph demonstrates well the shift from experience to advice and an overall 
strategy in which the reader becomes more and more a part of the narrated text, 
for readers can and do include themselves in the audience that Qoheleth 
addresses. Allow me to elaborate this point. 
68 In various instances the second person is indicated by the pronominal suffix ('9), 
imperative verb forms (e.g. n"tO at 11 .1), indirect speech (e.g. '~Mn 'tOM at 12.1 which 
governs the remainder of that poem). In the graph I have omitted the second-person verb 
r1tvl'n at 8.4 which is indirect speech at a level removed from Qoheleth's narration 
("Who may say to him [the king], 'What are you doing [i1tv17n]?''') and also the two 
instances of second-person as addressed to "the land" at 10.16-17. For the fonnula used 
for calculating the graph, see p. 35 n. 72. 
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The narratee is the character who is addressed in the "space" of the text 
itself. At the outer level of the frame this is the frame narrator's son. At the 
inner level of Qoheleth's narration-in which readers are more involved, since the 
frame causes amnesia-this is unknown, for Qoheleth never addresses anyone by 
name or title. However, we can construct from "hearing one side of the 
conversation", so to speak, that the person Qoheleth addresses worships at the 
temple or local "synagogue" (5.1-5), is a man (11.9), may have a wife (or 
"woman") whom he loves (9.9), is young (9.10; 11.9), has servants (7.21), may 
be a court sage by profession (8.3-5; 10.4, 20) and is probably inquisitive by 
nature (7 .16b; 11. 5). This is not so much a narratee as an "ideal", implied 
reader. That is, this addressee is able to relate perfectly to all that Qoheleth says 
on matters that he too is familiar with. In him Qoheleth would find solace, 
understanding and a solid drinking partner at the local watering hole. But this 
person does not exist anymore than Qoheleth does. Any reader can, however, 
take the place of this implied reader and, as it were, befriend the lonely 
Qoheleth. And this is made all the easier by the element of second-person 
narration, which, although the narratee has the above qualities, still does not 
provide a name. A name would have meant a barrier in this regard and its 
absence suggests that Qoheleth desired a wide audience to identify as much as 
possible with this narrated construct. 
There is another element that enables this reading activity. As W.P. 
Brown states, "underlying Qoheleth's reflections is an explicit awareness that the 
formation of personal character is a primary goal of wisdom" . 69 This includes 
the formation not only of his own character (which is dealt with by the story 
proper of the quest) but also, and primarily, the character of the narratee to 
whom is addressed his advice. Here is where readers can participate, as it were, 
69 Forthcoming study on characterization in the wisdom literature. 
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in the narrative world, for they are free to suspend disbelief and sense this 
concern for character formation (which is in Qoheleth's case very appealing since 
it ultimately concerns, as we shall see, living with/in joy), and in tum test the 
conditions that Qoheleth lays down for it. 
The shift in voice further underscores Qoheleth's "then" and "now" 
narrative stances established by first-person narration. But bringing the 
relationship between these stances into sharper focus also raises questions. 
Whereas we are able to comprehend much of the "then" narration of his 
youth-his circumstance, his desires, his failures and so on-we know little if 
anything about the time of his narration, the "now". He is, in whatever sense, no 
longer a king and he is older. But what are the influences on Qoheleth as he 
speaks in the "now" dimension? What did he (or "does he", as a character) feel 
as he narrated? One can speculate that the stance is largely influenced by the act 
of remembering, for the implied experience involved in re-telling his memories is 
necessarily emotional. Memories are by nature emotive and evoke emotions 
ranging from shame to euphoria. Indeed, if memories did not evoke some kind of 
feeling they would perhaps not be memories at all, for they would not be capable 
of being recollected. They would not be marked with an emotional tag by which 
they could be drawn from the subconscious mind. 
But Qoheleth's "now" emotions are not shown to readers. He relates his 
past, so to speak, expressionlessly. Yet when Qoheleth states that "I hated life" 
(2.17-18), is he only referring to his younger disposition? How do we deal with 
this as a story? Does he still hate life while he recounts his tale? When he states 
that he "turned to despair" his heart (2.20), is he only referring to his lamentable 
past? Or does he "still" despair? I do not think that he does. For, as I stated 
above, the narrated story redeems Qoheleth's earlier pessimism and despair by 
virtue of its being set in the past. This is the transforming power of 
autobiography. And by this we are brought back to the competing themes of 
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success and failure discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Without a doubt 
Qoheleth has failed in the act of his quest, but his success lies in the telling of his 
story. Further, by resolving himself to the fact that part of the wisdom of his old 
age was that he had learned the criteria of the deeper meaning he sought, he 
redeems the failure of his youth. Since the "now" can only emerge from the 
"brooding consciousness" of the "then", the "now" is necessarily refined by the 
fire of the "then". If readers lose their grasp of this narrative structure they 
become in danger of getting lost in the "then" of Qoheleth's most pessimistic 
reflection. Indeed, when Qoheleth breaks out with joy it is almost exclusively 
when he narrates in a "now" to the "reader" (see below). 
One emphasis of Qoheleth's "now" advice is on the practical behaviour of 
the "reader", and this effects changes in regard to the actors and elements of the 
actantial model as it applies to his quest. The new Subject is the ideal/implied 
reader (with which real readers might identify) in that, in Qoheleth's story, it has 
the role of seeking understanding and respectively failing (humanity and Qoheleth 
fail), but also of seeking God's enablement for a joyful life. The new Object of 
the new Subject, instead of understanding, which brings only grief, is practical 
living and enjoyment of life. Wisdom can now be a true Helper, without deceit. 
Whereas wisdom failed Qoheleth in the purpose for which he applied it, it will 
function adequately for the reader's purpose. This is not in the deeper sense of 
"becoming wise" but in the practical sense of effectively "getting by". In fact, 
Qoheleth has nothing bad to say about such wisdom, generally speaking (see 
above, p. 255). This helps us to make sense of those passages where Qoheleth 
praises wisdom and its effects, for on the whole they are addressed to the reader, 
the new Subject. The Opponent will only be its opposite, folly. 
As early as 3.22 Qoheleth prepares the way for this shift in the actantial 
model: "So I observed that there is nothing better than that humanity should 
rejoice in their deeds. Indeed, that is their portion; for who will bring them to 
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see what will be after them?" No one can bring them to see or understand the 
future-their fate--even as it unfolds, but at least they have another, more feasible 
Object: their portion of joy. Further, they ("humanity", addressee and reader) 
should not attempt to "become truly wise" (7.16; cf. 2.15; 7.23-24), for that was 
Qoheleth's Object and he failed to obtain it. Although they fail in Qoheleth's 
model (they cannot discover) they may at least rejoice in their deeds and thereby 
succeed at another level. 
It is important to note (in relation to the "new" model) that Qoheleth's 
advice is neither naive nor uncritical. That is, Qoheleth does not set the reader up 
for failure in the ways that he failed. The advice that he offers is no more a "sure 
thing" than his own enterprise. Indeed, he cites the practical outcome of wisdom 
for the addressee (11.3) alongside the absurd experience of it (11.4-5). He also 
states that wisdom is generally an advantage (7.11-12, 19; 9.16-10.1), but that 
fate will not be influenced or changed by it or by anything else under the sun 
(9.2, 11-12; 10.8-11; passim). This is precisely why the wise have no ultimate 
advantage over fools (6.8). Furthermore, in texts where Qoheleth suggests that 
God will empower people to enjoy what they have (esp. 2.25-26; 5.18-19; 6.2), 
joy is not imparted conditionally but is solely a gift of God, the recipient of 
which is determined by the giver (and there is "nothing better" than when this 
gift of God is given; 2.24; 3.12-13; cf. 3.22). It is in these texts that the Power 
of the new model is established. Whether people can enjoy all of the riches and 
goods God gives them depends on whether or not he chooses further to empower 
them to do so. At 2.25 Qoheleth asks, "Who can eat/enjoy ('!)M') apart from 
him?,,70 For it is only to those with whom he is pleased that be gives wisdom 
(but what kind?), knowledge and joy. But to the sinner God gives more toil, and 
70 That is, God, following the majority of conunentaries and LXX in the emendation 
of MT'S 'lOO to 'UOO. The previous verse quite blatantly sets the context for such a 
reading by stating that there is "nothing better" than to eat, drink and take pleasure in 
toil, for "this is from the hand of God" (M", C""M" "0 '!). 
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the fruit of that toil to the one who pleases God (2.26). (Note that for Qoheleth, a 
sinner [part. of "toM] is not necessarily one who offends God but is one with 
whom God is displeased for whatever reason71--the integrity of God's choice as 
the Power thereby remains intact.) Qoheleth does not appear to approve of this 
situation, for he goes on to say in the same verse that this was absurd and a 
pursuit of wind, but his doctrine (or rather, formulation as the result of empirical 
observation) is clear. It becomes even more clear in the small but weighty 
discrepancy observed between 5.19 and 6.2. In both verses there is a common 
figure: a man to whom God has given riches, wealth and (in 6.2) honour. But in 
5.19 God enables that man to enjoy it (~~~ ,!:)", to"'WM) whereas in 6.2 God 
does not enable that man to enjoy it ('~~~ ,!:)", C!"M'"M '~to"'rD""'""). 
Instead, a stranger enjoys it-not a sage or a fool, not a righteous person or a 
sinner, but a stranger ("'!:)~). No reason is given for the difference in God's 
choice (although note that Qoheleth clearly disapproves of the latter case which is 
an evil [6.1], while the former case is good [5.18]). As in Qoheleth's model, the 
reason for the will of the Power is vexatiously inscrutable. 
Other "joy" texts, however, put the responsibility for joy squarely on the 
"reader": 
Go! Eat your bread with joy, 
and drink your wine with a glad heart; 
For God has already approved your deeds. 
At all times let your garments be white, 
and let oil not be lacking on your head. 
Enjoy life with a woman whom you love, all the days of your absurd life 
that he has given you under the sun-all your absurd days; for this is your 
portion in life, and in the toil at which you toil. 
71 Qoheleth uses the participle in two senses. The other sense is found at 7.10 where 
Qoheleth states that there is no one righteous who does good and does not sin (cf. 8.12). 
With such a moral sense it is not possible to place the sinner and the one who pleases 
God as opposites since the latter does not exist. The sense found in 2.26 is also found in 
7.26 where the "sinner" is again contrasted to the one who pleases God. In the end the 
fate of the moral sinner and the one who "does good" (albeit imperfectly) are ultimately 
the same: death (9.1; cf. 2.16). 
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All that your hand finds to do, do with your strength; for there is no 
activity, or reasoning, or knowledge, or wisdom in Sheol where you are 
going. (9.7-10) 
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God has perhaps ultimately provided the ability to work and to enjoy (he is still 
the beginning and end of the individual's self and identity), but he is, as it were, 
one step removed. This is a human plane of activity, for God has already 
approved your deeds-the command is already given. And in the end God will 
judge you, as the rabbis I believe rightly understood, not concerning what you 
have discovered or attained, not concerning what enablement he has bestowed on 
you to enjoy life, but concerning the doing of these things: 
Rejoice, 0 young man, in your youth. 
And let your heart gladden you in the days of your youth. 
And walk in the ways of your heart, 
and in the sight of your eyes. 
And know for certain that concerning all of these things 
God will bring you into judgment. (11.9) 
Here the joy is human but the imperative is divine. There is a clear divide 
between what the reader/recipient of Qoheleth's advice is able to do and enabled 
to do. It is not that God should be forgotten,72 or that enjoyment means amoral 
behaviour, but that God has given a heart that is already capable of rejoicing and 
that the activities of everyday life (eating, drinking, dressing, lovemaking) are all 
able to be infused with joy. 
There are, then, two distinct strains of joy texts. In one God chooses (as 
the Power) to enable or not to enable enjoyment. In the other, joy is accessible 
through the help of wisdom in daily life and the responsibility for that joy is the 
reader's. Taken altogether the actants of the new model can be represented as 
follows: 
72 Indeed, quite the opposite is the case. Note that fearing God is key to Qoheleth's 
advice (3.14; 5.7; 7.18; 8.12-13) and that the most important injunction of all is to 
remember your creator (see below). 
9. Qoheleth's Quest 276 
~ He/per -- __ 
~ (wisdom/Qoheleth's advice) ..... -- -... __ __ 
------>-7' Power Subject 
(implied/real reader) (God/determination) 
~ Opponent 
(folly) 
figure 8. 
Object 
(joy/enjoyment 
of life) 
Qoheleth told the story of the failure to obtain his chosen Object, and in this 
respect the quest was, from the beginning, over. But from that juncture of failure 
Qoheleth relates what he has learned and points the reader to an obtainable 
Object. This is great autobiography in that by conveying the wisdom of a deeply-
lived life the folly of youth is redeemed. Although readers are still caught in his 
absurd predicament, day-to-day enjoyment and satisfaction is within their own 
grasp. Qoheleth's quest is therefore by no means the end of the story, for his 
prevailing concern is to show readers of his story how to live with the absurd. 
There is another kind of redemption present in Qoheleth's story, and it 
applies not only to his earlier narrated experience but also to the absurd condition 
in which he and the reader fmd themselves-that redemption is the act of 
remembering. Qoheleth makes clear that remembering is important (see Excursus 
2.4), and in the act of telling his story he has remembered what is presumably 
important to him. To re-member is to re-construct (Qoheleth has reconstructed a 
story-world from his experiences), and it is in this sense that Qoheleth redeems 
his-and the reader's--experience of the absurd; that is, by simply telling his 
story. For every story (particularly one which, like Qoheleth's, involves the 
strategy of recollection) is a making new and a creation of meaning when perhaps 
there was none to begin with. As Kierkegaard recognized, the whole process of 
recollecting redeems events that are absurd, cyclical or even meaningless, and 
creates meaning: 
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When the Greeks said that all knowing is recollecting, they said that all 
existence, which is, has been; when one says that life is a repetition, one 
says: actuality, which has been, now comes into existence. If one does not 
have the category of recollection or of repetition, all life dissolves into an 
empty, meaningless noise. 73 
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By recollecting, Qoheleth "made" his otherwise disjointed experience meaningful 
as a narrative, thereby transcending the cyclical and the absurd (which constitute 
the failed outcome of his quest). 
Making new in this way also means making something different from 
what it once was while maintaining continuity with the past. "Each time we relate 
a story", suggests Iudith Fishman, "it is both old and new: there are the events 
that we draw from our lives that we construct into a text and there is the 
new-our angle of vision, our selection, our memory ... our interpretation, our age, 
the moment of writing. ,,74 This brings us back to the sense of self in Qoheleth's 
story. The act of memory is intimately connected to self and identity since what 
we remember is uniquely our own, and through it we relate the way we see the 
world and interpret those events of our lives that are worthy of remembrance. 
This contributes to the fictional quality of Qoheleth' s story in that his is a 
reconstruction, for recollection is not the past "as it actually happened", but as 
we remember it. Narrated recollection cannot help but imaginatively refigure, 
interpret and imbue significance to the experience it recollects and to the "now" 
experience of the narrator. Indeed, as the philosopher and poet George Santayana 
realized, more than our empirical faculty, recollection involves the imagination. 
When I remember I do not look at my past experience, any more than 
when I think of a friend's misfortunes I look at his thoughts. I imagine 
them: or rather I imagine something of my own manufacture, as if I were 
writing a novel and I attribute this intuited experience to myself in the 
past, or to the other person. 75 
73 Fear and Trembling/Repetition, p. 149. 
74 "Enclosures: The Narrative within Autobiography", p. 29. 
75 Cited in Kerby, Narrative and the Self, p. 30. 
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Writing fiction and remembering are of the same cloth. Qoheleth's remembering 
is uniquely his own and as an act of remembrance and imagination, like any good 
story, easily engages our imaginations. 
Of course, Qoheleth's most poignant ode to the act of remembering is his 
final "set-piece" (Fisch's word), the poem of 12.1-7. I will not rehearse the 
history of its interpretation or discuss what it might refer to (there is plenty of 
this in the commentaries), for that would detract from the purpose at hand, which 
is to allow Qoheleth' s sense of poetic urgency and the importance of memory 
here to be felt. I therefore offer my own translation of a passage that, for what it 
is worth, is among my most treasured anywhere. 
Remember your creator in the days of your youth; 
Before the days of misery come and the years draw nigh, 
when you will say, "I have no delight in them"; 
Before the darkening of the sun and the light, 
and the moon and the stars; 
And the clouds return after the rain; 
In the day when the keepers of the house tremble, 
and the men of strength are bent over; 
And the women at the mill cease since they are few, 
and the ladies who gaze through the windows are darkened; 
And doors in the street are closed, 
and the sound of the mill is low; 
And the voice of the bird wanes, 
and all the daughters of song are brought low; 
When some fear heights, 
and terrors are in the road; 
And the almond tree blossoms, 
and the locust is heavy laden, 
and the caperberry buds; 
While humanity goes to their eternal home, 
and the mourners encompass the street; 
Before the silver cord is snapped, 
and the golden bowl is crushed; 
And a pitcher is broken at the spring, 
and the wheel is crushed in the pit; 
And the dust returns to the earth as it was, 
and the spirit returns to God who gave it. 
More than anything else this is poetry and demands reading as such. Ellul states 
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the case well when he writes that 
everyone reads this passage like an enigma from which we must find the 
allegorical meaning of each tenn ... I think the poem is too vast for this, 
and too "polysemous" ... It is first of all a poem! In other words, it is not 
at all a problem to solve ... First of all we must let the beauty of the text 
grip us, as we listen to it in silence, like music. We should let the poem 
strike our emotions first, and allow our sensitivity and imagination to 
speak before we try to analyze and "understand" it.76 
With this in mind I will relate my own reading. 
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I am reminded of images that grow dim, whether in the memory or before 
my eyes; of dreams and ideals that were once cherished and strong but have now 
diminished. I am reminded of the line of a folk song, "Don't our dreams die hard 
in the ashes of destiny?"77 By this I am reminded that everything fades to death. 
Indeed, as Qoheleth's reader I am reminded that everything eventually darkens, 
ceases, trembles, fears, closes and wanes in its own time. And yet I am lifted by 
other images: a bird sings, the seasonal fertility of spring continues (the locust is 
heavy laden) despite the ceasing of all that is under the sun. The closing images 
remind me of the break-down of an established society: the silver and golden 
furnishings eventually wear out, and the machinery by which we live (the pitcher, 
the wheel in the pit, all technology for living) becomes broken and will 
eventually be replaced, along with any meaning that that technology once held for 
its users. Finally, I am reminded of the end of everyone, and in the return to God 
I am left with hope. I am lifted for a moment from all the trappings of the 
absurd, perhaps above what is "under the sun" in Qoheleth's eyes, and yet I am 
brought back to the reality of Qoheleth's experience in a moment when I read, 
'''Absurdity of absurdities', said Qoheleth. 'Everything is absurd'" (12.8). That is 
my "felt" reading. 
76 Reasonjor Being, p. 285. 
77 Mark Heard, "Another Good Lie", from the album, Dry Bones Dance (Ideola 
Music, 1991). 
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Ellul goes on to convey his own sensitive reading which is worth citing, at 
least in part: 
As I read this poem .. .it calls to mind all declines, all breaches, closures, 
and endings. Not just the decline of an individual nearing death, not just 
human destiny, but everything: the end of any work which is no longer 
done, which disappears because no one is present to do it anymore ... the 
end of a village or community ... the end of a love replaced by fear; the 
end of an art, its works shattered, unless they die in our museums ... It is 
the song of the End.7s 
H. Fisch's sensitive reading is also worth citing: 
But there is something beyond death and vanity [in 12.1-7]. What counts 
is the life that is given us, the remembering, the testimony. Undercutting 
and contradicting the grave poetry of dying is the purposeful rhythm of 
living ... Before the days come when the sun, the light, the moon and the 
stars are darkened, we are to do our remembering, to remember 
beginnings and endings, to count our days. If we do well ... we shall 
perhaps be remembered in our tum, even after we are returned to dust 
and the golden bowl is shattered and all its fragile beauty, its fascination, 
its charm, its near-perfection have been seen as vanity. 79 
Fisch captures well the element of redemption in Qoheleth's closing words. 
Qoheleth has left behind the intellectual battle, the attempt to address our 
intellect, and has crafted words of beauty to remind us of the fragility of living 
and dying. Here is a redemption stunning in its depth and grace, brimming with 
the wonder of youth (for it places the reader "in" the opposite of old age and of a 
world that is only ceasing), yet the sadness of Qoheleth's "now" is present. The 
refrain, "before" the ceasing of everything, is the dominant idea and he cannot 
reverse the vexation of his own life, but he redeems for himself his experience of 
the loss of youth and the futility of his attempts to gain true understanding. Yet 
the understanding he demonstrates here is, as his flnal word, incomparably better, 
for it will not bring the curse of "~r1. And here lies his flnal redemption. By 
empathetically and elegantly prompting readers to remember (and re-membering 
78 Reason/or Being, pp. 285-86. 
79 "Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist", p. 178. 
9. Qoheleth's Quest 281 
itself is a form of redemption) their creator in the face of the end of everything 
(and this reminder unfolds after the import of living joyfully is related in 11.9), 
he enables "those who will hear" to live with the absurdity of dying. 
CONCLUSION 
Better the end of a thing than its beginning. 
-Qoheleth (Eccl. 7.8) 
In my own reading of secondary literature I have been struck by the disparity 
inherent in the co-existence of a general narrative understanding (as represented 
in the quotes in Chapter 1.1, for example) and the aversion to the application of 
narrative criticism for the purpose of analysis. Although scholars of Ecclesiastes 
like to imagine that Qoheleth's "brooding consciousness" is at its centre, clearly 
it is the emphasis on what Qoheleth said, and not how he said it, or for what 
reasons he said it in that way, that has been the predominant focus of Qoheleth-
studies. Why the dysfunctional enterprise? 
Perhaps the aversion to narrative approaches to Ecclesiastes lies in the 
relative mistrust of narratives as a contendable academic form of expression. As 
Judith Summerfield writes concerning American higher education, 
I suggest ... that we loosen what Jimmy Britton calls "the stranglehold that 
the expository essay has maintained over writing in American higher 
education". He notes, as well, that "if today's winds of change are any 
indication at all, narrative will be a candidate for a leading role among 
those forms of discourse that will replace the expository essay". 1 
That aversion quite possibly fortifies the reluctance to see in the works we study 
a narrative form, a reluctance to adopt a way of reading. In the case of 
Ecclesiastes, such a perspective has perhaps also been obscured by the clouds 
kicked up by those armies of redactors whom we, maybe too easily, imagine to 
have assaulted and maligned some Urtext of Qoheleth's tale. 
I have attempted to redress this interpretive imbalance by reading 
Ecclesiastes using the tools that narrative criticism has to offer. I have not 
I "Framing Narratives", p. 238. 
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categorically argued that Ecclesiastes can only be understood as narrative. Rather, 
this study has been an experiment in what happens when Ecclesiastes is 
investigated with confidence in its narrative quality. I have taken an idea and 
applied it to detennine its consequences, and in the process I have necessarily 
said some things which will appear to be extreme (especially since the narrative 
approach implies a rejection of other approaches as it involves seeing the text 
"one way", as a story). This in tum has left some questions open. While I have 
showed, for example, that Ecclesiastes can be read as narrative I must admit that 
the definition of narrative is constantly being expanded and is largely culturally 
dermed. That is, we call Bergman's Through a Glass Darkly and Beckett's 
Waiting for Godot stories, even though they do not operate with functional events 
in a time sequence of some kind (and if they do it is barely perceptible). But 
reading something as a narrative is a readerly decision. Readers can read 
Ecclesiastes as an unconnected collection of wisdom sayings, or they can just as 
easily read it with an awareness of its narrative quality and of the features of its 
story-line. 
Such a reading carries implications which can be compared to those raised 
by Solomonic readings. Readers after Martin Luther were "freed" to discuss 
critically authorship and the multi-layered attributes stemming from textual 
traditions. This in tum created all kinds of theoretical possibilities, some of 
which, in the manner of the documentary hypothesis, became Virtually doctrinal. 
As we have seen, the narrative method also creates distinct interpretive 
possibilities and makes good, as it were, the implied commitment to a narrative 
approach latent in so much of modem Qoheleth-studies. One is a construct of 
authorship that readers read with (Solomon as author), while the other is a 
construct of text that asks, What is its genre? What are its overall strategies of 
communication? In what way and on what levels does a story take place? 
Another "open question" is whether this approach has dealt satisfactorily 
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with non-narrative material in Ecclesiastes. I have not considered in-depth either 
the poetry sections or the blocks of wisdom sayings. We have seen, however, 
how portions of each of these have informed particularly narrative strategies (e.g. 
4.1-3; 7.23-29; 12.1-7). But there are two other considerations in my favour. The 
fIrst is that the poems can be seen as mirror-texts for the whole of Qoheleth's 
experience. The time poem (3.1-8), for example, has been seen by F. 
Zimmermann to reflect Qoheleth' slife experience-as a microcosm of the larger 
story.2 Also, all of the "non-narrative" material is in a narrative setting (see 
fIgures 1 and 4) and there are no "markers" to suggest that they should be 
considered to be outside of the story proper. The narrative integrity (of voice, 
person, stance and so on) throughout the whole is frrmly intact; indeed, it 
evidences stylistic strategies. Finally, Qoheleth's advice (much of which appears 
in the blocks of wisdom-sayings in chs. 7 and to), refmed in the fIre of his 
"earlier" experience, is spoken in the second person and functions largely to 
redeem the story/life of the protagonist, Qoheleth. 
In closing I would like to explain how I came to apply the narrative 
approach to Ecclesiastes. After one of my readings I conjectured that Ecclesiastes 
was a story. I was struck by the vitality of character that held the strings of 
observation together, the elements of time played on my mind and a good story 
emerged clearly from what was a sometimes murky reading experience. In fact, it 
felt more than a conjecture-it was as if I had understood the book on a whole 
new level. Therefore, this whole study arises and pays homage to a reading 
experience. This brings me to the role of the imagination in reading that I 
discussed in Chapter 9.5 and that I would like to describe briefly here. 
In my reading experience I can easily imagine Qoheleth telling his story, 
and can visualize a setting: a one-man play. For this is one context in which we 
2 See Inner World, pp. 44-49. Zimmermann argues that the narrativity of the poem 
reflects Qoheleth's "life-script". 
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may be told a story and allow the teller of the story to detract into maxims which 
convey the story's essence or "point(s)" . Such a setting also aids in the important 
realization that Qoheleth's story emanates from a person: that is, the narrative 
character that is more cohesive than what we have usually allowed for. When we 
read Proverbs we imagine the voice of wisdom, or perhaps for the more 
"educated" the voice of many redactors is heard (for some it may be the voice of 
God), but when we read Qoheleth it is the uni-voice of the cynic. Or is it the 
joyful optimist? Or is it the unique Hebrew intellectual? Whoever it is, it is 
Qoheleth the individual and it is his story that we hear. Of course, the frame 
narrator is the (Victorian?) stage itself, and Qoheleth sits in a rocking chair in a 
drafty room with a fireplace and many books on his shelves. Behind him flash the 
scenes of his youth while he tells his story: vineyards, kingdoms, oppressions of 
peoples, images of toiling, searching and of intermittent rest. Sometimes he gets 
up from his chair to speak directly to the audience, relating what is most 
important to take away. to remember. to know and to rejoice in. And this is 
where the real contribution of a narrative approach lies: the elucidation of that 
central figure who searches for relief from his absurd condition. 
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